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
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BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA

From an oil-painting by the Author

A E T E R N I T A S
A SPINOZISTIC STUDY

BY
H. F. HALLETT

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GENERAL PREFACE

THE following essay is essentially metaphysical: it is an attempt towards providing a corrective for the phenomenalism which, in one form or another, directly or inversely, prevails in our era. Though I am an Englishman, my belief in metaphysics as the source of genuine knowledge of the Real is naked and unashamed; but metaphysics must not be conceived as remote from the most fundamental interests of the spirit of man: the circle of human knowledge returns upon itself, and its most remote point is therefore to be found among our most intimate and deeply-felt concerns. Here as elsewhere it is incompleteness that gives the sense of distance; and similarly it is incompleteness in the form of an overweening phenomenalism that drives the human mind to the pictorial, and therefore inadequate, metaphysics of popular theology and superstition. To the negations of naturalism the spirit must oppose affirmations: if possible, adequate affirmations, but in any case affirmations. Thus where naturalism would confine human existence to the period between birth and death (and rightly, taking duration to be the sole meaning of existence), the spirit (equally rightly) demands something more. But not rightly if it too accepts the ultimacy of temporal existence, and thence infers a life after death (and even before birth) conceived as more of a similar kind. But the affirmation is but an illegitimate form of the correct refusal to accept a limited period of time as an adequate expression of human reality. Nevertheless it is surely clear that no one really desires an immortal existence thought of as an infinitely extended persistence through time. The dull round of endeavour and failure, of trust and deception, of achievement and recurrent dissatisfaction, while 'to-morrow and to-morrow and to-morrow, creeps in this petty pace from day to day', can only be an intolerable oppression to the alert imagination. Dusty death itself would be better than such immortality. 'To think of life as passing away is a sadness, to think of it as past is at least tolerable.'¹ Our vaunted immortal hopes are but dallies with eternity; they cannot slake 'the undying thirst that purifies our mortal thought'; but even that thought, so purified, may become 'a fountain of gardens, a well

¹ *The Early Life of Thomas Hardy*, by F. E. Hardy, p. 275.

of living waters'. Other source of satisfaction for us there is none; an immortality of ever-increasing insight and enjoyment may, indeed, seem less tantalizing, but that is not the destiny of beings cast upon this bank and shoal of time, however it may be in the strong level flight of angelic existence. For us, temporal life is largely repetitive and accumulative, with but few periods of that triumphant consciousness which is our reality and our highest good. And what we really desiderate is always more reality, and less of the idle repetition that belongs to mere time, and, with accumulation, is still the characteristic even of our duration. Our good is our eternity.

He who would escape from the dilemma thus presented must therefore find a way between its horns by probing deeper and into the very springs of finite duration. But he will thus, as it seems to me, discover a way better than either mortality or immortality: the *via aeternitatis*. For the threatened night of mortality, no less than the nightmare of immortality, is the bogey of a fabulist metaphysics using the figures of an all-comprehending phenomenology; and many of the questions which receive fictitious, or even merely verbal, answers in our popular superstitions (whether orthodox or eccentric) are, in an analogous fashion, questions which should never have been put, or should have been put otherwise. It is my hope that the discussions which follow may be useful in making it possible to put some of the great problems in a form in which they resolve themselves, or at least become capable of resolution as human insight increases, and without resort to imagination or a shoddy mysticism. There are many questions, genuine enough, which we can put, but which as yet we cannot answer; but questions which are essentially unanswerable are not genuine questions at all, and the sooner their fictitious character is exposed the better it will be for the progress of the human spirit, and its deliverance from the foiled searchings of mortality.

The use of the Latin title *Aeternitas* for an English work is an apparent affectation that requires some defence. The justification is the more readily here set forth because it gives the opportunity thus early for a concise warning against the age-long ambiguity of the term 'eternity' (and its equivalents), the exposure and resolution of which is the main purpose of the book. Latin titles have been used for purposes of convenience and brevity (as

perhaps with Laurie's *Synthetica*); or as neutral ground, where a work has been published simultaneously in two modern languages (as with Mr. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*); or to distinguish a new discussion of topics already considered by the same author under an English title (as with *Principia Mathematica*); none of these excuses, however, could apply to the present work. But my justification is even more ample: for the word 'eternity' commonly carries, has long commonly carried, and perhaps always will carry, the significance of an unending duration, from eternity to eternity. This conception was formally, and very definitely, set aside by Spinoza in favour of another, the nature of which is fully discussed in the following chapters. One of the minor conveniences of the plague of tongues is that we thus have several forms of the same word which become available for the divergent meanings which important terms are apt to accumulate. Thus since Spinoza, not for the first time, but perhaps more clearly than any other modern writer, re-defined the term, and since he wrote in the Latin, it has seemed an obvious convenience to appropriate the term *aeternitas* for his peculiar shade of meaning. It would have been a real affectation to have persisted in this throughout the book, but its selection as the title must be taken as an emphatic reminder that a vital distinction is to be drawn between eternity on the one hand, and sempiternity, immortality, or *aevum* on the other.

Further, although I have accepted the Spinozistic distinction between time and duration, it would have been an equal affectation to refuse to use the term 'time' as generally equivalent to duration where no special consideration demands their separation. Common speech and the practice of important philosophers demand this small concession to usage and style.

The description of the essay as *A Spinozistic Study* rather than as 'A Study of Spinoza' is intended to be significant, and is connected with what I have already said about the aim of the work. A Spinozistic study cannot fail also to be in some considerable measure a study of Spinoza, while many a study of Spinoza has failed simply because it has not been a Spinozistic study. But the distinction thus drawn does not imply that it is intended to put aside critical exposition in favour of biased defence, or even of insistence upon a mere *ipse dixit* (though no modern philosopher has a stronger claim than Spinoza to the dogmatic mantle of

Aristotle); it means that I prefer philosophy itself to the mere history of philosophy, and the creative spirit to the inert letter of an unfinished system.

The purpose of the book is thus not limited to a precise and conservative exposition of the views of a philosopher long dead, and, it may be thought, superseded, with respect to a set of topics far removed from the living thought of our own day. Such inquiries would in themselves be respectable and, however misleading when wrongly estimated, even valuable in no mean degree; here they are not to my taste, and in this study of the underlying principles of the system of Spinoza my aim has rather been to discover clues to the solution of some ultimate problems that in recent times have come into the focus of philosophical attention (though not always as problems), and which can only be met on the plane of metaphysics. Thus where I have found it necessary to discuss important points of interpretation, scholarship, use, or criticism in detail, I have done so by way of 'Excursus', and I hope that by this device, without failing to satisfy the just demands of exact scholarship, I have prevented the main argument from becoming too academic or overloaded with minutiae. The general reader may thus, if he wishes, avoid discussions which happen to lie beyond his immediate requirements, by occasionally omitting an *Excursus*.

The main interest, then, will be neither in the dateless intellectual history of ideas, nor in a precise historical account; but, starting from the main principles and premisses of Spinoza, and preserving a general historical sense sufficient to avoid gross anachronism, I shall permit myself to subordinate to the broad current of intellectual development the nicer historical distinctions between what was written and what was thought, between what was thought and what was implied, between what was implied and what may be inferred. I shall step freely from the order of history to the order of the intellect, as the inquiry itself may demand: and if the method is thus hybrid, it will be the better suited to the nature and complexity of the topics, and my own incompetence. For the main difficulty of philosophy, resulting from its extreme universality and concreteness, is that its problems cannot be segregated, so that their solution is not likely to result either from positive eclecticism, or from what I may call the negative eclecticism which is involved in a piecemeal criticism of this and that system viewed

from the outside. Even less is to be expected from mere negation. The philosopher must attempt to get inside: either inside the facts (which is very difficult), or inside some sound interpretation of the facts (which is difficult enough), or he is as little likely to succeed in his investigation as a man is to become a painter by reading about technique, looking at pictures, or listening to expert criticisms. The sole way to become a painter is to paint, and the way to become a philosopher is to philosophize. Thus, successful philosophizing is either that very rare and godlike thing, brilliant creative synthesis; or it is an attempt to acquire an inside view of the method and development of some original thinker, followed by a further, and speculative, explication and application of his principles in new regions of the Real. These methods need not, indeed must not, altogether exclude each other; but the latter is in the main the mode here attempted.

Thus I have not been obtrusively precise in distinguishing between the mere *ipsissima verba* of Spinoza and what is added under demand as speculative exposition and development. And to critics who profess to find more of speculation than of exposition in my book, declining from the lofty anonymity of Spinoza himself,¹ I reply: would that it were so! But it seems to me that what I have added is little more than emphasis to that which, after many years of study and reflection upon the writings of Spinoza, and in spite of the wide unanimity of commentators in a contrary interpretation, appears to me to be the plain teaching of the main texts. I should say that I have done no more for the philosophy of Spinoza than, in another medium, I have attempted to do for his facial lineaments. For Spinoza does not deliver his profoundest thoughts in a casual conversation through the mediation of a biased interpreter; more than any other philosopher, perhaps, he has suffered from the antithetical expositions of rationalizing historians of philosophy. Hegel has supplied the impulse, Leibniz the occasion. But what is needed above all in Spinoza-study is the study of Spinoza. The situation is curious: the traditional exposition having uniformly failed to explain certain doctrines, so definitely and so pointedly advanced that they could not be overlooked (I may name the absolutely crucial doctrine of the eternity of the human mind), the overwhelming majority of expositors have passively preferred to believe that Spinoza was inconsistent, stupid, or even dishonest,

¹ Cf. *Opera Posthuma, Praefatio*, § 7.

instead of concluding, as they ought to have done, that the exposition was faulty. For to no philosopher could these epithets be less suitably applied, and it has been my constant aim to discover the true place and significance of the main teachings of Spinoza in a coherent system of thought, and to do so without preciosity, eccentricity, or callow prejudice.

I have said that my essay is metaphysical: that is to say, it passes beyond phenomenology. What I mean in this connexion by 'phenomenology' will I hope become clear in the course of the argument, and I have discussed the general question in the Preface to Part III,¹ where it will be seen that in my opinion a theory which fails to carry its intellectual criticism up to the ultimate analysis of time and temporal productivity cannot rightly be named 'metaphysics', or the theory of Real Being: it is at most phenomenology. Now phenomenal or enduring being is not *more* real than eternal metaphysical Being, but is a limitation of it, and represents a descent towards that pure time which is non-being. I do not mean that metaphysics has no concern with time, or with phenomena, or even that these are illusory, but that they must not be taken as ultimate uncriticized and underived *data*. From the supreme amplitude of the eternal Being which includes, explains, integrates, and transforms all temporal differentiations and phenomena, *metaphysics must deduce time*; and my own aim has been no less than this. The phenomenology which I censure is that alone which, put forward as ultimate metaphysics, is the source, either of phenomenalism (where the bias of the thinker is subjectivistic), or of the demand for 'natural piety' (where his bias is realistic); and, that my condemnation is thus limited, is confirmed by the sections² in which I myself introduce phenomenological matter (though, I must add, these give no more than the merest sketch, sufficient for my purpose, but making no claim to provide an adequate, not to say exhaustive, account of their topics even from the point of view of phenomenology).

I have ventured to include, as Part III, some criticisms of contemporary writers who, for one reason or another, have been described as Spinozists; I have done so because it has afforded an opportunity, both of emphasizing what I regard as fundamental in the philosophy of Spinoza, and also of relating my main thesis to some prominent modern speculations. But again, in no case do

¹ pp. 221-7.

² e.g. Chapter VII.

I regard the treatment as exhaustive, or even as adequate from the point of view of the writers themselves; nevertheless I hope that in each case it is just, as well as adequate in relation to my own thesis; and though I do not subscribe to the dictum of Pope with reference to authors, that 'none e'er can compass more than they intend', it does seem sufficient if they reach that modest limit.

The description of Professors Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, and Whitehead, as Spinozists, is not my own, and I have accepted it as in a real sense significant in spite of my own judgement that, one and all, they miss or reject the very essence of Spinozism. The ascription of the title to M. Bergson could only be his own: it is most happily expressed in a letter addressed to M. Brunschvicg in connexion with the celebrations of the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the death of Spinoza, and I quote this as an addition and offset to my treatment of the writer in the course of my book: 'Il était réservé à Spinoza de montrer que la connaissance intérieure de la vérité coïncide avec l'acte intemporel par lequel la vérité se pose, et de nous faire "sentir et éprouver notre éternité". C'est pourquoi nous avons beau nous être engagés, par nos réflexions personnelles, dans des voies différentes de celles que Spinoza a suivies, nous n'en redevenons pas moins spinozistes, dans une certaine mesure, chaque fois que nous relisons l'*Éthique*, parce que nous avons l'impression nette que telle est exactement l'altitude où le philosophe doit se placer, telle est l'atmosphère où réellement le philosophe respire. En ce sens, on pourrait dire que tout philosophe a deux philosophies: la sienne et celle de Spinoza.'¹

The few remarks on Kant² are no more than a natural mode of introducing the central contention of Part III as to the place of time in phenomenology and in metaphysics.

Some paragraphs of the essay have already been printed as parts of an article on 'Spinoza's Conception of Eternity', in *Mind*, N.S. XXXVII, pp. 283-303, and cordial acknowledgement is offered to the Editor of that journal for his kind permission to reprint them here. It may be noted that this article and the chapter bearing the same title are not, even in scope, identical.

My obligations are so many and so heavy that I have not the heart to search them out in detail and set them down at length. Speculative passion a man must bring with him to philosophy: but speculative restraint is the last best lesson that he learns. If

¹ *Chronique des Lettres françaises*, No. 26, 1927, pp. 202-3.

² pp. 229-33.

I have learned it in any measure it has been from my honoured teacher, *quondam* senior colleague, and unfailing friend, Professor-Emeritus A. Seth Pringle-Pattison. No one has more consistently shown that the unremitting pursuit of genuine speculative unity, which is the ultimate end of all true philosophy, involves a constant resistance to the seductions of easy but premature unifications, with their inevitable train of mere negations. To him also I trace the inception of my study of Spinoza, and though the work itself has been entirely independent, both in the process and, *meo periculo*, in the result, I desire respectfully and affectionately to acknowledge his interest, encouragement, and inspiration over many years.

Of my obligations to Bernard Bosanquet I can speak more freely: indeed my indebtedness to his later speculations will escape the notice of no observant reader. Professor Pringle-Pattison has spoken¹ of the deep impression produced among the young graduands and graduates at Edinburgh by Bosanquet's two courses of Gifford Lectures when they were delivered in the old Logic Classroom in 1911 and 1912. Such an influence, at such a time, when our minds, very naturally, were wholly turned to philosophy, was little likely to be effaced by subsequent development under other influences and impulses, and I am gladly aware of its persistency in my own case. That there is a very definite limit to my obligations to Bosanquet I have not attempted to conceal: it has always seemed strange to me that one so well adapted to the study, both by temperament and by scholarship, should have been content (if that is the right term) with so defective a knowledge of Spinoza. Spinozism has often been asserted to be the characteristic fault of the idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet; but it seems to me, on the contrary, that a more unreserved devotion to a genuine Spinozism would have lifted them free from the lingering, if refined, anthropomorphism which is the transcendental root of the whole post-Kantian tradition, and has even, and not inexplicably, been advanced from time to time as its main significance.

What I owe to other contemporary thinkers lies open to view; and not least in the passages devoted to their criticism. It is possible that I have learned even more from some whom I have dared to censure than from many with whom I more cordially agree; but in the intellectual conflicts of true philosophers the 'direst' enemy is oftentimes the most 'dear'.

¹ *Bernard Bosanquet*, by Helen Bosanquet, pp. 125-7.

To Professor Joachim I am especially indebted for his kindness in subjecting a great part of my argument to an austere but not unsympathetic scrutiny, which I have found most useful and instructive. My obligations to him do not, of course, make him responsible for anything in the book: nevertheless I hope that, if he should think it worthy of a second perusal, he will judge that his criticisms and suggestions have not been in vain.

In the passage of the book through the press I have received valuable help, which I desire gratefully to acknowledge, from some of my friends and colleagues in the University of Leeds: especially from Mr. E. E. Bibby whose scholarly aid has extended over the whole range of proofs. My warm thanks are also due to Mr. A. E. Teale, who at an earlier stage read the whole in manuscript, and by his keen interest and care rendered the book much less imperfect than it would otherwise have been.

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PART I

THE ASCENT FROM TIME TO ETERNITY

CHAPTER I

TIME, DURATION, AND ETERNITY

ONE of the most promising features of recent philosophy is its concern with the crucially important group of topics commonly and summarily denominated 'The Problem of Time'. Mr. Alexander has said that 'the most characteristic feature of the thought of the last twenty-five years' is 'the discovery of Time'; 'I do not mean', he says, 'that we have waited until to-day to become familiar with Time; I mean that we have only just begun . . . to take Time seriously'.¹ Unless to take Time seriously means to accept its ultimate reality and positive character,² he ought, perhaps, to have said 'begun again'; for it could hardly be maintained that the great philosophers of the earlier modern period, even if we include Kant himself, did not take these topics seriously. Certainly there was no subject about which Spinoza was more in earnest, and it is because his less sophisticated reasoning on these matters may, nay must, cast light upon recent speculations in the same direction, that I have attempted an exposition and discussion of his conception of the relations of time, duration, and eternity.

It is a common view of the philosophy of Spinoza that it is a system, finished, self-complete, rigidly logical, and altogether unconvincing; to be taken or left as a whole; if failing at any point, failing in all; *in se ipso totus, teres, atque rotundus*. How little it is a finished system becomes increasingly clear to the serious student as he becomes more and more familiar with it, and begins to feel within it the movement of the ever-striving mind of its author. For its rigidity is that of the vertebrate rather than that of the Lucretian atom. Unfinished and plastic as it is in its details, inconsequent and pleonastic in its repugnances, it does not lack a firm and effective framework on which to function and from which to develop. In its fundamental principles it is as definite and rigid as any philosophy has ever been; and surely that is precisely where clearness and certainty, not to say validity, are essential.

¹ *Spinoza and Time*, p. 15.

² This may or may not be implied in Mr. Alexander's explanation: 'to realize that in some way or other Time is an essential ingredient in the constitution of things' (*Loc. cit.*).

There is no doctrine more fundamentally determinative in Spinozism than that of eternity and of its relations with duration and time. It may, indeed, be justly asserted that the conception of eternity is the very essence of the theory of Spinoza. Few philosophers have realized (though many have suspected, and some have acted upon the suspicion) how essential it is for a thinker on ultimate subjects to face and, if possible, to resolve the problems of time before proceeding to lesser matters. For this is the chart and compass and rudder without which it is dangerous or even fatuous to venture out of the port of *mera experientia* on to the high seas of speculation. Early in his career Spinoza made up his mind on these topics, and the main lines of his doctrine of time and eternity are already laid down in those *Cogitata Metaphysica* which he appended to his geometrical version of Descartes's *Principia Philosophiae* and published with it in 1663.¹ His views suffered no reversal or essential change right down to his untimely death in 1677: not that his thoughts turned away from such subjects; on few things perhaps did he meditate more often, for few are more often brought to the notice of the serious philosopher whatever may be the special direction of his inquiries, and certainly none are more worthy of his consideration.

It is because it has not always been remembered that the order of discovery often reverses the logical order, i.e. the real order of nature, that Spinoza's doctrine has commonly been misinterpreted as purely negative. In the order of nature eternity is prior to duration, and duration prior to time; in the order of discovery time and duration are prior to eternity. And the position is not rendered more safe for the unwary by Spinoza's attempt to identify the order of nature and the order of exposition by the use of the synthetic or geometrical form in his chief metaphysical work, the *Ethics*.

DURATION AND TIME

I begin with what is more familiar to us, viz. *duration*. This term is used by Spinoza much in the same way as those of us who are not mathematical physicists use the term 'time'. It means persistence, or as Spinoza expresses it, 'existence in so far as it is conceived as a certain form of quantity',² or 'the indefinite continu-

¹ See Excursus II (pp. 64-71).

² '[Existential], quatenus abstracte concipitur, et tanquam quaedam quantitatis species.' (*Eth. II, xlv, Sch.*)

ance of existing'.¹ It is from this quantitative character of duration that there arises the notion of measuring it, which gives us *time* in the Spinozistic sense: for observing that some things persist longer than others, and that certain motions (such as the apparent motion of the sun round the earth, or that of the moon, or the swing-swang of the pendulum) are regularly recurrent, we find it convenient to take the durations thus marked off as standards by which to measure the durations of other things. Such measurements are conventionally absolute, but really relative, for the standard is itself a quantity, and is, therefore, as measurable as any other quantity. Time is for Spinoza the measurement of duration by such comparisons;² whence it follows immediately that time is not a real thing, but only an *ens rationis*.

I have already indicated one of the main sources of misunderstanding in the study of Spinoza, but perhaps equally insidious, though by no mean peculiar to it, is the operation of the *idola fori*. This affects every exoteric philosophy so far as its leading ideas are expressed in terms rendered ambiguous by varied philosophical application; and more especially so where the ambiguity has been accentuated by prior or subsequent vulgar use. From this danger there is but one refuge, namely, precise definition, which the geometrical order affected by Spinoza is specially qualified to provide and emphasize.³ Thus it is of the first importance to take Spinoza's definitions very strictly, and very seriously; popular, or more recently accepted philosophical usage, must not be permitted to render them ambiguous, either in their content or in their actual use. That is a simple logical demand, to comply with which should be tolerably easy; and yet the history of Spinoza-study shows that some of the simplest distinctions are most easy to overlook. It has often been supposed, for example,

¹ 'Indefinita existendi continuatio.' (*Eth. II, Def. v.*)

² Cf. *Cog. Met. I, iv*: 'Durationem a tota alicujus rei existentia non, nisi ratione, distingui. . . . Haec autem ut determinetur, comparamus illam cum duratione aliarum rerum, quae certum, et determinatum habent motum, haecque comparatio tempus vocatur. Quare tempus non est affectio rerum, sed tantum merus modus cogitandi, sive, ut jam diximus, ens rationis; est enim modus cogitandi durationi explicandae inserviens.' Cf. also *Eth. II, xlv, Cor. i, Sch.*)

³ Cf. Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum, I, Aph. lix*: 'At Idola Fori omnium molestissima sunt; quae ex foedere verborum et nominum se insinuarunt in intellectum . . . Unde fit, ut magnae et solennes disputationes hominum doctorum saepe in controversias circa verba et nomina desinant; a quibus (ex more et prudentia mathematicorum) incipere consultius foret, easque per definitiones in ordinem redigere.'

that Spinoza must deny that the conception of duration, or any part of it, is predicable within the Real, merely because he denies that the Real is in time. We may well imagine how he might protest that it would be as absurd to deny that there can be a triangle, because Extension itself is not triangular, or because it is not composed of points, lines, or figures.¹

Time, then, cannot belong to the Real because it is a mere measure and its standard is arbitrary. It is an *ens rationis*, a mode of thinking, or rather of imagining (or misthinking) duration. It is a mere 'aid to the Imagination'.² Nor can there be an absolute measure of duration, for absolute measure implies an absolute unit; but such a unit cannot be found in the duration of any existing thing, since that duration is indefinite. The duration of a thing is not proportioned to its absolute nature or power, but depends upon vicissitude; it may be long or short as the circumstances of its occurrence determine. In the absence of obstruction each thing would endure for ever. In the absence of its producing cause the duration of a thing cannot even begin.³ Here, therefore, no absolute unit can be found. Nor can it be found in the nature of duration itself: for duration is neither discrete⁴ nor is it a whole.⁵

¹ An acute reader may detect a false suggestion in the analogy; this will be amply corrected in the text, and without the destruction of the essential point.

² 'Auxilium Imaginationis' (*Ep. xii*).

³ 'Duratio est indefinita existendi continuatio. Dico indefinitam, quia per ipsam rei existentis naturam determinari nequaquam potest, neque etiam a causa efficiente, quae scilicet rei existentiam necessario ponit, non autem tollit.' (*Eth. II, Def. v et Explic.*) 'Nulla res, nisi a causa externa, potest destrui.' (*Eth. III, iv.*) 'Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam. . . . [Hic] conatus . . . nullum tempus finitum, sed indefinitum involvit.' (*Eth. III, vii et viii.*) 'Nulla res singularis potest ideo dici perfectior, quia plus temporis in existendo perseveravit; quippe rerum duratio ex earum essentia determinari nequit; quandoquidem rerum essentia nullum certum, et determinatum existendi tempus involvit.' (*Eth. IV, Praef.*)

⁴ 'Idem . . . est Durationem ex momentis componere, quam Numerum ex sola nullitatum additione.' (*Ep. xii.*) The statement at the end of *Cog. Met. I, iv*, only verbally contradicts this statement: 'Notandum hic in duratione . . . quod major, et minor concipiatur, et quasi ex partibus componi, et deinde quod tantum sit attributum existentiae, non vero essentiae'; here the point is not that duration is composed of atomic moments, but that its nature is arbitrarily divisible precisely *because* it is *not* a whole or maximum, and again *not* composed of such ultimate minimal parts.

⁵ 'Attendendum est ad hunc loquendi modum, *ab aeterno*; eo enim nos aliud prorsus hoc loco significare volumus, quam id, quod antehac explicuimus, ubi de Dei aeternitate locuti sumus. Nam hic nihil aliud intelligimus, quam durationem absque principio durationis . . . Talem autem durationem non posse dari,

It provides for itself no absolute units either in the form of *minima* or in the form of a *maximum*. Every duration, however small, is a duration, and therefore divisible; every duration, however great, is partial, and therefore extendable. But in the absence of an absolute unit of measurement, time as a single absolute measure of duration cannot belong to the Real.

But what of *duration* itself, 'the indefinite continuance of existing', can this not be predicated of the Real?

Two distinguishable, but not altogether separable, arguments may be extracted from Spinoza's discussions of this important point.

(i) In the first place, 'duration is existence conceived abstractedly as a certain form of quantity', and this quantity is conceived as *divisible*. But the Real cannot be divided, for it must be self-complete and without limit. An incomplete reality is incompletely real. 'No attribute of Substance can be truly conceived from which it would follow that Substance can be divided.'¹ For if it were divided a section would either be the same as the whole (and therefore not a section at all), or different from the whole (and therefore incapable of being produced from it by mere division), or again, nothing real at all (which is absurd, since the Real cannot be wholly constituted of unreal sections).²

Now it might be objected that, whatever may be the value of these

clare demonstratur. Nam si mundus iterum ab hoc puncto retrograderetur, nunquam talem durationem habere poterit: ergo etiam mundus a tali principio usque ad hoc punctum pervenire non potuisset. Dices forte Deo nihil esse impossibile; est enim omnipotens, adeoque poterit efficere durationem, qua major non posset dari. Respondemus, Deum, quia est omnipotens, nunquam durationem creaturum, qua major ab ipso creari non possit. Talis enim est natura durationis, ut semper major, et minor data possit concipi, sicuti numerus.' (*Cog. Met. II, x.*) Though the argument of this chapter is mixed with purely Cartesian matter, I cannot doubt that the statements concerning eternity and duration are genuinely Spinozistic. (Cf. *Eth. II, Def. v et Explic.*) Duration which is relative to finite created existence is not determined by the essence of the created thing that endures, nor by its efficient cause, but by the constellation in which it exists. And the duration of that constellation, again, is determined by its constellation; and so on to infinity. *Tota Natura*, the infinite constellation of constellations, though it too is created, does not, for itself, endure, but is eternal. (Cf. below Chapter V *et seqq.*) On the whole question of the use I have made of the *Cogitata Metaphysica* in these chapters, see Excursus II (pp. 64-71).

¹ 'Nullum substantiae attributum potest vere concipi, ex quo sequatur, substantiam posse dividi.' (*Eth. I, xii.*)

² The argument is summary and general, and thus not, either in scope or arrangement, identical with Spinoza's own demonstration of *Eth. I, xii* (which is fashioned to suit its place in the geometrical order). It will be seen, however, that the arguments overlap.

arguments, they apply not only to duration but also to Extension; and yet Spinoza retains Extension as an Attribute of the Real, but denies that duration may be truly predicated of the whole. Mr. Alexander has, indeed, objected to this procedure, and has suggested a renovation of the Spinozistic theory in which duration would be retained as one of the Attributes of Substance.¹ Spinoza himself, I am confident, had he been compelled to agree with the arguments in question, would have rejected Extension with duration, rather than have accepted duration as an ultimate Attribute of Substance co-ordinate with Extension. But he would not in fact have recognized the dilemma, for he holds that we need not, and indeed cannot, conceive Extension as divisible, though in imaginative thinking we tend to do so. 'If we regard it as it is *in intellectu* . . . which it is very difficult to do, then . . . we shall find that it is infinite, one, and indivisible.'² And this is the true view of Extension: 'It is mere foolishness, nay insanity, to say that extended Substance is made up of sections or bodies really distinct from one another. It is as though one should attempt by the aggregation and addition of many circles to make up a square or a triangle or something of totally different nature.'³ Nor need we concentrate our attention solely on the intellectual conception of Extension in order to realize that it cannot be composed of sections (i.e. of *extended* sections, for the term 'unextended section of Extension' involves a contradiction), for even finite magnitudes may be incommensurable (that is, incapable of commensuration in terms of a single unit: Spinoza gives the example of the variations in the distances between the circumferences of two eccentric circles one of which lies wholly within the other). A finite, divided, discrete extension is an object of the Imagination; but in removing the limitations we do not lose Extension itself, or even its quantitative character: but we find that the conception of an infinite, single, indivisible Extension involves no contradiction, and may be accepted as true.

¹ In *Spinoza and Time*.

² 'Si autem ad [quantitatem], prout in intellectu est, attendimus . . . quod difficillime fit, tum, . . . infinita, unica, et indivisibilis reperiatur.' (*Eth. I, xv, Sch.*)

³ 'Quare ii prorsus garriunt, ne dicam insaniunt, qui Substantiam Extensam ex partibus, sive corporibus ab invicem realiter distinctis, conflata esse putant. Perinde enim est, ac si quis ex sola additione et coacervatione multorum circumulorum quadratum, aut triangulum, aut quid aliud, tota essentia diversum, conflare studeat.' (*Ep. xii.*)

It has not always been realized, or not with sufficient vividness, that the contention of Spinoza is that this correction is impossible with duration conceived as a quantity; for duration is *essentially* divided, since it is characterized by the irreversible distinction of past and future, or its equivalent. If the Real endures, then its existence is always essentially divided into what has already occurred and what has yet to occur. If that distinction implied no real division it would be a mere distinction of reason and not what it essentially is, the real character of duration. Nor does the fact that the line of division moves steadily towards the future render the division less fatal, for every emergent instant is in turn the division of past and future, and to heal the breach at one place is the same as to create it at the next or at another.

It might perhaps be contended that a similar argument is possible with Extension, which is characterized by distinctions such as right of and left of, above and below, nearer and farther, &c., and that these as much imply the real division of Extension as past and future imply that of duration, and that hence Extension too must be denied of the Real. In that contention I have here only an indirect interest, and it may therefore be sufficient to say that these spatial distinctions arise from the arbitrary selection of points or axes of reference, i.e. they belong to Extension limited and divided, and not to Extension illimitable and indivisible. How far the latter is really intelligible (as distinct from imaginable) it does not fall to me at the moment to discuss, but in any case the point of the argument is that past and future, before and after, earlier and later, are asymmetrical correlatives essential to time, while right of and left of, above and below, nearer and farther, are arbitrary perspectives of a symmetrical relation of distance.¹

¹ i.e. the spatial distance of two points, A and B, being mutual, is directionally ambiguous (either from A to B, or from B to A), and hence all spatial directions are relative to an origin (and to axes of reference also where only one point is given); but the direction of time is an absolute *datum*, which we can mentally ignore, but not really defeat.

I am anxious to make clear the precise point of my argument for a fundamental distinction of space and time: it is not that 'before and after', &c., are any less or any more dependent on the selection of a point of reference than are 'right and left', &c.; in this respect they are both arbitrary. This fact has sometimes been expressed in the form that the distinctions in question depend upon the presence of an 'experiencing subject' whose 'here-now' constitutes the point of reference. Against that assertion two objections may be urged, the second of which leads to a new expression of the distinction under discussion:

(1) There is a mischievous subjectivism in the form of expression, since an

It is, perhaps, to some extent the failure to give due weight to this essential difference between duration and Extension that has led some commentators to deplore a double use of the term 'duration' in Spinoza, or at any rate to overlook the necessity and importance of the admitted variety of his expressions. Thus it

'experiencing subject' only questionably or remotely has a 'here'; it is the extended body of the observer that occupies spatial position, whereas both mind and body possess temporal character and position. In so far, however, as the mind may legitimately be regarded as observing spatial perspectives from the position occupied by the body, this otherwise important objection might be met by the substitution of Mr. Whitehead's term 'percipient event', or its equivalent, for the 'experiencing subject'.

(2) But further, the 'percipient event' is not in precisely the same way essential in the space-system as it is in the time-system. A is to the right of B from the point of view of the 'percipient event' X; from the point of view of another 'percipient event' Y, B may be right of A, or over it, behind it, &c. Similarly we can perhaps suppose that A which is before B for 'percipient event' X, is after, or simultaneous with, B from the point of view of 'percipient event' Y, on the same principles as, for example, the lightning flash, which is simultaneous with the sound of the thunder (for both issue at once from the same electrical occurrence), appears to an observer at a distance to be earlier; or again, an auditor supposed to be travelling away from a concert hall at a speed greater than that of sound waves, would hear the programme repeated (if his sense of hearing were sufficiently keen) with the *order* of the notes reversed (I say nothing of their *character*). Now the crucial difference between the arbitrariness of spatial and temporal distinctions respectively is brought out if we suppose the 'percipient event' to be situated not at X or Y but at A: then in the *space*-system, B is neither right nor left, &c., of it, but simply 'at a *distance*', which is a symmetrical relation of A and B (for 'near' and 'afar' are measurements of the distance, and therefore relative to some further element); whereas in the *time*-system, B must be either 'before' or 'after' A, i.e. in a temporal *direction*, which involves a relation that is not itself determined by measurement, but by direct and absolute intuition. This intuition, of course, primarily determines the temporal relations of changes in the 'percipient event' A, so that a judgement concerning the temporal relations of A and the external event B must involve an estimate which may be at fault owing to unrecognized factors within the total perceptual system; but the essential temporal basis of the judgement is the intuition of temporal *direction*, which involves 'before and after' (i.e. an asymmetrical relation). Spatial *distance*, on the contrary, as we have seen, does not involve 'right of' or 'left of', 'above' or 'below', &c., but simply 'distance' in a reversible direction, which is only 'distance to right', 'to left', 'below', &c., in relation to external axes of reference which are easily provided in ordinary experience by the body of the extended observer. Thus while spatial distinction unambiguously involves only *relative* direction, temporal distinction involves an *absolute* direction; for events are not 'earlier' and 'later' only in relation to an external point of reference. From a given point of time any other point of time is at a temporal distance *absolutely before or after*; but from a given point of space, on the contrary, any other point of space is simply at a spatial distance, and only *relatively* right or left. Thus, with space, direction is relative to a system of axes arbitrarily selected, or at least to an origin (and this is so even with a one-dimensional space); but with time, though 'before and after', like 'right and left',

is said that in one mood Spinoza denies that an eternal being endures, since an eternal existence is not the same thing as indefinite persistence; while in another mood he speaks as if eternity were the same thing as complete and continuous duration (as opposed to time which is a divided fragmentary imagination of duration). But the inconsistency is in duration itself and not in the mind of Spinoza, and there is very good reason for his variety of emphasis, — a reason which is only obscured by our inveterate tendency to use the argument respecting the purification of Extension as if it would apply to duration by the mere change of terms from measure, body, Extension, to time, duration, eternity, respectively. The past and future alike seem continuous undivided durations, needing only to be taken without limitation and division and so applied to the Real. Further, the present which divides the continuous past from the continuous future is no fixed instant, but continuously moves from the past towards the future. Hence the division is continuously healed, it does not cicatrize the past. Thus we readily

are correlatives, the *direction* of time from 'before' to 'after' is an absolute *datum*.

It might, perhaps, be objected that the spatial distinction of 'right' from 'left' is also an absolute unchangeable *datum* within the 'percipient event' (and thus not capable of simple mathematical expression); I reply: undoubtedly, but whereas I can as easily move from left to right as from right to left (or if I cannot *nothing in the nature of space prevents it*), I find that I cannot move from after to before, but only from before to after: I am compelled by the very nature of time. Again, by changing my position I can really reverse the spatial relations of A and B, so that what was on the right is now on the left; but by no means can I reverse the real flow of time, and make what is before a given date come to be after it, and what is after it come to be before. I change my date, but I do not change the order of dates. I do not deny that we date external occurrences differently as a result of our motion relative to them; but that concerns our *judgement* of our spatio-temporal relations with the events, and not what I have asserted to be the essential basis of every judgement of temporal sequence, viz. the actual flow of time in the 'percipient event', which is directly intuited, but which, though in Spinoza's sense it may be 'imagined', *is not therefore only psychical*. (Cf. below, p. 18, note 1.)

The implications and full significance of the principles I have suggested, and the reservations required in their application, can only become clear as we proceed; and I need only add that I do not wish to suggest that Spinoza explored the relations of space and time along the lines indicated above: speculative exposition must be distinguished from crude anachronism; and Spinoza's definite and grounded acceptance of Extension, and rejection of duration, as ultimate characters of the Real, point towards the principles suggested, and therefore depend upon the acceptance of their main purport. It is one of the underlying pretensions of this book that such exposition need not be speculative in the bad sense, unless by philosophy we mean history, and by history chronicle.

overlook the division of duration as a perceptual accident. I shall have to consider in due course the attempt to construct an 'objective' duration free from the peculiar limitations of crude experienced time, but it would be well to say at once that no way of escape from our present difficulties is to be found in that direction. We have to make terms with the facts of our durational experience, for which the present is real, and past and future only real in so far as they were or will be real as present. It is to the present, therefore, that we must look for the peculiar quality of temporality which consists in a certain 'sense' or direction. For my purpose at the moment it matters little whether we say that events succeed each other in time, or that time itself flows, for the essential thing is that duration can only be understood as involving an irreversible order of procedure, and it is this that constitutes the hybrid character of duration, which again necessitates a double treatment of it as at once illusory, and also a clue to the Real. Duration is not a new dimension of Extension, for it is insufficiently determined as a mere quantity. What is essential to it is flow, 'sense', direction, the peculiar variety of temporal quality distributed through its quantity. Duration includes both externality, or extensive quantity (which it shares with Extension), and also transformation or temporal quality (which is its *differentia*). From these two threads there is woven that successiveness which is an inescapable characteristic of our crude duration; and it is this imperfection, involving as it does negation, which incapacitates duration for survival in the Real. This it is which corresponds with Spinoza's denial that an eternal being endures.¹ But the qualitative element of duration does not in itself include (or perhaps imply) negation, and in so far as it does not, it may survive the processes of intellectual criticism, and so be recognized as a character of the Real. It is that which corresponds with Spinoza's suggestion that duration is the 'imaginative' expression of eternity.²

The reason, then, why Extension survives the process of in-

¹ e.g. *Eth. I, Def. viii et Explic.*: 'Per aeternitatem intelligo ipsam existentiam, quatenus ex sola rei aeternae definitione necessario sequi concipitur. Talis enim existentia, ut aeterna veritas, sicut rei essentia, concipitur, proptereaue per durationem, aut tempus explicari non potest, tametsi duratio principio et fine carere concipiatur.'

² e.g. *Ep. xii*: 'Porro ex eo, quod Durationem, et Quantitatem pro libitu determinare possumus, ubi scilicet hanc a Substantia abstractam concipimus, et illam a modo, quo a rebus aeternis fluit, separamus, oritur Tempus, et Mensura.'

tellectual criticism and is admitted as an Attribute of Substance, while duration is excluded, is that temporal relations are essentially asymmetrical in a sense in which spatial relations are not. The latter demand no special (or spatial) variety in their terms, while the former can only be sustained in so far as periods differ from one another in date or epoch as well as in distance. They must differ in temporal quality as well as in temporal quantity: only thus can they be in succession. Remove the distinctions of past and future, earlier and later, before and after, and you remove the essential character of any kind of duration, and all that is left is a neutral form of externality like a dimension of space. But duration is like Extension in one feature only, viz. its quantitateness or measurability (avoiding the question as to which of these terms is the best expression of the common quality); in its specific quality it is wholly different, a fact that is too often slurred over in modern speculations, especially those of a mathematico-physical type.

(ii) These considerations lead naturally to the second and connected set of objections to predicating duration of the Real: the temporal variety of an enduring being is necessarily a *successive* variety. Whether we think of crude perceived duration with its distinctions of past, present, and future, or of historical time with its distinctions of earlier and later (and Spinoza, recognizing both, argues mainly against the latter, the former being obviously inapplicable to the Real), the elimination of succession involves the destruction of duration. For without change there can neither be the apprehension of duration nor, indeed, duration itself; and without succession no change. But change cannot be predicated of the Real, which can lack nothing, and can surrender nothing. Hence in the being of Substance 'there can be no earlier or later';¹ 'in the eternal there is no when, before, or after'.²

Hence the existence of the Real cannot be an enduring existence, not even an existence enduring without beginning or end.³

How, then, is the existence of the Real to be construed? It is not a quantity measurable by time. It does not endure: its existence is not divisible into earlier and later stages. But neither is it

¹ 'Deo nullam tribui posse durationem: nam cum ipsius esse sit aeternum, hoc est, in quo nihil prius, nec posterius dari potest.' (*Cog. Met. II, i.*)

² 'In aeterno non detur quando, ante, nec post.' (*Eth. I, xxxiii, Sch. ii.*)

³ *Eth. I, Def. viii, Explic.*

momentary. In one of his earlier works M. Bergson expressed the strange misconception that for Spinoza 'the indefinite duration of things was all contained in a single moment, which is eternity',¹ a conception comparable with the even more common opinion, that for Spinoza all multiplicity fades into mere identity in *Natura*, and all content into vacuity: the 'dark shapeless abyss' of 'eternal night', as Hegel has it. For Spinoza, I must contend, the Real occupies neither one moment nor many moments, nor even infinite moments. God does not exist *ab aeterno* or *in aeternum*, for that would imply a duration than which no longer can be conceived; he does not exist in a moment, for that would imply a duration than which no shorter can be conceived: and both are impossible, 'for the very nature of duration is such that it is always possible to conceive a duration greater or less than any given duration.'²

Must we then conclude that what does not exist in one, many, or infinite moments of duration does not exist at all? By no means; there can be no doubt whatsoever that Spinoza himself draws, and could draw, no such conclusion. No one has ever doubted that he at least attempts to establish a species of existence beyond the limitations of duration and time, though many have asserted or implied that the attempt has failed. Such existence beyond the limitations of duration he calls an *eternal* existence, and I must next attempt an explanation and discussion of some of the interpretations which have been put upon this conception, and make some introductory suggestions of my own.

ETERNITY

There is a short and easy way of interpreting Spinoza's conception of an eternal existence, which, though in itself wholly unsatisfactory, and, as applied to Spinoza, easily refuted, must first be mentioned, both because it is the common interpretation and also because it has some apparent basis in expressions used here and there by Spinoza himself. The reading to which I refer

¹ 'La durée indéfinie des choses tenait tout entière dans un moment unique, qui est l'éternité.' (*Les Données Immédiates*, p. 159.) The same interpretation is applied in *L'Évolution Créatrice* to the 'philosophy of Ideas': 'Passé, présent, avenir se rétracent en un moment unique, qui est l'éternité' (p. 346), whence the criticism ricochets to Leibniz, and (less clearly here) to Spinoza, who are said to move towards the conclusions of ancient philosophy (p. 382).

² 'Talis enim est natura durationis, ut semper major, et minor data possit concipi.' (*Cog. Met. II, x.*)

is not precisely that which takes eternity as synonymous with necessity, but one which, realizing that necessity is at most the logical *proprium* of an eternal existence, and not its metaphysical essence, attempts to construe the existence which is eternal as equivalent to, or framed on the analogy of, the being which belongs to necessary truths such as the propositions of Euclid, or established scientific principles. And *prima facie* there is some evidence in Spinoza's own expressions for such a view; the *Explanation*, for example, which is added to the *Definition* of eternity at the beginning of *Part I* of the *Ethics* seems to bear this significance: 'Such existence' (i.e. eternal existence) 'is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of the thing',¹ and the reader has to get well within the mind of Spinoza before it becomes clear to him how little such words bear the meaning that is by us most readily attached to them. For eternal truths, in the customary use of the term, do not 'exist' at all as such; they 'hold', or (to use the current philosophical *cliché*) they 'subsist'. And that is so because they are abstractions; in Humian phrase, they are 'relations of ideas' and not 'matters of fact'. They may be true of existence, they are not themselves existences.

Now Spinoza's point of view is essentially different, and nearer to that of Plato in the ancient world than to that of Empiricism in the modern, though it is remote from both. For him as for Plato, I think, to know truly *is* to know the real; an eternal truth is, in fact, the same thing as an eternal reality. It is not an abstract universal or the connexion of abstract universals.² That is the point of the last part of the sentence quoted: 'an eternal truth, like the essence of the thing'.¹ He speaks elsewhere of the essence of a man as an eternal truth,³ and the first *Corollary* to *Eth. I, xx*, runs: 'It

¹ 'Talis enim existentia, ut aeterna veritas, sicut rei essentia, concipitur.'

² Nor is it a *mere* essence without existence: 'Quod autem Authores errarunt' (i.e. in ascribing duration to God), 'in causa est I^o quia aeternitatem, ad Deum non attendentes, explicare conati sunt, quasi aeternitas absque essentiae divinae contemplatione intelligi posset, vel quid esset praeter divinam essentiam, atque hoc iterum inde ortum fuit, quia assueti sumus *propter defectum verborum* aeternitatem etiam rebus, quarum essentia distinguitur ab earum existentia, tribuere, ut cum dicimus, non implicat, mundum ab aeterno fuisse; atque etiam *essentiis rerum, quamdiu ipsas non existentes concipimus; eas enim tum aeternas vocamus.*' (*Cog. Met. II, i.*) (The italics are mine. Perhaps I may be allowed to digress so far as to say that Spinoza is not arguing that the world was created in time, as has often been supposed, but only that the term '*ab aeterno*' confuses duration with eternity.)

³ *Eth. I, xvii, Sch.*

follows that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth.'¹ To a correspondent who asked him point-blank whether things and their modifications are eternal truths, he answered 'Certainly', adding that the only reason why he had not constantly so described them was because he wished to avoid this very misunderstanding, since the term 'eternal truth' is also applied to general propositions (such as 'Nothing comes from nothing') which have no particular existence on their own account.²

An eternal existence, therefore, must not be explained, or explained away, as framed on the analogy of the validity of abstract or universal scientific principles or mathematical truths. For the whole paraphernalia of abstract universals of every kind had been definitely relegated to the Imagination, i.e. to knowledge of the lowest, the most confused, and the emptiest kind, resulting rather from impotence than from the power of the mind.³ 'It is above all necessary for us to deduce all our ideas from . . . real entities . . . and not to pass over to . . . abstractions and universals, neither for the sake of deducing anything real from them, nor of deducing them from anything real, for in either way we interrupt the true progress of the intellect.'⁴ Spinoza's own theory of Reason (the second kind of knowledge) is based upon a new kind of abstraction in which universal principles are embodied in universal singulars, and truths of reason are no longer mere 'relations of ideas', but also and essentially relations of existences, infinite and eternal. Truth is never a mere relation of ideas thought of as pictures or images in the mind, for an idea is the *essentia objectiva* of a thing, and to have an idea is to know a thing, so that to have a true idea is to apprehend reality. The eternity of scientific truths, therefore, rightly conceived, i.e. as truths about universal singulars, and not mere hypotheses, is not definable by negation as timelessness

¹ 'Hinc sequitur . . . Dei existentiam, sicut ejus essentiam, aeternam esse veritatem.'

² 'Omnino. Si regeris, cur eas aeternas veritates non voco? respondeo, ut eas distinguam, uti omnes solent, ab iis, quae nullam rem, reive affectionem explicant, ut, ex. gr. *a nihilo nihil fit*.' (*Ep. x.*)

³ Cf. *Eth. II, xl, Sch. i.*

⁴ 'Possumus videre, apprime nobis esse necessarium, ut semper a rebus Physicis, sive ab entibus realibus omnes nostras ideas deducamus, progrediendo, quoad ejus fieri potest, secundum seriem causarum ab uno ente reali ad aliud ens reale, et ita quidem, ut ad abstracta, et universalia non transeamus, sive ut ab iis aliquid reale non concludamus, sive ut ea ab aliquo reali non concludantur: utrumque enim verum progressum intellectus interruptit.' (*De Intell. Emend.*, Op. Post., p. 388.)

simpliciter, but as existence of a certain kind. The assertion that it is the nature of Reason to conceive things *sub quadam specie aeternitatis*¹ must not be interpreted as if its objects were 'ideal contents' or 'floating ideas' applying at *any* point of time because independent of time-reference; its objects are individual existences which are also universal by reason of their amplitude.

There is another interpretation which may be, and has sometimes been, given to Spinoza's conception of eternity, which, though perhaps less inadequate in intention than the view I have been discussing, is still irreconcilable with his general trend, no less than his definite assertions. It approaches most nearly to his view of eternity as the form under which Reason, rather than the third kind of knowledge (*scientia intuitiva*) conceives things. In so speaking I am careful to correct the suggestion that the phrase '*sub quadam specie aeternitatis*' is to be taken as implying that there is in the Real more than one *kind* of eternity, and, at the moment, to draw only the distinction between two modes of apprehending it: its formal conception by Reason, and its concrete enjoyment in *scientia intuitiva*. What remains to be said in this Part bears very largely upon that distinction and its implications, and I need not dwell upon it more particularly at the moment.² The interpretation of eternity to which I am now turning will best be expounded as the end of a process of intellectual criticism of crude perceived duration, in the course of which it will be convenient to review the main stages in the process of the refining and transforming of time, as well as some other attempts which have been made to determine the nature of eternity, and to bridge over the 'broad ditch' between the temporal and the eternal.

¹ 'De natura Rationis est res sub quadam aeternitatis specie percipere'. (*Eth. II, xlv, Cor. ii.*)

² For a discussion of the significance of the phrase '*sub quadam specie aeternitatis*' see Excursus III (pp. 99-104).

CHAPTER II

THE ASSAY OF TIME

HOWEVER the distinction may be expressed, between time as it is found in *mera experientia*, and time as the refined product of critical thought: whether as that of 'subjective' and 'objective' duration, of duration as perceived and as conceived, of imagined as opposed to real time, of microcosmic and macrocosmic time, the distinction remains, and is in some degree unavoidable.¹ Already, in commonplace experience, a duration divided into past, present, and future is distinguished from a duration lengthened out beyond the individual subject's remembered and anticipated duration, by the addition of time experienced or lived-through, not by him, but by earlier and later generations. And these further periods which were, or will be, to their possessors divided into past, present, and future, are by the present individual subject incorporated as wholly past or wholly future. Thus begins the criticism of duration which must lead on either to real duration or to the reality that is manifested as duration.

I begin, then, with crude, 'lived-through' or experienced, 'subjective', duration. It is, as I have noted, distinguishable into a growing past, a moving present, and a diminishing future. The remote past fades away into forgetfulness, and the less remote future into the unforeseen. Many moments of the individual's past are

¹ The alternatives named indicate what must be definitely emphasized, viz. that the distinction of 'subjective' time and 'objective' time is *not* equivalent to that of 'psychical' and 'physical' time. I am not, that is to say, distinguishing between the duration experienced by the mind in the flow of its own ideas, and the duration 'lived-through' by physical things. According to my use of the term, 'subjective time' belongs to the body of the experient equally with his mind (which is the *essentia objectiva* of the body). It is distinguished from 'objective time' which is attributed equally to all bodies and *animae* whatsoever (in my view falsely, because impossibly). I shall argue in the issue that time is, *strictly in this sense and only in this sense*, 'subjective', i.e. it belongs only to the parts of the Real, as parts, and not to the whole, to the microcosm and not to the macrocosm. I would willingly have used a less ambiguous term if one had been available: 'relative time' and 'absolute time', of course, will not do; and 'microcosmic' and 'macrocosmic' time, though perhaps more accurate and less dangerous, are still not quite accurate (for time belongs, on my theory, to the microcosm only in so far as it *fails* to be a genuine *κόσμος*), and have for other obvious reasons been rejected. (Cf. also below, p. 122, note 2.)

remembered as having once been present and future, and the remainder are judged to have been so; his present moment may be observed by him in the process of ceasing to be future and becoming past; his anticipation shows the moments of his future in turn becoming present and then past. These facts, and their extended correlates, constitute the peculiar unsuitability of crude duration as an Attribute of the Real. The conception of the present is especially ambiguous, and though its ambiguity infects both the past and the future, yet these in the main retain their 'sense' and quality, though the past continually recedes and incorporates new moments, and the future continually approaches and yields its earlier parts to the present and the past. Still, what is once past remains past, and what is now remote in Time's untravelled space will for long remain future. But the present is never for two instants the same, and if yesterday never was and to-morrow never comes, the present, though it always is, is never the same. Such, indeed, is the *prima facie* character of temporal process:

Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore,
So do our minutes hasten to their end;
Each changing place with that which goes before . . .

Each moment in turn approaches, is appropriated, becomes present, and then for ever ceases to be present. But it is only while a moment is present that its reality is actually lived-through and experienced; what is enjoyed is the present, and though the past may be remembered, and the memory of it be enjoyed, and the future expected, and its expectation enjoyed, the past itself that we remember, and the future that we expect, are never as such enjoyed. The active power of the individual is confined to the present, or proceeds beyond it only through the present; it alone is actual, it alone is for action. No character of crude time is more vital than the distinction between the past that has been and no longer is, the present that is, and the future that will be but is not yet; it is the basis of the common-sense habit of 'crowning the present, doubting of the rest', or rather, doubting of the future as a mere idea, accepting the past as fact indeed, though beyond our cure, but regarding the present as the real living fact. Here the individual seems to touch reality, and has his foothold in being; and the reality of the past or future, such as it is, is measured by the degree in which the past leaves its traces, or the future casts

its shadow, upon the present. Actual achievements and real possibilities are such alone as have their grip upon the present, and they draw their reality, such as it is, from what alone is real in the primary, or rather the primitive, sense of the term, viz. the present.

When, however, attention is directed to the analysis of this real present, it is found to be thoroughly ambiguous, and even contradictory, in meaning, in content, and in value. For it is at once the *minimum* in which action occurs, a cross-section having no durational width, and again a real period of duration, though short and ragged at the edges. The enjoyed present is a 'specious' present, as the phrase goes, and is thus a real part of duration, and not the mere cross-section dividing past and future which analysis demands; the individual's impact on time is not instantaneous but durational. And, indeed, since every part of duration must, as Spinoza says, be a duration, it is obvious that the experienced present of time *must* be 'specious', for if it were not, crude time would contain no present, and all perception would disappear. Nor would there remain a remembered past or an anticipated future, for with the present would go also all possibility of memory or expectation.

The specious present, therefore, may be expected to repeat all the old difficulties of duration in general, and to add some new ones of its own. If it is a duration, is it again distinguishable into past, present, and future? Undoubtedly within the present of ordinary experience the distinctions of past and future can still be detected, for this present is normally longer than the *minimum sensible* of duration. But there can be no present within the present, no specious present of the second degree leading towards an infinite regress; for the inner present is the *minimum sensible* of duration that, from the point of view of the subject, is not an extended duration at all, and is not composed of durations. Within the specious present, therefore, there is only past and future, but now these are not distinguished as that remembered from that anticipated, for all the parts of the specious present are alike perceived; indeed, it is thus that it is present. The past and the future that are perceived within the present are distinguished only by their observed order, strengthened by the connexion of what came first with what is remembered, and of what comes last with what is expected. It follows also from the durational nature of the specious present that its observed order is already a temporal

order, in which past and future are perceived (and not remembered or expected) as distinct from each other in temporal quality as well as temporal quantity. Under analysis, therefore, crude duration is seen to be composed of a past period that is remembered, a future period that is expected, and a present period composed of a perceived sequence of past and future. Further, it follows that the supposed superior reality of the present over the past and future belongs to it not as present (for the mere present is never experienced, and the specious present is already past and future), but is due to its special relation to the active percipient. It is not that the present is more real than the past or future, but that perception is judged to be a more reliable source of knowledge than memory or anticipation, and again, that the specious present is available to us for action in a way in which further past and future are not; and since all the parts of crude time are equally real or unreal, I may go further and deny explicitly that past, present, and future belong to time itself as such; they must be ascribed to the relations of the individual 'subject' (corporeally and mentally) with the contents of time.

The first step, then, in the refinement of duration involves the elimination of the present as a period or duration (it is at most a *minimum sensible* which only has magnitude for an imaginary outside observer with keener faculties). We are left, then, with a past composed of a large period that we remember or reconstruct and a short period that we perceive, and a future composed of a short period that we perceive and a longer period that we expect, anticipate, or imagine. Perception shades off into memory and expectation, while past and future are connected within that perceived duration which we call (and rightly call) the 'specious' (i.e. the pretended or apparent) present.

Spinoza, of course, knew nothing about the modern conception of the specious present, which was popularized by William James and had first been put forward in James's own time, though Spinoza's doctrine that all the parts of duration are durations implies that the experienced and 'lived-through' present is a duration and not a *minimum* or a cross-section of time. There are, however, good reasons for its introduction and criticism here, for not only was it exploited by Royce¹ as an analogue of the eternal character of the Absolute, but the resulting conception is an approximation to one

¹ See Excursus I (pp. 34-42).

of the most popular theories of the Middle Ages, which must have been well known to Spinoza, viz. the conception of the existence of God as an eternal 'now', as we find it put forward by Boethius in his treatise *On the Consolation of Philosophy*. These reasons are amply sufficient to warrant a further consideration at this convenient point of these twin conceptions of eternity as a specious present including the whole of time without the loss of its temporal distinctions, and, in the words of Boethius, 'a total and perfect possession of an endless life all at once'.¹

AN INFINITE SPECIOUS PRESENT

Enough has perhaps been said to bring out the essential nature of a specious present as a 'duration block' containing past and future without serious confusion in a single act of perception. Its element of past is neither remembered nor inferred; its element of future is neither inferred nor expected; but both are directly perceived in a moving stretch of duration.

The first difficulty about the extension of this conception to the whole of time is that in our experience the present is not at rest, but moves continuously forward towards the future, so that time, as it were, sweeps back through it. Thus its parts are distinguished as past and future. I need not argue that the past elements of the specious present are recognized as past by their continuous fading away into the past that is not perceived but only remembered; and its future elements as future by their shading off into the future that is expected or imagined, but not perceived; but I must and do argue that if the distinction is not made in that way it is necessary to rely upon the closely connected fact that relative to time in general the specious present moves on, the past elements being the earlier ones and the future the later ones. But in a specious present comprehending all duration limitation disappears, and with it the relative movement of time in general and the specious present. Time-distinctions, therefore, on either hypothesis, are lost, and duration becomes a motionless order of externality. With some such conception I shall have in due course to deal, so that I need not consider it at the moment; but in any case it is not a time-order, and hence cannot be described as an infinite specious present. It is important to notice what is the exact point of the

¹ 'Aeternitas igitur est, interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio.' (Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, V, *Prosa vi*.)

criticism I have been urging, viz. that a movement of time within the specious present implies, indeed is identical with, the movement of the specious present through time, so that time-distinctions cannot be supposed to remain within a specious present which, comprehending all time, cannot move through time. Nor can resort be had to the alleged infinity of time, for 'infinity' must here mean either 'indefinity', in which case no specious present can comprehend all time; or the 'wholeness' of time, in which case a second difficulty with respect to the extension of the specious present to the whole of duration must be met, viz. that there can be, and can be conceived, no whole of duration, and much less can such a whole be imagined: 'the very nature of duration is such that it is always possible to conceive a duration greater or less than any given duration.'¹ This fact alone,—that duration cannot be taken as a whole, because however much is taken there must always be more, and not more of the same symmetrical nature (as with Extension), but more characterized by serial temporal relations which, though transitive, are essentially asymmetrical, and thus by unique temporal qualities—this consideration alone would have provided Spinoza with ample grounds for rejecting the conception of an infinite all-inclusive specious present.

AN ETERNAL 'NOW'

If the notion of an infinite specious present, in spite of the impressive character of our experience of present extended duration, would not have commended itself to Spinoza, still less did the monstrous current transcript of it, according to which the existence of God is an eternal unmoving Now. Here the attempt had been made to establish a whole including infinite duration without loss of temporal relations and qualities. This involves at least the possibility of temporal order without transiency by the immediate recognition of before and after as such, without the later ever having been future or the earlier ever becoming past.

Although this ancient conception has by frequent emphasis gathered an air of religiosity, has indeed become a piece of 'shabby theology', it was in its time a respectable speculation, being, among other things, an attempt to reconcile the omniscience of God (involving foreknowledge of human actions) with human freedom and responsibility. More generally speaking, it was an attempt

¹ 'Talis enim est natura durationis, ut semper major, et minor data possit concipi.' (*Cog. Met. II, x.*)

to relate the conceptions of eternity and duration without reducing either to illusion. As I have already noted, a very clear account of it is to be found in the treatise of Boethius which directly and indirectly exercised so great an influence over Western thought. He expounds it in the sixth *Prosa* of the fifth *Book of The Consolation of Philosophy* as propaedeutic to a discussion of Divine prescience, which he infers is to be called *Providentia* rather than *Praevidentia*.¹ Although Boethius does not, of course, put forward the notion of the eternal present as an extension of our experienced 'saddlebacked present', it is interesting to notice that he tells us that our own momentary present bears some likeness to that enduring present which is experienced by God.² He is careful to insist that from the eternal present which is the form of the existence of God, past and future are neither excluded nor do they lose their quality as earlier and later, but the whole of infinite time is perfectly possessed at once; an eternal existence has always with it 'the infinity of moving time'.³ The essential thing in such an experience is after all not its infinite extent, but its single possession 'all at once'⁴ yet without loss of the specific temporal flavour; and the main limitation of a temporal existence is its inability to comprehend the whole space of its life at once. Thus the passage from an eternal existence to a temporal is at once a broadening out and a diminution. The eternal 'diminishes from the simplicity of a present into the infinite quantity of future and past time'.² This process, however, is not to be taken as a change from qualitative moment to a quantitative whole (though there are not

¹ Cf. below: p. 25, note 1.

² 'Hunc enim vitae immobilis praesentarium statum infinitus ille temporalium rerum motus imitatur: cumque eum effingere, atque aequare non possit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum, et ex simplicitate praesentiae decrescit in infinitam futuri ac praeteriti quantitatem; et, cum totam pariter vitae suae plenitudinem nequeat possidere, hoc ipso quod aliquo modo nunquam esse desinit, illud quod implere atque exprimere non potest, aliquatenus videtur aemulari, alligans se ad qualemcumque praesentiam hujus exigui volucrisque momenti: quae, quoniam manentis illius praesentiae quandam gestat imaginem, quibuscumque contigerit, id praestat, ut esse videantur. Quoniam vero manere non potuit, infinitum temporis iter arripuit: eoque modo factum est ut continuaret eundo vitam, cujus plenitudinem complecti non valuit permanendo.' (Boethius, *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, V, *Prosa vi.*)

³ 'Quod igitur interminabilis vitae plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit, ac possidet; cui neque futuri quicquam absit, nec praeteriti fluxerit, id aeternum esse jure perhibetur: idque necesse est et sui compos praesens sibi semper assistere, et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere praesentem.' (*Loc. cit.*)

⁴ 'Tota simul.' (*Loc. cit.*)

wanting signs of a tendency towards such a conception), for Boethius quite clearly asserts that though past is not past to God, nor future future, but all time is present, yet the knowledge of God contains 'the infinite spaces of present and past time considering all things as if they were now being done'¹—a conception which might perhaps be interpreted as meaning that past is not by God remembered, nor the future by Him expected, but that past and future are perceived together, while remaining in sequence; which seems to be precisely the notion of an infinite specious present. Certainly no more favourable interpretation of the eternal present can be extracted from the statements of Boethius, and if it is incorrect it must be put aside in favour of the notion of an eternal Now, similar to that ascribed to Spinoza himself by M. Bergson, which I have already proscribed, that 'the indefinite duration of things was all contained in a single moment, which is eternity'. If the former interpretation made time unreal, even more certainly the latter makes eternity unreal. I return, therefore, to the main path of the inquiry.²

Let us fix our attention next upon the terms past, present, and future, as they are predicated of the parts of duration. Is past time, for example, different in itself from future time? And if so, what changes in any period as it passes the gates of the present? I speak of the periods of time, and not of their empirical contents, for we know but too well, we are too often reminded, that 'Time that gave doth now his gift confound'. It cannot be supposed that a future period is any less or any more a time than one that is past, nor that in itself it gains or loses anything more than relative date when it becomes past. Past and future refer, as I have said, rather to the relations of enduring active beings with time. My past is

¹ 'Itaque si digna rebus nomina velimus imponere, Platonem sequentes, Deum quidem aeternum, mundum vero dicamus esse perpetuum. Quoniam igitur omne iudicium secundum sui naturam, quae sibi subjecta sunt, comprehendit: est autem Deo semper aeternus ac praesentarius status: scientia quoque ejus, omnem temporis supergressa motionem, in suae manet simplicitate praesentiae, infinitaque praeteriti ac futuri spatia complectens, omnia quasi jam gerantur, in sua simplici cognitione considerat. Itaque si praescientiam pensare velis quae cuncta dignoscit, non esse praescientiam quasi futuri, sed scientiam nunquam deficientis instantiae, rectius aestimabis. Unde non Praevidentia, sed Providentia potius dicitur, quod porro ab rebus infimis constituta, quasi ab excelso rerum cacumine cuncta prospiciat.' (Boethius, *De Consol. Phil.*, V, *Prosa vi.*)

² Some further discussion of these and allied conceptions is attempted below, p. 306 *et seqq.*, in connexion with Plato's figure of time as a 'moving image of eternity'. (*Timaeus*, 37D.)

the time in which I did once act and live; my future is the period in which I shall live and act; while my present is that duration in which alone I act, and which is thus the time that I perceive, and in which I remember, perceive, and anticipate.

So far I have not sought to pass from 'subjective' duration, not even in the discussions of the 'eternal now'; I have not attempted to escape from the relations of past, present, and future, which are 'subjective' in their reference. In crude time, past, present, and future are sections of duration; in the specious present, past and future constitute the whole which is present; in the 'eternal now', past and future are subordinated to, if not lost in, an all-comprehending present.

But if I am right in my assertion that pastness, presence, and futurity belong not so much to time as to the place of the individual 'subject' in time, and his relations to the time-series, then the next step in the assay of time must be the correct analysis of this situation with a view to obtaining, if possible, a conception of the nature of duration out of relation to individual experiences or events located in it. I shall thus at the same time be able to examine the contention that it is precisely this relation to individual experience or occurrence, and the consequent misreading of the character of duration, which incapacitates all enduring existence for survival in the Real; since divisibility and successiveness, which together constitute the *prima facie* vice of time, are the result of this very relation. It is the successiveness of the time-series that renders its divisibility fatal, because no passage from Imagination to Reason or *scientia intuitiva* can, as with Extension, re-cement the fragments of duration so long as its successiveness remains; thus it has sometimes been held that if it can be shown that successiveness is a character, not of time in itself, but of the relations of enduring things to one another and to time, then eternity may be adequately construed as that attribute of the Real which remains when the offending successiveness has been removed from duration. Without succession there can be no duration: so much will perhaps be admitted as a basis of agreement, but may there not remain a non-durational form of externality which is eternity?

The probable argument, then, is that the successiveness which infects, or even appears to constitute, enduring existence, is relative only to this or that observer or experient or event, or at best to some supposed resultant, mean, or representative observer or

experient or indicator, and is thus a 'subjective' or relative addition to (or, rather, subtraction from) the eternal co-existent facts. Existence, it will then be argued, purged of these ambiguities, is not a successive existence, and does not 'endure' in the objectionable sense of the term; but for analytic thought, as for 'subjective' perception, features of the eternal whole may be apprehended successively; and though perception presents them in an irreversible order, analytic thought can order them according to its special requirements. In other words, the Real is eternal in a sense which makes eternity the fourth dimension of the mathematical physicists, and therefore indistinguishable in nature from any of the dimensions of space. In it there is no past, present, or future, and the passage from the 'subjective' perspectives of duration to an 'objective time', by the simple process of removing the point of reference given by an observer's now, implies also a passage from an irreversible time to a neutral time, the order of which may be read according to the special needs of the thinker.

The relation of such an argument to the conceptions I have just been examining is too obvious to need special consideration; but as it is one of the most common of modern inferences or assumptions it is necessary for me to deal with it directly, and to indicate the grounds of my refusal to accept the conclusion that *duration* can be wholly purged of the reference to some individual, average, or standard *punctum*, and time yet remain a successionless form of existence or externality. From this dilemma there is no escape: if 'objective' duration is a neutral order it is no adequate expression of the reality which appears *sub specie durationis*; if, on the contrary, it is successive, then it is no adequate representation of the existence of an eternal Real.

'OBJECTIVE' DURATIONS

The various kinds of 'objective' or macrocosmic duration—historical time, Absolute Time, &c.—are durations purged of the offending ambiguities, or, as I shall hold, purged of some of the ambiguities which arise from the reference of empirical time to a real or supposed observer or indicator. They do not directly depend upon the temporal location of this or that individual indicator or observer, though historical time depends upon a generalized reference to the epochs of human observation and experience. History refers to the past alone, and is thus able to overlook the

distinction of this from the future, and even, in a more qualified degree, from the present. And in 'objective' durations generally there is no present, past, or future, for every instant is in turn future, present, and past, or rather is at once future with respect to what comes before, past with respect to what comes after, and present with respect to what occupies it. Thus in place of the relations of past, present, and future, 'objective' duration is determined by the relation of before and after which is independent of any unique point of reference or 'now'. Every point of time is before what follows it, and after what it follows, and it can at once enter into these contrary relations because it does so with respect to different terms. So far so good. There is no special objection to our making the point of reference slide freely backwards and forwards along the time-dimension, so long as we do not forget that the required 'objectivity' of the relation of before and after implies, what indeed we cannot afford to surrender, that time itself flows freely only in one direction, viz. from past to future through the present, or from before to after, or, if we adopt the point of view of the experient, from future to past through the present, or from the after towards the before.¹ *Time has a sense.* But on what grounds do we assume that this is so in the 'objective' order which we propose to establish by the purification of crude time? We must not yet assume that the banishment of the distinctions of past, present, and future as they exist in the crude time-order without the substitution of adequate temporal distinctions of a less 'subjective' flavour, but no less 'subjective' origin, will leave untouched the temporality of the resulting order. It may well be that the distinctions in question are not merely 'subjective' or relative accretions, but that they involve, and involve inextricably, the essential 'sense' of time. That, indeed, is the gist of my contention at this point; we lose the gold with the dross. For the fact that 'subjective' duration moves from past to future is one with the fact that what was future becomes past, and that again with

¹ It must be noticed that this alternative mode of expressing the 'movement' of time, does not imply its *reversibility*, but only its *relativity*. The confusion of these two things is facilitated and concealed through the common association of space and time as analogous orders. In Space, relativity of motion implies the symmetrical character of space, and it may be supposed that with time too relativity implies reversibility. But we must, of course, distinguish motion *in* space and time, and motion *of* time. I shall show in due course that the relativity of time is its essential feature, arising from the mode of its derivation from the eternal Real. It signifies both its 'subjectivity' and also its partial reality.

the fact that past means that which has been given, present that which is being given, and future that which is yet to be given. It is, of course, natural and inoffensive to begin with what we already have had, and are now having, and pass on to what we shall have; but in 'objective' time, considered strictly as such, no such distinctions are forthcoming, and they only appear to be so because we transfer to it distinctions only valid for 'subjective' time. We do so by imagining ourselves at a point of 'objective' time, calling what is before that point the past, and what is after it future, then determining the flow of time from past to future as it is for our individual experience, and thus making 'objective' time flow, too, in one direction only, viz. from before to after, from earlier to later. This illegitimate transference is further concealed from us by the use of terms saturated with time derived from our personal experience, such as 'before and after', 'earlier and later', and the like; but if the distinctions of 'subjective' time are not 'objectively' valid, by what right do we transfer what is inextricably woven with them, viz. the direction or 'sense' of time, to a macrocosmic time purged from the dross and crudity of our finite experience? In our 'subjective' duration the past has *been given*, the present is *being given*, and the future is *to be given*; but in 'objective' time *all is given*, and therefore time for which there is neither past nor future cannot flow, and the sense of duration which lurks about the terms 'before' and 'after' must carefully be excluded if we are to continue to use them in the determination of 'objective' time. With the terms 'earlier' and 'later' I need not especially deal, for they are even more shameless *petitiones principii*.

The main 'objective' times which have been put forward, therefore, are hybrids derived from the illegitimate union of qualitative distinctions derived from the transformations of individual experiences, with the final product of the assay of time (for I cannot call it 'pure time'). Historical time, for example, is an 'objective' order into which (by the use of memory and imagination) we place first the objects of our immediate experience, thus determining a direction of flow, and then proceed to fill out the earlier periods with events lying beyond our immediate experience but connected therewith in various ways. This time we may then transform into scientific, Absolute, or macrocosmic time by leaving out the point of reference given by the now or by the present epoch, but carefully (and illegitimately) retaining the direction of flow from earlier to later.

This is not the place to attempt more than the most superficial and incidental comment on Mr. Alexander's conception of Space-Time, but I may perhaps venture to suggest that even the Time element of Space-Time does not escape this analysis: for even if its characteristics can be shown to cohere with (I must not say 'depend on') the three dimensions of the space-element, Mr. Alexander expressly disclaims any intention of explaining why there are three dimensions of space, except that it thus coheres very well with the empirical—that is, for him, the real—characteristics of time, viz. its continuity, successiveness, irreversibility, and uniformity of direction. But the question I have been discussing is whether these would be the characteristics of a 'time' emancipated from all points of reference; or whether they do not belong to time only in its relation to that moving origin of reference, this or that finite individual, or supposed mean or representative, experient or indicator; and whether when that point of reference is in every sense and form excluded, time will still *flow*. That question is not resolved by weaving together space and time (though space may thus serve to combine the instants of time which otherwise are loose 'nows'), for succession cannot be instituted by the mere expedient of combining 'nows' into a continuum; unless, indeed, already these nows all differ in sequent *date*, i.e. are related to what is given (*datum*) or not yet given in some individual experience or existence (as the very term 'date' might have suggested).

My argument, then, is that the distinctions of past and future, before and after, earlier and later, &c., as well as the equivalent one of date, depend upon relation to an individual or supposed mean or representative experience or origin of reference, and that, therefore, if the ghosts of past and future are resolutely exorcized from earlier and later, from before and after, no absolute dates in a continuity of macrocosmic time can remain. With the exclusion of past and future (both body and ghost) from an order which had already lost its present, nothing of the essential nature of time remains. And, indeed, the exclusion of the present already meant as much, for it is precisely the present (with the past pressing upon it, and the future emerging from it) that constitutes the reality in empirical duration: past is gone, the future is not yet realized. But in an 'objective' duration the distinction of realized and unrealized disappears, and with it duration itself, and we are left

with a *neutral order of externality*; in attempting to escape from the limitations and particularities of empirical duration (for 'our dates are brief') we find ourselves condemned to a 'dateless night'. Yet this neutral order was in one sense the object of the *experimentum* or assay: will it not serve as an image of the eternity which is enjoyed by the Spinozistic Substance? *Prima facie* there is something to be said in favour of the hypothesis: it is at least free from some of the objections urged against the conception of duration as an Attribute of the Real. It is, in fact, a sort of Extension and therefore more capable of surviving intellectual criticism than any genuine duration which remains essentially successive.

Nevertheless, I must assert that no such neutral order is an adequate representation of Spinozistic eternity even as it is conceived by Reason. For though it is conceived as an order of existences, this is not the order that characterizes the Real. Such an identification would imply that the order of things in time is, with minor corrections for the spatio-temporal perspective of the experient, the real order of existences. But according to Spinoza it is not so: for him the real order is the logical or intellectual order, which is not a mere corrected temporal order, but proceeds on a different plan: there is no point-to-point correspondence between events in time and the stages of logical order. No distinction, indeed, is more clear in Spinoza than that between 'the common order of nature'¹ and 'the order of the intellect',² through which the actual time-order of our experiences is distinguished from the logical order of essences. Indeed, it is the order in which things can be conceived which determines their degree of reality; for all things are real and eternal in so far as they survive the process of being arranged in the intellectual order, as all things are illusory and corruptible as objects of unenlightened Imagination.

Furthermore, and in the second place, the logical order is not neutral, but moves from essence to expression, from ground to consequent, from Substance to mode.³ For *Intellectus* the process

¹ 'Communis naturae ordo.' (*Eth. II, xxix, Cor. et Sch. ; xxx, Dem.*)

² 'Ordo intellectus.' (*Eth. II, xviii, Sch.*) 'Ordo ad intellectum.' (*Eth. II, xl, Sch. ii ; V, x.*)

³ The motion is not, I need hardly say, even *sub specie extensionis*, locomotion, but real *motus et quies*. That is to say, essence is prior to expression, ground to consequent, Substance to mode. And in knowledge, though for the learner or inquirer the matter of the conclusion may often seem to be derived from a direct observation or from authority, and thus to be temporally prior to the premisses, which are the result of subsequent inquiry or instruction, yet, even here, in

in time from cause to effect (the Berkeleian transition from 'sign' to 'thing signified': a description which Spinoza might so far have accepted) gives place to the procession of grounds and consequents in eternity, and in the same transvaluation Imagination, the first kind of knowledge, gives place to adequate knowledge of the second or third kinds. The change from the time-order to the intellectual order, therefore, is not a change to neutrality, but a change from a serial order of mutually exclusive elements, to an order of inclusion; from an order of logical neutrality and irrelevance, to one of logical implication, and therefore, real productivity;¹ from

reality the full conclusion can only be known as following from the premisses. But it does not follow that the premisses are therefore temporally prior to the conclusion. Thus for the mind which in any degree genuinely knows, premisses and conclusion stand in no temporal relation to each other; or, if we conceive the knowledge as enjoyed at a period in the history of the knower (as we well may) we must say that the premisses and conclusion are simultaneous. For him the conclusion is the *explained* conclusion, which includes the middle (S is P for it is M); the premisses are for him the *sylogized* premisses (S is M which is P); so that, adequately conceived, the premisses and conclusion constitute an identity in difference. But the concrete identity or togetherness of the premisses and the conclusion must not be interpreted as implying a symmetrical relation between them: the premisses are necessarily and timelessly prior; the conclusion is necessarily and timelessly posterior; for such is the essential character of their *nexus*. (Cf. Bosanquet: *Logic* (2nd ed.), ii, pp. 4-8.) Nor should the fact that the logical movement may be read either as from conclusion to premisses, or as from premisses to conclusion, be allowed to suggest any such neutrality of order. It is failure to realize this simple but important principle that suggests that the universe of Spinoza is necessarily a 'block universe'; and it is this very conclusion that I am attempting to discredit.

¹ A similar distinction is indicated by Bacon when he emphasizes the importance of the search for *forms* rather than *efficients*. For if we know only the efficient, which is the temporal vehicle of the form, we are only able to produce the particular nature under circumstances similar to those in which we have discovered it; but if we know the form itself (i.e. the law of the nature, its genetic cause) then we know how to produce the nature itself in new ways, in unprepared circumstances, with different material. We can invent new vehicles and efficientes. 'Qui causam alicujus naturae (veluti albedinis, aut caloris) in certis tantum subjectis novit, ejus Scientia imperfecta est; et qui effectum super certas tantum materias (inter eas, quae sunt susceptibles) inducere potest; ejus Potentia pariter imperfecta est. At qui Efficientem et Materialem causam tantummodo novit (quae causae fluxae sunt, et nihil aliud quam vehicula et causae Formam deferentes in aliquibus), is ad nova inventa, in materia aliquatenus simili et praeparata, pervenire potest; sed rerum terminos altius fixos non movet. At qui Formas novit, is naturae unitatem in materiis dissimillimis complectitur; itaque quae adhuc facta non sunt, qualia nec naturae vicissitudines, neque experimentales industriae, neque casus ipse, in actum unquam perduxissent, neque cogitationem humanam subitura fuissent, detegere et producere potest. Quare ex Formarum inventione, sequitur contemplatio vera, et operatio libera.' (Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, II, Aph. iii.)

a symmetrical time-order which cannot explain the irreversible character of duration, to an asymmetrical logical order for which 'prior' and 'posterior', though seemingly reversible in the order of learning, are essentially and constitutively irreversible. For time, as distinct from duration, is not asymmetrical and irreversible, since all its moments are alike: pure Spinozistic time is neutral, indeed null; and duration becomes a real order only in the degree in which it transcends time by its dependence on quality. Only a relative whole can endure, and only the duration of a relative whole is irreversible. It escapes neutrality as the expression of systematic order.

The assay of time is thus complete. Step by step we have refined the ore; step by step we have made trial of the metal. And though, in the process, time has been deprived of its temporality, yet we could not regret the loss, if the residue in the crucible were the pure gold of eternity. For the *experimentum* was, after all, no mere assay, but alchemy. And though the magic has proved doubly ineffectual (for time is lost, and eternity not gained), yet still we need not count the work as wholly vain: for, as Bruno suggests,¹ useful discoveries may be made even in the futile search for the *lapis philosophicus*. Like men digging in a vineyard for buried treasure, though we have found no gold, we may have improved the vintage.²

¹ 'Nonne multoties nobis certum scopum praefigentibus aliud quaesito nobilius occurrit? Ipsum sane frequentissime alchimicis accidere experimentis non est quem lateat, quibus multoties auro perquisito longe meliora vel ex aequo desiderabilia adinvenisse accidit.' (Giordano Bruno, *Triginta Sigilli, Septimi Sigilli Explicatio*.)

² 'Neque tamen negandum est, Alchymistas non pauca invenisse, et inventis utilibus homines donasse. Verum fabula illa non male in illos quadrat de sene, qui filiis aurum in vinea defossum (sed locum se nescire simulans) legaverit; unde illi vineae fodiendae diligenter incubuerunt, et aurum quidem nullum repertum, sed vindemia ex ea cultura facta est uberior.' (Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I, *Aph. lxxxv.*)

EXCURSUS I

A COMPLETE TIME

ATTEMPTS have sometimes been made to save the reality of time by showing how it may be regarded as whole and complete, and therefore not essentially indefinite. I select for brief comment two modern attempts in this direction—that of Mr. J. S. Mackenzie, according to which time is conceived as complete but finite, and that of Royce, which makes time infinite but nevertheless complete.

(1) Mr. J. S. Mackenzie¹ makes the serious suggestion that the terms 'beginning' and 'end' may have significance when applied, not merely *within*, but also *to* the time-series: that is to say that time itself may begin and end. 'I should suppose that the first occurrence in the universe of events might simply step forward as that from which change sets out.'² I confess that I find very great difficulty in conceiving how the hypothetical first moment of time can be other than *in* time; and hence subsequent to a previous moment; and so not the first. The conception of a moment of time which is a present related only to a future and 'free from time-determinations' on its other side, calls for close scrutiny. Such a moment must be wholly future even when it is said to be present, for its present is either nothing real at all, or it is a specious present wholly composed of an experienced future. For the first moment of time, all time, including itself, is future. Similarly for the last moment of time, all time, including itself, is past. That these facts constitute a difficulty I do not suppose that Mr. Mackenzie would deny; the question which I shall raise is whether the difficulty is not self-made, and therefore superfluous.

Mr. Mackenzie attempts to resolve some of the confusions inherent in the *prima facie* implications of his theory by means of the distinction between time as a 'form or order' within which events occur (in which case 'it is evident that there can be no ground for thinking of it as having either a beginning or an end'),³ and time as a concrete order within which lies the totality of events. The former, which without events is nothing, is infinite (being without beginning or end), but not whole; the latter is whole but not infinite (for it both begins and ends): 'Time, that takes survey of all the world, must have a stop'. And this is real time; to it therefore we must turn our attention.

¹ 'The Infinite and the Perfect' (*Mind*, N.S. XIII, pp. 355-78); 'Notes on the Problem of Time' (*Mind*, N.S. XXI, pp. 329-46); *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, V: Art. 'Eternity', pp. 404-5.

² 'Notes on the Problem of Time', p. 338.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 336.

I have indicated the immediate difficulty which presents itself: there must be a moment which succeeds no past, and a moment which precedes no future; that these are impossible in the abstract is admitted by Mr. Mackenzie,¹ but can we conceive such moments even in the concrete? The popular mind has become accustomed to the paradoxical assertion of the relativists that space is finite, and it may be equally ready to accept Mr. Mackenzie's paradox with reference to time, but the serious inquirer will be well advised to reflect again, and in both cases. I do not expect ever to stand at the ultimate edge of space with room beside me and behind me but with none before; nor at the last moment of time, with the past behind me and no future yet to come; nor do I believe that any one, whether finite or infinite, ever will do so. It is not my business to discuss the implications of relativity, but I suggest that they appear paradoxical because no attempt has been made to distinguish between our measures of space and time (however 'objective' we may make them), and that which we set out to measure. In the nature of things, our processes of measurement must depend upon some form of motion, and we naturally make use of the most rapid motion known to us (*viz.* that of light); but this too is finite, and it is not surprising, therefore, that there should be a limit to our capacity to measure space, and that the limit should be a function of the velocity of light. But, though we can thus account for the critical importance of that velocity in the formulae of relativity, it does not follow that space is itself limited, or that the velocity of light is a real maximum. For the world which we can determine under the categories of physics, it may be so, and the space of that world may be finite; but the interests of the metaphysician are not so limited to the phenomenology of physics, his object is the Real as it is in and to itself, and not in and for the limited measurements of its microcosmic parts. There is thus nothing to be gained from mathematico-physical paradoxes in support of the idea of a finite total time, and I speak with becoming restraint when I say that the discaudate and decapitated first and last monstrous moments of time of Mr. Mackenzie's fancy could only be accepted if they could be shown to be essential features of some carefully analysed inescapable concrete situation. But nothing of the kind appears to be forthcoming.

Mr. Mackenzie's theory thus seems to be that, though abstract time is infinite, yet actual concrete time must begin and end with the total process which fills it; and that process, again, may well be finite. It is, of course, undoubted that empirical events and processes *in* time do begin and end, though their precise limits are elusive, and thus there must be 'first' and 'last' moments, *i.e.* dates before and after which

¹ 'Notes on the Problem of Time', pp. 331-2.

the event or process has no existence. But these are real moments of time within the duration of wider processes or events, and thus do not imply a beginning or end of time, but only of some finite duration. The question is whether we are justified in extending the analogy of the finite process, without correction, to the all-inclusive process of *tota Natura*, and thus in supposing that concrete time itself has a real beginning and end, so that periods before time and after time are, indeed, 'abstractly conceivable',¹ but no more. I am not sure whether Mr. Mackenzie means to argue that the finitude of time follows from the incoherence of the notion of empty time (since the first event would be preceded, and the last event succeeded, by time without events), but if so I should say that nothing but speculative perversity could have prevented him from concluding thence, not that time is finite, but that there are no first and last events in the imaginative conception of *tota Natura*.

One way of escape from this problem is by denying that *tota Natura* is a valid conception, and Mr. Mackenzie shows some signs of the disposition to move in that direction. The conception of a being which 'contains all possible reality within itself' he describes as 'absurd';² but if that is so what can be the precise point of the assertion that all reality lies within the limits of a finite time read as non-transient? 'The conception of a rounded whole, which yet contains a time-process within itself' is, he says, 'not altogether unintelligible',³ and, I gather, this conception is to be applied to the total time-process. Again I cannot think that there is any real way of escape through the emphasis on responsive finitude as the essence of perfection.² Doubtless a finite being is more perfect as he is more responsive to the whole, but only because thereby he more perfectly reproduces the infinite completeness or all-inclusiveness of the Real, which rests in itself and expresses itself in all things, and, in their degree, in each. As I shall argue in later chapters, empirical beginnings and endings are *in* time because time emerges as the concomitant of the hierarchical individuation which characterizes the Real. But *tota Natura*, at the head of that hierarchy, and informing all its parts, cannot begin or end *in* time because it is not a subordinate within a more inclusive individual the existence of which could be imagined as an indefinite time within which the subordinate might begin and end. For itself *tota Natura* must be neither finitely nor indefinitely extended in time; it must be eternal. For its subordinate individual parts it may appear to endure indefinitely, without beginning or end, while, as so related to the whole, these begin and end within its sempiternity. We cannot even imagine *tota Natura*

¹ 'Notes on the Problem of Time', p. 337.

² 'The Infinite and the Perfect', p. 376.

³ 'Notes on the Problem of Time', p. 344.

as finite in duration, much less *think* it, and I think that Mr. Mackenzie only imagines that he thinks it, because there are things that we can think but cannot imagine.

Now Mr. Mackenzie's difficulties, which he meets by the invention of his monstrous semi-temporal first and last moments of time, arise, as the Kantian antinomy arose, from the attempt to equate the imaginative conception of the existence of *tota Natura*, which a subordinate part most readily entertains, with the intellectual conception of its existence which the whole alone can fully possess (and a part only in so far as it reproduces the whole without imaginative qualification). Time, if, as such, it is taken as ultimately real, must, of course, have a beginning if we are to avoid the self-contradictory conclusion that an indefinitely long series has at any moment been completed. But since this is so, we have to choose between conceiving a beginning to time, and denying that time is an ultimate character of *tota Natura*. Yet even if the latter alternative is chosen, it does not become necessary to deny that time has a place in the Real as an 'imaginative', and not altogether false, expression of the dependence of the finite individual on the infinite whole. Further, the denial of a beginning and end to time need not imply that empty time exists before and after the occurrence of *tota Natura*; for, on the contrary, it is the infinite character of *Natura* that determines the indefiniteness of time. Time cannot stretch beyond the imagined duration of the whole, not even as an 'abstract conception'; but *Natura*, if I may so speak, 'inflates' time beyond all limits. It does so because time is an inadequate expression of the infinite self-dependence of *tota Natura*.

Hence it may not only be denied that the principles governing abstract time are, as Mr. Mackenzie asserts, 'of no real importance' in the determination of the limits of real time;¹ we may go further and assert that they apply *a fortiori* in this region because abstract time is but an extract of concrete occurrence. If we can even abstractly conceive a period of time before the beginning of events, then there can be no such beginning; 'quia ipsius naturae leges adeo amplae fuerunt, ut sufficerent ad omnia, quae ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt, producenda'.²

I am as ready, therefore, as Mr. Mackenzie himself to equate the 'good' infinite with the perfect as opposed to the indefinite or endless; the extraordinary thing is that it should be supposed that this equation implies that the absolutely infinite must have a beginning and end, that it is identical with the 'completely determined finite'.³ But, following Spinoza, I ask whence could arise the limitation? Not, Mr. Mackenzie

¹ 'Notes on the Problem of Time', p. 338.

² *Eth. I, App.*

³ 'The Infinite and the Perfect', p. 369.

assures us, from the time-order itself: 'there is nothing in the nature of the time-order as such to prevent the occurrence of something before the beginning or after the end'.¹ Nor can it arise from external things (for it is of *tota Natura* that I speak). The limitation thus arises from within *Natura* itself, which is thus unable to occupy all the duration 'abstractly conceivable' by the finite intellect of man (I cannot here speak of the infinite intellect of God). 'But', says Mr. Mackenzie, 'the question is not with regard to what is abstractly conceivable, but to what did take place.'² I accept the correction; but 'what did take place' is not an historical question, but must be determined by what is concretely conceivable, i.e. as true of *tota Natura*. This, as Mr. Mackenzie rightly asserts, cannot begin or end *in* time; its duration must be the duration of time;³ but reciprocally, and more strictly and intelligibly, we must say that time can only begin or end with the *exhaustion* of *Natura*. And it is because *Natura* is inexhaustible, that real concrete time (the 'imaginative' transcript of its inexhaustible existence or essence) has neither beginning nor end.

I turn from the question of the beginning and end of time to consider the temporal process between these limits. The issue of Mr. Mackenzie's argument is that eternity is identical with the concrete developing process of time: 'Time would not be, as with Plato, "the moving image of eternity" but eternity itself.'⁴ In this part of his discussion emphasis is laid upon some of the paradoxical characters of process developing towards an end. Here, though it is the means that *produce* the end, it is the end that *explains* the means: if now time is wholly occupied and determined by a single developing process (*tota Natura*) which, though retaining its temporal character, is eternal, then there arise two problems, viz. (a) how such a process can *begin* when *ex hypothesi* its first moment contains no more than a naked possibility, which is nothing; and (b) how it can be real when its complete character is only realized at its *end*, i.e. when it has ceased to exist. For it looks as if eternity is one, not with the total process of time, but with the last moment of concrete time (which contains all the others in the sense that it completes, synthesizes, and explains them). But how can it otherwise contain the process (or rather *be* it without its transiency) when the process has already vanished away? For the finite individual contemplating a finite process which falls within his own duration, the case is easy, for he endures after the last moment of the process, enjoying the synthesis of the development in a subsequent period of his own

¹ 'Notes on the Problem of Time', p. 336.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 337.

³ 'Si autem ante caelum et terram nullam erat tempus, cur quaeritur, quid tunc faciebas?' 'Videant itaque nullum tempus esse posse sine creatura' (Augustine, *Confessiones*, XI, xiii et xxx).

⁴ *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, V: Art. 'Eternity', p. 404.

duration; but *tota Natura* is in a less advantageous position on the hypothesis of Mr. Mackenzie, for *its* last moment is *the* last moment. Of course this does not really matter very much, since *Natura* possesses the whole time-order without its transiency;¹ but how its life can remain a process in any genuinely temporal sense I find it impossible to explain—a difficulty which Mr. Mackenzie seems to share, for he proceeds weakly to suggest that ‘in the case of the universe as a whole [we must suppose] . . . the end returns upon the beginning’.² This is a suggestion which seems to me to bring serious discussion to an end; ‘It is certainly difficult to make this quite intelligible’, he adds; I go further and assert that it is impossible to do so unless ‘end and beginning are dreams’; in which case the hypothesis itself is unnecessary. ‘Haec est clarissimi hujus viri sententia (quantum ex ipsius verbis conjicio) quam ego vix credidissem a tanto viro prolatum esse, si minus acuta fuisset’.

(2) In discussing the views of Mr. Mackenzie I have been compelled to advance beyond the point so far reached in my main argument; I shall be compelled to go even further in dealing with Royce’s idea of an infinite time which is also complete because it involves a single expression of the Divine Will and thus falls under the conception of ‘the actual infinite’.

Royce lays emphasis upon two features which belong to our temporal experience: (a) the double aspect of our consciousness of a series of events (whether in the specious present, or in our experience of wider successions such as the appreciation of a melody or phrase): we can ‘overlook a succession and view at once its serially related and mutually exclusive events’,³ and if we could not do this ‘we should never know anything whatever about the existence of succession, and should have no problem about time upon our hands’.⁴ This is ‘a matter of the most fundamental importance for our whole conception of Time, and . . . of Eternity’.⁵ In the apprehension of successions wider than the specious present we are able, in spite of transiency, to grasp the succession as a whole; and in the specious present we go further, and so far as the ‘time-span’ itself is concerned we grasp a succession all at once and without loss by transiency. For Royce there is no fundamental difference

¹ The conception of eternity as a time which has order without transiency will receive adequate attention in my main argument, as well as the question of the ultimate adequacy of temporal as opposed to intellectual order. Cf. ‘Notes on the Problem of Time’, p. 346: ‘Time . . . may itself be timeless in the sense that it does not pass . . . It may be an inseparable aspect of the life of the Absolute, though the Absolute cannot be held to be in it. Such a view . . . is the only one that seems to me to be finally coherent.’

² ‘Notes on the Problem of Time’, p. 343.

³ *The World and the Individual*, ii, p. 117.

⁴ *Loc. cit.*

⁵ *Loc. cit.*

in the two cases: 'A consciousness related to the whole of the world's events, and to the whole of time, precisely as our human consciousness is related to a single melody or rhythm, and to the brief but still extended interval of time which this melody or rhythm occupies,—such a consciousness, I say, is an Eternal Consciousness. In principle we already possess and are acquainted with the nature of such a consciousness, whenever we do experience any succession as one whole. The only thing needed to complete our idea [of it] is the conceived removal of that arbitrary limitation which permits us men to observe . . . at once a succession, but forbids us [if] it occupies more than a very few seconds'.¹ Thus eternity is God's specious present: a conception with which I have dealt sufficiently in the course of Chapter II.

(b) The second feature which is emphasized by Royce is that of purpose or will. 'Our temporal form of experience is thus peculiarly the form of the Will as such';² 'What is earlier in a given succession is related to what is later as being that *from* which we pass *towards* a desired fulfilment, or in search of a more complete expression of our purpose'.³ 'Time is thus indeed the form of practical activity; and its whole character, and especially that direction of its succession . . . are determined accordingly'.⁴ That there is vital truth in these statements I shall not deny, but it is necessary to point out that Royce seems very undecided as to its nature. It is possible to distinguish in his statements two distinct interpretations: there is the notion of time as the natural ally of real purpose and its fulfilment, as well as the precisely opposed view of it as the natural obstacle to the satisfaction of the will. 'The present, in our inner experience, means a whole series of events grasped by somebody as having some unity for his consciousness, and as having its own single internal meaning';⁵ 'only in terms of Will, and only by virtue of the significant relations of the stages of a teleological process, has time . . . any meaning':⁶ these expressions emphasize the alliance of time and the will. 'The real world is a temporal world in so far as, in various regions of that world, seeking differs from attainment, pursuit is external to its own goal, the imperfect tends towards its own perfection . . .';⁷ 'Our experience of time is thus for us essentially an experience of longing, of pursuit, of restlessness':⁸ here time is the opponent of fulfilment. More generally Royce combines the two aspects in what I may call a neutral statement: 'In pursuing its goals, the Self lives in time';⁹ but in fact this distinction is of the first importance, even if it is true that real duration combines both in a single character.

¹ *The World and the Individual*, ii, p. 142.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 124.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 123-4.

⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 126.

⁵ *Loc. cit.*, p. 129.

⁶ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 132-3.

⁷ *Loc. cit.*, p. 133.

⁸ *Loc. cit.*, p. 125.

⁹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 134.

For the question must arise as to the relations of the two elements of duration in the ideal progress towards complete satisfaction in the Absolute. Although the problem as to the meaning of 'purpose' in a complete being is also important, I do not at the moment consider that ultimate difficulty; but even supposing that it is true that 'the goal of every finite life is simply the totality whereof this life, in its finitude, is a fragment. When I seek my own goal, I am looking for the whole of myself';¹ that 'the Self in its entirety is the whole of a self-representative or recurrent process, and not the mere last moment or stage of that process . . . there is in fact no last moment';² still the question must arise as to whether the resistance of time to the will does not become less and less as the absolute whole of time is approached, while its scope and alliance increase *pari passu*, until in the limit, i.e. with the Absolute, the resistance ceases and the alliance is complete. But, if so, is the 'time' which is the eternity of the Absolute recognizably 'time' at all? If we gained all our ends without resistance, I take it that we should have no experience of a transient time at all. But should we experience succession? There would perhaps be the succession of fulfilled purposes; but in the Absolute this too must disappear, since its 'purpose' is single: the eternal order of the world. How, then, can that order be temporal? It is successive neither transiently nor intransiently.

In spite of these difficulties it is evident that Royce approaches very near to a solution of the problem of time and eternity; if he has failed to solve it that is because he did not sufficiently emphasize the ambiguous character of duration, and thus, in effect, by a curious inversion has used the wrong premiss in his inference. In his laudable endeavour to avoid the Bradleian *impasse* which loses the relative in the Absolute, he has argued as if time were essentially an *aid* to the will, whereas the truth rather is that by purpose we mean the defeat of time, and by contingency time's triumph. In an occasional passage or expression Royce is even willing to concede that 'in principle a time-sequence, however brief, is already viewed in a way that is not *merely* temporal, when, despite its sequence, it is grasped at once'.³ That supersession of the temporal is one with our conquest of time, and this manifests itself as the real duration of the finite individual, which thus reveals its eternity; and in the limit, i.e. in the Absolute, the defeat of time is complete, so that eternity can no longer be imaged as an enduring whole, but known for what it really is.

Thus the conception of 'the actual infinite'⁴ must be applied, not to the imagined complete whole of infinite time (which as I have shown in the main argument is an incoherent conception), but to *tota Natura* as an

¹ *The World and the Individual*, ii, p. 135.

² *Loc. cit.*, pp. 135-6.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 142.

⁴ See Excursus V (pp. 160-3).

Individual which infinitely reflects itself within itself as an ordered hierarchy of finite individuals. The unique actual infinite and eternal Individual thus reproduces itself in infinitely many partly eternal finite individuals, and their times are the efflux of their *partialitas*, and not of their *totalitas*. But time in itself is the very incarnation of the indefinite or 'bad' infinite.

Further, as time is the expression of our *partialitas*, and is reflected in the 'common order of nature' as that appears to our Imagination, so our real duration is the expression of our relative *totalitas*, that is to say, of our nature as it is arranged in the intellectual order. To that extent time is superseded by real unity. But not completely: hence we are identical beings persisting through, and able to review, time. Our unity is not temporal but essential; and thus, in the limit, *Natura* must be a unity, not temporal but essential, i.e. eternal. In so saying I am going far beyond the point yet reached in my essay; these summary statements will be more fully explained in the course of its main argument, but meanwhile sufficient has been said to show that in the speculations of Mr. Mackenzie and of Royce there is to be found no ground for supposing that the indefinite character of temporal extension can be conceived as complete, without either an illegitimate truncating, or an essential transcending, of time.

CHAPTER III

SPINOZA'S CONCEPTION OF ETERNITY

I TURN next to Spinoza's own precise account of eternity. The distinction, he says, between eternity and duration arises from the fact that we conceive the existence of Substance as entirely different from the existence of modes.¹ Again, eternity is 'an attribute under which we conceive the infinite existence of God. Duration is an attribute under which we conceive the existence of created things in so far as they persevere in their actuality'.² Or again, 'from our division of being into that the essence of which involves existence, and that the essence of which involves only a possible existence, there arises the distinction between eternity and duration'.³ 'By duration we can explain only the existence of modes, but by eternity the existence of Substance, that is, the infinite enjoyment or realization of existence or being.'⁴ Further, as the duration of a thing is its whole existence (for 'to whatever degree you deprive a thing of duration to that degree you deprive it of existence'⁵) so eternity is that 'infinite existence' which coincides with the real essence of God; 'which is attributable only to God, and not to created things, no, not even if they endure for ever'.⁶ For this existence is not something which is superadded

¹ 'Clare apparet, nos existentiam Substantiae toto genere a Modorum existentia diversam concipere'. (*Ep. xii.*)

² Aeternitas est 'attributum, sub quo infinitam Dei existentiam concipimus. Duratio vero est attributum, sub quo rerum creaturarum existentiam, prout in sua actualitate perseverant, concipimus' (*Cog. Met. I, iv*). On the use of the term 'attributum' in this connexion, see Excursus II (pp. 64-71).

³ 'Ex eo, quod supra divisimus ens in ens, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, et in ens, cujus essentia non involvit nisi possibilem existentiam, oritur distinctio inter aeternitatem et durationem.' (*Cog. Met. I, iv.*)

⁴ 'Per durationem . . . modorum tantum existentiam explicare possumus; Substantiae vero per aeternitatem, hoc est, infinitam existendi, sive, invita latinitate, essendi fruitionem.' (*Ep. xii.*)

⁵ 'Quantum enim durationi alicujus rei detrahis, tantundem ejus existentiae detrahi necesse est.' (*Cog. Met. I, iv.*)

⁶ 'Deo infinita actu existentia competit . . . atque hanc infinitam existentiam aeternitatem voco, quae soli Deo tribuenda, non vero ulli rei creatae; non, inquam, quamvis earum duratio utroque careat fine.' (*Cog. Met. II, i*). I have commented in Excursus II (pp. 64-71) on the important change of emphasis in Spinoza's views when, in the *Ethics*, he assigned eternity to *mens humana*, thus in a sense going beyond *solus Deus*; but only 'in a sense', for man is eternal only in so far as he is a reproduction, and thus also an essential part, of God.

to God, even by right; it is not something that God enjoys or possesses, it is the divine being. 'We cannot affirm that God enjoys existence, for the existence of God is God himself.'¹ Duration is, indeed, the enjoyment of existence, but eternity is existence itself. It is this infinite realization of existence and not an indefinite emptying of existence that must give us our clue to Spinoza's conception of eternity. What duration is to a conditioned existence, that, or not less than that, is eternity to the necessary existence of God; it is its essence. 'As we cannot attribute duration to God, we call him eternal', he says, hastily correcting his not unconsidered assertion that 'by the term eternity we explain the duration of God'.² I need not reconsider here the reputed double valuation of duration by Spinoza to which I have already made reference; it would be easy to show that the ambiguity belonged, not to the mind of Spinoza, but to duration itself; it was essential for him both to distinguish and to relate the two conceptions, duration and eternity: to distinguish them, since he was very much concerned to distinguish an eternal existence from an existence *ab aeterno et in aeternum*; to relate them, since not only are both for him forms of existence, but they are both forms of the same aspect of existence; for duration is clearly related to eternity in a way in which number (e.g.) is certainly not. These are facts which have too often been overlooked, especially by those who have been wont to think of Spinozistic eternity as the mere negation of duration, or as equivalent to timelessness.

Eternity, then, is a kind of existence, it is existence *par excellence*, an infinite existence, or, as the formal definition runs: existence 'conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition [i.e. the essence or nature] of the eternal thing';³ that is to say, where the distinction of essence and existence is a mental device rather than a real difference.⁴ And in one of his great sayings, characterized by his peculiar intensity of meaning and restraint of expression, Spinoza lays bare the source of the errors of metaphysical writers

¹ 'Deus vero non potest dici frui existentia, nam existentia Dei est Deus ipse.' (*Cog. Met. II, i.*)

² 'Praecipuum attributum . . . est Dei Aeternitas, qua ipsius durationem explicamus; vel potius, ut nullam Deo durationem tribuamus, dicimus eum esse aeternum.' (*Loc. cit.*) See Excursus II (pp. 64-71).

³ 'Per aeternitatem intelligo ipsam existentiam, quatenus ex sola rei aeternae definitione necessario sequi concipitur.' (*Eth. I, Def. viii.*)

⁴ i.e. a *distinctio rationis* and not a *distinctio realis*.

on this subject, namely, their vain and futile attempt to explain eternity in abstraction from the nature of God or perfect being: 'as if eternity could be understood apart from the contemplation of the essence of God, or indeed as if it were anything other than the divine nature.'¹ Evidently the ultimate view of eternity, if we are to do justice to the conception of Spinoza, must be something more even than a certain abstract intellectual order, which is but its empty *schema*. It is real existence as flowing from, nay, as identical with, essence: it is an essential existence.

It remains, then, to inquire into the peculiar nature of this existence which is not to be conceived as a mere persistence. Has the human mind any experience of such a form of existence? In the absence of such experience the unreality of duration and the necessity of a certain intellectual order might well be accepted as abstract conclusions, but the mind would not attain any more inward apprehension of the nature of eternity.

I may, with advantage, say at once that I shall in the issue argue that the essence of Spinoza's teaching is that not only has man such experience or knowledge, but that he only has knowledge of any kind, even Imagination of a changing world of finite modes, in so far as such imagined or 'imaginative' existences have removed themselves from the divisions and exclusions of finite empirical duration, and begun to approximate to the whole and inclusive character of eternal being; that a temporal existence in so far as it is purely temporal is the same as non-existence, and is perishing in proportion to its fragmentariness and exclusiveness; and that existence in every range in so far as it gains content moves already towards an ideal of perfection which is one with eternity itself. But even at the present stage of my argument I can and must affirm that according to Spinoza the human mind, finite as it is, is not left without knowledge, not merely of a partially 'eternized' duration, but of eternity itself. It is, perhaps, characteristic of Spinoza's metaphysical fervour (I might even call it 'passion', for it is to some extent a failing in him) that he seems to leap direct to the goal instead of approaching it by ordered and graded steps. Plato had, in his own way, known much better: 'the form of the Infinite must not be applied to the Many until all the species intermediate

¹ 'Quasi aeternitas absque essentiae divinae contemplatione intelligi posset, vel quid esset praeter divinam essentiam.' (*Cog. Met. II, i.*)

between the One and the Infinite have been surveyed . . . The wise men of our time make their One by chance, and their Many too quickly or too slowly, and from the One pass direct to the Infinite, so that the middle terms always escape them.¹ This tendency to be too quick or too slow in conceiving plurality in unity is, indeed, the characteristic un wisdom of the wise, and not merely of sophists, in all ages. For Spinoza, we are not merely other than temporal, possessing an actual duration, but we are even to some degree eternal, and as such, therefore, share the eternity of undivided Substance. I have not yet reached the proper point in my argument for the discussion of the difficulties of such a conception, but I may, perhaps, suggest that this is Spinoza's own way of expressing the truth which had appeared to Descartes in the form of the absolute certainty of our own existence as the starting-point of all knowledge. It is in a very real sense as important for Spinoza to establish the eternity of the mind, as it was for Descartes to establish the certainty of the existence of the self. Unless, in some sense, the knower is eternal he must for ever be cut off from absolute truth and from the knowledge of God. He would have no status in the Real, and therefore could not even be aware of its reality. It was thus essential for Spinoza to affirm the eternity of the mind, or, what is the same thing, its knowledge of its eternity. We are not left without that affirmation: 'we feel and prove by experience that we are eternal',² for we as men have commerce with, and enter into, reality; and we do so most truly in so far as, both corporeally and mentally, we reproduce the Real in those ordered intellectual perceptions and precise corporeal responses that constitute at once our groundedness in the Real, and our real contribution to it. Thus only do we enjoy our true being. Only in so far as we fail to apprehend and respond to the Real do we suffer birth and death and vicissitude, and are thus excluded from the Real.³ 'For the mind feels those things that it conceives by the intellect no less than those that it [imagines]. For demonstrations are the eyes of the mind whereby it sees and observes things.'⁴ Further, as we saw before,⁵

¹ *Philebus*, 16 D, E.

² 'Sentimus, experimurque, nos aeternos esse.' (*Eth. V, xxiii, Sch.*)

³ Cf. below: Chapters IV *et seqq.*

⁴ 'Nam mens non minus res illas sentit, quas intelligendo concipit, quam quas in memoria habet. Mentis enim oculi, quibus res videt, observatque, sunt ipsae demonstrationes.' (*Eth. V, xxiii, Sch.*)

⁵ Above, pp. 14-17.

Spinoza does not regard our demonstrative knowledge as merely hypothetical and concerned with abstract universal features of existence, for the objects of Reason are universal singulars, viz. the common properties or universal bases of all finite being, those 'fixed and eternal' things of which he speaks in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* as the source of the inmost essence of all individual things. 'These mutable singulars depend so intimately and essentially (so to speak) upon the fixed [and eternal] things that they cannot either be or be conceived without them.'¹ 'Whence these fixed and eternal things, *though they are themselves singulars*, will, nevertheless, owing to their omnipresence and the supreme amplitude of their power, be to us as universals.'² Reason no less than *scientia intuitiva* brings us into contact with the Real, and its peculiar failing is not that it is merely hypothetical (though if its incomplete parts were taken alone that would be true of them), but that it is selective and analytic in procedure. Its main concern is not the concrete nature even of these *fixa et aeterna* as universal individuals (much less of the mutable singulars) but their necessary connexions and relations. Undoubtedly, these are also constituents of their natures, but they are conceived by Reason for themselves, and not as constituting this or that unique individual. But in spite of these special limitations, it is none the less of the nature of Reason to perceive things *sub quadam specie aeternitatis*.³ This in itself is a notable conclusion, implying, as it does, that the Real is a *totum* which partly manifests itself in those eternal and necessary relations between whole ranges of content which are familiar as the principles of geometry (extension), of dynamics (motion and rest), and of the special sciences generally, culminating for us in the physiology of the central nervous system of man; but even more important, as I shall indicate in the issue, is the assertion that the finite mind is capable of the third kind of knowledge, *scientia*

¹ 'Haec mutabilia singularia adeo intime, atque essentialiter (ut sic dicam) ab iis fixis pendent, ut sine iis nec esse, nec concipi possint.' (*De Intell. Emend.*, Op. Post., p. 389.)

² 'Haec fixa, et aeterna, quamvis sint singularia, tamen ob eorum ubique praesentiam, ac latissimam potentiam erunt nobis, tanquam universalia, sive genera definitionum rerum singularium mutabilium, et causae proximae omnium rerum.' (*Loc. cit.*)

³ *Eth. II, xlv, Cor. ii.* A fuller discussion of the significance of this phrase in the light of the wider issues raised in the course of my argument will be found in Excursus III (pp. 99-104).

intuitiva,¹ which views things as eternal individuals within and flowing from *Natura*. Doubtless our capacity for such 'intuitions' is limited as the result of our special range of individual perfection, but we must not too readily conclude that 'intuitive' knowledge is only possible in so far as human minds are corrected and *amplified beyond recognition* as they become identical with the mind of God. Full and complete intuitive knowledge undoubtedly belongs to God alone, but we too can possess knowledge of *Natura* as a universal Individual: knowledge which, though not full and absolutely complete, is yet true and adequate so far as it goes.² *Scientia intuitiva*, therefore, is possible even where knowledge is incomplete: nor need the incompleteness be confined to the exclusion of whole types of being (or 'Attributes') from the grasp of the knower. Even within the Attributes of Thought and Extension incompleteness of adequate range does not exclude the possibility of an 'intuitive' apprehension of part of the content available. And if this were not so, as has been said, all 'Rational' knowledge would for us be *purely* hypothetical (and thus empty and unmeaning); for by no mere *collection* of laws, but only by their systematic *connexion*, can we apprehend in their full concreteness the natures of Extension or of Thought: '*demonstrations*' are the eyes of the mind. But the '*demonstrations*' which constitute *scientia intuitiva* are not the serial proofs of the learner, nor these made timeless for contemplation,³ but the intuitive proofs of the real knower, who

¹ 'Summus Mentis conatus, summaque virtus est res intelligere tertio cognitionis genere.' (*Eth. V, xxv.*)

² 'Unaqueque cujuscunque corporis, vel rei singularis, actu existentis, idea Dei aeternam, et infinitam essentiam necessario involvit. . . . Cognitio aeternae, et infinitae essentiae Dei, quam unaquaeque idea involvit, est adaequata, et perfecta. . . . Mens humana adaequatam habet cognitionem aeternae, et infinitae essentiae Dei.' (*Eth. II, xlv-xlvii.*) 'Ad quaestionem tuam, an de Deo tam claram, quam de triangulo habeam ideam, respondeo affirmando: Si me vero interrogas, utrum tam claram de Deo, quam de triangulo habeam imaginem, respondebo negando: Deum enim non imaginari; sed quidem intelligere possumus. Hic quoque notandum est, quod non dico, me Deum omnino cognoscere; sed me quaedam ejus attributa; non autem omnia, neque maximam intelligere partem, et certum est, plurimorum ignorantiam, quorundam eorum habere notitiam, non impedire. Quum Euclidis elementa addiscerem, primo tres trianguli angulos duobus rectis aequari intelligebam; hancque trianguli proprietatem clare percipiebam, licet multarum aliarum ignarus essem.' (*Ep. lvi.*)

³ I need hardly say that I do not think that the *essence* of any proof is in time, even for the learner. Its progressive *clarification* is in time. I add this note because even timeless proof is 'serial' in the sense that the distinction of *prior* and *posterior* is essential to it.

grasps the instance in the concrete universal and the concrete universal in the instance, and whose intellectual life is thus an enjoyed concrete sorites. It is an essential part of my general thesis that all real existence, *qua* real, is the object of such *scientia intuitiva*, and is, as such, eternal: not merely in the negative sense of 'timeless', nor merely in the neutral sense of 'necessary', but in the real and positive sense that its content or quality is a draught of the very nature of the eternal whole.

That is a conclusion not yet established, to which I must approach by ordered steps; but it is the principle which must govern my interpretation of the common judgement that for Spinoza 'to know the eternal is to be eternal'. This statement is *formally* no more than a particular expression of the general principle that 'the order and connexion of ideas is the same as the order and connexion of things.'¹ In so far as we know the temporal, we are temporal; in so far as we know the eternal, we are eternal. And the same principle applies not merely as between the Attributes, but within each Attribute: in so far as our bodies or our minds reflect or reproduce the eternal whole of Extension or Thought respectively, they too are eternal. And this is the *real* significance of the statement: in knowing the eternal we do not put aside our finitude and lose ourselves in the divine. In knowing the eternal we do not become 'The Eternal'; though the divine nature alone is eternal in the full and complete sense. All finite things are, in their measure, eternal: they may, and must, be truly apprehended *sub quadam specie aeternitatis*; they are no *mere* sections of the divine nature capable of eternity only in so far as they receive amplification *in pari materia* (though that is true to some extent with all finite beings), but they are themselves inchoations of the eternal, and draughts of the Real. So much by way of presage of the general direction of my argument.

In the proof of *Corollary ii* to *Proposition xlv* of *Part II* of the *Ethics*, Spinoza shows special concern about excluding all time-relations,² and thus emphasizes the logical character of an eternal existence, i.e. its necessity. This has misled many into supposing that he intends here to convey the metaphysical essence of eternity. But we may be confident that he had no such intention, for it is necessary to pass beyond Reason to *scientia intuitiva* to obtain that further knowledge; the necessary connexions and relations of things

¹ *Eth. II, vii.*

² 'Absque ulla temporis relatione' (*Eth. II, xlv, Cor. ii.*).

must be woven into concrete individuals as such, and not as mere assembled implicates.¹ Similarly, in order to experience eternal existence we must be able to take a single view of our own individual existence from inside, and thus also to have adequate knowledge of external things and of the whole. And it is in this sense alone that to know things *sub quadam specie aeternitatis* is also 'to feel and prove by experience that we are eternal'. There need be, for us there can be, no real separation of the two forms of knowledge; Reason blossoms into *scientia intuitiva*, which enlarges and reconstructs itself by means of Reason. Thus our finitude genuinely reveals itself.² The *Ethics* of Spinoza is itself a notable example of these relations of Reason and *scientia intuitiva*; in the main it is a system of Reason, but again and again it uses conceptions which imply the presence of *scientia intuitiva*, both in the author, and in the reader if he is to understand his philosopher. Of no part of the work is this more true than of the second section of *Part V*: and I might go so far as to assert that it is just those propositions which most truly exemplify the processes of Reason, that provide the text for the view of Spinozism as reducing relation to identity, and existence to a moment; as it is the more concrete teaching of *Part V* that must become the essential ground for a true view of Spinozistic Eternity.

THE AFFECTS³

But although it is to *scientia intuitiva* that we must look for the main clue to the Spinozistic conception of eternity, it is not necessary, indeed it would be pernicious, to separate the second section of *Part V* of the *Ethics* from the rest of the work. Spinoza means to tell a single story; and in order to show that in the main

¹ The reader who finds this summary phrase, and the ensuing sentences, obscure, is referred to later discussions, and especially to Excursus III (pp. 99-104).

² For in the perfect individual experience, or Thought, no such enlargement or reconstruction could be forthcoming or needed. The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of Extension as the perfect extended individual. (Cf. also below, p. 102.)

³ I use the term 'affect', in spite of some obvious objections, rather than the more usual 'emotion' because (1) it is less ambiguous, since the word 'affect' has no other common substantival meaning in English; (2) it is a near relation of the Latin *affectus* which is Spinoza's own term, and thus constantly recalls the reader's attention to the original; (3) because it does describe the nature of these modifications, which arise only in finite beings, and as a result of their relations with external things by which they are 'affected', and which they 'affect'.

he succeeds in doing so, I shall consider next the theory of the Affects, which is found in *Part III*, and which has an important bearing on our main problem, providing us, as it does, with a clue to a Spinozistic phenomenology.

Spinoza draws a clear distinction between the joy (*laetitia*), sorrow (*tristitia*), and desire (*cupiditas*) of the finite mode on the one hand, and the eternal blessedness (*beatitudo*) of God and the free man on the other. Conscious of its finitude, each fluctuating mode suffers continual change, which it as continually resists so far as it can, i.e. so long as it exists. This change, and the striving against change, are experienced as joy or sorrow, and desire, respectively. In these affects we are directly aware of processes, which are not to be taken as alternating, unconnected states, but rather as felt qualities in which succession has been transcended but not lost, and in which transformation has become a felt, and therefore direct, *datum*. For Spinoza is emphatic in his insistence upon the identity of the affect with the process, and not with the *termini* of the process: 'I say [joy and sorrow] are transitions: for joy is not perfection itself, for if a man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess the same without joy. . . . Neither can we say that sorrow consists in the absence of greater perfection; absence is nothing, whereas sorrow is an actual positive affect, and hence a transition.'¹ The finite mind, in other words, does not merely apprehend its objects and its ideas in their logical or perceptual distinction and order, it directly apprehends their changes towards or away from perfection, and it apprehends its own existence as a ceaseless urge or struggle against an obstructive environment.

As opposed to these direct experiences of transition and of duration which belong to the finite mode, Spinoza contrasts the eternal blessedness of God: 'If joy consists in the transition to a greater perfection, assuredly blessedness must consist in this, that the mind is endowed with perfection itself.'² No assertion in

¹ 'Dico transitionem. Nam Laetitia non est ipsa perfectio. Si enim homo cum perfectione, ad quam transit, nasceretur, ejusdem absque Laetitiae affectu compos esset. . . . Nec dicere possumus, quod Tristitia in privatione majoris perfectionis consistat; nam privatio nihil est; Tristitia autem affectus actus est qui propterea nullus alius esse potest, quam actus transeundi ad minorem perfectionem.' (*Eth. III, Aff. Def. iii, Explic.*)

² 'Si Laetitia in transitione ad majorem perfectionem consistit, Beatitudo sane in eo consistere debet, quod mens ipsa perfectione sit praedita.' (*Eth. V, xxxiii, Sch.*)

the *Ethics* is more decisive for my argument, for joy belongs to an enduring existence, but blessedness to one that is eternal. As opposed to duration, which implies change towards or from perfection, an eternal being, incapable of change, enjoys fullness and perfection of existence, enjoys blessedness, not as though it were something different from its essence, which it might therefore be without while still existing, but as the very content of its reality.

It has sometimes been asserted that, in view of Spinoza's own statements about the nature of the fundamental affects, the conception of blessedness, though in itself one of the most attractive features of the system, is really only a beautiful excrescence.¹ For the affects, as transitions to or from perfection, are essentially durational in character; an eternal being, on the contrary, being incapable of such transitions, must lack all affective experience.² I shall meet that contention by tracing the development of the

¹ The phrase is Mr. Alexander's, dropped in the course of a discussion arising out of a paper on Spinoza's doctrine of Eternity which I read at the Manchester University Philosophical Society in January 1928.

² A parallel, or rather inverse, 'excrescence' appears in the doctrine of *Part II* of the *Ethics*, where Spinoza tells us that the human mind knows only its own body and its changes directly, and other things only through the *propria communia*. He then goes on to affirm that 'the human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected' (*Eth. II, xix*), and the impression gathered is that but for the interference of external things causing changes in the human body, the mind would be wholly unaware of its body; and, in effect, that the mind only perceives changes and their *termini*. That principle, if carried through to the end, would deprive Substance of the Attribute of Thought, just as an insistence on the transitional nature of joy seems *prima facie* to deprive God of blessedness.

It is obvious that Spinoza desires to advance no such conclusion; and in the demonstration of the Proposition that I have quoted, his line of argument becomes clear: the reason why the body would not be known by the mind but for the action of other things on it, is that it does not exist in isolation from other things, and ultimately from the whole universe which, in its measure, it reproduces. It is the tendency of Imagination to take things in isolation, both external things and also our bodies, that constitutes its peculiar danger, and renders it liable to err. Thus even where we seem to know the body without relation to external things, the knowledge is inadequate, and is only possible because external things co-operate with our bodies to form reproductive 'images' on certain soft parts of the organism. The point, therefore, is not that we cannot know anything but changes in the body, but that knowledge is always of a world or connected system; and since the human body is a finite, and therefore incomplete, system, deriving both its content and its complement from *Natura* as an infinite and complete whole, it follows that knowledge of the body must depend upon its reciprocal relations with the *facies totius Universi*. Thus not least when its object seems most independent and whole in its *partialitas* does knowledge point to the infinite Attribute of Thought.

notion of blessedness. The transition to this conception from that of joy is through the conception of *inward mental repose*¹ which is defined as 'joy arising from the contemplation of ourselves and our own power of acting'², that is to say, it is not mere abstract joy, but one that is grounded, and which arises from the perception of a perfection already possessed. Now the perfection or reality of a thing, according to Spinoza, is identical with its activity, it is the possession within its own individual nature of adequate genetic causes for its particular content. The essence of a thing in so far as it is real *is* this activity or grounded content. 'Our mind is sometimes active . . . [and] in so far as it has adequate ideas, it is necessarily active.'³ The 'actual essence' of a finite thing is this real essence modified in proportion to its finitude by the passivity involved in, or concomitant with, inadequate ideas. The result of this qualification or finitude is to limit existence to the form of duration, so that the *potentia* of a thing appears as its *conatus in suo esse perseverandi*, and as desire, the third fundamental affect. It follows that desire does not belong to God, for whom actual and real essence are identical, and who therefore cannot be conceived as enduring. These statements involve important principles which I cannot here elaborate; for the present I must be content to sum them up dogmatically by saying that genuine activity, as it is found in God and in the eternal part of the free man, is not identical with desire, and does not imply transient causality; it is one with the logical *nisus* of adequate or grounded ideas.

It follows, further, from the well-known doctrine of *idea ideae* that the mind is capable of a 'reflective' joy in contemplating its concrete achievements, over and above the direct joy of this or that achieving. For the mind could not unknowingly possess this *nisus* to wholeness which belongs to adequate ideas, because its being *is* its knowledge: 'The essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge.'⁴ Thus though it is not true to say that 'reflective' knowledge *constitutes* individuality,⁵ it is certainly one with the

¹ *Mentis acquiescentia in se ipso.*

² 'Laetitia, orta ex eo, quod homo se ipsum, suamque agendi potentiam contemplatur.' (*Eth. III, Aff. Def. xxv.*)

³ 'Mens nostra quaedam agit . . . quatenus adaequatas habet ideas, eatenus quaedam necessario agit.' (*Eth. III, i.*)

⁴ 'Nostrae Mentis essentia in sola cognitione consistit.' (*Eth. V. xxxvi, Sch.*)

⁵ Cf. Camerer: *Die Lehre Spinoza's*, II, i, 2. In discussing this conception, Professor Joachim says: 'If we ask what Spinoza intended to establish by his conception of "idea ideae", the answer can hardly be doubtful. He intended

enjoyment of individuality or perfection, and is thus the source of *mentis acquiescentia in se ipso*. The mind, therefore, not only experiences its duration or temporal transitions as affects, it also knows itself, and, so far as it is active or real, as in some degree it

to restore that unity and continuity in all our thinking, which his conception of the mind as a complex of "ideae" seems to have destroyed . . . It does not seem erroneous to suppose that Spinoza intended to find such a unity in the "idea ideae"—the consciousness of our thinking which every act of thinking involves. But if this was his intention, it must be confessed that he has failed' (*A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, pp. 140-1). I do not think that Spinoza had any such intention, nor do I think that any such restoration of unity was needed. That the human mind is not *fully* individual is, of course, one of his main contentions; but that it is a mere aggregate of atomic ideas is an entirely Humian misrendering of his theory of the nature of finite mind. Professor Joachim's interpretation of *Eth. II, Post. i*, and *II, xv* in this sense, is, I think, to say the least, very unsympathetic, and in effect fundamentally erroneous. This point is further discussed in connexion with the notion of the *corpus simplicissimum* below (Excursus IV, pp. 137-41), but I may here add that no doctrine of mind could in itself be further removed from mental atomism than that of Spinoza; for according to him, mind is essentially systematic, and the human mind is only rightly so called in so far as it is not completely pulverulent. True mind, even finite mind, is in its measure *active*, that is, it contains within itself adequate generating causes for its ideas: its content is grounded (not transiently caused), and therefore systematically connected in accordance with logical principles, which are also the principles of real production. The mind is really individual in proportion as its ideas are in 'the intellectual order'; it is an aggregate only in so far as it remains in 'the common order of nature'. Nor does this mean or imply, as Professor Joachim asserts, that the human mind has being and individuality only in and for God; 'but *in and for God* man is no longer what he is for himself and for other men. His real being and individuality is God's being and individuality, and is "his own" only in the sense in which God is all things and all things are in God' (*Loc. cit.*, p. 142). In the course of subsequent chapters I have attempted to distinguish clearly between the little truth and the very great error of such a statement, and to that further discussion I must refer the reader.

I conclude that a more sympathetic interpretation of this part of Spinoza's theory would have shown that the doctrine of '*idea ideae*' or reflective knowledge has no special relation to his supposed combination of Atomism in Physics and Psychology with Parmenideanism in Metaphysics, but is intended to elucidate the nature of thinking being, and of our awareness of it as a distinct form of existent.

I may add that the atomistic misreading of Spinoza's theory leads Professor Joachim to ascribe to him the truly hopeless contradiction involved in asserting at once (1) that the *idea ideae* is identical with the *idea* itself ('in fact, so absolutely one are they, that they cannot even be conceived as identical: for identity with no difference is a meaningless term' (*Loc. cit.*, p. 140), a statement which is perhaps intended to relieve the contradiction; but if so, at the expense of the whole theory of the *idea ideae*); and also (2) that the *idea ideae* involves a process *in infinitum* (*Loc. cit.*, p. 141). I have shown elsewhere that the *Scholium* to *Eth. II, xxi* (on which he bases these views) definitely repudiates the suggestion of the infinite series; and in the same place (below, p. 260, note 5) I have indicated what I take to be the essence of Spinoza's intention and meaning.

must be, knows itself adequately, and in this self-knowledge may be supposed to pass to a greater perfection as 'reflective' knowledge becomes more effective and profound. For the 'reflective' knowledge of the mind must more and more approximate to *scientia intuitiva*, for which the temporal transitions of Imagination are superseded by 'logical transitions';¹ and these are rightly apprehended in *scientia intuitiva* as the eternal *nisus* of grounds and consequents. Such concrete intuition is, according to Spinoza, accompanied by delight proportioned to the degree of perfection already achieved, so that *acquiescentia* is not, like joy, an unreal abstraction or *passio*, but an *actio*, and the proper affective enjoyment of adequate knowledge. It would be strange indeed if the mind could feel its transition to a greater perfection, and yet be wholly unaware of the perfection itself to which it has passed; for thus perfection would be wholly relative, instead of being the very standard of absoluteness: 'By reality and perfection I mean the same thing.'² Nor can grounds and consequents be rightly separated as successive or as coexistent in an intellectual space or neutral 'time': their distinctness is not spatio-temporal, and their coexistence, though not spatial, does not lapse into identity or confused altogetherness, nor again into 'identity' in mere 'difference': their relation is asymmetrical. It becomes quality.³ And when Spinoza

¹ Objection may, perhaps legitimately, be raised to this extension of the use of the term 'transition' to timeless logical relations in which there can be no 'transience' in the literal sense of a going over or across to something else. I hope that the course of my argument will indicate that I am quite aware of the partial unsuitability of the term; what I am anxious to make clear is that even when all time-relations are abstracted from logical content there remains something in the nature of 'process'. For though they are 'together', premisses and conclusion form no symmetrical identity in difference, but there remains the fundamental distinction between the logically *prior* and the logically *posterior*.

I cannot think that the theological term 'procession' is any less objectionable than 'transition'; and, in view of Mr. Whitehead's use of the term, 'passage' seems definitely worse. 'Direction' which is more neutral is also more spatial in suggestion (see p. 158, note 1).

² 'Per realitatem, et perfectionem idem intelligo.' (*Eth. II, Def. vi.*)

³ As will be seen in due course, even the 'common order of nature' is never a mere series distributed in temporal points without 'permeation'. The world of Imagination lacks the wholeness of the 'intellectual order', but it cannot be entirely lacking in connexion and continuity: it is at least an 'order' of nature. And the causes which we detect in nature are never Humian causes, but bear some real relation to their effects: they are 'genetic' or producing causes; and in so far as the world of perception lacks such real causes it lacks causation altogether, it exhibits mere transitions, and duration gives place to time, quality to quantity, and reality to nonentity.

speaks of the possession of unchanging perfection as being without joy, he must not be understood to deny that it involves *acquiescentia*, the positive experience of inward mental repose; rather it must be asserted that joy itself would be impossible without some awareness of its *termini*, since though change is not the same thing as difference *simpliciter*, still less is it pure process. Awareness of change without awareness of achievement or loss is, in strictness, inconceivable, though the actual estimation of the result may be vague and inadequate.

Now blessedness is identical with that highest possible mental repose¹ which arises from the third kind of knowledge. It is the affective apprehension, not of temporal transition to or from perfection, but of perfection itself, not of achieving but of achievement. But, it may be objected, the real fallacy in Spinoza's doctrine is not its assertion that joy, or the affective perception of transition, implies *acquiescentia*, or the affective perception of the *termini* of transition, and that hence an eternal being is not deprived of affective or qualitative content; but the converse assertion that there can be awareness of achievement without awareness of achieving: that a perfect and complete being can, without change or struggle, enjoy not merely the fruits, but also the sense, of victory. That is an objection that seems to run nearer to the heart of the thesis, and I must admit that Spinoza's own statement about the genesis of *acquiescentia in se ipso* is not altogether unambiguous. 'When the mind is able to contemplate itself it is thereby *supposed* to pass to a greater perfection, that is (by *III, xi, Sch.*) to feel joy,'² which seems to make *acquiescentia* after all only a transition, and therefore a particular example of joy. But the use of the term '*supponitur*' is significant; for there can be no genuine transition in such a case, since the *idea* and the *idea ideae* are one and the same: 'The idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing.'³ True, there may seem to be, with the finite mind, a transition to a greater degree of 'reflective' clearness, arising from our ideas becoming more adequate; but this is necessarily absent from the free mind in proportion to its freedom;

¹ 'Summa, quae dari potest, Mentis acquiescentia.' (*Eth. V, xxxii, Dem.*)

² 'Cum ergo fit, ut Mens se ipsam possit contemplari, eo ipso ad maiorem perfectionem transire, hoc est (per *Schol. Prop. xi hujus*), laetitia affici supponitur.' (*Eth. III, liii, Dem.*)

³ 'Mentis idea, et ipsa Mens una, eademque est res, quae sub uno, eodemque attributo, nempe Cogitationis, concipitur.' (*Eth. II, xxi, Sch.*)

and in any case, it is not a transition from knowledge of an object to 'reflection' upon knowledge itself: 'He who knows anything by that very fact knows that he knows it, and at the same time he knows that he knows himself to know it, and so on to infinity.'¹ *Acquiescentia*, therefore, is not a transition in the same sense as is joy, it is not a temporal transition, but a 'supposed' transition, and this must be explained as meaning that the 'transition' is logical rather than temporal. And it is because the transitional nature of joy does not infect its qualitative content, that perfection itself, which is no literal transition, may be enjoyed as quality in *acquiescentia*. In joy the moments of temporal transition are summed up as enduring quality; in finite *acquiescentia* the moments of logical 'transition' are concretely enjoyed *sub specie durationis*; and in blessedness the eternal *nisus* of grounds to consequents is apprehended and enjoyed as that intellectual love which alone among the affects is eternal.

The same distinctions are pertinent in the interpretation of the unchanging character of the Real. The lack of transition in *Natura* is not meant by Spinoza as an imperfection in it, but, on the contrary, as an alternative expression of its perfection, i.e. of its absolute completeness. Transition is denied because it implies imperfection either in its *terminus a quo* or in its *terminus ad quem*, indeed, ultimately in both; but logical 'transition', or the *nisus* of grounds towards consequents, involves no such defect, but is the very ground of all perfection, and the essence of the Real.

It is the distinction between unreal or temporal transition, and real 'transition' or logical *nisus* (which in analytic exposition appears as *feigned* transition) that makes clear the essential nature of *acquiescentia* and blessedness, and their relation to joy. Temporal transition is unreal because it is a contradiction in terms; duration itself is only possible as achieving grows out of achievement, and achievement out of achieving; while in eternity achievement and achieving are identical, and in *Cogitatio* their identity is intellectual love: 'Although this love towards God has no beginning, it nevertheless has all the perfections of love, just as if it had originated as we feigned in the Corollary of the last Proposition.'²

¹ 'Simulac enim quis aliquid scit, eo ipso scit, se id scire, et simul scit, se scire, quod scit, et sic in infinitum.' (*Eth. II, xxi, Sch.*)

² 'Quamvis hic erga Deum Amor principium non habuerit (per *Prop. praec.*), habet tamen omnes Amoris perfectiones, perinde ac si ortus fuisset, sicut in *Coroll. Prop. praec.* finimus. Nec ulla hic est differentia, nisi quod Mens

Similar considerations will be found to govern Spinoza's conception of the relations of alternation, causation, and perfection. No theory that accepted the externality of causation could escape the objections with which I have been dealing, for achievement would be external to the process of struggle, and could only be recognized as achievement through our memory of the process which led up to it.¹ But Spinoza's view is that all genuine causation is immanent or genetic in its real nature, though to the *partialitas* of a finite being it may appear as transient, and therefore, as having duration. That is an inescapable imagination in the experience of the finite individual; but it need not be and remain an error. Even the finite mind can recognize the ultimate nature of the Real (within its determining Attributes), and of causation, not because it is finite, but because it is intellect. Causation cannot be wholly external if there is to be real process and achievement. Even the continuous *memoria*² (either in the mental or corporeal sense) of a series of events up to the present (performing the duties of Hume's too useful 'imagination') cannot make the series a real process working to a *terminus*. The last event of an associated series only becomes a real *terminus* or achievement in so far as the whole series forms a connected system. Where that condition is entirely

easdem has perfectiones, quas eidem jam accedere finximus, aeternas habuerit, idque concomitante idea De tanquam causa aeterna.' (*Eth. V, xxxiii, Sch.*)

But, it may be asked, is not the *Ethics* arranged in accordance with the *synthetical* method? And if so, why speak of the fiction as a feature of the analytical exposition? I reply that if the *Ethics* had been in the synthetical order with any reasonable degree of exactness then the doctrines of *Part V, Propp. xxi* to *xlvi* would have preceded those of *Parts II, III, IV, and V, Propp. i* to *xx*. And, to come to the present point, the whole of the exposition of the affects is obviously *analytical*, beginning as it does from the tendency towards perfection (*laetitia*); and proceeding to the recognition and enjoyment of finite perfection (*acquiescentia*); and lastly to perfection itself (*beatitudo*). But a *synthetic* exposition should have begun from perfection and proceeded to its imperfect temporal expressions. (On the distinction of analytic and synthetic method, cf. Descartes, *Meditationes, Resp. ad Sec. Obj. vii.*)

Thus though the terms 'supponitur' and 'finximus' which I have emphasized in the passages quoted, refer primarily to what has been supposed and feigned in earlier passages, yet my argument is that these suppositions and fictions were necessary at those points because, having begun with imperfection there was no possibility of ever reaching the principles governing perfection without the use of these devices. *Beatitudo* is no fiction, and *acquiescentia* no mere supposition; but *acquiescentia* can only be reached from *laetitia* by means of a supposition; and *beatitudo* by the use of a fiction.

¹ But memory would, of course, be impossible on such a theory.

² Cf. *Eth. II, xviii, Sch.*

unfulfilled there cannot be even transiency: as in the theory of Hume, each event is absolutely temporary and disconnected. Where it is only partly fulfilled there is a measure of genuine transiency, and the process endures. Only where the condition is completely fulfilled is there real process in the sense of production as distinct from conditioning; and here transiency gives place to immanency. The perfection of the whole, therefore, must already contain all the stages of its achieving, not *sub specie durationis* as stages external to one another and to their end, and leading up to perfection, but *sub specie aeternitatis*, and after the manner in which premisses are contained in their explained conclusion: i.e. as constituting, not an identity in mere difference, or *symmetrical* difference, but an identity uniting and retaining the difference of the logically prior and the logically posterior.

Spinoza's theory of joy, then, must be taken as his recognition that the finite mind perceives duration, not as separated *puncta*, but as quality. Pure externality belongs only to time and measure, and these are unreal. His theory of *acquiescentia*, again, must be taken as signifying that it is insufficient to establish the continuity of duration, since it cannot be adequately perceived as pure process without *termini*. It is always possession, achieving, and achievement, inextricably woven together. Duration is only duration by the pressing in of the past upon the present and the emergence of the future therefrom. It is not a succession of nows, it is process; but it is not *pure* process, for successive positions in a real duration are different in quality; and the essence of existence, even of enduring existence, is that very qualitative growth through which we escape the 'absolute relativity' of mere time (and the self-contradictory phrase exactly describes the logical vice of both time and measure).

M. Bergson has well argued that real duration is not a kind of space, but is an intensive quantity, i.e. a quality; the past concentrates itself at the growing point of the present,¹ which it

¹ "Durée", the operative concentration of the self's past history at the growing point of the present, is one with the relative timelessness of a finite self. If, then, it is admitted that timelessness is an essential constituent of time—and this much will hardly be denied to-day—then to say of any finite being that it is temporal (has or is "durée") includes, strictly speaking, all that can be demanded for the description of such a self by the theory which takes eternity to be its full and perfect character.' (Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 339.)

permeates. And it is this permeation of achievement or creation by possession that constitutes the reality of duration, which is thus an enjoyed quality rather than a measurable quantity. This conception of duration was regarded by M. Bergson as a refutation of what he conceived to be Spinozism, viz. the theory that causation is identity and duration nothing. If the view which I have put forward is correct, the Bergsonian theory of duration is but a partial and inadequate Spinozism; for it is not, strictly speaking, the past as past that permeates the present, but only the past as the given, and therefore as our main source of creative essence. The permeation of the present by the past as such could not make intelligible the reality of duration. *Its creativity becomes a miracle!* What really operates at the present to produce the future cannot be merely past, but both past and future, while remaining such, must also in some sense be present at the growing point of process; and thus what operates must be relevantly efficient in past, in present, and in future, and must permeate them all: viz. eternal essence. With a stern eye directed towards M. Bergson, Mr. Alexander protests: 'In what sense it can be held that Time as we experience it in ourselves is other than a duration which is intrinsically successive passes my understanding.'¹ But the implication is not that temporal process is merely successive: or even that it is sufficient to establish its continuity in succession. There can be no succession without change of quality, nor change of quality without permeation of some sort. But the permeation is not that of the present by the past as such, any more than by the future as such; it is the permeation that we find in the relation of premisses and conclusion, through which the conclusion receives its justification, and the premisses their full content. When we say that the conclusion follows from the premisses, we do not mean that the premisses precede the conclusion in time, but that they determine the conclusion. There may be a sense in which, on occasion, e. g. in the process of learning, the premisses do precede the conclusion in time, but the premisses are still premisses after the conclusion has been drawn, and indeed, are not, strictly speaking, premisses at all until the conclusion is drawn. The conclusion, again, cannot in any but the most superficial sense be said to follow the premisses in time, since it is only a conclusion in so far as it is determined by the premisses. Further, even where

¹ *Space, Time, and Deity*, i, p. 124.

the recognition of the conclusion follows the postulation of the premisses, it is not the premisses alone as postulated that determine the conclusion, but the system within which the premisses operate and the conclusion remains.

While admitting the analogical character of this account, I must, nevertheless, contend that it does elucidate the nature of the permeation that belongs to duration. The conditions governing abstract formal inference are necessarily an inadequate representation of real productivity; but a perfectly adequate expression of this would pass beyond analogy to identity, beyond abstract implication to concrete production. The creativity of duration is one with the determination of the temporal occurrence of individual things and minds, and this again with the production by the eternal whole of its own finite expressions or partial content. It is the nature of the whole so to express itself and, in expressing, to constitute itself; and since 'matter was not lacking to him for the creation of everything from the highest down to the lowest degree of perfection',¹ the expressions are of every degree of completeness, and cannot but appear, therefore, to the finite expressions themselves, as incomplete and successive, i.e. as involving limited duration. The creativity of duration is thus but a finite extract of real creativity, which is eternal and constitutive.² There is some danger that in our anxiety to maintain the reality of duration, upon which all other reality seems to, and in a sense does, depend, we may imagine either, on the one hand, that it can be real as an unmoving and immovable $\epsilon\lambda\eta$, or, on the other hand, that its reality must be conceived as a creativity that 'passeth understanding' and can only be met appropriately in that spirit of artificial stupidity which is sometimes made to pass under a better name.³ But the reality of duration consists in its positive quality rather than in that quantitative exclusiveness which is its *prima facie* character. That positive quality is caught up into eternity,

¹ 'Ei non defuit materia ad omnia, ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum, creanda.' (*Eth. I, Appendix.*)

² This point is more fully examined and elaborated below.

³ 'Natural piety' should be exhibited from the beginning of our speculations, and not introduced at a later stage to mitigate the seemingly miraculous irruption of insistent factors which have been overlooked in the collection of our *data*. All existence is, in a sense, miraculous: that is the significance of the term 'creation'; but there is nothing in 'emergent qualities' more demanding natural piety than in the constitution of Space-Time itself. My thesis is that Space-Time and its so-called 'emergent' qualities should never have been divorced.

while its externality and limitation, its negativity, is lost. In the same way the eternal blessedness of God is not a summation of the joys of finite modes (which would necessarily be qualified by their sorrows); it is their consummation, explanation, and infinite completion. Joy is the realizing of perfection in its degrees, its temporal achieving; *acquiescentia* is the realization of a perfection already achieved; blessedness is the realization of perfection and its eternal achievement; it is the ideal limit of both desire and joy as they constitute a being for whom transformation involves no succession. Duration only elapses in so far as the mind drifts; for the thinking mind it 'wells up'; for the free man it is a 'well springing up into eternal life'; and for the being that thinks all things, and is all things in their real order and efficiency, the existence which 'wells up' is eternity itself.

Spinoza, too, is quite clear that neither the joy of the finite mode nor the blessedness of the free man or of God is a mere feeling divorced from its object. The joy is a caused transition towards perfection, and blessedness, as I have contended, is a grounded enjoyment of perfection. Thus as for the contemplative finite mind joy is always joy *in*, i.e. love for, some object; so blessedness, arising not from reasoning but from intuitive knowledge of the articulated whole, is one with the infinite intellectual love wherewith God loves himself. As I have indicated, and as will become even clearer at a later stage of my argument, this supreme beatitude is not wholly beyond the experience of finite modes,¹ for nothing is wholly unreal when rightly apprehended: 'There is nothing positive in ideas on account of which they are called false.'² In so far as a man recognizes his context adequately, he puts his mind within the intellectual order, and may come to know himself and things, not as perishing fragments, nor merely as implicates, but as eternal existences flowing from the divine essence. In such knowledge 'this or that' man attains to and recognizes a relative perfection, experiences blessedness, becomes free, and 'proves by actual

¹ I mean that the finite individual *as finite* (though not *because* finite) can participate in 'blessedness'. As we proceed the reader will find that I hold, as against the common view, that for Spinoza (and in truth), when man places his mind within 'the intellectual order', he does not become identical with God, but remains finite (for God is not divided). He then achieves and enjoys the grade of perfection which he *is* eternally. God is not merely our complement and completion: he is our creative 'constellation'.

² 'Nihil in ideis positivum est, propter quod falsae dicuntur.' (*Eth. II, xxxiii.*)

experience' that he is eternal.¹ The existence of 'this or that' man, therefore, is at once a limited duration for Imagination; it lies within an intellectual order of implicates for Reason; while for *scientia intuitiva* it is known as what it essentially is: a beam of the eternal love wherewith God loves himself.

¹ Cf. *Eth. V*, xxii-xxiii, *Sch.*

EXCURSUS II

THE AUTHORITY OF THE *COGITATA METAPHYSICA*

THOUGH it is not my main purpose in this book merely to provide a conservative account of the philosophy of Spinoza, it is my aim, nevertheless, to approach historical accuracy with respect to doctrines which fall within the scope of his writings or might have come under his notice. I take this early opportunity, therefore, of indicating the degree of authority which I assign to the *Cogitata Metaphysica* as an expression of Spinoza's own views. It has been customary to emphasize (often, it seems to me, unduly, or at least too uniformly) the admittedly important statements of Lewis Meyer's *Preface* to the whole work, a preface which was evidently passed for publication by Spinoza himself, and, so far as the passages in question are concerned, probably inspired by him. 'Animadverti tamen vel imprimis velim in his omnibus, nempe tam in 1 et 2 Princip. partibus, ac fragmento tertiae, quam in Cogitatis suis Metaphysicis Authorem nostrum meras Cartesii sententias, illarumque demonstrationes, prout in illius scriptis reperiuntur, aut quales ex fundamentis ab illo jactis per legitimam consequentiam deduci debebant, proposuisse. Cum enim discipulum suum Cartesii Philosophiam docere promisisset, religio ipsi fuit, ab ejus sententiae latum unguem discedere, aut quid, quod ejus dogmatibus aut non responderet, aut contrarium esset, dictare. Quamobrem judicet nemo, illum hic, aut sua, aut tantum ea, quae probat, docere. Quamvis enim quaedam vera judicet, quaedam de suis addita fateatur, multa tamen occurrunt, quae tanquam falsa rejicit, et a quibus longe diversam fovet sententiam.' No one familiar with the mature doctrines of Descartes and Spinoza will be inclined to question the main purport of such a statement, but neither, I think, will he hold, after consideration, that it implies that the work is 'of no authority for determining Spinoza's own opinions' (for convenience I quote the most recent English statement of this point of view.¹ Is it not rather true (to quote the same author) that 'it betrays throughout some of Spinoza's characteristic points of view'?² Mr. Roth himself names Spinoza's nominalism, his doctrines of contingency, of the unreality of time, of the relativity of good and evil, his anti-anthropomorphism, his idea of the unity of nature, and of man as a coherent part of nature, and so on: a sufficiently imposing array for a tractate of about fifty pages, said to be 'of no authority'.

It may be noticed that there is some confusion in Lewis Meyer's

¹ L. Roth, *Spinoza*, p. 24

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 25.

account of the *Cogitata Metaphysica* in relation to the doctrines of Descartes: he speaks of it as referring to important and difficult questions 'a Cartesio nondum enodatas' (which implies that it contains either further deductions from Cartesian principles, or an expression of Spinoza's own views, or again only statements of commonly accepted opinions); but a little later he expressly states that in this work (i.e. including the *Cogitata Metaphysica*) Spinoza expounds *nothing more* than the opinions of Descartes with their demonstrations. I cannot but feel that this confusion results from loose writing, and that the former statement is the more accurate, while the latter account belongs in the main to the version of the *Cartesian Principles*, to which the *Cogitata Metaphysica* are appended. My feeling is strengthened by the occurrence of a converse inaccuracy of expression in the earlier statement which suggests that the *Cogitata Metaphysica* are 'more illo geometrico demonstrata'. I am not, of course, denying that there is much in this *Appendix* which is Cartesian rather than Spinozistic; indeed, the main example given by Lewis Meyer himself is also found, as he says, in *Cog. Met. II, xii*.

The argument of those who depreciate the authority of the *Cogitata Metaphysica* seems to be that since it is known that certain doctrines (only partly specified) are not the author's, therefore *no* part of the treatise may be taken as authoritative in the determination of his real views. But such an inference is defensible only on the assumption that the treatise in question is the sole source of knowledge respecting the opinions of the author, or has nothing in common with any other source. In isolation, the *Cogitata* would, for our purpose, certainly be of very little authority (though a careful comparison of its teaching with that of Descartes might well reveal something of its author's own mind); but happily it does not stand alone, so that it becomes possible to discriminate between the various doctrines of the treatise, and to escape from general uniform doubt with reference to them all. Thus, if an essential (if not complete) agreement between any of the doctrines of the *Cogitata Metaphysica* and those of the *Ethics*, the *Epistolae*, &c., can be recognized, and no relevant direct or implied contradiction, and if the former account is fuller, more detailed, more systematic, or in some way better, then on that topic its authority will be greater than that of the *Ethics*, *Epistolae*, &c.; for these will give the initial assurance, will sweep away doubt, and the fuller account will thus be free to produce its just effect. Greater authority could only be conceived if the better account belonged to the *Ethics* itself. In considering this argument it is important to keep clearly in mind that the problem is not the *origin* of the doctrine in question, or whether it is *peculiar* to Spinoza, but rather whether Spinoza *accepted* it.

It has been necessary to state the case in quite general terms, but in

the application of the principles laid down the precise degree of authority developed will depend on the importance of the agreement detected between the *Cogitata Metaphysica* and the *Ethics*, &c., in relation to the elaboration of the doctrine in the former. An example of the value of this critical procedure (a procedure which, perhaps indistinctly underlies Mr. Roth's exaggerated and seemingly contradictory assertions) is found in the case of the doctrine of time. The passage which I have quoted from *Cog. Met. I, iv* on p. 5,¹ is nowhere precisely repeated or paralleled in the main writings of Spinoza; but statements may be found in the *Ethics* and the *Epistolae*, for example, which, with less detail, either imply the same general principles, or by their harmony with the statement of the *Cogitata Metaphysica*, suggest that its truth is being assumed: 'nemo dubitat, quin etiam tempus imaginemur, nempe, ex eo, quod corpora alia aliis tardius, vel celerius, vel aequae celeriter moveri imaginemur',² where the point clearly is that time arises from a comparison of motions, which is the doctrine I quoted from *Cog. Met. I, iv*, though without the inference that time is a mere *modus cogitandi*. That this conclusion is not drawn in this passage of the *Ethics* is due, not to the rejection of it, but to the special interest of Spinoza's argument, which is directed to the explanation of contingency and not to the description of time. But further, *Ep. xii* shows that Spinoza did hold that time is a *modus cogitandi sive imaginandi*, an *ens rationis*, an *auxilium Imaginationis*: 'Porro ex eo, quod Durationem, et Quantitatem pro libitu determinare possumus, ubi scilicet hanc a Substantia abstractam concipimus, et illam a modo, quo a rebus aeternis fluit, separamus, oritur Tempus, et Mensura; Tempus nempe ad Durationem; Mensura ad Quantitatem tali modo determinandam, ut, quoad fieri potest, eas facile imaginemur. Deinde ex eo, quod Affectiones Substantiae ab ipsa Substantia separamus, et ad classes, ut eas quoad fieri potest, facile imaginemur, redigimus, oritur Numerus, quo ipsas determinamus. Ex quibus clare videre est, Mensuram, Tempus, et Numerum nihil esse praeter cogitandi, seu potius imaginandi Modos. . . . Neque etiam ipsi Substantiae Modi, si cum ejusmodi Entibus rationis, seu imaginationis auxiliis confundantur, unquam recte intelligi poterunt. . . . Ubi quis Durationem abstracte conceperit, eamque cum Tempore confundendo in partes dividere inceperit, nunquam poterit intelligere, qua ratione hora ex. grat. transire possit. . . . Quare multi, qui Entia rationis a realibus distinguere assueti non sunt, Durationem ex momentis componi, ausi sunt asseverare, et sic in Scyllam inciderunt cupientes vitare Charybdim. . . . Porro cum ex modo dictis satis pateat, nec Numerum, nec Mensuram, nec Tempus, quandoquidem non nisi auxilia imaginationis sunt, posse esse infinitos. . . .'³ I may add that the doctrine of the 'imaginative'

¹ Note 2.² *Eth. II, xliv, Cor. i, Sch.*³ *Ep. xii.*

character of time which underlies the statements of *Eth. II, xxx-xxxi; IV, lxii et Sch.*, &c., is in harmony with this conclusion, though their approach is from a different angle. I conclude, therefore, that the full and explicit statement of the *Cogitata Metaphysica* conveys Spinoza's own view of the nature and value of time, and that it is thus not to be included among the passages of that treatise (of which only one is precisely indicated by Lewis Meyer) against which the *Preface* utters its warning.¹

If scholars have been disposed to underestimate the possible authority of the *Cogitata Metaphysica* (which, after all, is part of the only work which in the lifetime of Spinoza bore his name on its title-page), they have often, I think, been equally prone to over-estimate the value and authority of the *Korte Verhandelng*, which we do not even know with certainty to have been written by Spinoza. It would be unwise and unjustifiable to *emphasize* the doubtful character of this work, but it is prudent to recall that internal and external evidence is not unambiguously in favour of the authorship of Spinoza himself, though we can say with some confidence that its writer was an immature Spinozist of somewhere near the time of Spinoza. But there must have been several persons falling under that description, other than Spinoza himself; and in any case the unresolved doubt is a more serious obstacle to the acceptance of the treatise as authoritative in the determination of Spinoza's early views than the doubt thrown over the *Cogitata Metaphysica* by the admonitions of its *Preface*.

I have also looked to the *Cogitata Metaphysica* for light upon Spinoza's conception of eternity, more especially to *I, iv*, and *II, i*. Here again the use in these passages and elsewhere, of the term 'attributum' as applied to eternity, may suggest to some of my readers that Spinoza is only expounding the philosophy of Descartes, since, as is well known, the author of the *Korte Verhandelng* had definitely argued, as against the popular theology and philosophy of his day, that eternity (together with infinity, immutability, self-subsistence, &c.) is not an attribute (*eigenschap*) of God, but only a mode (*wyz*) or extrinsic denomination (*uytwendige benaming*) attributed to him with respect to all his 'proper attributes' (*eigene eigenschappen*); just as omniscience and omnipresence are attributed to him with respect to Thought and Extension respectively. The real Attributes are 'infinite substances' (*oneyndige zelfstandigheeden*)—clearly a reference to the doctrine of Descartes. 'Aangaande de eigenschappen van de welke God bestaat, die zyn niet als oneyndige zelfstandigheeden, van de welke een ieder des zelfs oneyndig volmaakt moet zyn. Dat dit noodzaakelyk zoo moet zyn, daar van overtuygt ons de klaare en onderscheidelyke reeden, dog datter

¹ For a discussion of the Cartesian doctrine of time see Professor Norman Kemp Smith's *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy*, pp. 128 *et seqq.*

van alle deze oneyndige, tot nog toe maar twee door haar zelf wezen ons bekend zyn, is waar; en deze zyn de Denking en Uytgebreidheid, voort alles dat gemeenlyk aan God werd toegeschreven, en zyn geen eigenschappen, maar alleen zekere wyzen, de welke hem toegeëigent mogen werden of in aanmerkinge van alles, dat is alle zyne eigenschappen, of in aanmerkinge van Een eigenschap. In aanmerkinge val alle, als dat hy is een, eeuwig, door zig zelfs bestaande, oneyndig, oorzaak van alles, onveranderlyk. In aanmerkinge van eene, als dat hy is alwetende, wys, enz., het welk tot de denking, en weder dat hy is overal, alles vervult enz. het welk tot de uytgebreidheid toebehoort.¹ 'Tot hier toe dan gesproken van wat God is, zullen wy van syn eigenschappen, maar gelyk als met een woord zeggen hoe dat de zelve, welke ons bekend zyn maar bestaan in twee namelyk Denking en Uytgebreidheid, want hier spreken wy maar alleen van eigenschappen die men zoude eigene eigenschappen Gods kunnen noemen, door de welke wy hem in zig zelf en niet als werkende buyten zig zelfs komen te kennen. Al wat dan de menschen aan God buyten deze twee eigenschappen, meer toeschryven, dat zal (indien het anderzins tot hem behoort) moeten zyn, oft' een uytwendige benaming, gelyker wys, als dat hy is door zig zelfs bestaande, eeuwig, eenig, onveranderlyk, enz. ofte, zeg ik, in opzigt van syne werkinge, gelyker wys, als dat hy is een oorzaak, een voorbeschikker, en regeerder van alle dingen: welke alle eigen aan God zyn, zonder nogtans te kennen te geven wat hy is.'² It has been thought that it is to this account that Spinoza refers in *Ep. vi*, where he speaks of a complete treatise on how things began, their dependence on the first cause, and the improvement of the understanding (a description which does not fit the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* in its present form). In this letter he mentions the point I am discussing: 'Ut scias quid in meo hoc opere contineatur, quod concionatoribus offendiculo esse possit, dico, quod multa attributa, quae ab iis et ab omnibus, mihi saltem notis, Deo tribuuntur, ego tanquam creaturas considero; et contra alia, propter praejudicia ab iis tanquam creaturas consideratas, ego attributa Dei esse et ab ipsis male intellecta fuisse contendo.'³ I may note that in the account of the *Korte Verhandeling* the reference to eternity, immutability, self-subsistence, &c., as modes, is not insisted upon in the further discussion, where the term '*propria*' (*eigenen*) is introduced to describe them (though omniscient, wise, merciful, &c., are still said to be modes of the thinking being).

The account is not altogether clear, but the distinction which the author seems to be making is between *constitutive* attributes, i.e. substances (e.g. Thought and Extension), through which we can know what God is *in se*; and *descriptive* attributes, i.e. either (1) *propria*,

¹ *Korte Verhand. I, vii, Aanteek.*

² *Loc. cit., I, ii.*

³ *Ep. vi.*

which give us no knowledge of what God is *in se*, but are mere *denominationes extrinsicae* (e.g. eternity, infinity, &c., and perhaps, omniscience and omnipresence); or (2) modes, through which we can know God only as he operates *extra se* (e.g. merciful, wise, &c.).

Thus when he finds a definite reference to eternity in the *Cogitata Metaphysica* as an 'attributum', the reader is apt, as I have said, to infer that this is one of the points on which Spinoza is there content to reproduce Descartes, or at least that it is not possible with safety to base an account of his own doctrine of eternity upon it. The allied point, in relation to the doctrine of time, has already been discussed, but as the conditions in the present case are somewhat different, it will be well to defend this further dependence on the text of the *Cogitata Metaphysica*.

In the first place, it may be pointed out that the doctrine of the *Korte Verhandeling* is known to diverge in essential points from the mature views of Spinoza: e.g. Thought and Extension are not substances; infinity, immutability, &c. are not modes; God does not operate *extra se*, &c. There is thus no reason why the *Cogitata Metaphysica* should not diverge from the *Korte Verhandeling* and yet give Spinoza's own views of eternity; the fact that it is a change *back* must not too much impress us, so long as it does not involve the complete reversal of the whole doctrine. But in fact only the attribute of eternity is affected.

Further, the *Korte Verhandeling* itself uses 'attribute' as a general term under which may be included 'proper attributes' and the 'attributes which we call *propria*', and in this way even speaks of the latter as 'attributes' simply (e.g. *I, ii* <*fin.*>; *I, vi* <*init.*>); so that even on the assumption that the *Korte Verhandeling* represents Spinoza's settled views on this subject, the return of the expression in the *Cogitata Metaphysica* might indicate no more than the author's willingness to ignore a distinction not discussed by Descartes, and not imply that the whole argument was foreign to Spinoza.

It is important to remember, also, that the doctrine of eternity in the *Cogitata Metaphysica* is much more adequate and mature than anything to be found in the *Korte Verhandeling*, and agrees with what we know, from his correspondence, of Spinoza's own views at the date of the publication of the *Principia Cartesii* (1663): compare for example the passage quoted on p. 43¹ with the considered words of *Ep. xii* (1663): 'Unde clare apparet, nos existentiam Substantiae toto genere a Modorum existentia diversam concipere. Ex quo oritur differentia inter Aeternitatem, et Durationem; per Durationem enim Modorum tantum existentiam explicare possumus; Substantiae vero per Aeternitatem, hoc est, infinitam existendi, sive, invita latinitate, essendi fruitionem.'

¹ Note 2.

The account given in the *Ethics* is, of course, not precisely that of the *Cogitata Metaphysica*. It agrees with it in making eternity an 'attribute' of Substance (and of all its constitutive Attributes): 'Deinde per Dei attributa intelligendum est id, quod Divinae substantiae essentiam exprimit, hoc est, id, quod ad substantiam pertinet: id ipsum, inquam, ipsa attributa involvere debent. Atqui ad naturam substantiae pertinet aeternitas.'¹ I make no further comment here on this subject as I have discussed its significance in a later chapter. The doctrine of the *Ethics* also most certainly *modifies* that of the *Cogitata Metaphysica*, a fact that will surprise no reader who remembers that the *Ethics* is not an absolutely complete and final expression of the Spinozistic philosophy, but represents only the point to which Spinoza himself had brought his settled principles; it gives but little hint of the directions of his recent, or probable subsequent, development; but in my opinion the elaboration and application of the doctrine of eternity was undoubtedly one of the growing points of the system, and I have elsewhere noted the striking development which took place when Spinoza was able to ascribe eternity not to '*solus Deus*', but also to '*mens humana*'. This amazing step was in itself a more than sufficient reason for a partial revision of the account of *Cog. Met. I, iv; II, i; and Ep. xii*, which by implication, and directly (*II, i*), had denied eternity of all modes of Substance. The definite assertions of the *Ethics* that the immediate and mediate infinite modes are eternal, must also be recognized as a significant change from the doctrine of the *Korte Verhandelng* that *Natura naturata generalis* has been '*van alle eeuwigheid*', and will remain immutable '*in alle eeuwigheid*'—phrases which imply not *aeternitas* but only *semper aeternitas* (which are sharply distinguished already in the *Cogitata Metaphysica*,² and, of course, also in the *Ethics*).

It must have been a very real difficulty to Spinoza, when he came to write the *Ethics*, to give a definition of eternity capable of retaining its real essence, while leaving the way open for the conclusions of *Eth. I, xxi-xxiii* and *V, xxi et seqq.*, and however the parsimony and austerity of *Eth. I, Def. viii* may lead to serious underestimation of its content, we cannot but admire its ingenuity and real potency for its work. For it had at once to retain the identity of eternity with the essence of the eternal being, as it is explained in the *Cogitata Metaphysica* (cf. '*Aeternitas est ipsa Dei essentia, quatenus haec necessarium involvit existentiam (per Defin. viii, Pt. I)*'³—the reference is interesting), and also to make possible the eternity of the real modes of Substance, which the *Cogitata Metaphysica* had denied. I shall show in due course how these ends were achieved.

To conclude this excursus, let me say that the *Scholium* to *Eth. I, xix*

¹ *Eth. I, xix, Dem.*

² *II, i.*

³ *Eth. V, xxx, Dem.*

(‘Deus, sive omnia Dei attributa sunt aeterna’) makes pointed reference to *Prin. Cartesii*, I, xix (‘Deus est aeternus’), which again in its proof refers to *Cog. Met.* II, i, from which I have so largely drawn the details of Spinoza’s conception of eternity. This series of references is noteworthy, for Spinoza is not at all likely to have gone out of his way to direct the attention of his readers in the *Ethics*, without warning or correction, to an account and further reference in another book which he did not believe to be, in its main purport, true.

CHAPTER IV

THE ETERNITY OF THE HUMAN MIND

BECAUSE the important doctrine of the eternity of the human mind involves more than a mere application of Spinoza's general doctrine to a special instance; because it provides further evidence as to the conception of eternity which he entertained; and because it carries further the elucidation of the nature of the eternal existence of extended and thinking Substance; for these reasons I must, however inadequately, discuss it here. Nor can the account of man's survival in the Real be separated from that of the nature of the eternal existence which he may enjoy in spite of (nay rather, because of) the resolution of the 'common order of nature' into the 'order of the intellect'. Here, too, important collateral evidence as to the positive character of eternity will be found.

In a later chapter¹ I have commented on the development which seems to have taken place in Spinoza's conception of the ultimate destiny of the human soul or mind: starting from the doctrine of the *Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-being*² that the soul becomes immortal (*onsterfelyk*) through union with God in the knowledge of the divine nature; modified by the Cartesian elements of the *Cogitata Metaphysica*; up to the mature doctrine too briefly, but most weightily, expounded in the *Ethics*. Leaving aside the interesting critical questions as to Spinoza's earlier beliefs and our evidence for them,³ I now turn to his final and characteristic teaching as it is laid down in the momentous propositions of *Part V* of the *Ethics*.

Very little would be achieved at this stage of the discussion by a mere transcription of these propositions with their demonstrations and *scholia*; they are so famous and so familiar as almost to have become dark by repetition. More profitable will it be to lay down the main characters of his conception. This may be done, sufficiently but not exhaustively or exclusively, in four propositions:

¹ Chapter VIII. See also p. 43, note 6, and Excursus II, p. 70.

² *Korte Verhandeling van God de Mensch en deszelfs Welstand*, II, xxiii.

³ Some remarks on these questions are added on p. 193, note 2.

(i) Eternity does not mean *aevum*,¹ and the eternity of the human mind does not mean immortality in the sense of endless persistence

¹ It has not seemed desirable to devote special attention in the course of the argument to the rather obscure Thomistic conception of *aevum*, partly because it would involve a lengthy analysis of technicalities, the study of which offers little prospect of further enlightenment with respect to the main thesis of my essay, and partly because it has seemed that the principles involved have been elsewhere discussed at sufficient length, and destructively.

An account of *aevum* and of its relations with time and eternity is given by Aquinas in the *Summa Theologica*, I, *Quaestio x*, *Art. 5*: 'Aevum differt a tempore, et ab aeternitate, sicut medium existens inter illa. Sed horum differentiam aliqui sic assignant dicentes quod aeternitas principio et fine caret; aevum habet principium, sed non finem; tempus autem habet principium et finem. Sed haec differentia est per accidens. . . . Alii vero . . . per hoc quod aeternitas non habet prius et posterius; tempus autem habet prius et posterius cum innovatione et veteratione; aevum habet prius et posterius sine innovatione et veteratione. Sed haec positio implicat contradictoria. . . . Est ergo dicendum quod cum aeternitas sit mensura esse permanentis, secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia essendi, secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate. Quaedam autem sic recedunt a permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum est subjectum transmutationis, vel in transmutatione consistit; et hujusmodi mensurantur tempore, sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium corruptibilium. Quaedam vero recedunt minus a permanentia essendi, quia esse eorum nec in transmutatione consistit, nec est subjectum transmutationis; tamen habent transmutationem adjunctam vel in actu, vel in potentia; sicut patet in corporibus coelestibus, quorum esse substantiale est intransmutabile; tamen esse intransmutabile habent cum transmutabilitate secundum locum; et similiter patet de Angelis, quod habent esse intransmutabile, quantum ad eorum naturam pertinet, cum transmutabilitate secundum electionem, et cum transmutabilitate intelligentiarum et affectionum et locorum, suo modo; et ideo hujusmodi mensurantur aevo, quod est medium inter aeternitatem, et tempus. Esse autem quod mensurat aeternitas, nec est mutabile, nec mutabilitati adjunctum. Sic ergo tempus habet prius et posterius; aevum autem non habet in se prius et posterius, sed ei conjungi possunt; aeternitas autem non habet prius neque posterius, neque ea compatitur. . . . Creaturae spirituales quantum ad affectiones et intelligentias, in quibus est successio, mensurantur tempore. . . . Quantum vero ad eorum esse naturale, mensurantur aevo; sed quantum ad visionem gloriae, participant aeternitatem. . . . Aevum est totum simul, non tamen est aeternitas; quia compatitur secum prius et posterius.'

It is evident that what is here advanced is a mode of duration subject to speculative, rather than definitive, exposition. *Aevum* is *totum simul* because succession does not belong to its essence. But it is not *totum simul* in the same sense as eternity, for while the latter can in no way admit of mutability, *aevum* is subject to initiation, termination, and vicissitude, if not actually, at least potentially. It would seem, therefore, that it must possess a *schema* capable of determination under the category of succession. But the statement of Aquinas leaves it still in doubt as to whether *aevum* is to be conceived as possessing durational *extent*, or whether this too is to be excluded, together with durational *sense* or successiveness. The general atmosphere of the discussion, beginning as it does from the definition of eternity given by Boethius, seems to favour the retention of such durational externality; in which case *aevum* must be conceived as a temporally neutral extent of existence, without *intrinsic* beginning or end, but capable of being extrinsically determined or limited or subjected to vicissitude.

through time after death. Nor does it mean sempiternity. It does not even imply either immortality or sempiternity. This distinction must be not only asserted but emphasized, for Spinoza's verbal slips, or more probably his difficulties in expressing his conception in language primarily developed for purposes of ordinary temporal experience, have frequently been preferred to his clear formal utterances as they are found in such important or key passages as *Eth. I, Def. viii et Explic.* and *V, xxiii, Sch.*¹ I need not again labour the point.

(ii) What Spinoza is asserting is the eternity of the individual mind of 'this or that' man, not the eternity of some general mind of humanity, or of the 'infinite idea of God', or of 'Science'. From the perfectly true assertion that by the eternity of the mind Spinoza does not mean personal immortality, it has sometimes been wrongly concluded² that he means the survival of a system of

Such a conception of a neutral order of externality has been sufficiently discussed in the course of the main argument.

As opposed to this extensive interpretation of Thomistic *aevum*, Baron von Hügel has described it as 'an interesting groping after what M. Bergson now describes under the designation of *Durée*, the succession which is never all change, since its constituents, in varying degrees, overlap and interpenetrate each other; a succession which can be anything from just above the chain of mutually exclusive, ever equal moments,—artificial, clock-time,—to just below the entire interpenetration and *Totum Simul* of Eternity' (*Eternal Life*, p. 106). The question of the precise justice or adequacy of this comment on Aquinas need not be discussed at length in a note such as this, but while I acknowledge the interesting character of the comparison, not only in itself, but even more in its implicit recognition of the problem of the separating of durational extension and durational sense, I cannot detect in the account of Aquinas any special uneasiness on this point, or, therefore, any sense of groping towards its solution. On the contrary, the discussion seems to be directed towards the very natural end of softening the impact of time and eternity by means of a series of abstractions. It has been my aim to accomplish the same general end by means, if I may so speak, of a series of concretions.

¹ 'Per aeternitatem intelligo ipsam existentiam, quatenus ex sola rei aeternae definitione necessario sequi concipitur . . . Talis enim existentia . . . per durationem, aut tempus explicari non potest, tametsi duratio principio, et fine carere concipiatur.' 'Sentimus . . . mentem nostram . . . aeternam esse, et hanc ejus existentiam tempore definiri, sive per durationem explicari non posse.'

² e.g. by Martineau (*A Study of Spinoza*, pp. 296 *et seqq.*). So again Professor Taylor asserts that 'by the survival of the Mind as "intelligence"' Spinoza means 'simply the fact that an adequate idea, when once thought, forms a permanent addition to the stock of scientific knowledge in the world' (A. E. Taylor, 'The Conception of Immortality in Spinoza's *Ethics*', *Mind*, N.S. V, p. 164). The date of this article (1896) indicates that it was one of the earliest of Professor Taylor's massive sequence of publications, and this explains its obvious immaturity and lack of originality. The line of argument by which the result I have noted was reached, helps to redeem its *prima facie* extraordinary inconsequence,

adequate ideas, not constituting the mind of 'this or that' man, but of 'man', or of God. But it is not the personality or individuality of the mind that must be denied, but its immortality in the sense of endless duration. The formal assertions of Spinoza could not be misunderstood by an unbiased and unsophisticated reader; it is puzzled reflection that introduces doubt: 'In God there is necessarily an idea which expresses the essence of *this or that* human body under the form of eternity'¹; 'Although we do not remember that we existed before the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far as it involves the essence of the body under the form of eternity, is eternal, and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time, or explained through duration. Thus our mind can only be said to endure in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body'²; 'If we look to men's general opinion, we shall see that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of the mind, but that they confuse eternity with duration, and ascribe it to the imagination or the memory which they believe to remain after death',³ that is to say their error is not their belief in the eternity of the mind but their confusion of eternity with duration. Once more, I need not labour the point: it is sufficiently clear that Spinoza intended to establish the individual eternity of 'this or that' man; the further important point as to whether he succeeded in doing so will necessarily be noticed in due course.

(iii) Spinoza puts forward the doctrine of individual eternity as belonging to the human mind in some sense or degree beyond that eternity in the whole which belongs to all positive content. Falsity is fundamentally a defect of order, for 'there are no ideas confused

but certainly without establishing its truth. If Spinoza intended to establish no more than this, his expressions are little better than an elaborate pretence; but why a writer who had already given up human freedom and divine purpose without pretence should have pretended that he was establishing individual survival is something of a mystery. (See also p. 96, note 4; and p. 125, note 1.)

¹ 'In Deo tamen datur necessario idea, quae hujus, et illius corporis humani essentiam sub aeternitatis specie exprimit.' (*Eth. V, xxii.*)

² 'Quamvis itaque non recordemur nos ante Corpus exstitisse, sentimus tamen Mentem nostram, quatenus Corporis essentiam sub aeternitatis specie involvit, aeternam esse, et hanc ejus existentiam tempore definiri, sive per durationem explicari non posse. Mens igitur nostra eatenus tantum potest dici durare, ejusque existentia certo tempore definiri potest, quatenus actuale Corporis existentiam involvit.' (*Eth. V, xxiii, Sch.*)

³ 'Si ad hominum communem opinionem attendamus, videbimus, eos suae Mentis aeternitatis esse quidem conscios; sed ipsos eandem cum duratione confundere, eamque imaginationi, seu memoriae tribuere, quam post mortem remanere credunt.' (*Eth. V, xxxiv, Sch.*)

or inadequate, except in respect to a particular mind'.¹ All positive content finds a place in the Real and is eternal in that place. That, in truth, is the sole ground upon which writers have, mistaking *proprium* for essence, identified Spinozistic eternity with logical or scientific necessity. Now it cannot be supposed that when Spinoza asserts the eternity of the human mind he means simply that man is within the world of psychical and physical nature, and is eternal only as such and merged in it. We shall find reason to question whether, and in what sense, and how, infinite *Natura* can have parts at all, but I shall argue without delay that if *Natura* has parts in no sense, then the human mind cannot be said to remain in the Real; yet if, on the other hand, *Natura* is divisible into sections, the partition cannot, on the present hypothesis, be stayed until the universe is reduced to the ultimate dust of an infinitude of *corpora simplicissima animata* (or even of instantaneous *puncta*) in which the body, and with it the mind, of 'this or that' man could hardly be said to 'remain'. The mere formulation of such a dilemma is sufficient to show that the eternity of a human mind, if it is to be individual, must be peculiar to that mind: in some sense its ultimate possession. Not, indeed, that Spinoza admits exclusive or atomic individuality in any sense that would defeat the ultimate unity of the Real. Man is not 'situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom'²; he follows nature's order rather than disturbs it; he is not determined solely by himself. But even if *Natura* were finite, and man external to it, his due subordination would not imply nonentity; much less can he be nothing who is a part of *Natura*, and a finite expression of its infinite power.³

¹ 'Nullae inadaequatae, nec confusae sunt; nisi quatenus ad singularem alicujus Mentem referuntur.' (*Eth. II, xxxvi, Dem.*)

² 'Plerique, qui de Affectibus, et Hominum vivendi ratione scripserunt . . . hominem in natura, veluti imperium in imperio, concipere videntur. Nam hominem naturae ordinem magis perturbare, quam sequi . . . credunt.' (*Eth. III, Praefatio.*)

³ In view of the 'vulgar error' that Spinoza denies the reality of the finite individuals, and resolves all things into the single all-embracing individual *Deus sive Natura* (which thus becomes an empty unity), a passage in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* is of interest: 'Naturae . . . potentia ipsa Dei potentia est, qui summum jus ad omnia habet; sed quia *universalis potentia totius naturae nihil est praeter potentiam omnium individuorum simul*, hinc sequitur unumquodque individuum jus summum habere ad omnia, quae potest . . .' (*c. xvi*), the crude but common translation of which uses the term 'aggregate': 'the power of nature at large is nothing more than the aggregate of the powers of all her individual components'. Undoubtedly, Spinoza's phrase was unguarded, but the false suggestion is unwarrantably emphasized in the translation. The main point

(iv) The same general conclusion is in harmony with the fourth character of Spinoza's conception of human eternity. It is not the whole mind that is eternal: there is a part that perishes at death; and it is possible for a man so to live that what perishes is of small importance in comparison with what remains (i.e. what is eternal).¹ 'That part of the mind which remains, be it great or small, is more perfect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind is the Intellect . . . the part which we have shown to perish is the Imagination.'² The use of the word '*remanet*' as meaning 'abides' or 'remains unaffected by resolution into the intellectual order' requires but a minimum of good will in a reader who takes the argument as a whole. The translation of the word (by Elwes) as 'endures' is particularly infelicitous, since the essential thing in Spinoza's theory is that the eternal part of the mind never was, is, or will be, in time: we cannot remember or imagine before birth any more than after death, for the eternal part of the mind which is unaffected by birth and death did not exist before birth and will not exist after death. How, indeed, could it be otherwise, for 'in the eternal there is no when, before, or after'.³ Here we have further assurance that the eternity of the mind is not identical with the general eternity of all positive content in its dependence upon Substance; for Imagination and memory are not necessarily false: their positive content, too, is eternal. Yet human eternity excludes that of Imagination and memory; and it does so, clearly, not because these are wholly unreal, but rather because they do not as such belong to the mind as an individual, but are a confused apprehension of its relations with its context, and belong to the limbo of its finitude. In 'the order of the intellect' all that is positive in them is eternal. In 'the common order of nature' they pass.

here, as the context amply certifies, is that *Natura* is an individual of individuals, and not an individual *among* individuals, even *prima inter pares*. There is no finite individual *outside of Natura*; but *Natura* is certainly not the *aggregate* of all finite individuals. The precise relation of the individuals and the Individual will be determined in the course of the discussion. Cf. below, Chapter V, and especially Excursus IV (pp. 137-41).

¹ 'Mentem humanam posse ejus naturae esse, ut id, quod ejus cum corpore perire ostendimus, in respectu ad id, quod ipsius remanet, nullius sit momenti.' (*Eth. V, xxxviii, Sch.*)

² 'Partem mentis, quae remanet, quantacunque ea sit, perfectiorem [est] reliqua. Nam pars Mentis aeterna est intellectus; . . . illa autem, quam perire ostendimus, est ipsa imaginatio, . . . atque adeo illa, quantacunque ea sit, hac est perfectior.' (*Eth. V, xl, Cor.*)

³ 'In aeterno non detur quando, ante, nec post.' (*Eth. I, xxxiii, Sch. ii.*)

Such are the four main characters of the eternity of the mind as it is conceived by Spinoza, and a satisfactory exposition of his doctrine must harmonize with them all or must wholly fail.

An essential distinction between the eternal and the perishing is that the former is ordered and whole, while the latter is disordered and fragmentary. The eternity of the human mind, therefore, consists in its ability to survive the resolution of all things into an enjoyed intellectual order; and the fact that Spinoza begins his exposition from the side of the body is important both for our understanding of his theory and as a significant element in the theory itself. For the distinctions of human minds (and bodies) cannot sustain themselves through intellectual criticism if, and in so far as, they rest upon the mere exclusiveness and quantitative externality that seem to distinguish the regions of extension. Not division and exclusion but implication and inclusion characterize the intellectual order whether in corporeal nature or in mind. And this must be so even within the Attribute of Extension where, as I have said, externality appears to be a primary character of the Real, and where, therefore, mutual exclusion of co-existing parts seems, *prima facie*, to be the rule in spite of the indivisibility, unity, and wholeness which Spinoza insists upon as the true characters of Extension.¹ This point is worth elaboration.

In one of his latest letters, written only a few months before his death, Spinoza expresses his view of the nature of Extension with some warmth, though, unfortunately, with but little direct light: 'With regard to your question as to whether the variety of things can be deduced *a priori* from the conception of extension alone I believe I have shown clearly enough already that it cannot; and that therefore matter has been wrongly defined by Descartes as extension; it must necessarily be explained through an Attribute which expresses infinite and eternal essence'.² The distinction

¹ 'Si . . . ad quantitatem attendimus, prout in imaginatione est, quod saepe, et facilius a nobis fit, reperietur finita, divisibilis, et ex partibus conflata; si autem ad ipsam, prout in intellectu est, attendimus, et eam, quatenus Substantia est, concipimus, quod difficillime fit, tum, ut jam satis demonstravimus, infinita, unica, et indivisibilis reperietur.' (*Eth. I, xv, Sch.*)

² 'Quod petis, an ex solo Extensionis conceptu rerum varietas a priori possit demonstrari, credo me jam satis clare ostendisse, id impossibile esse; ideoque materiam a Cartesio male definiri per Extensionem; sed eam necessario debere explicari per attributum, quod aeternam, et infinitam essentiam exprimat.' (*Ep. lxxxiii.*)

which Spinoza is here expressing is not primarily that between extension as we imagine it, and as it is for 'science', though that distinction is implied and essential; he is thinking rather of the difference between an abstract conception of extension as a 'quiescent mass'¹ whether finite or infinite, occupying one or several instants of time, and a concrete conception of infinite and eternal Extension. The former distinction is between imagined extension for which the standpoint of the observer is an origin for measurement, the main directions of his body giving axes of reference, and his magnitude an arbitrary unit; and an 'objective' extension for which these relations are universalized and largely discounted. Every point of such 'objective' space may be an origin, every direction an axis of reference, and every magnitude a unit for measurement. Imagined extension is limited in time and indefinite in magnitude; 'objective' space is infinite in magnitude and timeless in the sense that it bears no essential relation to the date of any individual observer. As I have indicated, such an extension, unlike duration, may survive the process of 'objectification' because spatial relations are symmetrical and therefore reversible, the actual application of correlatives being itself relative to our arbitrary choice of axes of reference. Within it there is no absolute magnitude and no absolute location; it is infinite and undivided. It may, nevertheless, become the underlying object of the science of geometry, for it may be conceived as modified, its finite determinations being relatively limited. 'Objective' extension, in other words, is characterized by externality and relation, though not by these as localized and measurable in any absolute sense. Measure is an *ens rationis*, and hence all measures are relative. Euclid, for example, does not prove truths about this or that figure, occupying this or that position in space, and having this or that absolute magnitude. He makes no reference to absolute location or size, but reasons about the proportions of extension and about relative location. Relative magnitude and position have meaning only for an extension conceived as modified in definite forms, but the special figures which we determine in space do not occupy space as a building occupies a site, thereby excluding all other buildings. Curves, quadrilaterals, tetrahedrons, &c., are the modes in which spatial externality and

¹ 'Ex Extensione, ut eam Cartesius concipit, molem scilicet quiescentem, corporum existentiam demonstrare non tantum difficile, ut ais, sed omnino impossibile est.' (*Ep. lxxvi.*)

relation are expressed, and the infinite space of the geometer is not an indefinite collection of mutually external measurable parts, but rather the infinite ground or essence of which these figures are determinate expressions or modes. In respect of size or location or direction, infinite extension is neutral. In it there is no mutual exclusion of separate parts, but only a differentiation of modes expressing its universal nature.

It has been commonly held, as I have said, that this 'objective' extension of the geometer is the Attribute which Spinoza assigns to Substance, but my contention has been and is that, on the contrary, he would have rejected any extension, whether imagined or reasoned, which is out of all relation to duration or eternity, and which therefore has no real existence. The extension which we imagine endures through an indefinite period; that which we conceive by the use of the intellect is also a singular, though universal, existent; it is conceived *sub quadam specie aeternitatis*. Of such a real Extension no adequate imaginative conception can be formed. It is not to be defined as the mere absence of finite determination, for its content is infinite and eternal; it is not empty but supremely full. But it is not full in the sense that a bookcase may be full of books. It is full as the universal ground of all possible determinations. In the processes of geometry we limit it 'imaginatively', whereupon it appears as partly filled and as occupying a period of time; since, however, the period is neutral, we think of Extension as occupying any and every period of time, i.e. as enduring without limit. It is in this sense that Spinoza speaks, to the surprise of the unwary, of duration as one of the attributes of Extension: 'It would be an imperfection in [Extension] if it . . . lacked duration, position, &c.'¹; again, 'Extension can only be called imperfect in respect of duration, position, or quantity'.²

Infinite Extension conceived *sub quadam specie aeternitatis*, not as the finite enduring ground of this or that mode, but as the infinite and eternal ground of every extended mode, is a universal singular rather than a timeless form of externality; and it is because it is such, that it can be a universal ground capable of 'imaginative'

¹ 'Quamvis enim ex. gr. extensio de se cogitationem neget, nulla tamen hoc ipsum in ea est imperfectio. Hoc vero, si nimirum extensione destitueretur, in ea imperfectionem argueret, ut revera fieret, si esset determinata, similiter si duratione, situ, &c. careret.' (*Ep. xxxvi.*)

² 'Extensio solummodo respectu durationis, situs, quantitatis imperfecta dici potest.' (*Loc. cit.*)

expression in indefinitely many various forms through an indefinite duration. Its duration as so conceived is the 'imaginative' expression of its capacity for various related but non-compossible expression or modification; for its modes do not co-exist superimposed on each other, nor as side by side in an instantaneous extension: they flow eternally from the infinite nature of Extension, and it is thus that abstract geometrical truths are regarded as valid at all epochs of time. In geometry as in kinematics and even in dynamics (where time as a measure appears as a factor) absolute date has no significance.

Eternal Extension, then, must not be conceived as an instantaneous form of externality, nor even, if it were possible, as an enduring but 'quiescent mass' within which singular things must be introduced or created. It is not the vacant site on which the building has to be erected by the use of some extraneous material. Even for abstract geometry such an extension would be wholly inadequate. Far more futile would it be as a ground from which to deduce the variety of the universe. Its futility reduces in the end to its temporality; it is pulverized by time; it is the mere being which is non-being. It provides no ground of union between its successive contents (for we cannot now speak of its modifications or manifestations). As Descartes himself had seen, it would demand not one day of creation, nor even six, but every day and every moment the world would need to be recreated. This is not explanation but mystification.

As opposed to such a view, however, viz. that it is time that prevents instantaneous or recurrent extension from being the ground from which particular existence may be deduced, there is Mr. Alexander's astonishing contrary suggestion that Spinoza's solution of this difficulty is a failure 'because he has omitted Time'¹; but surely the truth rather is that he omitted time of set purpose because it constituted the main difficulty in the deduction. For time is essentially divided and limited. An undivided and unlimited time is, as I have said, *ipso facto* non-temporal. It was this that divided, indeed pulverized, imagined extension, and in the conception of an instantaneous or recurrent extension no adequate cement has been provided. For the geometer this problem is not vital, for he is not concerned with the deduction of curves, figures, and solids from space, and even on Spinoza's more concrete view

¹ *Spinoza and Time*, p. 33.

of geometry the deduction would be selective, temporal, and phenomenological, rather than complete, eternal, and metaphysical.

It is the transition to a more adequate conception of extension as an 'Attribute which expresses eternal and infinite essence' that Spinoza adumbrates in the letter I have already quoted. This is undoubtedly one of the growing points of Spinozistic philosophy, and though there can be little doubt that Spinoza had long recognized the special requirements of his own theory, as opposed to that of Descartes, he had certainly not satisfied himself about the proper way of expounding his views. 'Perhaps some day,' he says, 'if my life be prolonged, I may discuss the subject with you more clearly. For hitherto I have not been able to put any of these matters into due order'.¹ This was the last of Spinoza's published letters, and seven months later he was dead; we are left, therefore, without the final and ordered deduction of his thoughts on this important matter, and I must attempt, therefore, however feebly and artificially, to fill in the *lacuna* as well as I can by speculative exposition. Happily we are not left without valuable clues to the main structure of his conception.

The conception of extension as purified from 'subjective' reference, as reunited, complete, and temporally neutral, is insufficient as a ground for metaphysical deduction. The Real cannot be adequately represented as occupying successive instants of an infinite 'duration' even when the contents of the instants are externally united by 'causation', each state of the whole being the transient cause of the next. Spinoza would certainly have denied that such purely temporal succession was rightly called connexion or causation at all. The unity and indivisibility of infinite and eternal Extension must relate not only to its extensiveness, but also to its existence, and to every existence within it. For it comprehends them all, indissolubly, totally. It is Imagination that pulverizes eternal Extension, dividing the whole, both in its existence and also in its essence. It divides its *existence* into the successive moments of duration, variously filled in, though not without a lingering unity expressed as continuity or transient causality. It divides its *essence*; for each instantaneous extension

¹ 'Materiam a Cartesio male definiri per Extensionem; sed eam necessario debere explicari per attributum, quod aeternam, et infinitam essentiam exprimat. Sed de his forsan aliquando, si vita suppetit, clarius tecum agam. Nam huc usque nihil de his ordine disponere mihi licuit.' (*Ep. lxxxiii.*)

is broken up into mutually exclusive sections or bodies, though again not without a lingering unity expressed as reciprocal relatedness. And both the transient causality and the reciprocity are derived from the positive spirit of the whole, that alone is the source of the degree of reality which, because no positive content can be wholly unreal, belongs to the world of Imagination. So the infinite and eternal nature of the extended Real is spread out in time and divided in extension, and thus imagined as a complex process in which the warp of Time and the woof of Space are woven into the web of the Real conceived as a concrete Space-Time. But the Real is the undivided essence, and not the divided process; it is not Space-Time but *sub hac specie* eternal Extension, or rather (if the reader will permit the bizarre and ambiguous phrase), extended Eternity.

How, then, is the concrete nature of eternal Extension to be conceived? If it is neither an empty instantaneous form, nor a 'quiescent mass', nor again a whole composed of sections (the sections being bodies); and if again from it 'the variety of things' is to be deduced, how must its nature be conceived (for we must not attempt to imagine it)? How, in other words, is the transition to be made from Extension to the extended universe?

Spinoza's doctrine is well known: the formal descent is made in two stages, through the immediate infinite and eternal mode of 'motion and rest' to the mediate infinite and eternal mode which he calls 'the face of the whole universe'.¹ As commonly interpreted that 'deduction' presents a very mechanical appearance: it looks like a miracle followed by a dissection. As Spinoza puts forward his view in conscious opposition to that of Descartes, it cannot be supposed that he means the deduction to be temporal as it might be represented in a crude picture of the Cartesian theory: extension coming first, motion and rest being imparted to it, or produced in it, by God, the world of interacting bodies being the final result of the process. The process is certainly to be taken as logical, immanent, and eternal, not physical, transient, and temporal. *Motus et quies* is a real mode or expression of Extension, and the extended universe is a real mode following from that mode

¹ 'Exempla, quae petis [i.e. of the things produced immediately and mediately by God], primi generis sunt . . . in Extensione . . . motus et quies; secundi autem, facies totius Universi, quae quamvis infinitis modis variet, manet tamen semper eadem.' (*Ep. lxiv.*)

of Extension, and exhausting its infinite content. These modes flow from the very character of Extension as an infinite and eternal reality: they are not superadded to it as an extraneous filling. Nor again must motion and rest be conceived as motion through space in time, or rest in space for a time. It is an infinite and eternal mode, and cannot therefore be in time or for a time, not even though the time be without beginning or end.

I say that the motion cannot for intellectual apprehension be locomotion, nor the rest, locoquiescence or the mere exclusive occupation of a place or region. Indeed we have not motion and rest as two modes of Extension standing in contradictory, or even contrary, opposition, but motion-rest, a single mode constituting an infinite, universal, singular being, expressing the nature of eternal Extension. The motion and rest that belong to an 'imaginative' section of the whole are rightly and necessarily pictured as locomotion and locoquiescence; but even here the simplest application of thought shows that both the motion and the rest are relative, since they mean motion or rest with respect to axes of reference (usually, but not always or necessarily, supplied by the position and orientation of the observer's body). Locomotion among bodies is, in fact, an obvious expression of their finiteness in relation to the indivisibility of Extension. Bodies move through space because, being of one substance with it, they differ solely in their proportions of motion and rest. Nor can a body be defined by its occupation of a region of Extension: if it were so defined, and adequately, it could not even appear to move from region to region. And in the Real it does not so move, since in the Real there are no identical regions. The indivisibility of Extension has 'imaginative' expression in the neutrality of absolute position, i.e. in the relativity of all position. Thus Extension appears to do nothing, to be neutral, *because it does everything*. So the whole cannot move or rest, because it is not *in*, but *is* Extension.¹

The nature of the infinite and eternal mode of *motus et quies* must

¹ The more individual a thing is the more its *motus et quies* depends on itself, i.e. the more it resembles the whole which determines the proportions of motion and rest within itself, and itself remains unmoving and unresting. Thus locomotion and locoquiescence are signs of *partialitas* (for a finite thing is moved from place to place, or remains where it is, precisely because it is passive (i.e. *really* rests)); while real *motus et quies* is a sign and expression of wholeness, i.e. of self-determining and self-maintaining activity. Through its real infinite restlessness it transcends the possibility of locomotion (or even locoquiescence), for, as I have said, it is no longer *in* space, it *is* space in its concrete reality.

thus be deduced from that of Extension characterized as it is by formal diversity or externality, and by unity. Extension is at once the infinitude of externality or multiplicity with its *nisus* to eternal unity, and the eternal unity with its *nisus* to infinite diversity or externality: *res extensa naturata* and *res extensa naturans*. It is thus that *motus et quies* constitutes the immediate infinite and eternal mode of extended Substance; for concrete Extension necessarily expresses itself through this reciprocal *nisus* to externality and to unity, and again, through this reciprocal *nisus*, the unity and continuity and infinity of Extension are further 'modified' and expressed as the infinite variety of the eternal universe as an extended whole. In the *facies totius Universi* as a whole which also is infinite and eternal, *motus et quies* is still not through or in time, but is regarded in its infinite variety and organization as the constituent essence of individual extended things. Viewed imaginatively as it belongs to finite singular things, *motus et quies* necessarily, and therefore rightly, becomes spatio-temporal for external observers; but even here, as I shall argue in due course, the motion and rest of any given thing, in so far as the thing is real, is viewed by Intellect, not as locomotion and locoquiescence (for these indicate the outward-looking apprehension of a part within a larger whole), but as a harmony or balance of motion-rest.

How these simple facts relating to the distinctions of eternal and infinite *motus et quies* on the one hand, and spatio-temporal locomotion and locoquiescence on the other, can so uniformly have escaped the attention of even careful interpreters of Spinoza, is no small mystery. It has probably been supposed that since motion is essentially relative and balanced in the whole (for the whole *qua* whole does not move) that therefore the contradiction is 'somehow' resolved; but however fond Spinoza may have been (according to the popular gibe) of the word '*quatenus*', he had little use for the phrase '*nescio quo modo*' to qualify his solutions. Though a whole of moving sections may, as a whole, remain unmoved, a genuinely indivisible whole, which does not itself move, cannot 'contain' (and certainly not 'produce') movement in the sense of change of place in time. These facts were perfectly clear to Spinoza, and I thus infer that if extended Substance expresses itself as infinite and eternal motion and rest it follows that these must be given another significance than that of motion and rest as they are for Imagination.

The clue to the solution of this problem, as well as to that of the eternity of the mind, towards which I am making my way, is to be found in the series of *Lemmata* following *Proposition xiii* of *Part II* of the *Ethics*. These are 'physical' propositions introduced to facilitate the exposition of the processes of perception and of knowledge generally. Spinoza expressly disclaims any intention of dealing in them with the constitution of bodies or of the material universe as a whole with any completeness: 'I should feel bound to explain and demonstrate . . . at more length, if I were writing a special treatise on body. But I have already said that such is not my intention, I have only touched on the question because it enables me to prove easily that which I have in view.'¹

The doctrine of the *Lemmata* is that any individual whole or body is constituted not by its separate region of Extension, nor by the identical material of its parts, but by a certain relation or union or balance of motion and rest in its members or parts. Thus in so far as a body is an individual, it does not move through space in time, nor does it, strictly, rest in space for a time (rest and motion being relative). But in so far as some section of this individual is regarded in isolation from the individual as a whole, it cannot but be regarded as moving or at rest in space. Every individual thing, therefore, has motion or rest in space-time in so far as it is regarded as a section of some wider individual thing, but has no spatio-temporal motion or rest in so far as it is regarded as an individual. To this conception there are two corporeal limits: there is, on the one side, the *facies totius Universi* as an infinite individual which cannot be regarded as a section of any wider individual, and therefore cannot have spatio-temporal motion or rest at all, but is itself an infinite complex of balanced, and therefore real, *motus et quies*; and at the other end of the scale of things, there are the *corpora simplicissima*, which are the mere dust of being, since they are nothing but 'infinitesimal' or minimal relative movements in space-time.²

Between these corporeal limits there is a hierarchy of individual forms of which the human body is a notable example as a complex of complex individuals of a certain order, possessing a high degree

¹ 'Haec, si animus fuisset de corpore ex professo agere, prolixius explicare, et demonstrare debuisssem. Sed jam dixi me aliud velle, nec alia de causa haec adferre, quam quia ex ipsis ea, quae demonstrare constitui, facile possum deducere.' (*Eth. II, Lem. vii, Sch.*)

² See Excursus IV (pp. 137-41).

of individuality as a complicated system of reciprocal *nisus*, but which, being finite, is subject to spatio-temporal motion and rest as a single thing in relation to others within some wider individual (e.g. the world).

In such a view it is evident that spatio-temporal motion and rest is but a symbol of finitude, or an 'imaginative' expression of unbalanced *nisus* from externality towards unity, due to *partialitas* and fragmentariness. Motion and rest in space-time is incomplete *nisus*; individuality is reciprocal or balanced *nisus*. And the relativity of spatio-temporal motion and rest is itself an expression of the reciprocal nature of the relations of the moving or resting, i.e. finite, sections. For these move or are at rest only relatively to each other: the whole has no spatio-temporal motion or rest.¹ Nor do the real parts or members of any whole in themselves move in so far as they are regarded (and rightly regarded) as wholes, but only in so far as they are regarded as sections.²

Thus by a new path the familiar truth is reached, that for Spinoza reality and eternity are the same as completeness and individuality; for finite individuals are all one in respect of Substance. They do not either move or rest in Extension. Their reality is their individuality, it is the self-determined, and therefore balanced, mobility and quiescence of their members. But as finite sections of a more inclusive individual their individuality is qualified by spatio-temporal motion and rest, i.e. their *real* motion and rest is limited and truncated. The perfect Individual, the *facies totius Universi*, does not, from any point of view, move or rest in space-time; its parts or members, *considered as sections*, have relative motion and rest, though their movements are a balanced harmony in the whole. But again, these parts or members of *Natura* themselves, *regarded as partial wholes*, are without spatio-temporal motion or rest, and their parts or members in turn, regarded as sections, move and rest in space-time, and are in their degree balanced in their system; and so to infinity.

The real *motus et quies* which is the immediate infinite and eternal mode of Extension is without transition in space-time, but it is progressively dissected and dissipated into transiency for the

¹ Though it contains, of course, all degrees of balanced *motus et quies*.

² The distinction between a part and a section, which I shall have occasion frequently to use and to emphasize, is here important. For though no section can also be a whole, a real part must be so regarded; and in this special case it is essential to regard it as a relative whole (in its measure) reproducing the absolute whole.

imaginative apprehension of ever lower grades of individuality within the whole. Motion and rest in space-time, as the expression of finitude, are mainly constituted by negation, and where they are absolute (the limit asymptotically approached in the *corpora simplicissima*), the negation is complete; for absolute motion and absolute rest are one and the same, and null. In the Real there is no movement through Extension, or rest in a region of Extension; for Extension is undivided, and the Substance of all things is the same.¹ That, as I shall show, is the source of our eternity.

My immediate conclusion is that infinite and eternal *motus et quies* is that reciprocal *nîsus* between externality or multiplicity and unity which is one with individuality, and is the expression of the essence of *Res extensa* as at once infinitely multiplex yet one and indivisible. A point of view is thus attained from which at last it becomes profitable to consider the place of 'this or that' human mind in the infinite and eternal Real.

The individual human mind does not, according to Spinoza, survive resolution into the intellectual order by becoming infinite, or by being merged and lost in the infinite, but, at least partly, it remains unaffected by that resolution: it 'feels and proves by experience that it is eternal'. The human body, of which it is the *essentia objectiva* is finite; it is only a part of *Natura*; it thus appears as depending upon sempiternal nature for its temporal origin, career, and survival. But though a part, it is not merely a section of *Natura*, it is also an individual capable of self-maintenance and of determining the relations of its subordinate parts in accordance with those universal principles of synthesis that we call the intellectual order, and that are most fully exemplified and expressed in the universe as a whole. Those principles are universal in essence, though the degree in which they are exemplified in the different complexes of motion and rest that are the individual things with which individual minds are correlated, varies through the widest range: 'a mouse no less than an angel depends on God; yet a mouse is not a kind of angel'.² Further, some of the things

¹ 'Corpora ratione motus, et quietis, celeritatis, et tarditatis, et non ratione substantiae ab invicem distinguuntur.' (*Eth. II, Lem. i.*)

² 'Quamvis opera . . . omnium eorum, quae sunt, ex Dei aeternis legibus, et decretis necessario profluant, continuoque a Deo dependeant, attamen non solum gradibus; sed et essentia ab invicem differunt: licet etenim mus aequè, ac angelus, et aequè tristitia, ac laetitia, a Deo dependeant, nequit tamen mus species angeli, et tristitia species laetitiae esse.' (*Ep. xxiii.*)

that we call individual or singular things are such only for Imagination because they appear as occupying separate regions of imagined extension; they are not real individuals constituted by the reciprocal *nisus* of a range of multiplicity or externality and a partial unity: a stone or a chair, for example, may only be an 'imaginative' individual, its reality may depend wholly on its place in a much wider system for which it is a more or less insignificant detail possessing no independent value. But, according to Spinoza, the human body transcends such absolute dependence. In its degree it is an expression of a genuine unity within its range of externality. It is not merely a section of nature but a genuine part, i.e. a relative whole within nature. This is possible because *Natura* is not a mere aggregate of exclusive pieces, but is infinite, one, and indivisible. Its variety is qualitative rather than quantitative, or quantitative only because it is primarily qualitative. I have said that the *facies totius Universi* does not contain or suffer spatio-temporal motion and rest, though its imagined sections must either contain or suffer, and may both suffer and contain such motion and rest. But its real parts are not exclusive; they are in thoroughgoing relation with the whole, and in their way reproduce the whole. That they can do so without becoming identical with the whole follows from the nature of extended Substance as at once infinite in multiplicity, diversity, or externality, and also one and indivisible. If it were a mere empty form it could be nothing at all, for the unity would resolve the diversity, or the diversity would destroy the unity. It is both one and infinite in so far as it is an eternal existent, and, as such, its real parts retain their *partialitas* while reproducing the whole, and also, as parts, reciprocating with each other. Their reality as parts and their expressiveness of the whole are one and the same thing, for it is the essential character of an infinite whole that each of its parts reproduces it, and, as I have said, sections which do not reproduce it are not rightly called its parts.¹

¹ In this part of my interpretation of Spinoza I am, of course, engaged in speculative exposition. I beg the reader to remember that by that term I do not mean 'imaginative' exposition, but an attempt to get at the spirit both in the letter and behind the letter, but always through or by means of the letter. My views are based upon certain unobtrusive but, to the prepared reader, provocative statements and suggestions in Spinoza's writings, as well as upon the implications of the main principles of his system. The broader basis of the interpretation will become clear as the argument develops, and I shall endeavour to indicate from time to time the bearing of Spinoza's statements upon the

The variety of the *facies totius Universi* is not, therefore, wholly illusory. If it were, there would cease to be an extended world of

subject; but prominent among the assertions which form the *points d'appui* of my account of Spinoza's thought as involving a qualified form of the macrocosm-microcosm theory of the universe and man, are to be placed those of *Part II* of the *Ethics* with reference to the *propria communia*. 'Omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt' (*Eth. II, Lem. ii*); this becomes the basis of the possibility of adequate knowledge for the finite mind, for 'Illa, quae omnibus communia, quaeque aequae in parte, ac in toto sunt, non possunt concipi, nisi adaequate' (*Eth. II, xxxviii*). Thus there are *propria* which singular things possess in common with one another and with the whole of *Natura* (and the same is true also of ideas). But it may be objected that this doctrine of Spinoza really opposes the interpretation which I am defending, since these *communiae* are only abstract *propria*, and do not even constitute any finite singular thing, as the preceding proposition indicates: 'Id, quod omnibus commune (de his vide supra *Lemma ii*), quodque aequae in parte, ac in toto est, nullius rei singularis essentiam constituit' (*Eth. II, xxxvii*). My reply is that it is the *Demonstration* of this proposition that must determine the significance of its *Enunciation*; and that indicates that by 'constituting the essence of a singular' Spinoza means 'depending upon the singular thing for essence and existence'. So that the point really is not that 'finite singulars' are too complete to be constituted by a relatively abstract *proprium*, but rather that the *propria* are too complete to be constituted by a relatively limited singular. For the extrinsic determinations of singular things are negations, and it is the negation that cannot be derived from the *propria communia*. How far Spinoza's consciousness of the ambiguity of his expression here is really acute, does not appear from the text. Perhaps he is thinking for the moment of the *proprium commune* apart from Substance, i.e. as abstract, and though more ample in scope, relatively emptier than the finite modes (thought of as modes of Substance). But in any case, his view is, I think, quite clearly that the *propria communia* do constitute 'fixed and eternal' singulars: 'Unde haec fixa, et aeterna, quamvis sint singularia, tamen ob eorum ubique praesentiam, ac latissimam potentiam erunt nobis, tanquam universalia, sive genera definitionum rerum singularium mutabilium, et causae proximae omnium rerum' (*De Intell. Emend., Op. Post., p. 389*). But they do not constitute these mutable singular things.

But that no finite thing fully reproduces any external thing or the whole, Spinoza is emphatic. The microcosm is no complete reproduction of the macrocosm, and even the 'eternal part' of the mind is not identical with the *infinita idea Dei*, but only a part of it, i.e. an individual abstraction from it.

The thoughts of the reader will here doubtless turn to the comparable doctrine of Leibniz with reference to the monads as reflections of the universe (and some also, by special grace, reflections of God). But though Leibniz, like Spinoza, limits the adequacy of the reflections of the finite individuals, the two theories are widely divergent in most other essential respects. That of Leibniz is very much more brilliantly detailed than are the broad and general statements of Spinoza, though I think that there is discoverable in and under the latter, the outlines of a theory more satisfactory, profound, and in accordance with our experience, than the Leibnizian theory of monads. I have attempted in the course of the text to bring the Spinozistic theory to distinct expression, and I have added a more detailed discussion and comparison of the two theories in the Preface to Part II (pp. 107-11). Great as was the influence on Leibniz of his study of the *Ethics* of Spinoza, perhaps the effect on subsequent speculation

nature. But its unity and variety must be such that the order which constitutes the whole shall constitute also every genuine part, though not the 'imaginative' sections, of the whole. And this is true of the human mind in genuine knowledge as distinct from mere memory and Imagination as such. Those who have concluded, therefore, that all minds become one in rational knowledge, have forgotten that the *fons et origo* of this part of Spinoza's theory is extended Substance as an infinite self-maintaining whole of real parts constituted by the same intellectual order without loss of individual distinction. Hegelians and idealists generally will, doubtless, reject that foundation, and thus become involved in familiar difficulties about the reality of finite personality, but Spinoza must not be entangled in difficulties that do not belong to his theory as it stands. He must be attacked, if at all in this connexion, through his conception of Substance as really extended: realists will not be inclined to attack him there, and idealists who feel the inclination may be invited to remember the *aperçu* of Bosanquet that monadology explains the 'insides' but not the 'outsides' of things. And this may have an even wider application.¹

A further corroboration of my general conclusion is to be found in those propositions scattered throughout the *Ethics* in which Spinoza defines the place of body in the act of perception, especially the significance of the organism with reference to the acquiring and possession of adequate knowledge by the mind. He asserts, on the one hand, that the mind knows only the body²; yet, on the other hand, that it is capable of possessing an adequate idea of God³; and the seeming contradiction is uniformly resolved through the principle of the unity and interconnectedness of *Natura*. 'The human mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is so in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number of impressions.'⁴ Nor does he find any incoherence between these

would have been even greater if Spinoza could have read the short resumé that came in the course of a century or so to be called '*La Monadologie*', though I do not think that it would have changed the real character of Spinozism.

¹ Further thoughts on this subject will be found below, especially in the discussions of the infinite Attributes of the Real, in Chapter XI.

² *Eth. II, xiii.*

³ *Eth. II, xlvii.*

⁴ 'Mens humana apta est ad plurima percipiendum, et eo aptior, quo ejus Corpus pluribus modis disponi potest.' (*Eth. II, xiv.*)

assertions and the equally emphatic one that 'the human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected'.¹ The human body in the midst of nature is, indeed, very roughly analogous to an instrument in an orchestra: its contribution is a part of the whole symphony, but it also *sotto voce* contributes a reproduction of the whole; each instrument takes its part with the others in the whole, but a very acute ear would detect it playing its own responsive, and therefore selective, version of the whole in a normally unnoticed undertone. To bodily responsiveness in Extension there corresponds an appropriate relation in Thought, and it is because nature (both psychical and physical) is a whole of responsive parts, parts which as capable of adequate response are more than mere sections—are, indeed, relative wholes, that complete knowledge is an ideal for man, or, in truth, that knowledge is for him possible at all.² Further, and even more important, this reproduction of the whole is not a mere insubstantial reflection, for the orchestral analogy here breaks down: there each instrument plays a section of the symphony as its main work, and reproduces the whole, in its measure, *sotto voce*; but in nature it is the reproduction of the whole in each that is its contribution to the whole. '*Sotto voce*' must here refer not to a concealed additional undertone, having no real part in the whole, but to the very contributions of the parts which reproduce the whole *partialiter*, i.e. *sotto voce*. It follows that the parts are real with the whole; for they are one with it in substance, and therefore one with it, in their degree, in form. Their finitude means not their unreality, but their inadequate responsiveness. In so far as any part of nature is capable of adequate attunement with the whole, to that degree it is, in Leibnizian phrase, 'big' with the whole; but no part can be wholly equal to the whole and yet remain a part; nor can a whole be infinite which is not a whole of infinite parts: 'the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature and power; . . . matter was not lacking to God for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more strictly, the laws of his nature are so vast, as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite

¹ 'Mens humana ipsum humanum Corpus non cognoscit, nec ipsum existere scit, nisi per ideas affectionum, quibus Corpus afficitur.' (*Eth. II, xix.*)

² Cf. *Eth. II, xix.*

intellect'.¹ 'When you say that by making men so dependent on God, I reduce them to the likeness of the elements, plants, or stones, you . . . confuse things which pertain to the Intellect with the Imagination. If you had understood the meaning of dependence on God *puro intellectu* you certainly would not think that dependence on him rendered things dead . . . for who ever dared to speak so meanly of the supremely perfect Being; on the contrary, you would understand that it is because they depend on God that they are perfect, so that this dependence . . . may be best understood . . . by considering not stocks and plants but the most intelligent and perfect of created things.'²

The distinctness of the parts of extended nature arises, therefore, from their relation to nature as a whole, through which relation they are at once both parts and also reciprocating parts. They could not be real parts if they did not reciprocate; they could not reciprocate if they were not real parts. And as reciprocating parts of the whole they are distinct from each other and within the whole. They are distinct as parts of an infinite extended whole characterized by spatial externality; they are reproductions as parts of an infinite extended whole characterized by individuality and unity. As I have already noticed it is mainly for those who deny the ultimate reality of Extension that difficulties have arisen in maintaining both the distinctness and the wholeness of the genuine parts of the Real; and it is only a further mark of the expository and polemical acuity of Spinoza that he approaches the question of the reality and the eternity of the mind, not primarily from the side of Thought, but by insisting on the nature of extended Substance.³

¹ 'Rerum perfectio ex sola earum natura, et potentia est aestimanda . . . ei non deficit materia ad omnia, ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum, creanda; vel magis proprie loquendo, quia ipsius naturae leges adeo amplae fuerunt, ut sufficerent ad omnia, quae ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt, producenda.' (*Eth. I, Appendix.*)

² 'Quod vero ais, me homines, eos a Deo tam dependentes faciendo, ideo elementis, herbis, et lapidibus similes reddere, id sufficienter ostendit te meam opinionem perversissime intelligere, et res, quae intellectum spectant, cum imaginatione confundere. Si enim puro intellectu percepisses, quid sit a Deo dependere, certe non cogitares, res, quatenus a Deo dependent, mortuas, corporeas, et imperfectas esse (quis unquam de Ente summe perfecto tam viliter ausus fuit loqui), e contra caperes, ea de causa, et quatenus a Deo dependent, perfectas esse. Adeo ut hanc dependentiam atque necessariam operationem quam optime per Dei decretum intelligamus, quando non ad truncos, et herbas; sed ad maxime intelligibiles, et res creatas perfectissimas attendimus.' (*Ep. xxi.*)

³ Though an analogous deduction from the side of Thought should involve no insuperable difficulties.

The second kind of knowledge, Reason, is adequate knowledge of the *propria communia* of things and of their implications. These common properties are not so much abstract universals as universal singulars, but these viewed in their universality rather than in their individual character. This has been generally understood, but it has for the most part been overlooked that these *propria communia* form not a mere list, but an ordered hierarchy. Reason is concerned both with their content and implications and also with their order, but with these distributively rather than systematically. Spinoza is himself largely responsible for this persistent oversight, because two only of the most universal of these singular existences are actually named by him, viz. extension, and motion and rest.¹ A comparison of *Propositions xxxvii* and *xxxix* of *Part II*, however, reveals the important fact, signalized by the variation of phrase from 'common to all' to 'common to the human body and to such other bodies as are wont to affect it', that grades of universality are admitted among these *propria*.² 'The mind is fitted to perceive adequately more things in proportion as its body has more in common with other bodies'³; 'Whatsoever so disposes the human body that it can be affected in many ways, or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many ways, is useful to man, and is more useful in proportion as the body is thereby better fitted to be affected in many ways, and to affect other bodies . . . In proportion as the body is rendered more fitted for [affecting or being affected by other bodies] the mind is rendered more capable of perception (by *Prop. xiv, Pt. II*).'⁴ It is the peculiar function of Reason to work within these ranges of universality, but, as Reason, it cannot weave them together into a concrete conception of the ordered hierarchy of notions as a whole constituting the

¹ 'In his . . . omnia corpora conveniunt, quod unius, ejusdemque attributi conceptum involvunt. Deinde, quod jam tardius, jam celerius, et absolute jam moveri, jam quiescere possunt.' (*Eth. II, Lem. ii.*)

² Cf. also *Eth. II, xxxviii, Cor.*: 'notiones omnibus hominibus communes.' But nothing comes of the distinction.

³ 'Mens eo aptior est ad plura adaequate percipiendum, quo ejus Corpus plura habet cum aliis corporibus communia.' (*Eth. II, xxxix, Cor.*)

⁴ 'Id, quod Corpus humanum ita disponit, ut pluribus modis possit affici, vel quod idem aptum reddit ad Corpora externa pluribus modis afficiendum homini est utile; et eo utilius, quo Corpus ab eo aptius redditur, ut pluribus modis afficiatur, aliaque corpora afficiat, et contra id noxium est, quod Corpus ad haec minus aptum reddit. Quo corpus ad haec aptius redditur, eo Mens aptior ad percipiendum redditur (per *Prop. xiv, P. II*) . . .' (*Eth. IV, xxxviii et Dem.*)

individuality, or some partial manifestation of the individuality, of the infinite whole or One. It is precisely this which is accomplished by the mind in the exercise of the third kind of knowledge, *scientia intuitiva*, the peculiar character of which is that it proceeds 'from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things'.¹ In such 'intuitive' knowledge there is an inweaving of infinite common notions of common properties, in their logical order and precedence, to form the notion of an individual whole.² It is not the mere abstract deduction of the narrower *propria* from the wider, beginning with absolutely infinite extension conceived as an abstract universal, for that is an impossible process; but it proceeds from an adequate or concrete notion of the more universal existences, to the implied variety constituted by the less universal determinations. It is knowledge of a thing 'solely through its essence',³ i.e. as a singular or individual thing reproducing (and only as reproducing) the whole.

The ideal instance of such knowledge is that which is in God as the knowledge of that eternal infolding and unfolding of *Natura naturans* and *Natura naturata* which is 'the infinite love wherewith God loves himself', and which constitutes the eternity of God.⁴

¹ 'Hoc cognoscendi genus procedit ab adaequata idea essentiae formalis quorundam Dei attributorum ad adaequatam cognitionem essentiae rerum.' (*Eth. II, xl, Sch. ii.*)

² On the question of the mind's *passage* from Reason to *scientia intuitiva*, see Excursus III (pp. 99-104).

³ 'Perceptio . . . ubi res percipitur per solam suam essentiam.' (*De Intell. Emend.*, Op. Post., p. 362.)

⁴ 'Deus est absolute infinitus (per *Def. vi, P. I*), hoc est (per *Def. vi, P. II*), Dei natura gaudet infinita perfectione, idque (per *Prop. iii, P. II*) concomitante idea sui, hoc est (per *Prop. xi et Def. i, P. I*), idea suae causae, et hoc est, quod in *Coroll. Prop. xxx hujus* Amorem intellectualem esse diximus' (*Eth. V, xxxv, Dem.*). 'Deus absolute infinitus' means according to *Eth. I, Def. vi*, to which Spinoza here refers, 'Substantia constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam, et infinitam essentiam exprimit'; and God, he says, referring significantly to *Eth. II, iii*, 'rejoices in infinite perfection and in the accompanying idea of himself'; this proposition runs: 'In Deo datur necessario idea, tam ejus essentiae, quam omnium, quae ex ipsius essentia necessario sequuntur'; so that God rejoices in his nature as involving the whole totality of Attributes *with the infinite expressions of their essence*, i.e. *Natura naturata*. But this rejoicing is accompanied by 'idea sui, hoc est idea suae causae', he knows himself as the eternal cause of his own infinite perfections and expressions, i.e. *Natura naturans*. And this eternal rejoicing in expression and expressing is the *Amor intellectualis infinitus* with which 'Deus se amat' (*Eth. V, xxxv*). Again, 'aeternitas est ipsa Dei essentia, quatenus haec necessariam involvit existentiam' (*Eth. V, xxx, Dem.*), a statement which also explains the reference in *Eth. V, xxxv, Dem.*

But *scientia intuitiva* is not confined to the infinite whole, for 'he who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal',¹ for such a mind does not possess the various common notions of its ever widening circle of affinities as a mere list, it can weave them together in such a way as to reproduce within itself that universal and eternal order which constitutes the Real as an infinite whole. And in so far as it does so, it possesses at once 'a great knowledge of itself and of God' so that its 'greatest or chief part is eternal'.² In so doing it puts aside all those ideas which belong to Imagination in so far as they are confused or inadequate, i.e. in so far as they are mere memories or imaginations; not because they are in themselves false, for it is through our relations with the whole that we have knowledge at all, and memories and imaginations are confused apprehensions of our relations; it puts them aside because they do not clearly and wholly belong to the real essence of the finite individual in whose world they have intruded. 'There are no ideas confused or inadequate except in respect to a particular mind.'³ They symbolize our finitude; they constitute no part of *our* eternal being: in life they do not, and out of life they cannot.

It is thus that in our 'rational' and 'intuitive' apprehension of the nature of the Real 'we feel and prove by experience that we are eternal'. We do so even in those abstract conceptions of the universal laws of being and their implications, that constitute the content of Reason; but we do so more completely and concretely when we seek to escape that abstractness of reasoned truth which expresses itself for 'imaginative' applications as temporal neutrality.⁴

to *Eth. I, xi*; and finally, to complete the circuit: 'Deus vero non potest dici frui existentia, nam existentia Dei est Deus ipse, sicut etiam ipsius essentia' (*Cog. Met. II, i*). Thus the very being of God as Thought is intellectual love, which is a draught of eternity itself; or since each Attribute is but the obverse to which the infinite remaining Attributes are the reverse (see below, Chapter XI), the infinite intellectual love wherewith God loves himself is one with eternity itself.

¹ 'Qui Corpus ad plurima aptum habet, is Mentem habet, cujus maxima pars est aeterna.' (*Eth. V, xxxix.*)

² 'Quia Corpora humana ad plurima apta sunt, non dubium est, quin ejus naturae possint esse, ut ad Mentem referantur, quae magnam sui, et Dei habeant cognitionem, et quarum maxima, seu praecipua pars est aeterna, atque adeo ut mortem vix timeant.' (*Eth. V, xxxix, Sch.*)

³ 'Nullae inadaequatae, nec confusae sunt; nisi quatenus ad singularem alicujus Mentem referuntur.' (*Eth. II, xxxvi, Dem.*)

⁴ And, I may add, as neutrality with respect to individual distinctions, where the truths of Reason are regarded as mere connexions of abstract universals. It is as a result of this simple error, together with the related failure to grasp

Scientific truths are dateless because they are true of every date, and 'imaginatively' applicable, therefore, at any date. But there

the significance of Spinoza's doctrine of *scientia intuitiva*, that leads inevitably to such extraordinary theses as those of Professor Taylor, to which I have incidentally referred (p. 74, note 2), and of Martineau, with reference to the meaning of Spinoza's assertions about the eternity of the human mind. 'It is only as identified with necessary truth that it [i.e. the human mind] is "eternal": the "*oculi mentis*" are the "part" of it that is so; and they are the "*ipsae demonstrationes*". Each "demonstration" makes but one "eternal", however many the individuals who "see" it, or the copies of Euclid that contain it: it goes home to a nature common to all, and not to the differences which mark off person from person. It is the universal organism of reason, the system of intellectual law, expressed in our "mode of thinking", which Spinoza sets free from time-relations: and he by no means intends to constitute a population of "eternals" including as many individuals as can understand a proof. It is as if "the mental eyes", instead of being repeated in each of us, had proclaimed their unity of function by being planted, like a telescope, outside us all, yet available for all. Then, whoever came and looked and passed away, the same vision would be there' (*A Study of Spinoza*, pp. 296-7). But this is imaginative, rather than speculative, exposition run mad! The source of the (not uncommon) error begins to reveal itself, however, in the issue, for Martineau proceeds to reject the relatively more satisfactory theory of Camerer (*Die Lehre Spinoza's, II, v*), mainly on the ground that it reads eternity as personal immortality, instead of timeless necessity. Doubtless he is right in denying that *aeternitas* is *aevum* or *sempiternitas*; but in denying this, it is not necessary to proceed also to deny that it is *individual* eternity of which Spinoza speaks, and so to reduce it to mere timeless necessity. The two questions must be kept distinct, and it is nothing but an obstinate attempt to impose a false Empiricist theory of ideas upon Spinoza (cf. p. 298: with Spinoza 'there is no mind as the subject of ideas, but only ideas that in the aggregate are verbally unified and *called* the mind') that leads Martineau hopelessly to confuse them.

Now the whole theory of Spinoza depends upon his rejection of mere hypotheticals and abstract universals: all real being is individual (though not necessarily therefore partial and fragmentary). There is thus no reason at all (apart from the error about ideas) for denying that it is the individual human mind that is, in part, eternal. All the reasons are in favour of the affirmation.

On the other hand, it is as false or fatuous to read eternity as timelessness, as to read it as *aevum* or *sempiternitas*: fatuous, if time is *completely* different from eternity (as e.g. number is); false, because self-contradictory, if time and eternity are related (since 'timelessness' can then only mean 'momentary' or 'under a neutral order of externality').

I have called the theory of Camerer 'relatively more satisfactory' because while it is certainly in error in assigning to Spinoza a belief in individual immortality, it is nearer the truth in affirming the mind's genuine individuality, both as a dweller in time and as an 'eternal' reality. On the other hand, Martineau is in error both with reference to the nature of the individual human mind, and also in reading eternity as timelessness *simpliciter*. And no more noteworthy example than this could, perhaps, be found, of the necessity of reading Spinoza in his own light, and not by means of a borrowed candle, if fatal confusions are to be avoided. It may, indeed, be said, both with reference to the theory thus imputed to Spinoza, and not less to the minds of its authors: 'if the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!'

can be no such neutrality (however it is to be expressed in relation to an eternal being) for the truth which constitutes the eternal part of the mind. Duration cannot be neutral for concrete 'imaginative' existence, for it *is* that existence; and eternity is not neutral for the Real: it constitutes its essence no less than its existence.

EXCURSUS III

SUB QUADAM SPECIE AETERNITATIS

SOMETHING has been done in recent years towards discovering the literary and philological origin of this often quoted expression, and to trace the developments of its significance, as well as the exact meaning which it bore in the mind of Spinoza.¹ The phrase occurs in the writings of Spinoza both in the longer form as it stands at the head of this Excursus, and also in the shorter form 'sub specie aeternitatis'; and it is my business, not to trace the possible developments of its significance in the mind of Spinoza, but rather to determine its precise meaning in his developed doctrine, and to indicate the probable basis of the variety of emphasis which it seems to bear, and which is signalized by the frequent introduction of the word 'quadam', or its equivalent.

When Spinoza says that 'de natura Rationis est res sub quadam aeternitatis specie percipere',² or 'ad Mentis naturam . . . pertinet Corporis essentiam sub specie aeternitatis concipere',³ he does not, I need hardly say, mean that Reason and *scientia intuitiva* view things under a false appearance (*species*) of eternity. On the contrary, they rightly grasp the nature of eternal things, and eternity is no 'specious' appearance.

Again, the phrase is not completely understood as meaning simply that Reason and 'intuition' view things from an eternal standpoint (*ex specula aeternitatis*), though doubtless, rightly interpreted, that meaning is not wholly alien to the doctrine of Spinoza; it is, however, metaphorical, and hence unlikely to indicate the very precise significance that Spinoza assigned to his often repeated and emphatic phrase.

I shall best indicate its import, not by attempting to find an exact English translation of it, but by examining the conditions which govern knowledge of the 'rational' and 'intuitive' kinds respectively. The distinction drawn by Spinoza between four (or three) kinds of knowledge⁴ belongs only to finite minds; for *Natura* neither 'imagines' nor 'reasons', but 'intuits', and its 'intuition' is, by reason of transcendence, homonymous with ours. Thus finite thought is only a 'part' of the divine Thought in so far as it is 'intuitive', and no longer merely 'rational' or 'imaginative'. The distinction between Reason and *scientia intuitiva* can

¹ Cf. e.g. *Bar. de Spinoza, Ethik*, übersetzt von O. Baensch, 10 Aufl., p. 284; 'Ewigkeit und Dauer bei Spinoza' (*Kant-Studien*, XXXII, i, *Spinoza Festheft*, 1927, pp. 72 et seqq.; C. Gebhardt, 'Spinoza und der Platonismus' (*Chronicon Spinozanum* I, pp. 200 et seqq.); &c.

² *Eth. II, xlv, Cor. ii.*

³ *Eth. V, xxix, Dem.*

⁴ *De Intell. Emend., Op. Post., pp. 362 et seqq.; Eth. II, xl, Sch. ii.*

therefore only be elucidated by an examination of typically finite knowledge.

The general nature of the Real will be laid down in the text with sufficient detail to indicate that the finite individual knows the eternal Whole only in the degree in which he reproduces it mentally and corporeally.¹ That reproduction can never be complete, either with the mind or with the body, but it can be adequate,² and in particular this is the case with the ideas of Reason and *scientia intuitiva* (and their corresponding corporeal modes). 'Cognitio primi generis unica est falsitatis causa, secundi autem, et tertii est necessario vera'.³

Reason

The objects of Reason are the *propria communia*, including both those which are common to all bodies whatsoever,⁴ and those which are common to the human body and the bodies which chiefly affect it.⁵

Now the human mind is the *essentia objectiva* of the human body, and its knowledge is thus primarily a knowledge of its body; it follows that the *propria communia* known to man must be of many grades of concreteness according to the number of types of individuality interposed between that of a man and that of a *corpus simplicissimum* (with its 'idea'). In verbal strictness a *proprium* is not 'commune' unless it is possessed in common by the knower's body and some other body external to it; so that we may regard the knowledge possessed by the knower of his own peculiar individuality as the ideal limit to which Reason as such does not proceed. But it is also, the reader must not forget, the real object of all our knowledge, and thus also of our knowledge of the whole. For though not all finite things possess all *propria communia*, the Whole which they all in their measure and manner express, does possess all *propria*, in a rationally synthesized form, i.e. in 'the intellectual order' (which is no uni-dimensional range of contents); and no other being possesses them all. Our idea of the Whole, therefore, is our idea of the body (but 'writ large' as the expression of our experience of the magnipotence of the external world); and our *true* idea of the whole is our idea of the body, rearranged, corrected, delimited, in accordance with the demands of the Intellect.

From these principles it follows that our knowledge is adequate with respect to the *propria communia* possessed by the Whole and by all things whatsoever; but it is only thin and abstract. Our knowledge with respect to the *propria communia* possessed by the Whole but only by some parts of the universe will still be adequate, but error may arise through false attribution to parts which cannot accept them; but it is

¹ *Eth. II, xiv; IV, xxxviii.* I am, of course, anticipating the conclusions of my own later chapters.

² *Eth. II, xlv-xlvii.* ³ *Eth. II, xli.* ⁴ *Eth. II, xxxviii.* ⁵ *Eth. II, xxxix.*

more concrete. And thus in the limit our knowledge of our real *propria* (*propria propria*), which we share only homonymously with the Whole and other 'enveloping' individuals, will be adequate, but liable to error from our tendency to impose them, either on external things (as in the 'pathetic' fallacy), or on the Whole (or other 'enveloping' individual) without proper delimitation (as in anthropomorphic theologies).

It has not, I think, been commonly recognized that the *propria* of things, whether they are *propria communia* or *propria propria* with respect to this or that knower, are identical with either the Attributes, or the infinite and eternal modes, of Substance. The only *propria communia* actually named by Spinoza are Extension and *motus et quies*.¹ I have elsewhere pointed out² that in this part of Spinoza's theory a great *lacuna* remains to be filled in before it can be regarded as in any sense adequate. But something is done at the other end of the series of individuals by the important doctrines of *Part V* of the *Ethics*, according to which man as intellect is eternal, and God can be explained in some degree 'per essentiam humanae Mentis, sub specie aeternitatis consideratam'.³ Thus the eternal essence of each man finds its place in God as one of his infinite and eternal modes: infinite, in that it expresses a draught of the undivided divine nature, though finite as doing so incompletely or abstractly. Thus the infinite and eternal modes must be infinitely various, and not limited to the few outstandingly concrete ones expressly named by Spinoza: Extension, *motus et quies*, *facies totius Universi*; Thought, *intellectus absolute infinitus*, *infinita idea Dei*. (It must also be remembered that in proportion to their *real* concreteness will be their relative abstractness for us.)

Scientia intuitiva

But though all our adequate knowledge is of the *propria* of *Natura*, it does not follow that it is limited to 'reasoning'. The presence in *Natura* of *propria communia* implies the presence in the human mind of certain ideas or 'notiones omnibus hominibus communes',⁴ and our knowledge may concern itself with these, and with their relations and connexions, and those of their objects. But if it does so it will fail to achieve genuine individuality, not because the *propria Naturae* are not individuals, for they are, but because their structure and relations will be considered, rather than their wholeness or individuality. For the Real is no mere series or collection of laws, but these are abstractions from its concrete nature. This is seen from the start in the fact that the immediate object of finite knowledge is the finite *individual* himself, both mind and body, and it follows that for knowledge, not merely

¹ *Eth. II, xxxvii*, referring to *Lem. ii*.

³ *Eth. V, xxxiii, xxxvi*.

² Below, p. 182.

⁴ *Eth. II, xxxviii, Cor*.

adequate, but also as perfect as is possible to the finite individual, the universe is simply himself with the limitations transcended and the perfections realized.

Thus his most perfect knowledge of the Real is of an Individual possessing all his perfections without their limitations, and infinitely more. And this knowledge must take the form, not of a collection or serial order of abstract universal laws made concrete by surreptitious introduction of precise minor, or vague major, individualities (such as 'electrons', 'atoms', 'plants', 'animals', 'men', &c.); but of *scientia intuitiva*: the knowledge of a universal Individual in which an 'adequate knowledge of the natures of things' follows from an 'adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes' of *Natura*.¹

Such *scientia intuitiva* arises not from the imaginative idea of himself as a being actual in the time-series, but from his rational knowledge²; and though there is doubtless a technical difficulty in understanding how the finite individual can pass from purely 'rational' abstract knowledge to 'intuitive' concrete knowledge, yet when it is remembered that the *propria communia* are of all grades of concreteness down (or up) to that of the knower, and that Reason is only excluded from the knowledge of the *propria propria* of the knower as from a 'limit', it must be admitted that the difficulty is at least mitigated. The *propria propria* of the individual (which he can only know by *scientia intuitiva*) are not sundered from the *propria communia* (which he can know in their precise structure and relations by Reason); and hence the former can be corrected and delimited by 'rational' criticism and construction. And this self-knowledge, qualified by knowledge of the things that limit the power of the self, becomes knowledge of the Whole; and when it is corrected by Reason, becomes true knowledge of the Whole by the delimitation of its content: 'Ignarus enim, praeterquam quod a causis externis, multis modis agitur, nec unquam vera animi acquiescentia potitur, vivit praeterea sui, et Dei, et rerum quasi inscius, et simulacri pati desinit, simul etiam esse desinit. Cum contra sapiens, quatenus ut talis consideratur, vix animo movetur; sed sui, et Dei, et rerum aeterna quadam necessitate conscius, nunquam esse desinit; sed semper vera animi acquiescentia potitur.'³ (It is of interest to compare the accounts given by Spinoza and Descartes of the relations of the self, of God, and of things, and to see the central importance of the doctrines of human eternity and of the 'cogito ergo sum' in the two systems respectively.)

The essential thing about *scientia intuitiva*, therefore, is not primarily its detail or range of content, but the form and order in which it synthesizes its content (and thus realizes it). It is knowledge not of abstrac-

¹ *Eth. II, xl, Sch. ii.*

² *Eth. V, xxviii et xxix.*

³ *Eth. V, xlii, Sch.*

tions but of *entia realia*¹ in the 'order of the intellect' as they flow necessarily from the *essentia Dei*. But '*aeternitas est ipsa Dei essentia, quatenus haec necessariam involvit existentiam*',² so that *scientia intuitiva* rightly views things in the form and order in which they really are as eternal modes of Substance, i.e. *sub specie aeternitatis*, in the form in which they *constitute* eternity, or essence which is identical with existence. And it is not as if essences could be ordered as they really are and yet not exist (being *in intellectu* but not *in re*): when they are so ordered they *are* the real things: if mental essences, minds; if corporeal essences, bodies. I say 'minds' and 'bodies', not necessarily Thought and Extension; for these principles apply in due measure even when the systematic order of essences does not extend from *Natura* down through all its parts to the infinitely remote *corpora simplicissima* and their ideas. If the essences involved are in 'the order of the intellect', i.e. not merely in the right linear series, but in their hierarchical order of ascending and descending individuality, there is *scientia intuitiva* rooted in the divine nature (though abstractly), and therefore real existence flowing from the *essentia Dei*; blessedness; eternity. It is thus that the human mind (and body) is eternal.

But Reason, taken alone, can present and achieve no such concrete reality, though its genuine results are adequate and certain. It does not constitute an individual; even in its most concrete flights, it does not reveal an individual, for no individual is composed of serially connected laws. It considers relations rather than *relata* (though it constantly assumes these as *pièds-à-terre*). But the subordinate individuals which are so ordered by Reason are placed in the *ordo ad intellectum*, i.e. they take their places in an order corresponding to that which they really have in *Natura*; they are apprehended, not as constellated to form (and thus subordinated to) a higher individual, and hence not as *constituting* eternity (*sub specie aeternitatis*), but *sub quadam specie aeternitatis*, in their correct order among co-ordinate individuals. 'At quoniam naturae leges (ut jam ostendimus) ad infinita se extendunt, et *sub quadam specie aeternitatis* a nobis concipiuntur, et natura secundum eas certo, atque immutabili ordine procedat, ipsae nobis eatenus Dei infinitatem, aeternitatem, et immutabilitatem *aliquo modo* indicant.'³

In conclusion I may perhaps notice the fact that, on rare occasions, Spinoza shows a certain carelessness in his use of the variants of this phrase. Thus in *Eth. V, xxix, Dem.*, he quotes *Eth. II, xlv, Cor. ii*, in the shortened form, in spite of the fact that he has emphasized the '*quadam*' in the *Demonstration* of that *Corollary* by the phrase: '*sub hac aeternitatis specie*'. This is probably a mere accident. The use of the

¹ *Eth. V, xxx, Dem.*² *Loc. cit.*³ *Tr. Theo.-Pol., cap. vi.*

longer form in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*,¹ where intellect in general is being discussed, may involve no more than ease of expression, though it might conceivably indicate the process of transition from his earlier view, which confined eternity 'to God alone',² if that phrase, as is most probable, indicates his own opinion), to his mature view, which assigned eternity, as I have indicated, to all the infinite modes in their ordered hierarchy. In that case the 'quadam' might bear a limiting significance with reference to Reason, and an apologetic significance with reference to finite *scientia intuitiva*. But the former hypothesis seems the more likely in the absence of further evidence.

¹ Op. Post., p. 391.

² Cog. Met. II, i.

PART II
INDIVIDUATION

PREFACE

LEIBNIZ AND SPINOZA

READERS more familiar with the philosophy of Leibniz than with the details of that of Spinoza may be tempted to suppose that I am permitting myself in these chapters to drift towards an interpretation of the latter in terms of some of the leading principles of the former, and thus to spoil the balance and harmony of the one without elucidating the other, because the two are in essential opposition. It may therefore be of value if I attempt to state as briefly and pointedly as possible what I take to be the extent of the agreement and disagreement of the two systems in their main features. Happily this can be done without attempting the impossible feat of giving an adequate statement and valuation of the complex and profound theory of Leibniz in a brief essay.

The real point of contact is, I think, the doctrine of the macrocosm and the microcosm which receives special embodiment in both theories, though more obviously in that of Leibniz. In spite of the suggestiveness of Spinoza's pregnant expressions, there is, perhaps, no reason to believe that there is any direct connexion between these two expressions of this ancient and persistent theory of the relations of the universe and man. It is difficult, indeed, to deal with the theory of knowledge without recourse to some such view, so that a considerable history of philosophy might well be written round its development, culminating in its ultimate subtle misapplication in modern theories of subjective, and, in some of its forms, transcendental, idealism. Thus we cannot represent the theory of Leibniz as a development of hints received from the *Ethics* of Spinoza; on the contrary, it seems to me that the theory of Leibniz might with greater plausibility be regarded as essentially a brilliant confusing of issues already elucidated by Spinoza, though not by him developed in detail: a confusion from which philosophy has not yet recovered.

If we examine the analytic and synthetic movements by which Leibniz passes from the world of ordinary experience to the reconstructed world of the 'monadology' we find that the first process, corresponding to the Spinozistic movement towards the *corpora simplicissima animata*,¹ is one of analysis by which he reaches the

¹ The conception is discussed in Excursus IV (pp. 137-41).

idea of the simple monad as an unextended, positionless 'mathematical' *punctum*, endowed with activity which takes the form of the representation of the whole universe, partly actual (viz. perception) and partly potential (viz. appetition). The infinite variations of the proportions of actuality and potentiality provide an infinite series of monads, each totally independent of all the others, except for their common *τέλος*, i.e. their so-called 'pre-established' harmony. Already, therefore, in the analytic process important divergency is apparent between Leibniz and Spinoza: for the *corpora simplicissima* are not *puncta* (which for Spinoza could be nothing real at all, and are only real for Leibniz through the imputation of activity), but are what may be called 'minimal' extensions 'momentarily' distinguished by actual motions, and by these constituted. Potentiality belongs to the *corpora simplicissima animata* only through their relations within some total system of which they are the 'momentary' expressions. This divergence is, of course, directly connected with the contrasted attitudes of Spinoza and Leibniz to the reality of Extension. For Leibniz it is, as such, phenomenal, and is only a mode in which the possible relations of co-existence of the monads are represented; for Spinoza, on the contrary, real concrete Extension is an ultimate Attribute of *Natura*.

Divergency becomes even more pronounced in the upward synthetic movement from the simple monads, to empirical individuals, and on to the universe, and God. For Leibniz, each monad is independent, it has no 'windows', and thus empirical things and organisms can be existentially no more than aggregates of monads, and their differences of grade must be due, not primarily to their systematic order, but to the natures of their 'dominant' monads or 'souls'. Thus the distinctions of inorganic things, plants, animals, men, &c., are reached. But the 'dominant' monad of any compound substance is only *existentially* extraneous to its 'body': *essentially* it is related in such a way that metempsychosis is impossible; for while the 'soul' represents the whole universe in some measure, it also, in so doing, represents the different aggregates of monads within the universe with different degrees of clearness, and the aggregate that it represents most clearly is its 'body', which thus, as reflected in it, becomes the 'point of view' from which the 'soul' reflects the universe. It follows that the 'body' must be an *aggregate* only existentially; essentially, it

is an *organic whole*. As composed of independent monads, it is an aggregate; as represented in its 'dominant' monad or 'soul', it is an organism or microcosm through which the complete unity of the macrocosm is represented in a single monad. Thus in *essence* the 'body' stands midway between the universe and the 'soul'; both 'body' and 'soul' are representations of the universe and are contained in it *eminenter*. But in *existence* the 'soul' is not contained in the 'body' *eminenter*, for the body is a mere aggregate, but contrariwise, the 'body' as an organism is contained in the 'soul', and again in the universe. The ambiguous position thus occupied by the 'body' in the theory of Leibniz, arises from the differences which distinguish his analysis and synthesis from that of Spinoza. It is because he takes Extension as phenomenal, and thus analyses it into co-existent non-extended *puncta* without position, that he must make the 'body' existentially an aggregate. It is because he takes Thought seriously, and thus makes the universe something more than an aggregate (since it is reflected in the single monad) that he is forced to make the 'body' an organic unity. Now for Spinoza, with his more adequate view of both Extension and Thought, the analytic process cannot reach mere *puncta*, so that it becomes possible to return synthetically up to the organic animated body, and so to the universe, mental and corporeal individuality varying *pari passu* in an ordered hierarchy. The special difficulty about the body as both a part of the universe, and also a representation of it, is capable of resolution on the principles which govern the nature of the 'soul' in the theory of Leibniz. In other words, Spinoza applies the 'microcosm-macrocosm' relation adequately to both body and soul, while Leibniz fails to apply it satisfactorily to either. For if each monad is existentially independent of all others, how can these others be reflected, with even partial adequacy, in its single experience, and how can they all be reflected with entire adequacy in the *Monas monadum*? Again, if they are all independent, how can the 'body' be *really* organic? Its 'organicity' becomes a mere *phenomenon* pessime *fundatum*, belonging only to the representation of it in the 'soul'. For Spinoza, on the contrary, no finite singular can be independent either in existence or in essence, but only the perfect whole.

Thus the whole problem is, after all, transferred to the relations between the parts or members of the whole within the whole itself, i.e. to the nature of the universe. Is it an infinite series or

collection of singulars and aggregates, or is it a genuine individual? To that question it appears that Leibniz could give no unambiguous answer, because his individuals are at once *existentially puncta* and *essentially κόσμοι*. Even the universe as a whole is only real as the content of a single *Monas monadum* which is existentially distinct from all subordinate monads, the essences of which form part of its essence, or are derived from it. Happily, however, the 'Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles' enables us to neglect the existential differences, and to pass direct to the question of the essential relations of the grades of individuality within the whole, i.e. within the *Monas monadum* (for ultimately existential differences must, by that Principle, depend on differences of essence). In the *Monas monadum*, then, all things are present (in essence) as they really are. In a subordinate monad only its own content is present (in existence and essence) as it really is, while the contents of other monads are present (in essence) only as phenomena. How then are the essences present in the *Monas monadum*, i.e. how are they related in the universe as a whole? It is no answer to say that they are present 'ideally' (even if that were, for Leibniz, a distinctive form of presence): the question refers to their relations within the whole, or more succinctly, how is a *grade* of being also a *part* of the whole? The answer to this question, which appears to be 'deficient' in the philosophy of Leibniz, is what is most prominent in the Spinozistic theory which I have expounded. Spinoza, I think, recognized, though he did not precisely and clearly expound his opinion, that the grades of soul and body are related under the category of whole and part. Two *corpora animata* are related to each other, either as whole and part, or as parts within a whole, or both. For Leibniz, the grades form an infinite linear series with no ultimate gaps (except that between soul and spirit, which is the result of 'transcreation'); and thus in the *Monas monadum*, the finite monads must ultimately lose their distinctness, and with it their existential independence outside of the *Monas monadum*. So far, therefore, from Leibniz finding a place for the finite individual that Spinoza had submerged, the truth rather is that it is Spinoza who finds a place for finite individuals in their ordered hierarchy, possessing definite irreducible grades of individuality, and no merely continuous series of gradations (if that self-contradictory phrase may be permitted).

Doubtless it was some perception of these consequences, as well

as the necessity of explaining how the monads become *existentially* independent when they are *essentially* related within the universe as a whole, that led Leibniz to pass beyond the account to which I have so far referred, and to make a distinction between the universe, which is reflected by 'bare monads' and 'souls', and God, the creator of the universe, who is reflected by 'spirits' (which are *also* 'souls' and 'bare monads'). To this I must refer very briefly. God is more than the universe: as its creator, He contains in thought all the monads, including free 'spirits', and all the infinite possible universes containing them, of which the actual universe is only the best (and does not, presumably, contain the others *eminenter*). Thus the potentiality of God transcends the actuality of the world. Spirits are transcreated from souls, and reflect their creator; they are therefore free, and can act, not in ways not *conceived* by God (for all possibilities are in the mind of God), but in ways not *determined* by him. But, just as Spinoza had explained the potentialities of the finite individual as due to his *partialitas* under some whole, so he held that the conception of pure potentiality in an absolutely perfect being is incoherent. And even on Leibniz's own principles it is difficult to understand how possible arrangements of monads (constituted by thought) can be conceived by a Being (himself constituted by thought) without thereby becoming actual. This whole development of the Leibnizian theory is rendered impossible by the principles laid down by Spinoza. In God or *Natura* all possibilities are actual; in man contingency is one with his partial wholeness within the necessary whole. And freedom is thus the expression of the whole within the part, and varies with the completeness of that expression. If this appears to deprive the finite individual of genuine freedom, it is because the natures of time and eternity have been misconceived; for in *Natura* all possibility is actualized, not at this or that epoch of time, but eternally, and hence without compulsion. All compulsion arises from *partialitas*, as all freedom from *totalitas*; whence only *Natura* is perfectly free. In time, the finite individual may become increasingly free, though he cannot transcend the limit of his eternal *partialitas* (for in time he cannot ever at once realize his eternal reality);¹ and the *corpora simplicissima animata* alone approach the limit of 'iron necessity'.

¹ This subject is expanded in the text, and some of the more important points are discussed in Excursus VIII (pp. 301-4).

CHAPTER V

DURATION AND INDIVIDUATION

IT is in the light provided by the *Lemmata* of *Part II* of the *Ethics*, that the relations of duration and eternity, as they are conceived by Spinoza, become most clear; for he there gives a more exact account of his conception of the nature of true and false *partialitas* and wholeness, on which, again, are founded the distinctions of Imagination and Intellect, of duration and eternity. *Natura* as an infinite whole, I have said, is a system which is not in time, does not endure, but is eternal, and is the perfect *ideatum* of 'intuition'. It has, thus, neither limited nor unlimited duration: it has not existed *ab aeterno*, it will not exist *in aeternum*, precisely because its existence is eternal, and 'existence of this kind . . . cannot be explained in terms of duration or time, not though the duration be conceived without beginning or end'.¹ It is only when *Natura* is considered, not as an infinite One, but as a whole of parts, whether adequately by the Intellect as a whole of real parts, or inadequately by the Imagination as a whole of unreal parts or mere sections, that it is thought of as enduring beyond all limits as compared with its parts or sections, which are then regarded as limited in duration: having a beginning, enjoying existence, and suffering death. *Natura* as a whole thus appears as sempiternal, but man perishes, and things are never the same for two moments together. But *Natura* is not *for itself* sempiternal; not because it is mortal or illusory, but, on the contrary, because it is eternal and real. Sempiternity is the account given of the existence of *Natura* from the point of view of one of its parts.

In this conception of temporal or enduring existence we are partly right and partly wrong. If all the parts of the infinite whole were mere sections, we should be wholly right (on the impossible assumption that such knowledge could be ours at all). We are right in so far as we recognize the perishing character of all 'imaginative' sections of the whole. In so far as the human body is a mere section of nature it is born and it dies: there was a time

¹ 'Talis enim existentia . . . per durationem, aut tempus explicari non potest, tametsi duratio principio, et fine carere concipiatur.' (*Eth. I, Def. viii, Explic.*)

when it was not, and there will be a time when it has ceased to be. It is produced through the operation of causes lying beyond its own nature, and it will in due course be destroyed in one way or another by other such causes. Indeed, its content is, within limits, always changing even during its lifetime: it may change so radically as to become almost wholly different both in form and in matter; and if this 'seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy of other men'.¹ But so long as the variations which occur do not pass a certain limit, the body is said to remain identical, and as such to endure. It is this balance or harmony or proportion of motion and rest that constitutes the actual essence of the body, and so long as this remains the body remains. 'This body of ours had a different proportion of motion and rest when it was an unborn embryo; and in due course, when we are dead, it will have a different proportion again.'² As a section of the extended universe, therefore, the human body is a perishing existence: not that before its birth or after its death anything real is lacking from *Natura*; for *Natura* is infinite and eternal, and cannot change. Every 'imaginative' section of it undergoes perpetual change: its ultimate sections are perpetual changes; for the *corpora simplicissima* would be pure unbalanced motions, incapable of concrete identity or, consequently, of continued duration. They would be the dust of physical being. And what would be true of these ultimate elements of the whole, is true in great measure of the various congeries of them which constitute the 'imaginative' and the imagined things of nature; and it is wholly true of them in so far as, and only in so far as, they are mere congeries.

Duration itself, therefore, belongs to the sections of the extended

¹ 'Corpus tum mortem obire intelligam, quando ejus partes ita disponuntur, ut aliam motus, et quietis rationem ad invicem obtineant . . . Nulla ratio me cogit ut statum corpus non mori, nisi mutetur in cadaver; quin ipsa experientia aliud suadere videtur. Fit namque aliquando, ut homo tales patiatur mutationes, ut non facile eundem illum esse dixerim, ut de quodam Hispano Poeta narrare audivi . . . Si hoc incredibile videtur, quid de infantibus dicemus? Quorum naturam homo provectae aetatis a sua tam diversam esse credit, ut persuaderi non posset, se unquam infantem fuisse, nisi ex aliis de se conjecturam faceret.' (*Eth. IV, xxxix, Sch.*)

² 'Dog in andere proportie van beweginge en stilte was dit ons lighaam een ongeboren kind zynde; en in gevolge daar na, en in andere zalt bestaan als wy dood zyn.' (*Korte Verhandeling, II, Voor Reeden, Aanteek, i, 10.*)

universe only in so far as they are parts of *Natura*, possessing an individuality through which they achieve a relative permanence in the waste of time. Their duration is their existence viewed from the external standpoint of *partialitas* in the whole. In so far as an organism is considered as a part of *Natura* possessing relative wholeness as a harmony or proportion of parts, to that degree it must be considered as infected by time (for it is a part of the whole), but yet as surviving the infection, and thus enduring through time (for it is a relative whole of parts). It remains for a time, but then perishes, as it was produced, through the operation of external things. It is an existence, but a transitory, perishing, existence. The *facies totius Universi* is eternal and therefore essentially beyond time and duration; the ultimate *puncta* of instantaneous extension, on the other hand, are so purely temporal as to be absolutely temporary. They cannot endure. They are not born, they do not live, they cannot die; for to them birth, life, and death, are all the same. Their essence is pure accident, and their existence non-existence.¹ The *corpus simplicissimum*, again, is the creature of the vanishing moment. It flashes into temporal being under the 'induction' of the whole, and as quickly disappears for ever. It enjoys but a ghostly eternity in the all-comprehending Attribute.² But the *corpus humanum*, together with all the parts of nature in so far as they are genuine parts, is born and lives and suffers death; it is at once temporal and eternal, and thus it endures. The distinction, therefore, between duration and eternity is based upon a difference of viewpoint, and it is this that makes the instance of the human individual so important for a correct understanding of Spinoza's general conception. For the individual man is not merely a section of the universe, existing only *per accidens* or not at all: viewed from the outside he is at least a section of the universe exhibiting a certain identity or individuality as a persisting harmony of partly balanced motion and rest; he is a partial whole and is thus capable of being viewed by himself from the inside as a relative whole, and, therefore, after the pattern of *Natura*, which is an absolute whole. And only so can he be correctly viewed; the external view is necessarily inadequate since

¹ 'That shady nothing out of which the world was made' (Thomas Traherne, *Centuries of Meditations*).

² A further discussion of the important question of the nature of the *corpus simplicissimum* is added in Excursus IV (pp. 137-41).

it represents the individual as a section of the universe acted upon by other sections to infinity. But the true nature of the individual must be derived, not from purely external things, but immediately or mediately from the whole which it reproduces in the measure of its capacity to respond. Its relation to that whole is not an external relation of exclusive things, but an internal one, whether we think of the being of the individual as within the whole, or of the knowledge of the whole as within the individual part. The true view of a finite individual, therefore, is the view which he must take of himself when he resolutely attends to his positive character as a whole, not ignoring the negativity implied by his dependence on the wider whole which he reproduces. That view again will be one with God's apprehension of the individual as a real part of *Natura naturata*, reproducing the whole, constituting the whole, and in a sense co-extensive with the whole, at least in the measure of its individual perfection.

In such a view the individual is not confined to a region of extension separate from the regions occupied by other parts of the whole. Extension is infinite, one, and indivisible, and has no regions separate from one another. The finite individual is, rather, a whole, though an abstract whole, not rising up to the absolutely singular or concrete universal, but none the less real and eternal.¹

¹ Our common 'Nominalistic' mode of representing the relations of individuals and universals is as a pyramid with the singulars (possessing the maximum of concreteness, and being indeed, the only things really existing) at the base, as the foundation of the whole structure, and rising up through *infimae species* by regular stages to a *summum genus* of pure Being, which is thus the most abstract of all, and furthest removed from real existence. It cannot too soon be recognized that, though Spinoza was a 'Nominalist', this scheme does not give a just idea of his theory of the relations of things within *Natura*. For him the apex of the pyramid is not only the most universal, but also the most concrete, individual, and real, of all things. Its existence is identical with its essence, that is to say, it is a self-creating individual. Now scholastic 'Realists' had represented these relations, putting the emphasis on the reality of universals, not as a pyramid such as I have sketched, but as a kind of *Arbor Porphyriana*, proceeding from a trunk of *perfect* Being (as, at least verbally, opposed to *mere* Being) out to the branches and ultimate twigs of more and more limited *genera*, *species*, and instances. But though this correctly reverses the existential emphasis, it does not represent the view of Spinoza: he is no 'Realist' but regards all *termini transcendentales* (*ens*, *res*, *aliquid*, &c.), *notiones universales* (*homo*, *equus*, &c.), and so forth, as the most confused and inadequate of all ideas, and as belonging to *cognitio primi generis* or Imagination (*Eth.* II, xl, Sch. i). Thus he is a 'Nominalist' as denying the reality of abstract universals; but he is a 'Realist' as affirming that finite individual things are not the most real beings. Real being, according to Spinoza, though it belongs only to individuals, yet belongs to

In such intuitive knowledge the individual knows nothing of birth or death or of persistence through time. From that inner standpoint birth and death and duration are unmeaning. Are they not always unmeaning while we think? And though our duration is a positive experience to us as men living and acting within a world of connected things, yet even for that experience birth and death are nothing. We cannot remember, perceive, or imagine, we cannot *intuit*, our birth or death. They are nothing for us; if they were something for us they would not be our birth or death. They only seem to have meaning for us because we slip away from the perception of ourselves in our individual existence and view ourselves as we view other men and things, as parts or sections of the all-comprehending universe, enjoying or suffering with them the vicissitude of enduring but finite being. And our existence itself, as distinct from its beginning or end, in our ordinary experience has duration only in so far as it is constantly brought home to us that we are finite and subject to the operation of things outside of us.¹ That is Imagination; and thus we endure. But the real life of man is not to be found in such experiences, but in the existence which is thought, intellectual love, blessedness, the welling-up of eternal life.

It follows further from what I have said that eternal life must not be imaged as a recurrent experience in the drawn-out life of

individuals in proportion to their universality and concreteness. Thus the apex of the Spinozistic pyramid (to continue the figure) is the most concrete and universal of all things, the most individual, and therefore the most real: the pyramid rests upon its apex. At the most remote stage there are the *corpora simplicissima* (or their 'ideas'), the most limited and abstract of all beings and the least real (for they flash into and out of being in an 'infinitesimal moment'). These are the true 'ghosts' of the universe. Between these extremes there are finite individuals of all kinds, arranged and constellated in due order, and all in their measure expressions of the whole within which they 'live and move and have their being'. The correct order of dependence for the finite individual is thus not *up* to abstract *species* and *genera*, nor *down* to molecules, atoms, and electrons; but from *Natura* through the various ranges of individuality and concreteness. For all genuine individuals, even if they are not complete, have their point of contact in the Real; and thus, though their response to it, and knowledge of it, may be abstract and thin, it is yet real and so far adequate. It is this principle that makes it possible for man to have an adequate (though incomplete) knowledge of God, and to know things *sub specie aeternitatis*. (See also Excursus III, pp. 99-104.)

¹ 'Mens humana ipsum humanum corpus non cognoscit, nec ipsum existere scit, nisi per ideas affectionum, quibus corpus afficitur.' (*Eth. II, xix.*) 'Mens se ipsam non cognoscit, nisi quatenus corporis affectionum ideas percipit.' (*Eth. II, xxiii.*)

man in time. That is to fall back on our fragmentariness, and to forget that we are real parts of the eternal whole. The foiled searching of mortality is too often due to the assumption that the eternal must establish itself within, and accommodate itself to the conditions of, time. We must not picture the Real as a mere ghost within the actual. The eternal life which we 'feel and prove' does not, in and for itself, occupy time, it only does so when viewed inadequately from the outside by Imagination. It does not begin at one moment of time, and cease some moments later; it neither begins nor ends. What occurs, recurs, or persists in time, though it may be a partial expression of our eternity, cannot precede it, or follow it, or affect it in any way. 'Nor Eternity serves Time, where all must fade that flourisheth.' The life of man is a mixed life, and it is so because he is not the infinite whole. But we must not attempt to mix these elements incongruously, or simply to sum them arithmetically. For *Natura* 'end and beginning' are not even 'dreams'; but for a partial whole, conscious of its *partialitas*, and thus of its dependence, not merely and directly on the whole that it reproduces, but indirectly also on other parts of the whole external to itself,—which complex dependence is its occurrence and duration in time;—for such a being experience must be mixed: it will be partly temporal and temporary, and partly eternal. But we must not say that individual existence before birth and after death are less than during life, as if temporal existence were to be added to eternal existence to get a mixed total. They are incommensurable:¹ the length of an individual's life is

¹ Cf. O. Baensch, 'Ewigkeit und Dauer bei Spinoza' (*Kant-Studien*, XXXII, i, *Spinoza Festschrift*, 1927, pp. 44-84). Professor Baensch distinguishes three kinds of existence: 'die Ewigkeit-Existenz Gottes als der Substanz und ihrer Attribute, die Einbegriffenheits-Existenz der Modi als Wesenheiten, und die Dauer-Existenz der Modi als Einzeldinge' (*Loc. cit.*, p. 71); the first two belong to eternity in an extended sense of the term, while the third involves 'der Dinge Versinken in nebelhafte Vergangenheit, ihre sich aufdrängende Nähe in greller Gegenwart und ihr Empортаuchen aus dunkler Zukunft' (*Loc. cit.*, p. 84). Though his motive is undoubtedly the perfectly legitimate one of attempting to show how Spinoza conceived the relation of these kinds of existence within the ultimate Real without denying the validity of either, it is none the less astonishing that, having emphasized the distinctions so clearly, Dr. Baensch permitted himself to drift into the familiar error of supposing, indeed asserting, partly directly and partly by implication, that according to Spinoza since it is the 'flowing' character of duration, and not its 'enduring', that is its distinctive imperfection, it is possible, by excluding the former, to include duration at one blow and as a whole in God's eternity. 'Die Dauer ist kein blosser Schein. Sie besteht wirklich und unendlich in Gott. Aber in Gott ist sie ganz und auf

not the measure of his perfection; there is no proportion subsisting between the finite and the infinite. Man is powerless before the infinite forces of the universe which determine his duration. Not only is it true that 'the endeavour whereby a thing endeavours to persist in its being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time',¹ but also that 'the force whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes'.² Though our occurrence within a period of time is an imagination, it is not, therefore, wholly illusory (for nothing positive is wholly illusory). It expresses a twofold truth, viz. our total dependence on the whole for our existence; and our reality as responsive parts within the whole. The *dependence* appears for Imagination as the dependence of our lives on the operations of external things which produce, maintain, and destroy our bodies; the *reality* appears as the endeavour to persist in proportion to the degree of perfection enjoyed. 'The endeavour wherewith each thing endeavours to persist in its own being is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing itself.'³

The total reality of 'this or that' man, therefore, is not merely his positive part, his eternal part, but this in dependence upon the eternal whole; and only the eternal whole is wholly positive. But a man's total existence is not his eternity *plus* his duration (which is an impossible congeries), but his eternity in its reality and real dependence on the whole. That total existence eternally enjoyed by 'this or that' man, though it may, and perhaps must, by us be pictured through imaginative conceptions, has never been in time,

einmal ewig enthalten, ohne zu dauern oder richtiger ohne zu fließen' (*Loc. cit.*, p. 84). But this is only the *tota simul* of Boethius and the mediaevals over again! It will be seen that I hold as resolutely as Professor Baensch that duration is no mere appearance: its place and character can be deduced from the nature of the Real conceived as an eternal whole of real parts; but the existence of the total Real must not be conceived as temporally extended, nor as enduring without flowing: for duration essentially flows, it can only endure as flowing; it cannot be conceived either as standing or as a whole. Doubtless, if duration could be conceived as standing, it might be conceived as a whole; and if it could be conceived as a whole, it might be true that 'die gesamte unendliche Dauer-Existenz dauert nicht, sondern ist ewig' (*Loc. cit.*, p. 78); but, as I have shown, the condition cannot be fulfilled.

¹ 'Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse presecverare conatur, nullum tempus finitum, sed indefinitum involvit.' (*Eth. III, viii.*)

² 'Vis, qua homo in existendo perseverat, limitata est, et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur.' (*Eth. IV, iii.*)

³ 'Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam.' (*Eth. III, vii.*)

and cannot vary because of 'imaginative' occurrences in time; it contains all the variations that appear in its time, but not as successive. In *Natura* they are transmuted into quality, and only thus achieve their reality, i.e. their eternity. So far from time ruling the real existence of 'this or that' man, temporal occurrences are governed by the latter; so far as they are positive they are produced by it in its dependence on the whole; and so far as they are not real, they need no cause other than the impotence of non-being.

I have said that the essence of the individual is his positive character as an individual part of *Natura* qualified by the negativity involved in his dependence on external things. His dependence on Substance is complete without qualification, and his dependence on *Natura naturata*, though also complete, is qualified by the fact that he is a real part of the whole on which he totally depends. His eternity, therefore, as a part of *Natura naturata* is not to be defined as totally independent or self-dependent existence; it is existence in reciprocal relations with all things. It is thus partly dependent and partly independent; as a part, it is dependent on other things; as a relative whole, it is self-dependent (in a sense that also implies its complete dependence on the whole). Now the existence of a whole as such is necessary existence, infinite existence, eternal existence; the existence of a part as such is conditioned existence, finite existence, duration. Thus the existence of a finite individual is partly eternal and partly durational. As a real part of the whole the individual is eternal with the whole; as a part which is also a whole it is eternal within the whole (which, in its measure, it reproduces); as a part of the whole reciprocating with other parts it endures. So far no special difficulty occurs; different appearances result from different standpoints.

But the question immediately suggests itself as to how the existence of an individual when he is not enduring, differs from his existence during life. This, however, seems a difficulty mainly because we suppose the assertion about the existence of the finite individual as being 'partly eternal and partly durational', to mean that during his life he has two existences: the eternal and the enduring, lacking the latter before birth and after death. But he has, of course, only a single existence, which from one point of view is eternal, and from another is duration. But both points of view are, for the finite being, justifiable: he *is* eternal, and he *does* endure. Before birth, he endures in the future; after death, he

endures in the past; during life, he endures in a moving present enlarged by remembered and anticipated periods of the past and future respectively. Again, his position before birth and after death is no worse than in the past (or even the future) periods of his lifetime; childhood exists in the past, we can do nothing about it; and though our future is to some extent within our derived power, it is not so while it remains future. Our actual duration is thus only a very small part of the prolonged period of remembered and anticipated duration. Still, it might be contended, there is a lengthy period during which we do actually enjoy existence, not all at once, but in successive moments, and two indefinitely longer periods in which we never endure, and the question is, what is the relation between our eternal existence in the eternal whole as eternal parts, and our short duration of life within the sempiternity of nature? My general reply is that it is a difference of standpoint, which again is justifiable in so far as there *are* real parts in nature. Though all existence is ultimately eternal, yet man's 'eternal part' does not fully represent 'his' total existence, since he is, after all, only a part of *Natura*. God's eternity alone is sufficient in itself, and includes all being; and man's eternity as a real part of the divine nature is the ultimate transcript of what he represents to himself under the categories of his impotence as an eternal life *plus* a finite duration. In this he is more right than he would be in denying either the 'eternal part' or the finite duration. But, nevertheless, the account remains faulty so long as the *plus* remains unresolved. In the divine nature all such conjunctions are resolved by synthesis into quality. In so saying I run beyond the precise point of my argument, and it is necessary to return for a little to the details of my account of the relations of duration and eternity in finite experience. Those details may best be elucidated by a more general discussion of the relations of limited and unlimited duration and of eternity within the systematic nature of the *facies totius Universi*.

In the *Ethics* Spinoza gives a general description of the *facies totius Universi*: 'We thus see how a complex individual can be affected in many ways, and nevertheless retain its nature. So far we have conceived an individual which is composed of bodies which are only distinguished from one another by motion and rest, speed and slowness, that is, the most simple bodies. If now we conceive another individual composed of many individuals of diverse natures, we shall discover that it may be affected in many

other ways, its nature nevertheless being preserved . . . If we now conceive a third kind of individual composed of individuals of this second kind, we shall discover that it can be affected in many other ways without any change in its nature. Thus we may proceed to infinity and easily conceive the whole of nature as one individual, the parts of which, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways without any change in the whole individual'.¹ This passage indicates the type of situation we have to consider in determining the relations of eternity and duration in *Natura*. Further light is gained from a most precise and illuminating passage in *Ep. xxxii*.²

Now let A be the *facies totius Universi* (*tota natura* in the lemma quoted), the perfect Individual.

Let B be a real part of A; this is also, therefore, in its degree an individual. Let me take the *corpus humanum* as an example.

Then B partly reproduces A (in activity or active response) and partly fails to do so (through passivity); i.e. B is partly whole and partly partial.

Let C be some real part of B. I take as an example the 'little worm living in the blood' which Spinoza uses in his account of the relations of whole and part in the passage of *Ep. xxxii*.²

¹ 'His itaque videmus, qua ratione Individuum compositum possit multis modis affici, ejus nihilominus natura servata. Atque hucusque Individuum concepimus, quod non, nisi ex corporibus, quae solo motu, et quiete, celeritate, et tarditate inter se distinguuntur, hoc est, quod ex corporibus simplicissimis componitur. Quod si jam aliud concipiamus, ex pluribus diversae naturae Individuis compositum, idem pluribus aliis modis posse affici, reperiemus, ipsius nihilominus natura servata. . . . Quod si praeterea tertium Individuorum genus, ex his secundis compositum, concipiamus, idem multis aliis modis affici posse, reperiemus, absque ulla ejus formae mutatione. Et si sic porro in infinitum pergamus, facile concipiemus, totam naturam unum esse Individuum, cujus partes, hoc est, omnia corpora infinitis modis variant, absque ulla totius Individui mutatione.' (*Eth. II, Lem. vii, Sch.*)

² 'Fingamus jam, si placet vermiculum in sanguine vivere, qui visu ad discernendas particulas sanguinis, lymphae, etc. valeret, et ratione ad observandum, quomodo unaquaeque particula ex alterius occurso, vel resilit, vel partem sui motus communicat, etc. Ille quidem in hoc sanguine, ut nos in hac parte universi, viveret, et unamquamque sanguinis particulam, ut totum, non vero ut partem, consideraret, nec scire posset, quomodo partes omnes ab universali natura sanguinis moderantur, et invicem, prout universalis natura sanguinis exigit, se accommodare coguntur, ut certa ratione inter se consentiant. Nam si fingamus, nullas dari causas extra sanguinem, quae novos motus sanguini communicarent, nec ullum dari spatium extra sanguinem, nec alia corpora, in quae particulae sanguinis suum motum transferre possent, certum est, sanguinem in suo statu semper mansurum, et ejus particulas nullas alias variationes passuras, quam eas, quae possunt concipi ex data ratione motus sanguinis ad lympham, chylum, etc. et sic sanguis semper, ut totum, non vero ut pars, considerari

Then C will partly reproduce B (in active or adequate response), and, as passive, will partly fail to do so; it will reproduce A even less fully than does B, which already fell short of complete responsiveness. Thus C is a whole in a degree lower than B, and to a greater degree partial.

Let D be an ultimate part of body, i.e. *corpus simplicissimum*.¹ Its capacity for response, either to the absolute whole or to any partial whole, is 'infinitesimal' but real (for it is not *simplex* but *simplicissimum*). Its duration is 'momentary', and in that sense only is the *corpus* actual. As I shall show, it is in principle incapable of being identified, for it is but the ideal limit of corporeal (i.e. *real*) analysis.

Let E be an ultimate *punctum* of instantaneous extension, i.e. a mere ideal limit of *mathematical* analysis. Evidently it has no capacity for response, for it does not endure even for a 'moment'. Its individuality is merely potential, and thus, in isolation, nothing. Such a *punctum* is therefore identical with absolute non-being.

Now in this selective system of things reality is present at every stage until the last, which is not, in the strict sense, a stage at all. A is wholly real; E is wholly unreal; intermediate individuals are partly real and partly 'imaginative'.²

deberet. Verum quia plurimae aliae causae dantur, quae leges naturae sanguinis certo modo moderantur, et vicissim illae a sanguine, hinc fit, ut alii motus, aliaeque variationes in sanguine oriantur, quae consequuntur non a sola ratione motus ejus partium ad invicem, sed a ratione motus sanguinis, et causarum externarum simul ad invicem: hoc modo sanguis rationem partis, non vero totius habet. De toto, et parte modo dixi.' (*Ep. xxxii.*)

¹ See Excursus IV (pp. 137-41).

² I say 'imaginative' rather than 'imagined' or 'imaginary', because these latter terms suggest that the things so described are, at least in part, mental or subjective in character. I am aware, of course, that 'imaginative' normally qualifies mental facts, but I am here using it as a description of *physical* things in so far as they are not ultimately real, but are appearances of the Real, under finite categories, and in time. But they are *real* appearances, and might thus be called 'phenomenal'—a use which would harmonize with the significance which I attach to the term 'phenomenology' (see Part III, Preface, pp. 221-7). But as I have said, the latter term is already ambiguous, and I have only used it for lack of a better. 'Imaginative' also emphasizes the essential idea that these things are the objects of *Imaginatio* (the first kind of knowledge)—a use of this term peculiar to Spinoza, and not involving the unreality or subjectivity of its *ideata*. Imagination is not necessarily fallacious (*Eth. II, xxxvi, Dem.*), though *ali falsity* belongs to it (*Eth. II, xxxv et xli*). Its positive content is not unreal (*Eth. II, xxxiii*). That which reveals and conveys the rough edges of finite being cannot be wholly false and unreal, though it may well be inadequate. Indeed, it *must* be so. I am thus impelled, as far as possible, to avoid the terms 'subjective', 'imagined', 'imaginary', 'phenomenal', 'unreal', and have taken refuge in 'imaginative'. (But see also above, p. 18, note 1.)

Let us consider next the relations which exist between these grades of individuality. For the sake of convenience I do so under the Attribute of Thought:

(1) Consider first A's apprehension of itself and of its subordinate parts:

(a) For itself, A is eternal, for its existence depends on nothing outside of itself, but only on the immanent causality of *Natura naturans*. Its existence follows from its essence when it is thus rightly considered.

(b) For A, the existence of B is partly eternal (as reproducing A through adequate response), and partly 'imaginative' (as it depends on other parts as transient causes). That part of its being which is confused, unformed, mixed, must be 'imaginative', and for the absolute whole in which all is clear, formed, and distinct, it must suffer transforming synthesis, without loss of positive content. B's reproduction of the whole is indistinct and incomplete therefore, not so much in scope as in arrangement. It succeeds in clarifying a part of the whole, and thus is real and eternal with the whole; it fails to clarify the whole as an absolute whole, and thus becomes involved in Imagination, and in 'ortality'¹ and mortality. Thus from A's point of view, B is partly responsive or active, and partly inert and passive. And its inertia is not mere negation, but the confused appearance of the spirit of the absolute whole within the finite whole. For only thus can what is finite also be a whole in a relative sense: its reach exceeds its grasp.

(c) For A, the existence of C, again, is partly eternal and partly 'imaginative'. But its eternal part is 'smaller' than that of B, and its element of confusion greater. If B fails adequately to reproduce A, and C again fails adequately to reproduce B, then C must even more seriously fail to reproduce A. It is even less responsive and more inert.

(d) A can only apprehend D as 'infinitesimal' activity and indefinitely great inertia; as a 'momentary' response to the precise demands of a definite spatio-temporal configuration. For D is but

¹ I venture upon the succinct, and somewhat barbarous, neologism, in order to emphasize what popular thought, with its active eye directed mainly on the future, is apt to overlook: the finitude of transitory things involves the necessity of birth as well as of death. A similar defect distinguishes the conception of *aevum* from that of *semper aeternitas*. (See p. 73, note 1.)

the image of the *facies totius Universi* within the 'infinitesimal', and is thus the offspring of time.

(e) Considered strictly in isolation, E must appear for A as a mere ideal limit, devoid even of a point of view; and thus untouched by the spirit of the whole *without either activity or inertia*.

(2) Consider next B's apprehension:

(a) For B, the existence of A will appear both as eternal and as sempiternal. The difference corresponds to the two senses in which A is the whole of which B is the part. It is the whole to which B's nature approximates; and it is the whole in which he exists as a part, acted upon throughout his duration by all the other parts. As the ideal end of reproduction or reflection, A will necessarily be apprehended by B as eternal; as the whole of *Natura*, including the 'magnipotent' external universe, together with the human body upon which that universe acts, it will appear as sempiternal in comparison with the 'ortality' and mortality of each of the interacting parts.¹

(b) For itself, B will be not only eternal but also 'ortal' and mortal, and even in a certain sense sempiternal. As a part of A, it will be, with A, eternal. In fact A's idea of B, and B's own true idea of himself as a part of A, are one and the same.

But in his perception of himself as only a part of *Natura*, infinitely overshadowed and compelled by external things, B will know himself as transitory in comparison with the sempiternal appearance of A. But he may also know that the part of him which is eternal, because it is also a part of A, cannot be either 'ortal' or mortal,² but may by him be regarded ('imaginatively') as, with A, in a certain sense sempiternal. Absorbed as the mind is in the

¹ Cf. *Cog. Met. II, x*: 'Illi facillime iste eximetur, si advertat, nos illam durationem non ex sola contemplatione creatarum rerum, sed ex contemplatione infinitae Dei potentiae ad creandum intelligere: Non enim creaturae concipi possunt, ut per se existentes, sive durantes, sed tanquam per infinitam Dei potentiam, a qua sola omnem suam durationem habent.' The statement arises out of the seeming contradiction between duration being dependent upon created things, and creation having occurred, 'si vera est Chronologorum computatio', at a point of time. The whole chapter affords an interesting example of an almost unconfused interplay of Cartesian and Spinozistic conceptions, with a background of scholastic theology, thus giving the total impression of a 'double concerto'.

² He will know, too, that the part of him which is mortal cannot *as such* be sempiternal. I have yet to indicate in what sense, if any, that mortal part of him is also eternal.

contemplation of a durational and 'imaginative' being, its eternal part may be imagined as persisting, with A, beyond the period of B's own lifetime, thus existing before his birth and after his death unchanged; but, less crudely, it may be conceived as a certain unchanging validity and applicability, such as intellectual truths exhibit; it will then appear not as changing from moment to moment, nor exactly as perduring through time, but as subsisting, as we say, 'timelessly'. Its sempiternity would be the immortality of 'science,' which does not, of course, itself, as an individual, exist immortally without dependence on human minds (for if man and all similar beings ceased to exist, 'science' would disappear with them), though we are so prone to image it to ourselves as existing.¹ Under the Attribute of Thought, therefore, the eternity of B concerns his intellect which, in its measure, reproduces the whole; the 'ortality' and mortality concern his Imagination (which represents the action of external causes on him, rather than his active response to them).²

(c) For B, the existence of C will appear as even more transitory than himself in comparison with the sempiternity of A. Nevertheless it will be apprehended by the intellect of B as not wholly transitory, but as possessing an eternal part in so far, and only in so far, as it is a necessary element in the whole which, to that degree, it reproduces.

(d) and (e) Cf. (1) (d) and (e).

(3) Consider C's apprehension:

(a) On the assumption that C is acted upon, not only by parts of B, but also by parts of A which lie beyond the nature of B, then C's apprehension of A will correspond (*mutatis mutandis*) to B's apprehension of A. If, however, we assume that C is only acted upon by and through other parts of B, then it will mistake B for A, regarding it as *tota natura*.³

(b) For C, the existence of B will be either eternal, sempiternal, or transitory, according to the conditions. The intellect of C will

¹ This was the special problem at which Professor Taylor was working in the article quoted above (p. 74, note 2). But he thus made of a side issue the main question; for the view of the eternal part of the mind as immortal involves a one-sided and therefore illegitimate emphasis on our *partialitas*.

² 'Si ad hominum communem opinionem attendamus, videbimus, eos suae Mentis aeternitatis esse quidem conscios; sed ipsos eandem cum duratione confundere, eamque imaginationi, seu memoriae tribuere, quam post mortem remanere credunt.' (*Eth. V, xxxiv, Sch.*)

³ Cf. p. 121, note 2.

recognize its own eternity, and with that, the eternity of B which it partly reproduces. If, then, C is wholly confined within B, and has therefore no relations with things outside of B except through its mediation, then it will be unaware that B is only a part, and, taking it for A, will regard it as sempiternal. If, on the contrary, C is acted upon chiefly by other parts of B, but also by parts of A outside of B, then C will regard A as sempiternal, B as relatively permanent, and itself as relatively transitory.¹

(c) For itself C, like B, will be partly eternal, partly transitory, and partly sempiternal.

(d) and (e). Cf. (1) (d) and (e).

(4) The 'infinitesimal' character of D clearly renders 'infinitesimal' also its capacity for distinguishing between A, B, and C. It is but the 'momentary' response to the 'momentary' system of nature. That system, therefore, as it appears to D will be a mere ghost, with 'infinitesimal' reality. Here the distinction of duration and eternity becomes evanescent,—a deduction which reciprocates with the position already reached, that the *corpus simplicissimum* is no identifiable *corpus simplex*, but a limit of corporeal analysis. It is thus not unreal, but 'infinitesimally' real: a character which its universe must share. That there are no ultimately isolable simple motions, and no real ultimate *puncta* without motion, follows from the nature of the extended Real, which expresses itself in the infinite and eternal mode, *motus et quies*, which again, from the very nature of motion, as essentially continuous, modifies the extended Real in *infinite* ways.

(5) Lastly, E has no point of view. It is nothing; it knows nothing; it responds to nothing. Equally from the point of view of A, B, C, and D, the *punctum* E is an ideal limit of the mathematical analysis of instantaneous extension. It is nothing actual; it is not eternal, it is not sempiternal, it is not even 'ortal' or mortal; it is timeless, and

¹ This is very much the position of man as a part both of society and of nature as a whole. Nature thus appears to us as sempiternal, society as relatively permanent, and individual men as relatively transitory. We also recognize that nature as a whole is eternal, that if society were, as such, individual or perfect, it would have an eternal part, and that man as an individual has a 'smaller' eternal part. But, in fact, we cannot conceive society as an individual in the sense in which nature and man are individuals. The status of society in nature is an important problem too complex for serious discussion here; but it would demand consideration in any adequate application of the principles of the present work to the moral and political spheres. Cf. also below, p. 203, note 2.

thus absolutely temporary. Possessing *neither activity nor inertia* it is non-being, or at most an *ens rationis*.

It thus becomes clear how, and how far, it is possible for one individual to be, from different points of view, and with different degrees of 'speculation', at once eternal, sempiternal, and transitory. From the viewpoint of *Natura* we are eternal, and the 'imaginative' elements of our minds are illusory in so far as, being confused and fragmentary, they appear as clear and whole: from that point of view Imagination is wholly 'imaginative'; and it is so because for *Natura* everything positive in Imagination has been sorted out, and has found its place in some eternal being. Only the confusion or negation is lost, therefore, and that is wholly empty and illusion. From the point of view of human individuality, in the degree in which it adequately reproduces *Natura*, we see ourselves as we are, i.e. as *Natura* sees us, and thus 'we feel and prove by experience that we are eternal', for so we belong to the whole as its real parts. But our passivity, our inertia, our finiteness (and we are truly finite), is represented in our Imagination. For this is the torn edge of finite individuality, the limbo of appearance and disappearance. And this twilight of the Imagination seems overwhelmingly real to us as we recognize our minuteness in the face of 'magnipotent' external nature. We cannot wholly rise above it; it absorbs and holds our attention, often to the entire exclusion of all that is real in our experience. It does so because it is the upwelling of the whole within the part, the inchoation of the infinite within the finite. Man's impotence is the obverse of the power of things external to him; his power is its reverse.¹ Imagination, therefore, is for us not wholly illusory: it has a basis of truth, and thus alone has it power over us. Our duration is not wholly an illusion, for it would be as untrue to say that we as intellects set in a limbo of Imagination, are wholly transitory, as that we are wholly eternal. Nor can it even be said that Intellect is eternal while Imagination is wholly transitory. Within Imagination and its objects there is a certain individuality, which is a confused reproduction of connexions within the whole. And these, as rightly understood, are real connexions. Within Imagination the chaff must be distinguished from the grain: unenlightened Imagi-

¹ But all power or *conatus*, whether in us or in external things, is derived from the infinite power of *Natura*: it is that power, immanent in and constituting us and them.

nation is illusion, but, in the light of analysis, clarification, right understanding, it contains truth, and its objects have a certain reality. This combination of completeness and incompleteness, which is proper to finite individuality, is read as duration; and it is in this sense only that time is real. But it is no unimportant sense.

Further, it must be remembered, we are only parts of *Natura*, and hence we can never wholly clear up our Imagination. I shall, indeed, go so far as to say that our Imagination is not strictly 'ours' at all, and that it is thus that it can find no place in 'our' eternity; *its* eternity, the eternity of its positive elements, belongs elsewhere, to other subordinate parts of the whole, not necessarily human. And in that sense it is also true that the human body, as it is for Imagination, is not wholly 'ours', nor are external things wholly other than us; in some degree a man's body is a rough section of the universe, the outlying regions of which do not rightly belong to him at all, but are only the connecting links between him and the universe. Again, his environment is not rightly understood except as, in some sense and degree, belonging to him. Clearly the actual boundary of the body is vague and indeterminate; its contours are differently placed for different purposes. In a stricter sense than is usual, it may be very small indeed: merely the nervous system, sense-organs, and muscles; and the connecting membranes, bony structure, skin, hair, nails, &c., thus belong to the individual only in a remoter sense, much as a long-used pen may become a part of the writer's body in a sense a little more remote. In an even stricter sense, the body may not be so much as the attenuated nervous system, but some essence of it, or of some part of it, or of some whole within which it lies, which is permanent even through death, though beyond the range of normal sense-presentation. On the other hand, and in the widest possible sense, everything which aids in a man's response to the universe, and therefore in his power over the parts of *Natura*, may be conceived as belonging to his body: the motor car that he drives, the 'Flying Scotchman' on which he travels, the dry land and the water and the air, 'the great globe itself, yea, all which it inherit', 'the sun and the moon and the other stars'; all, or his perspectives¹

¹ The term 'perspective' must not be taken to imply total or even partial 'subjectivity' in the *mental* sense. The nature and characteristics of 'objective' perspectives form a difficult and essential part of the subject matter of phenomenology, and Mr. Whitehead has made some progress towards its elucidation.

of them, are parts of his body: in a remote sense.¹ The boundaries may be drawn where it is convenient to draw them and normally this is round the contours of the visible organism, because that is the part that a man carries about with him, and uses in his active life. His body is his *partialitas*; and since it is the correlate of his mind, it follows that according as 'mind' is read broadly or narrowly, so 'body' must be read broadly or narrowly. Extension is not divided up into the exclusive pieces or parcels commonly called 'bodies', nor is *Natura naturata* so divided. A man's body is his responsive perspective of Extension; his mind is his conscious draught of Thought. He is real, but he is not the whole; he is finite, but he is not atomic.

This, then, is the truth of our duration. Our eternal parts do not in themselves endure, nor do any of the parts in that quasi-aggregate we call the 'body', not, at least, in so far as they are real; if in any sense they endure (and they do) it is because, though they may be 'imaginatively' disconnected from the real, essential, body, they are not wholly disconnected. Their duration belongs to us only in so far as they themselves are ours; and though the connexion may for a time seem to us to be intimate and essential, that too is Imagination: valid for us as parts, but integrated and made perfect in the whole. What endures for us is that corporeal limbo of our individuality, which truly is organized with, and is an extension of, our real individuality. But the organization of that limbo is not

¹ The idea is no novelty, but almost a commonplace of contemplative literature: 'You never enjoy the world aright, till the sea itself floweth in your veins, till you are clothed with the heavens, and crowned with the stars. . . . Till your spirit filleth the whole world, and the stars are your jewels. . . . Till you more feel it than your private estate, and are more present in the hemisphere, considering the glories and the beauties there, than in your own house.' (Thomas Traherne, *Centuries of Meditations*.)

'The grass is not grass alone; the leaves of the ash above are not leaves only. From tree, and earth, and soft air moving, there comes an invisible touch which arranges the senses to its waves as the ripples of the lake set the sand in parallel lines. The grass sways and fans the reposing mind; the leaves sway and stroke it, till it can feel beyond itself and with them, using each grass blade, each leaf, to abstract life from earth and ether. These then become new organs, fresh nerves and veins running afar out into the field, along the winding brook, up through the leaves, bringing a larger existence. The arms of the mind open wide to the broad sky.

'Some sense of the meaning of the grass, and leaves of the tree, and sweet waters hovers on the confines of thought, and seems ready to be resolved into definite form. There is a meaning in these things, a meaning in all that exists, and it comes near to declare itself. Not yet, not fully, nor in such shape that it may be formulated—if ever it will be—but sufficiently so to leave, as it were, an unwritten impression that will remain when the glamour is gone, and grass is but grass, and a tree a tree.' (Richard Jefferies, *The Sun and the Brook*.)

clear to us, and is not, perhaps, complete in itself so as to form a single ultimate individual thing; it does not, therefore, find a place in our real active being, but belongs rather to our passivity. So far as it is organized, it is real; so far as it is confused, it is illusory; and its organization thus appears as duration. If the organization were complete, the duration would appear to the individual as sempiternity; as it does not so appear, it must be incomplete, and man's bodily limbo must remain compound rather than single and individual; it is thus that its duration appears as limited. But each of the real parts constituting the compound, or including it, is eternal in its place in *Natura naturata*.

Each thing in nature, therefore, is eternal in proportion to its wholeness, and possesses a finite duration in proportion to its incompleteness. In so far as the mind is able to put itself into the 'intellectual order', it must resolve Imagination by analysing it, and reorganizing its positive content; thus 'imaginative' experience is temporal and subject to birth, vicissitude, and death, while intellectual being is eternal. The objects of Imagination, including the 'imaginative' body, necessarily share in its mortality, while the objects of Intellect, including the body as it is for Intellect, are eternal. The fact remains, however, that while Imagination can, by Reason, increasingly be resolved, the 'imaginative' content itself stubbornly remains, and thus evinces its commensurate reality. 'When we look at the sun, we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet; this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true distance, or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards learn that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of the earth's diameters, we none the less still fancy it to be near; for we do not imagine the sun as near us because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said body is affected thereby.'¹ We can get rid of our illusion (in virtue

¹ 'Cum solem intuemur, eum ducentos circiter pedes a nobis distare imaginamur, qui error in hac sola imaginatione non consistit, sed in eo, quod dum ipsum sic imaginamur, veram ejus distantiam, et hujus imaginationis causam ignoramus. Nam tametsi postea cognoscamus, eundem ultra 600 terrae diametros a nobis distare, ipsum nihilominus prope adesse imaginabimur; non enim solem adeo propinquum imaginamur, propterea quod veram ejus distantiam ignoramus, sed propterea, quod affectio nostri corporis essentiam solis involvit, quatenus ipsum corpus ab eodem afficitur' (*Eth. II, xxxv, Sch.*).

of our wholeness), but not of 'imaginative' content (for we are truly partial). It is thus that we are both eternal, and enduring but transitory, beings. And although we cannot when we will, or entirely, get rid of 'imaginative' content, it is none the less infected with illusion, and it cannot therefore appear as sempiternal. It suffers continual change. Further, our Imagination is not solely of our own body, nor solely of other bodies, it is of our own body as affected by other bodies; its mortality, therefore, does not imply that of our body as it really is in its eternal relations. It is our 'imaginative' world that passes away when we are said to die; and it is an 'imaginative' thing that passes away when another person is said to die. The difference is that he that is said to die loses his whole world of Imagination (but does not 'survive' without it in time), while those that remain lose only a part of theirs (and that not wholly, since memory remains). Death in each involves partial death in all; but death never touches an eternal being, or its eternal relations. Death as the resolution of illusion is itself illusory. And the same must be true *mutatis mutandis* of birth. The content that is the basis of our illusion is due to our *partialitas*; it is so far necessary, though the illusion is not; the resolution of the illusion may arise from the self, as in intellectual criticism, or it may come from the development of the 'imaginative' content itself towards dissolution (for it is not *as such* eternal). Thus birth and duration and death belong to the 'imaginative' world of things; and thus, further, it must not be said that death relieves us of 'imaginative' content, as if we still endured after death, but without a world to live in. If we still endured we should still be infected with Imagination, but now in the form of memory.¹ Nor must it be thought that in an after-life we shall persist, but with a new world of Imagination into which we shall be born,² in which we shall, in a new time-order, live, and out of which we shall once more be shaken, when illusion shall have developed into non-being. For we do not persist after death any more than we existed before

¹ An *aevum* of memory (=consciousness of existence in the past) cannot be ours after death, from the very nature of memory as involved in 'imaginative' confusion. All that is real in our duration is otherwise conserved and conceived.

² Into the fine cloth white like flame
Weaving the golden thread,
To fashion the birth-robcs for them
Who are just born, being dead.
(*The Blessed Damsel*).

birth. 'Before birth' and 'after death' have meaning only for those others that endure in these periods; the individual experiences time only while he himself endures, though it is true that he then experiences more of time than he *perceives*: for he *remembers* part of the past, and *anticipates* something of the future. We cannot exist before our birth (except *in utero*), or after our death, for to be expected or remembered by others is not to exist.¹ Yet a man's birth and death cannot be wholly without meaning even for him: through them he knows that he is partial, for his limited duration is the expression of his real finitude. Nevertheless as an eternal part of *Natura* he cannot die, for he never was born; his real existence is not an enduring existence at all, it is eternal. Real or eternal existence involves self-dependence; 'imaginative' or enduring existence involves dependence on external things; but all finite existence is dependent on the infinite self-dependent whole, which alone is eternal *in its own right*. Man's dependence on external things is fully represented by his birth, vicissitude, and death; that is his complete duration. Thus our real existence is not a series of births and deaths and re-births, either in this 'imaginative' world, or in other 'imaginative' worlds, or in worlds without Imagination: not in this world, for we have no lien on parts of the world's duration beyond our lifetime; we have our day and cease to be; we cannot 'lie down for an aeon or two' and then begin again refreshed: for without memory we cannot be said to be the same *within a single time-series*.² After death it may be said that our 'imaginative' experience 'endures' in the past; before birth that it 'endures' in the future; during life alone it endures in the present: and as thinking and extended modes of Substance we need no more of duration, and can have no more.³ Nor can we recur or occur in other 'imaginative' worlds before or after this, for thus the new worlds would become parts of this time-order, preceding or succeeding the present world in a single duration. Nor can we have

¹ It does not follow that no significance is to be attached to the not uncommon belief that the memory of our friends is our sole immortality.

² Of course memory is not essential for identity in an eternal being: for such there is no passing away, and hence no need for the retention or the retrieving of a past.

³ Whether in any other of the infinite Attributes of the Real the finite individual has other modes of real or 'imaginative' existence, is a question which for lack of premisses cannot be answered. *Human* existence is a certain union (but not concatenation) of body and mind, but not of corresponding modes of other Attributes.

before-life or after-life in a world without Imagination, for such a world would be without duration, and thus could not precede or succeed the present world.¹ Hence we do not exist before birth, nor do we go on existing after death; our true existence is not that which we enjoy as parts of the universe having a limited duration. It is because we are so prone to think (and not wholly illegitimately) of duration as real existence (as opposed to the empty 'subsistence' of abstract conceptions and laws), and thence to pass to the (wholly illegitimate) notion of temporal existence as something *in pari*

¹ Nor can it here be determined whether there are other 'imaginative' transcripts of the eternal relatedness of finite individuals with and within *Natura naturata* in distinct time-orders. For such time-orders could neither succeed nor be contemporaneous with each other (though a general harmony of their elements seems to be essential). Hence such enduring lives would have no *temporal* relations with each other. Thus if the individual has one eternal being and a plurality or infinity of durations in time-series without temporal relations with each other, then his many or infinite lives are wholly devoid of temporal relations with each other, being only indirectly related as his through the mediation of his single eternal being in eternal relations with and within *Natura naturata*. And thus of lives other than his present life he could have no memory, expectation, or even 'intimation'. They can neither precede, succeed, nor occur with his present life. Nor, strictly speaking, does any duration precede succeed, or occur with his eternal being: for this is not in time. These are regions in which Imagination (confined to a single time-series) must fail to enlighten, so that resort must necessarily be had to Intellect for a solution or resolution of such questions.

There may be some evidence, not of linear relation, but of *intersection* of such diverse time-orders in the rarely recurrent human experiences of moral, intellectual, and aesthetic vision or 'intuition'; for in many so-called 'eternal' moments the individual seems to be not wholly free from duration, but rather to have passage into a transformed time-order, which is at once the same, and yet mysteriously not the same. Such questions could only be answered satisfactorily, or withdrawn, as the result of a metaphysical deduction of time from the relations of finite eternal beings, the deduction being carried out in considerable detail, and not in the formal manner adopted in the present essay. Such a deduction would be essential within a metaphysics of ethics (though not for ethical science), for thus only could it be explained how the temporal life of a partly eternal being could be, not improved (for that might be the accidental product of time), but ruled and determined here and now by eternal values: how the determined time-series of the individual's duration could, without the miraculous irruption of absolute values (which, as eternal, have no temporal relations with this or that occasion), be amended without ceasing to be a time-series in precise harmony with the standardized time-series of social life. These are questions which I must beg leave to postpone, with the final reminder that though separate time-series cannot be regarded as temporally related (i.e. as serial or concurrent), or thus as freely intersecting with each other, yet all time-series as emanations of eternity must be focused in the eternal. It is thus that God can see into the hearts of men, dissipated as they are by time and change; and it is thus, perhaps, that man's eternal part can rule the changing destinies of its own enduring counterfeit. Cf. also below, Excursus VIII (pp. 301-4).

materia which must be superadded to eternal existence, that we tend to interpret eternal existence (from which duration has been removed)¹ as further persistence through time. But temporal existence is not, from the point of view of the eternal, a real or additional existence; but only a faint copy of real, i.e. infinite existence: it is eternity mixed with non-being. And this is appropriate only to a finite, and not to an infinite, eternal being, for the finite demands a complement which, as finite, it cannot grasp except under the categories of its impotence. As a thinking and extended mode of Substance, therefore, man is both eternal and also enduring; he is eternal as an adequate (though not complete) reproduction of the whole *Natura naturata*; he endures as an incomplete part of that whole, and his lifetime in the sempiternity of nature is his full duration as a part: he has no right to immortality, and it may seriously be questioned whether he has any genuine desire for it.²

¹ Or rather, in which duration is finally integrated or 'constellated'. For eternity, as I have said, is not the *sum* of all durations, but their *perfection*. This conception can only be elaborated at a later stage of my argument.

² Such desire as we do undoubtedly entertain, except where life has achieved a relative temporal completeness, and fades away into forgetfulness, is due to our impotence. Our demand is really for what is, in our measure, eternally ours, viz. genuine existence, not for that strife of gain and loss which is of the essence of duration. Our demand is for completion, longer life being demanded only as the seeming pre-requisite of that; and completeness, which is in fact perfect response to the whole, is imaged as more satisfactory connexion with the persons and things which really or apparently constitute our environment. Death seems to tear these from us, and to maim or destroy our being; and thus only, bating the errors of superstition, do we shrink from death. The inverse of this truth is familiar enough: Thomas Hardy has given it apt, and now classical, expression in his 'Friends Beyond':

We have triumphed: this achievement turns the
bane to antidote,
Unsuccesses to success,
Many thought-worn eves and morrows to a morrow
free of thought.
No more need we corn and clothing, feel of old
terrestrial stress;
Chill detraction stirs no sigh;
Fear of death has even bygone us: death gave all
that we possess.

As I have suggested, the demand for more of temporal life comes most poignantly from those whose purposes are incompletely realized, and whose impulses are thwarted by mere occasion or vicissitude: a few more months or years and the work would have been completed, the impulses satisfied! So we suppose, and the argument is to us finite beings impressive; nevertheless it is inconclusive. The real 'purpose' (if I may so speak) may be to leave the human purpose

The mind, then, and the body are equally eternal and equally 'ortal' and mortal; the mind does not live on after the body is dead, nor is the body born with a mind already old. The essential human body is neither the body that we perceive, nor any mere section of it. It is eternal while the things of Imagination perish. But though bodies are in themselves real and eternal as parts of *Natura*, we do not share the eternity of all bodies, but enjoy only our own; they are represented to us selectively and confusedly as enduring things. Yet nothing real is other than eternal. If we are finite (as we must be if the whole is to have content) then our eternity must be that of a finite part. The things with which we are connected and related form in themselves no essential part of *our* being, though in so far as they awaken response in us they are, in us, adequately reflected or reproduced.¹ They only appear to be our body, as distinct from completely external bodies, for Imagination, which confuses relation with identity, and the section with the part. Thus we include in our 'imaginative' body what is not essentially ours, and paint the Real with what is ours only *per accidens* (being but the limbo of our impotence). Nor are we wholly wrong when we impute our own nature to the Real; for our being is our sole clue to the nature of the extended and thinking Real; we are wrong in so far as we do these things confusedly. For everything in the world is ours for thought and in organic response; we must understand the Real as it is reproduced in our own nature. Imagination does it wrongly, and so becomes the seat of illusion. It and its objects perish because, or in so far as, they never had any real being. As relative *wholes* we eternally are, both corporeally and psychically; but as only *relatively* whole we are dependent on

unfulfilled; our finitude in this respect too may be essential to the infinite being of the Real: 'It is like the manager discharging from the stage some actor whom he has engaged: "But I have not finished the five acts; I have played but three." "Good: life's drama, mark you, is complete in three. The completeness is in his hands who first authorized your composition, and now your dissolution. Neither was your work. Serenely take your leave; serene as he who gives you the discharge."' (Marcus Aurelius, *To Himself*, xii, § 36.)

¹ I need hardly point out that reproduction is not here confined to knowledge (or *essentia objectiva*); it means actual reproduction of the whole in the part, both on the side of Thought and on that of Extension. In mind, it is mental response to other minds; in body, it is bodily response to outside things. Ideas do not *reproduce* or *represent* things: they *are* our knowledge of things. Mind does not respond to body, nor body to mind; but in reality they are the same mode of Substance under different Attributes.

other things. That dependence could only appear before birth as existence in a future period; after death, it can only appear as existence in a past period; during life, it is existence through a period which is a moving specious present lengthened out by memory and anticipation. There is no real difference. If it is asked how an eternal dependence can appear, now as existence then and not now, and again as existence now but not then, the reply must be that it does so because we are here considering it as dependent, not on the absolute whole, but on an indefinitely great number of parts of the whole external to the dependent part; i. e. the dependence is not categorical but conditional, and must so remain while we are considering only the infinitely many parts as parts. Duration is conditioned existence, i. e. existence conceived as distinct from, and added to, essence; eternity is necessary existence, i. e. existence following from essence, which thus can neither be, nor be conceived, except as existing. And the true reason why the duration of a thing is not proportioned to its perfection or wholeness is, firstly, that its perfection is always a derived perfection; and, secondly, that external nature, which derives its being from the same infinite source, is always infinitely stronger than any one, or combination, of its parts. How else could it be infinite?

EXCURSUS IV

CORPORA SIMPLICISSIMA

SPINOZA'S conception of the *corpus simplicissimum*, and his explanation of individuality in nature and man in terms of the 'composition' of these elements, have for long been sources of misunderstanding and of consequent adverse criticism, and I must here attempt to examine, as far as possible, the main questions which arise in this connexion. My argument in Chapter V has shown that some fundamental doctrines depend directly upon the correct interpretation of this conception. I have already indicated¹ that Professor Joachim's account of the human individual lays great emphasis upon its 'aggregate' character, and does so very largely as a result of his reading of the doctrines of the 'physical' sections of *Part II* of the *Ethics*. "The human body is a complex aggregate of many complex aggregates. Its "unity"—when it is regarded as "a single thing"—is the coactivity of its multiple constituents. Every elementary corpuscle has its soul-side; and the mind is therefore in reality a complex aggregate of many complex aggregates of ideas."² But if we are to take 'compositum' thus in the crude, and ultimately impossible, sense of 'aggregated', must we not take 'individuum' also in its crude and impossible sense ('for identity with no difference is a meaningless term')³? But to do so would reduce the whole theory, culminating in the doctrine of *Eth. II, Lem. vii*, to crude and impossible nonsense. I suggest that this interpretation overlooks the very important and significant assertions of the first two *Lemmata*: 'Omnia corpora in quibusdam conveniunt',⁴ i.e. all are extended, and have *motus et quies*, and thus 'ratione motus, et quietis, celeritatis, et tarditatis, . . . ab invicem distinguuntur'.⁵ Thus their aggregation will involve something more, where there is real compounding, for the constituent motions will fall into system, and aggregation will, so far, be superseded by concrete wholeness or real individuality. Doubtless there is a sense and degree in which every *finite* whole is an aggregate, but in so far as it is a *whole* it transcends aggregation, and enjoys integration. The human body falls between mere aggregation (which applies only at an ideal limit of analysis to *simplicia* which are no more than *entia rationis*), and complete concrete individuality (which belongs to *tota Natura* alone).

I am ready to agree that Spinoza's assertions about the *corpora sim-*

¹ p. 53, note 5.

² *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, pp. 130-1.

³ *Loc cit.*, p. 140.

⁴ *Eth. II, Lem. ii.*

⁵ *Eth. II, Lem. i.*

plicissima do, *prima facie*, admit of an atomistic misreading (especially if his doctrine of time and eternity is not grasped), but it must be remembered that the Axioms, *Lemmata*, and Postulates of *Part II* of the *Ethics*, where this conception is introduced, are admittedly concerned with physics (in the sense that they are *de natura corporum*) and that they do not pretend to give a complete account even from that point of view: 'Qua de causa operae pretium esse duxi, haec ipsa accuratius explicare, et demonstrare, ad quod necesse est, pauca de natura corporum praemittere'.¹ 'Facile concipiemus totam naturam unum esse Individuum, cujus partes, hoc est, omnia corpora infinitis modis variant, absque ulla totius Individui mutatione. Atque haec, si animus fuisset, de corpore ex professo agere, prolixius explicare, et demonstrare debuisssem. Sed jam dixi me aliud velle, nec alia de causa haec adferre, quam quia ex ipsis ea, quae demonstrare constitui, facile possum deducere'.² Thus it follows that the analysis of complex corporeal individuals will be carried no further than the stage of the most elementary *bodies*. Now 'per corpus intelligimus quamcunque quantitatem, longam, latam, et profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatam',³ and, of course, as the same *Scholium* emphasizes, extended Substance is not composed of such, or indeed any, parts (in the sense of 'sections'): 'quod jam (*Prop. xii cum Coroll. Prop. xiii*) absurdum esse ostendi'. Thus a *complete* analysis of the universe of extended bodies would not result in an aggregate of extended atoms, but in *puncta* endowed with such *motus et quies* as a *punctum* can accept. Now we are told that the *corpora simplicissima* 'solo motu, et quiete, celeritate, et tarditate ab invicem distinguuntur',⁴ and thus there is here, it must be admitted, a certain unresolved ambiguity: for the statement will be true both where the corpuscles are all of the *same* extensive magnitude, shape, extensive complexity, &c., and also where they are all entirely *devoid* of these further attributes (or some of them). In the former case, we have a sort of atomism (though, as we shall see, not an unqualified atomism); in the latter case, it may be a fore-shadowing of the more precisely expounded theory of Leibniz with reference to *materia prima* and *materia secunda*.

According to Leibniz, *materia* is more than mere instantaneous extension,⁵ and involves *vis activa* (including *actus* and *conatus*), which in the complete analysis that results in *materia prima*, appears as *antitypia* or impenetrability resident in unextended points. Here we have the ideal limit of the analysis of extension together with the minimum of

¹ *Eth. II, xiii, Sch.*

² *Eth. II, Lem. vii, Sch.*

³ *Eth. I, xv, Sch.*

⁴ *Eth. II, Ax. ii alt.*

⁵ Cf. *Plan of a Letter to Arnould*: 'L'étendue est un attribut qui ne sçauroit constituer un estre accompli, . . . elle exprime seulement un estat présent, mais nullement le futur et le passé, comme doit faire la notion d'une substance' (Gerhardt, ii, p. 72).

activity (or passivity, which is not the mere absence of activity). But such passive points only have real existence in relation with one another; as isolated, each is but an *ens rationis*. All real matter is *materia secunda*, which is extended, collective, and active now in the further sense that it possesses *entelechy*.

Now Spinoza, I think, leaves on one side the questions that resulted in the Leibnizian theory because, as indeed he suggests, they are not essential for his immediate purpose; nevertheless we must suppose that he did have views on the subject which, if they could be reconstructed, would bring greater order into his theory. It is plain, in the first place, that he did not mean to suggest that the *facies totius Universi* is completely explained as a mere collection of ultimate extended and sempiternally enduring atoms wholly unprepared for their office; I need hardly stay to support that indubitable truth. We get to the ultimate corpuscles by analysis rather than by division; we get to *tota Natura extensa* by synthesis rather than by aggregation. The main question at the moment is where exactly Spinoza calls a halt in the *corporeal* analysis of the universe. Plainly, the final results of a corporeal analysis must be *corpora*; but if so, such an analysis cannot be ultimate: for so long as we are left with particles or grains or *minima* of matter, it is possible to proceed further by *mathematical* analysis. In that case, however, the ultimate *simplicia* will not be *corpora* but *puncta* of some description.

All this is well understood by Spinoza, I make no doubt, and it seems to me therefore that he confines himself to a corporeal analysis in the sections we are considering, because he wishes to explain the nature of bodily individuality, and because he recognizes that to carry the process of analysis to an ideal mathematical limit would necessarily involve the introduction of the immediate infinite mode of *motus et quies*, without which the ultimate *simplicia* would be mere *entia rationis*. For if we proceed right down to unextended *puncta*, we approach an *impossible* limit where there is finite motion *at* a point, and not *through* a point; in which case the motion can be no more than potential, i.e. for Spinoza (as opposed to Leibniz) nothing at all. For him the so-called potentiality is an actual function of the total system of motions constituting the eternal extended universe as it is related to an ideal 'tempunctum' within it. Thus the ultimate *simplicia* turn out to be expressions of the infinite and eternal in terms of the *absolutely* finite and instantaneous; i.e. no expressions at all, and therefore nothing. From such units nothing could be 'compounded' in any sense of that ambiguous term; but the fault is not in the theory of a hierarchy of individuals, but in the supposition that eternal Extension is composed of timeless points endowed with mere potentiality of motion. These constitute, therefore, only an ideal limit, and not a real stage of the analysis, not even the last.

In view of the difficulties which I have indicated, it seems to me that

the rapid account given by Spinoza is as satisfactory as could be expected in the absence of a terminology founded upon the developed notion of the 'infinitesimal' (which was only shortly after to become available). We shall see that, at its worst, the suggestion of the term *corpora simplicissima* is atomistic only in a qualified sense, and, as I have said, the immediate purpose of the discussion demanded no more thorough analysis or exposition; indeed, further analysis was excluded, for the phenomenological account of the *Lemmata* is only fruitful in so far as it is limited to enduring individuals. Forced down to the instantaneous, it becomes sterile. But, I need hardly add, this does not mean that it is valueless in the elucidation of the nature of the Real.

I take the *corpus simplicissimum*, therefore, as standing between the supposedly isolated, and therefore unreal, *puncta* of a hypothetical instantaneous extension, on the one hand, and the supposed sempiternally enduring atoms (or minimal bodies) of Epicurus, on the other. They are *bodies* in so far as they are actual 'infinitesimal' motions through 'infinitesimal' spaces, so that they may become the origin of phenomenological construction, composition, or aggregation; but they are real only in the sense that they possess 'infinitesimal' duration. The 'atom' that endures beyond a moment is so far complex, and thus the *corpora simplicissima* are only atoms in a qualified sense. Further, though it is true that the isolated *puncta* of an instantaneous extension are indistinguishable from each other (for they do not even possess position, which is always relative), yet at every stage short of that absolute limit there must be distinction of the individual elements. At the limit of *corporeal* analysis, the *corpora simplicissima* are distinguished *solely* by their motion and rest; at the higher stages, the individuals are also distinguished by their capacity for self-maintenance and adequate response to external things and to the universe at large. Again, the differences of motion and rest which distinguish the *corpora simplicissima* arise solely from their relations within the *facies totius Universi* (which flows from eternal Extension as that Attribute is modified by infinite and eternal *motus et quies*), and these relations must change continually, through the infinite diversity of temporal expressions demanded by an infinite and eternal being. Though the *corpora simplicissima* are not timeless, their duration is essentially 'infinitesimal', and they are thus perpetually generated and destroyed. They are 'momentarily' actual, and the least of eternal things. Their reality is only the efflux of the eternity of the extended Real within a spatio-temporal 'infinitesimal', and they are of all degrees of motion and rest as the situation and circumstances of their appearance may demand. But like all finite individuals, to use the image of Augustine, they are made 'towards' *Natura*, and are restless till they find rest in it.

Turning to the question of the actuality of the *corpora simplicissima*,

we must recognize that they are, not merely in fact but also essentially, unidentifiable. This follows from their definition: for since there can be no minimal duration, no atomic moment, it follows that there can be no *corpus simplex*. Nevertheless we may legitimately proceed towards more and more simple bodies, and thus in an ideal limit of corporeal (and not mathematical) analysis, to the *corpora simplicissima* possessing 'infinitesimally' small duration; and again from that limit proceed in the direction of the re-integration of individual things, i.e. a phenomenological construction of *tota Natura extensa*. It is significant in this reference that Spinoza's term is *corpus simplicissimum* rather than *corpus absolute simplex* (nor, I think, does his use of the term *ens perfectissimum* for the *absolutely* perfect being really lessen the significance). The conception of a *corpus absolute simplex* is, as I have shown, incoherent: if it is *simplex* it is no *corpus* (for it does not endure), but an instantaneous *punctum*, and pure potentiality, that is, nothing.

To speak, therefore, as Professor Joachim does, as if *corpora simplicissima* and God are individuals in a strict sense, and human bodies are individuals only 'in a loose sense',¹ is, in my opinion, unjust to Spinoza. The sense is surely much looser with the *corpus simplicissimum* than with the *corpus humanum*; and if man himself does not stand within nature as 'imperium in imperio',² much less do the *corpora simplicissima* stand within the human body as ultimate individual particles constituting it by mere aggregation. For while the human body (with the mind) endures, and is even in part eternal, the supposed constituent 'atoms' are approximately temporary, and *disappear as they change*. One of the main characteristics of the complex individual, on the contrary, is its ability to survive large changes, both in its individual constituents, and in its magnitude as a whole.³ How, I ask, could this occur if it were a mere aggregate? But even for mathematics the integration of infinitesimals is not the same thing as their aggregation.

¹ *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, p. 141, note 3.

² *Eth. III, Praef.*

³ *Eth. II, Lemm. iv-vi.*

CHAPTER VI

THE INDIVIDUALS AND THE INDIVIDUAL

IN the ordered hierarchy of extended individuals, the *corpus humanum* occupies an ambiguous position between the *facies totius Universi* (which is eternal, and does not for itself endure) on the one hand, and on the other hand the isolated *puncta* of instantaneous extension (which as instantaneous do not in any sense endure). It is at once temporal and eternal. It is temporal in so far as it is not completely whole; because it is incompletely whole it fails to be a perfect part, and so far fails to be real. To that degree it is a mere section of the whole, and is thus the basis of illusion. But it is not merely a section, it achieves a relative wholeness, and is therefore partly eternal (though as a real part of nature, imagined as occupying regions within nature, it is 'ortal' and mortal). Its real *partialitas*, as I have indicated, is not its occupation of a region of extended *Natura*, but its partial reciprocation with *Natura* as a whole. Each man comprehends *Natura* as a whole, in his degree, but *Natura* comprehends them all.

The separate individuality of man, which I have mainly illustrated from the nature of Extension as providing a basis for that infinite differentiation of identical form which is finite individuation,¹ is thus seen to depend for its positive content not on its occupation of regions of extension, but on the degree of responsiveness possessed by the various bodies of the individuals. Extension is not divided, but the individuals that are its real modes or expressions are none the less distinct individuals. That distinctness is pictured by Imagination as the occupation of different regions of 'imaginative' extension. But the distinctness itself means variety in the reproduction of, and responsiveness to, the whole; and this again is part of the content of infinite and eternal Extension as an Attribute of the Real.

A human body, therefore, is not a mere aggregate of *corpora*

¹ For it must be remembered that pure repetition never occurs in nature. Nor is this merely an interesting empirical *datum*: it is a metaphysical necessity. Two individuals precisely alike are either identical, and hence not two, or they are distinguished spatially, temporally, or spatio-temporally. Spatial distinctions, however, are not distinctions of place (for Extension is indivisible) but of content; place is thus posterior to quality. Again, temporal distinctions are, as I have sufficiently emphasized, posterior to individuation.

simplicissima, nor indeed of complex bodies of higher degrees of individuality than these. It is not a mere complex motion within a region of extension, for as such it would be nothing at all. Reality means connexion and wholeness, and the real being of the body must therefore be at once partial and whole, at once finite and infinite. Its *partialitas* is not a mere illusion: viewed even by Intellect itself we are but partial individuals, with a corporeal environment and a perceptual consciousness of external things. But our *partialitas* does not exclude a certain wholeness, which implies for the body a certain responsiveness to the whole, and for the mind reproduction of the *infinita idea Dei*, i.e. knowledge of the whole. It is in this sense only that knowledge is our eternity, not as opposed to our extended reality, but as revealing its genuine character.¹

It follows, further, that even if *per impossibile* each of the infinitely many real parts of the whole completely reproduced the whole, they would only be the more perfectly individual, and not the less. But, it may be asked, if they were thus identical in content, would they not be one, rather than infinitely many?² From

¹ It is mainly in this respect that the solution of the problem of human eternity in the *Ethics* is a further clarification of that offered in terms of 'immortality' (*onsterfelykheid*) in the *Short Treatise*. In the latter work (cf. below, p. 192, note 1) we are told that because the soul is a mode of Thought it can unite itself with God on that side of his being, and thus share his imperishability. (At the end of *Korte Verhand. II*, xxii he says that 'uyt deze Liefde en Vereeniginge eerst komt te volgen een eeuwige en onveranderlyk bestendigheid', but in any case the word 'onsterfelykheid' is ambiguous and does not exclude real eternity). The *prima facie* implication of the statement is that the body as a mode of Extension cannot in the same way become 'imperishable' (*Korte Verhand. II*, Voor Reeden, Aanteek. i, 15; cf. *II*. xxiii). But this would confuse the whole theory. Perhaps by 'union with the body' is meant 'imaginative' union with lower types of individuality partly external to man, and thus 'imaginatively' disintegrated and passing; and by 'union with God', union with the whole which, rightly integrated, abides. That is, 'body' means the 'imaginative', and not the real, body. In the *Ethics*, as I have said, the exposition is more mature, and this may possibly be due to the fact that Spinoza had begun to see his way from the conception of extension as it was held by Descartes but modified, of course, by his own early attribution to it of intrinsic *motus et quies* (cf. *Korte Verhand. I*, ii, Aanteek. 7) towards the more concrete conception that I have attempted to expound. The fact that the *Short Treatise* denies that eternity is an Attribute of God, making it a mere *proprium*, points in the same direction; but otherwise the evidence seems too slight to lead to certainty.

² Readers who find in the text a suggestion that the development of finite individuals may imply the ultimate merging of the many in an undifferentiated one, through the operation of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles; or inversely, that the ultimate *partialitas* of the finite individuals implies the impossibility of individual progress, are referred to the more general discussion of Chapter XII, and particularly to Excursus VIII (pp. 301-4).

non-numerable in the sense of infinitely many, they would become non-numerable in the sense of *unica*.¹ The reply must be that an *actual* one or whole must be, not indefinitely, but infinitely, many; and an actual infinitude must be whole or unique. To fall back either on the unity to the exclusion of the infinitude, or the infinitude to the exclusion of the unity, is to fall back on nonentity. If the actual infinite ceased to be infinitely many in being one, the one would be empty, and hence not actual: for its content can only be the infinite totality of the reproductions of the whole in the infinitely many parts, and even an indefinitely great sum of nothings cannot make an infinite. If the parts go, the whole goes. Contrariwise, if the one ceased to be one in being infinitely many, then the whole would be naught: for each part, as a reproduction of the whole, would be pulverized, and the whole would be the dust of dust to infinity. An empty 'one' and an indefinite 'infinite' are equally incoherent, and therefore unreal. What is actual must be the one which is also infinitely many: i.e. the true infinite.²

Thus the reality of the infinite whole, and therefore of each of the infinitely many real parts which reproduce it, depends on the 'uniquity' and actual infinity of the whole. Now if each part were *completely* to reproduce the whole, each would be, with the whole, one and infinite; and the parts and the whole would either be identical or *ultimately* atomic: and on either hypothesis equally unintelligible. But for Spinoza the Real is necessarily the intelligible (though not *constituted* by anthropomorphic intellect); it is the very norm of intelligibility; it is 'conceived through itself'.³ Thus it was necessary for him to maintain both the *reality* and the *incompleteness* of the parts as modes of Substance; and thus the doctrine of the eternity of the human mind, so far from being an excrescence on his theory, an elaborate pretence, or a last relic of superstition, is the keystone of the system. Only thus can the absolute whole be at once one and infinitely many, i.e. a real whole, for thus it possesses content; only thus can the parts be at once both distinct

¹ And it must be remembered that though Substance is without number, which is a 'mere aid to the Imagination' (*Ep. xii*), it is neither without infinity (*Eth. I, viii et xvi*), nor without unity (*Eth. I, xiv, Cor. i*): it is '[unica Substantia] constans infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam, et infinitam essentiam exprimit' (*Eth. I, xi*). Actual infinity and actual 'uniquity' are not integers but 'ideal limits' which become actual by real identity.

² On the nature of 'the actual infinite' see Excursus V (pp. 160-3).

³ *Eth. I, Def. iii*.

and dependent, i.e. real parts, for thus they have form. The parts must be real if the whole is to be intelligible; they must be, not indefinitely numerous, but infinitely many, if the whole is to be infinite; and, in their own perspective, they must be distinct though not separable, if they are to be both real and, in this sense, infinite. Substance, therefore, has not merely immediate and mediate infinite and eternal modes, it must also have finite eternal modes which are the real parts of *Natura naturata*. And that is the significance which must be attached to the words: 'Matter was not lacking to God for the creation of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more strictly, . . . the laws of his nature are so vast, as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by an infinite intellect.'¹ 'From the necessity of the divine nature must follow infinite things in infinite ways: that is all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.'² There is a place in or under the infinite for the finite; the real finite, indeed, constitutes the partially disintegrated content of the infinite; as the infinite, again, is the constitutive, integrating, principle of the finite: 'The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind considered under the form of eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself';³ and again, 'the love of God towards men, and the intellectual love of the mind towards God, are one and the same.'⁴

The reality of the parts implies and is implied by the concreteness of the whole; abstract infinite extension, whether instantaneous or recurrent in time, could have no parts, for they would all be alike, and thus indistinguishable, and hence not parts.

¹ 'Ei non deficit materia ad omnia, ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum, creanda; vel magis proprie loquendo, . . . ipsius naturae leges adeo amplae fuerunt, ut sufficerent ad omnia, quae ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt, producenda.' (*Eth. I, App.*)

² 'Ex necessitate divinae naturae, infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent.' (*Eth. I, xvi.*)

³ 'Mentis Amor intellectualis erga Deum est ipse Dei Amor, quo Deus se ipsum amat, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per essentiam humanae Mentis, sub specie aeternitatis consideratam, explicari potest, hoc est, Mentis erga Deum Amor intellectualis pars est infiniti amoris, quo Deus se ipsum amat.' (*Eth. V, xxxvi.*)

⁴ 'Amor Dei erga homines, et Mentis erga Deum Amor intellectualis unum, et idem.' (*Eth. V, xxxvi, Cor.*)

Again, absolutely eternal and infinite Extension abstractly conceived as *res extensa naturans* could for the same reason have no parts (though it is full while mere extension is empty). The structure of the Real can therefore be neither the one nor the other; and the repeated use of the term '*quatenus*' represents Spinoza's earnest attempt to state the case satisfactorily. It is, as every student of Spinoza must recognize, intimately associated with the distinction drawn within the divine nature between *Natura naturata* and *Natura naturans*. These are not, of course, two separate beings, but two asymmetrically related aspects of the same reality. It is in the interpretations of these aspects that the special difficulties of Spinoza's application of this scholastic distinction have been found, difficulties which even sympathetic interpreters of Spinoza have said to be insuperable. But the difficulties have mainly arisen because it has been too readily assumed that Spinoza regards modal being as a whole, or in its parts, as illusory. If that were so, if to be a mode were necessarily to be unreal, then we should have to deny the reality of *Natura naturata*, which is by Spinoza himself defined as modal: 'By *Natura naturans*, that which is in itself and is conceived through itself must be understood, that is, those Attributes of Substance which express eternal and infinite essence, in other words, God, in so far as he is considered as a free cause. By *Natura naturata* I understand all that which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the Attributes of God, that is, all the modes of the Attributes of God, in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which without God cannot be or be conceived.'¹ How, then, can it have been inferred that modes are necessarily illusory? They follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and thus, though they are logically posterior to Substance, they must be equally real with Substance. There can be no doubt whatsoever that Spinoza intends us to understand that *Natura naturata* is a reality in which unity and infinite variety are reconciled. They are reconciled because *Natura naturata* is not an

¹ 'Per Naturam naturantem nobis intelligendum est id, quod in se est, et per se concipitur, sive talia substantiae attributa, quae aeternam, et infinitam essentiam expriment, hoc est, Deus, quatenus, ut causa libera, consideratur. Per naturatam autem intelligo id omne, quod ex necessitate Dei naturae, sive uniuscujusque Dei attributorum sequitur, hoc est, omnes Dei attributorum modos, quatenus considerantur, ut res, quae in Deo sunt, et quae sine Deo nec esse, nec concipi possunt.' (*Eth. I, xxix, Sch.*)

aggregate like a flock of sheep, in which the parts are individuals, but the whole a mere collection; nor is it a whole of parts as a machine is a whole of parts, i. e. of parts which are all different from it, but are nicely formed and adjusted to constitute the single whole. Ultimate reality cannot be a whole on that plan, not because a machine is not in a sense an individual, but because it is not a self-dependent individual, it could not produce itself, maintain itself, adjust itself. An infinite and eternal machine would require an infinite and eternal mechanic. Nor again, can *Natura* be an organic unity, for that implies a reciprocating environment to which the organism responds. The infinite and eternal whole must require neither external cause, nor external source of stimulus, nor external object of response; it must be all-inclusive. And for the same reason it must be self-dependent and self-constituting. Again, it must be infinite, not merely in extent, but also in the variety of its parts, for otherwise it would lack something which is available; its own parts must be its content. It is a whole, therefore, constituted by infinite parts in which each part, in its degree, reproduces the whole, and thus responds to it, and to all its other parts. To that degree it is real. And it is precisely because this conception is circular: because the whole Real is constituted by parts which in turn gain their reality from their reproduction of the whole, that *Natura naturata* cannot be Substance (which is conceived solely through itself) but must be logically posterior to *Natura naturans*; and thus, though it is real, it is regarded as but one aspect of reality, incomplete without that active aspect or *Natura naturans* which is logically prior.¹

No student of importance has understood this to mean chronological priority, but many have concluded that logical priority involves metaphysical priority, so that *Natura naturata* is less real than *Natura naturans*. That by no means follows: they are equally real and metaphysically ultimate, but in their due logical order (which is asymmetrical) and, therefore, distinct within the Real.

It follows, further, from these considerations that *Natura naturans* is not prior to *Natura naturata* in the sense that it can be conceived without relation to *Natura naturata*: it is conceived *per se* only in the sense that it depends on no external cause, it cannot be deduced from anything more ultimate. I do not mean that it can be conceived as active essence but yet as doing nothing; as a 'free

¹ These points are further elaborated below.

cause' but as causing nothing: it cannot be conceived except as the eternal creative cause of *Natura naturata*.¹ The conception of Substance reciprocates with that of mode; and the reality of eternal Substance implies the reality of the eternal modes, both finite and infinite (though as logically posterior).

But from the reality of *Natura naturata* that of its sections cannot be deduced (for it has no sections), or even of its real parts in isolation (for in isolation they cease to be real). Man is only real and eternal as a part of *Natura naturata*, and therefore as following from the divine nature. For he is real only as a partial reproduction of the whole, and thus as a responsive individual within the whole. He cannot stand alone even in the sense in which we might (though erroneously) regard *Natura naturata*, including as it does all modal being, as capable of standing alone as a whole. He is a part of *Natura naturata*, but a real part; *Natura naturata* is, indeed, composed of such parts, but not as an engine is composed of cylinder, piston, rod, flywheel, &c. The whole reproduces itself in every part of itself in proportion to the *partialitas*

¹ This is the true solution of the apparent contradiction in Professor Joachim's account of the matter: 'Natura Naturans is logically prior to Natura Naturata, or could be conceived without it, though not vice versa . . . Natura Naturans has its fulfilment in Natura Naturata; and it is only the full understanding of the eternal system of God's modes which would render possible a complete knowledge of God and his Attributes' (*A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, p. 65, note 1). Nor, I think, is the contradiction merely apparent: it is true that we can have an *adequate* knowledge of God without having a *full and complete* knowledge of him; just as we may have an adequate knowledge of the 'triangle' in its definition, without understanding all its *propria*. But this is not to say that *Natura naturans* could be conceived adequately without *any* knowledge of *Natura naturata*. Professor Joachim draws the line in the wrong place. However abstract may be the nature of the knower, and in consequence his idea of God, that idea, if it is to be even adequate, must still conceive God as *Natura naturans* expressing itself in some abstract essence of *Natura naturata*. I may, perhaps, be allowed to add that the analogy between God's Attributes and 'lines of force', which Professor Joachim uses in this place, seems infelicitous; though I admit that it is less mischievous than Camerer's description of God (also in part adopted by Professor Joachim) as 'die innere Lebenskraft der Welt und nichts weiter' (*Die Lehre Spinoza's*, I, i). Professor Joachim adds, expressly repudiating Camerer's phrase 'und nichts weiter', 'but he is more, for he is also that which the force animates' (*A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, p. 66). Similar descriptions and analogies are rightly condemned by Mr. Alexander as 'undefined ideas, transferred from our experience to describe metaphorically the being of God' (*Spinoza and Time*, p. 33). It is the merest justice to add that Professor Joachim only uses the analogy of 'lines of force' in passing, and without serious emphasis. It does not appear in his main exposition of the nature of an Attribute (*Loc. cit.*, pp. 17-27).

of the part, and thus constitutes it; or rather, since neither the modal whole nor the parts can be thought of as active, we must say that *Natura naturans* (i. e. Substance as cause) reproduces the whole *Natura naturata* (i. e. its complete expression, or infinite and eternal mode) in each of the infinite parts of *Natura naturata* (i. e. men, &c.) in their measure, and thus constitutes both them and it.

Such is the result of the demand for the final metaphysical intelligibility of the Real as opposed to mere epistemological intelligibility. The intelligible is the systematic; intelligibility demands synthesis of differences, the explanation of the partial through the complete, the integration of the premisses in the conclusion, and the differentiation of the conclusion through the middle; but the ultimate intelligibility of the Real demands more than mere system; it must explain not only the coherence of the parts in the whole, but also the existence of the whole of parts. Nothing in the constitution of the system may be assumed. With incomplete systems, or with the complete system inadequately conceived, we assume an existing matter which accepts a form; with the ultimate system also we must do so formally, but we must not forget at the proper time that we have done so; for here the ultimate matter is non-being, and the ultimate form is the very Real we are to explain. That is the truth at the back of Empiricism. We must begin somewhere, and where more naturally than with our immediate world of extended and conscious being? But what we begin with must not be wholly illusory if through it we are to reach the Real (and that is the sense in which, as I have indicated, Spinoza's doctrine of the eternity of the mind is connected with Descartes's doctrine of the philosophical primacy of the *cogito*). Since we are finite and incomplete embodied minds, the demand for intelligibility leads us on to the idea of a complete and infinite being, both extended and thinking: i. e. a systematic whole of extended and thinking reality like ourselves (for how else should we know it, or be real parts of it?) but complete and infinite (for how else should we be finite and incomplete?). But we may not rest there: reality, as I have said, cannot be ultimately or metaphysically intelligible merely as system. Our finitude implies also our incapacity to produce the *datum* from which we began, and hence we must find a cause for it. But that cause cannot be the system so far reached, because that system itself is constituted by its

parts, and equally with them needs production. Such a producing cause can be found, then, neither in the parts nor in the whole, considered strictly as parts of a whole, and as a whole of parts, respectively. Nor can it be found outside of the whole, for the whole is infinite. It must be found, therefore, in the very nature of the Substance of the whole as active essence, i. e. as possessing existence by right, rather than enjoying it as a gift. 'We cannot affirm that God enjoys existence, for the existence of God is God himself.'¹ Thus the very demand for the ultimate intelligibility of the Real carries us beyond mere system; for it involves two things: formally, inclusiveness and coherence of 'objective content' in our ideas; and materially, and not less important for metaphysics, the reality of knowledge itself, i. e. the real existence of the inclusive and coherent *ideatum*. Real existence, whether corporeal or mental, cannot be conjured out of ideal coherence, except on the assumption (which, though necessary, must, none the less, not be made tacitly, but openly recognized) of the possibility of real knowledge; i. e. the necessity that the inclusive and coherent 'idea' corresponds with a real inclusive and coherent 'ideatum'. In that sense, truth cannot be established without a positive *datum*; and however truth may be developed from that basis (or within it), it must in the end, for metaphysics, return to it, and make it intelligible, not merely in content or essence, but also as *datum*, i. e. implying real existence. The knower may in some sense 'make' the 'objective content' of his own ideas, but in no sense normally does he make his own 'ideata' or real known things. The one-sided insistence on inclusiveness and coherence as the *epistemological* meaning of intelligibility (which is undoubted) has too often been regarded as settling the *metaphysical* meaning of the term. But epistemology is a special science, assuming a special subject matter (viz. knowledge), the laws of which it investigates. Thus, very naturally, it takes knowledge for granted; it is its *datum*. But the metaphysician must inquire also into the nature and significance of knowledge, and what is implied when it is taken (as it must be taken) as *datum*. For the positive *datum* which is essential for the establishment of truth is no mere empirical *fact*, but *the form of knowledge itself*, or, if you will, the whole which is *the perfect object of knowledge* (for the pure form of knowledge is only fully actual in the knowledge of

¹ 'Deus vero non potest dici frui existentia, nam existentia Dei est Deus ipse' (Cog. Met. II, i).

perfect being). That *datum* implies a *dator*, and metaphysics must make this intelligible also, as far as it can. To be metaphysically intelligible means more than to be epistemologically intelligible; and *Natura naturata* can only be intelligible in this ultimate sense, as the eternal expression of *Natura naturans*. *Natura* must in the end be both *dator* and *datum*.

I have said that each mind knows *Natura* in so far as it is the *essentia objectiva* of its own body, which in its degree reproduces *Natura* as a whole. But it is also true that *Natura*, which each individual knows, itself includes that individual as one of its parts. But, it may be asked, how can that which includes *Natura*, also be included by *Natura*? For this must be the case both corporeally and mentally, though more obviously on the latter side: *Natura cogitans* is cognitively included in the finite knower (in the degree of his wholeness); and the knower is himself (so far as he is real) included in *Natura cogitans*. The answer must be that this is the very nature of true *partialitas* within an infinite whole; a formal definition both of actual infinity and of true *partialitas* might be directly framed upon it.¹ Thus I have spoken again and again of man, both body and mind, as a real part of infinite *Natura*; I must now explain in greater detail, in what sense man is, in his degree, a part of *Natura*, that is, what is the character of his success and failure in reproducing the whole; and what is meant by 'in his degree'; and how the precise quality of his being is thus determined, and the special direction of his impotence or unreality.

I distinguished between being a *part* and being a *section*, and the main point was that a real part differs from a section in that it reproduces the whole while remaining distinct within the whole. Only thus can it survive in the whole, and thus it must survive if the whole is to have content. Now the whole is, as I have indicated, infinite externality, diversity, or multiplicity, with its *nisus* to unity; thus its parts may vary either in the width of the range of diversity which they synthesize, or in the degree of unification which they achieve (the two types of variation being ultimately connected). The human mind is capable of a certain perfection, and suffers a certain imperfection, in both respects. It is capable of adequate knowledge of the nature of ultimate reality in so far as some 'notions' are common to all minds, i. e. there are *propria* common to all parts of *Natura*, viz., Thought, Extension, ideation, motion

¹ See Excursus V (pp. 160-3).

and rest, &c. Thus we have an adequate knowledge of the essence of God, though necessarily knowledge that is largely abstract or selective in the sense that the full content of these 'notions' of *propria* is not fully developed. Again, the mind is capable of a detailed acquaintance with certain individual things, especially of its own body as that is affected by its environment. Thus it has a detailed knowledge of a narrow range of things, though this knowledge is very largely confused and imaginative.

Thus the power of the mind is, on the one side, its capacity to understand certain broad ultimate truths about the Real, and, on the other side, its acquaintance with its own character as an individual. Its impotence consists in the abstract¹ nature of its adequate knowledge, and the imaginative character of its conception of the individual. These two factors meet in the knowledge of the body itself which is at once the narrowest of the *propria communia* and the richest of our singulars.

In *scientia intuitiva* the mind fills in the concrete content of the *propria communia* (if such a gross description may be allowed) so as to present the ranges of the Real adequately conceived, as wholes or individuals, approximating to the perfectly individual whole. Even here, therefore, the mind remains but a partial reproduction of the *infinita idea Dei*, and it is important to notice in what exactly the *partialitas* consists. It has been a problem to many students of Spinoza, otherwise sympathetic, to understand how the finite can know the infinite, and share the eternity of *Natura*. That is a problem, mainly, because a misleading mental image of the relations of man and God too easily occupies the mind.

Human knowledge is, at the best, an 'intuitive' grasp of a partial hierarchy: on the one side, of ranges of universality beginning from *Natura naturata* and passing down to its own narrow range; and, on the other side, of ranges of individuality passing from its own degree to the abstract character of the *corpora simplicissima animata*. The highest human knowledge is thus of the whole of *Natura* as an individual at once extended and thinking, but as partly external to man, and so far opaque to thought, and in that sense abstract.

¹ By 'abstract' I must not be understood to mean that it is knowledge of something unreal, i. e. of *ens rationis* or of fiction. All knowledge is of the real, i. e. of the existing; but abstract knowledge is knowledge of universal individuals in which the full content, owing to the unresponsiveness of the mind, is undeveloped. This repetition is justified by the great importance of this point in the Spinozistic epistemology.

Natura in itself must be perfectly individual and universal (as the *corpora simplicissima animata* are approximately empty and abstract). The knowledge of man at its best is infected by a certain emptiness and abstraction which is one with his *partialitas* on the side of mind. We cannot apprehend the whole of *Natura naturata* as flowing transparently from creative *Natura naturans*. There are ranges of being to which our minds and bodies are unresponsive, and our failure to apprehend the whole is thus failure to apprehend the wider ranges of individuality as individual (i.e. as real). It is thus that our knowledge of God is incomplete while remaining adequate so far as it goes. Our knowledge of God is really our knowledge of our bodies, but broadened out and delimited by the unity of the body with *Natura* as a whole, but not with the more ineffable ranges of individuality.¹

Our *partialitas*, therefore, is not primarily our minuteness in contrast with nature as a whole, but the low degree of our responsiveness to higher grades of individuality, or more complete syntheses of externality. How relative size is related to organization I need not attempt to determine, for the body as we imagine it, i.e. as measurable, is not the body as it really is for thought; and further, the undivided character of Extension implies the incommensurability of extent and organization, because the latter (to use a mathematical analogy) proceeds along a new dimension.

Far more important is the consideration that the *partialitas* of man implies no breach within the Real; for each man in adequately knowing his own body, also knows God adequately, though not fully. We must no longer picture *Natura* to ourselves as an *Arbor Porphyriana* or an ascending scale from mere individuals up through ever emptier universals to Substance as a *sumмум genus* emptiest of all. For Spinoza the true and original Individual is *Natura naturata* as it eternally issues from *Natura naturans*, and other things are individuals only as reproducing *Natura* with ever increasing abstractness as the lower ranges of individuality are approached. The *corpus simplicissimum animatum* is abstraction at its worst, short of non-being.

It is thus that man's knowledge of *Natura* is at once adequate and partial. There is no gap between human individuality and the divine; for man is not outside of *Natura*, but is a subordinate part of it. His individuality is a partial transcript from *Natura*,

¹ For a discussion of these ranges of being see Chapters XI and XII.

and his knowledge, so far as it is true, is a subordinate part of the infinite idea of God. Such knowledge is always of the infinite One, though only of selected features of it; and it may be true in spite of its incompleteness, because those features constitute genuine, though partial, wholes. It is knowledge of the One only as this is the ground of the degree of individuality enjoyed by the body itself, and not as it is the perfectly infinite and eternal *Natura*. God himself knows himself and loves himself in the eternal expression of *Natura naturans* as *Natura naturata*; and man's adequate knowledge is the expression of *Natura naturans* (in so far as it is possible) as a human nature, viz. a real, i.e. responsive, part of *Natura naturata*. If knowledge is possible to the part at all, then, in some degree, the part must reproduce the whole: the degree in which it does so, represents the degree of reality possessed by the part in the whole and for itself. Whether it is rightly called 'adjectival', and if so, in what sense, I shall have occasion to discuss later;¹ but certainly it is a part, for it selectively reproduces the whole; and it reproduces the whole selectively because it is only a part.

Thus man touches God, because he involves both multiplicity or externality and also the *nisus* to unity; that is, he does so as a real existence which is an eternal expression, rather than a passive content. For it is in our active, positive being that we are eternal, that is, as real but finite individuals expressing an abstracted individual essence of *Natura*. And thus we may be eternal even as finite modes, for our failing from infinity is not our individuality, but the lack of individuality, the abstractness, the inability to probe and rest in the full riches of the divine nature, that arises from our incomplete responsiveness to that nature. We are relatively empty; *Natura* is full. We are finite modes of Substance; *it* is infinite Substance expressing itself in infinite modal nature (for as I have said, the Real is not Substance as excluding the modes, but as expressing itself in them). And our failing, therefore, does not sever us from the Real, we are real selections from the Real, from *Natura naturata*; and the more individual we are, the less we are a mere selection, and the more we are real, the more self-sufficing; for real individuality lies in the direction of *Natura*, and not in that of the *corpora simplicissima animata*. Here as elsewhere it is 'imaginative' pictures that lead us astray; content-

¹ Below, pp. 316 *et seqq.*

ment with the picture of individuation as a mere process of division, instead of conceiving such modal division as unreal except as the result, and 'imaginative' expression, of finite individuation.

On the side of Extension, therefore, each part belongs to the whole, and, as it were, runs right through it. The *partialitas* of the part is maintained by its real content, i.e. by its degree of adequate responsiveness to the whole content of the Real. Only thus can the infinite multiplicity or externality of Extension be sustained against its *nisus* to unity. Mere abstract instantaneous extension cannot be real; it would collapse by reason of its vacuity. It is the eternity of Extension that is the basis of the individuation of its essence; a 'timeless' extension has no content to *individuate*. It can only be *divided*.

Again on the side of Thought, each part belongs to the whole and reciprocates with it. The *partialitas* of the part is its real content which results from the degree of adequacy of its knowledge. As Intellect it is partial; as Imagination it is other than itself; as Intellect and Imagination together it reciprocates with the whole (though incompletely). The *infinita idea Dei* is not a whole without parts, for so it could not be called an 'idea', it is a whole of infinitely many real parts duly organized as the eternal apprehension of itself, and of *res extensa aeterna*. It is the positive nature of the part which is truly itself (and this it derives from the whole): its Intellect, its responsive organization; and only in a looser sense is it Intellect *plus* enlightened imaginative content; responsive organization *plus* responding environment; and that '*plus*', as I shall show, in the Real is transformed into non-additive quality.

The contradiction between Extension as infinite, one, and indivisible, and as composed of infinite real parts, is thus resolved, and can only be resolved, by understanding it not as a 'quiescent mass', or as abstract form, but as a real existence, which is infinitely full of content. Every part of that content is, in the degree of its *partialitas*, constituted by the whole; so that the whole, as active essence, remains infinite, one, and indivisible. I shall not use the too magnificent phrase of Giordano Bruno:¹ 'wholly in the

¹ 'In toto et in omni parte totum' (Bruno, *De Immenso et Innumerabilibus*, II, xiii). The conception is, of course, much older than Bruno, or even than Plotinus through whom, presumably, it was derived. Cf. *Enn.* V, viii, 4: καὶ γὰρ ἔχει πᾶς πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ἄλλῳ πάντα, ὥστε πανταχοῦ πάντα καὶ πᾶν πᾶν καὶ ἕκαστον πᾶν καὶ ἀπειρος ἡ αἴγλη. According to Bruno, it is true of 'divinitas,

whole and wholly in every part of the whole'; more soberly I shall say: 'wholly in the whole and partly in every part of the whole', more soberly, but not more parsimoniously, for thus the whole escapes the dilemma of non-being, and becomes real and infinite: 'matter was not lacking . . . for the creation of every degree of perfection'.¹

Again, it is precisely because *res extensa* is infinite, one, and indivisible, that its modification necessarily implies its eternity. If it can express itself in modes (and its reality, as we have seen, demands that it shall) then it must have content which in its very organization involves both real variety and unity. That content is eternity itself, which belongs primarily to the absolute whole (the existence of which thus 'follows solely from its essence'); and, in a derived sense, to the real parts of the whole which selectively reproduce it. *Res extensa* is not divided; it is modified or individuated. And it is modified because it is eternal Substance; it is individuated because it is the supreme Individual, and not a *summm genus* or empty form.

The same principles that establish the unity and distinctness of Extension and its modes establish also the distinctness of the modes from one another. There is a sense in which each body extends throughout the whole, and another sense in which it occupies only a limited region of the whole. But neither assertion is true unconditionally. There would be no separate bodies if each were omnipresent; and there could be no *res extensa* if bodies were ultimately confined to regions. In abstract extension there can be no absolute regions; nor can there be such in *Extensio naturans* as such. Distinctions of regions are relative to variety of content in *Extensio naturata* or the *facies totius Universi*. Bodies, I have said, are not distinguished by their exclusive occupation of finite spaces, but those spaces are distinguished as occupied by different bodies. Real *partialitas* is prior to spatial distinction in *Natura naturata*. Body means balance or proportion of *motus et quies*: bodies differ modally, not substantially. But not to differ substantially does not mean that the differences are superadded to the general identity of abstract substance. Not because Substance

intellectus universi, bonitas absoluta atque veritas'; but a lower perfection belongs to the 'corporeum immensum simulacrum' of divinity, because it is only 'in toto totum'.

¹ *Eth. I, Append.*

is empty and abstract, but because it is full and concrete, do all bodies agree in it. They are one in substance because the nature of Substance is so full as to require the whole variety of the world, in its parts and as a whole, to express it.

Bodies differ modally, but they are substantially the same, i.e. their distinctions do not make them absolute sections or 'chunks', but rather, a hierarchy of constellations. What is from one point of view a single body, from another point of view is many bodies, or infinite bodies. The universe is in one sense a single body (if the unsuitable expression may be allowed):¹ in another sense it is infinitely many bodies of infinitely many kinds.² The same is true of every real body (except the *corpus simplicissimum*) but this does not imply that bodies of all degrees of individuality can freely overlap one another. In so far as they are individual they cannot overlap. Overlapping means *partialitas*, lack of individuality. There can be but one complete Individual. What is from one point of view a part of one thing, may from another point of view be a part of some other, but only in so far as the two things are not complete individuals. They overlap as mere sections having a common region.³ Again, one individual may fall wholly within another (as man within the universe), but only because that which falls within is incompletely individual. Man falls within the universe because he is a part of the universe; or rather the two facts are the same. Individuals of the same degree of wholeness cannot be so related; nor can they overlap, or have a common region in so far as they are individuals. Their community implies *partialitas* and incompleteness, as their responsiveness implies wholeness and relative completeness. All this is obviously purely analytic and explicative; the main point is that distinction and *partialitas* in *res extensa* is the same as individuality and responsiveness as between the whole and its infinite parts.

It follows that the extent of individuality is in some degree

¹ 'Per corpus intelligimus quamcunque quantitatem, longam, latam, et profundam, certa aliqua figura terminatam, quo nihil absurdius de Deo, ente scilicet absolute infinito, dici potest' (*Eth. I, xv, Sch.*). Certainly in that sense the universe is *not* a body.

² 'Facile concipiemus, totam naturam unum esse Individuum, cujus partes, hoc est, omnia corpora infinitis modis variant, absque ulla totius Individui mutatione' (*Eth. II, Lem. vii, Sch.*). Cf. *Eth. I, xvi*: 'Ex necessitate divinae naturae, infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent.'

³ Thus a house may be in two or more roads at the same time.

arbitrary in all cases except the universe as a whole; for it is the nature of each part to reproduce the whole, in part adequately, in part inadequately. But to reproduce inadequately is still to reproduce: it is not identical with pure passivity and inertia. Hence it becomes a question at what point to draw the line: what is from one point of view A's body or mind, is from another point of view a part of some external body or mind. But this gives no ground at all for making the distinctions *wholly* arbitrary: for thus there would remain no distinctions in the whole; and hence no whole. To seek for individuality alone either in the ultimate instantaneous *puncta*, or in the *facies totius Universi*, could only deprive the Real both of individuality and of content, i.e. of reality. There must, therefore, be finite individuality at each of the infinite stages, but individuality in every case appropriate to the stage. The individuality, indeed, constitutes the stage.

Res extensa, then, cannot be a *collection* of exclusive individuals; nor can it be merely a *single* individual; nor again is it sufficient to say that it is a *system* of individuals; for such a system need not have that degree of individuality which alone is adequate to the whole. It is only to be defined as Spinoza himself defines it: as an individual composed of individuals, which again are themselves composed of individuals, . . . *ad infinitum*. Such is the reality of *res extensa naturata*. Abstract extension is merely the place of instantaneous *puncta*; real Extension, like real Thought,¹ is the

¹ Corresponding assertions may be made with respect to Thought as constituted by the infinite variety of reciprocal *nisus* between 'objective' diversity and unity. In both Extension and Thought this *nisus* involves not merely summation, but also constellation. To express this relation I have, from time to time, made use of the phrase '*transformation without succession*': the phrase is dramatically, rather than logically, satisfying, but I find it impossible to improve upon it while retaining a suitable brevity (cf. p. 55, note 1). What I mean to emphasize by its use is the fundamentally important fact that a logical system is neither serial nor one-dimensional. We are accustomed to correct the vulgar notion of an inference as being in time (premisses preceding conclusion); in so doing we come to think of it as system timelessly grasped as a whole. But there is mortal danger in so doing: for even as timeless system the distinction of logically prior and posterior remains, constituting an asymmetrical order. There is logical 'movement' or rather 'transformation'. But not in time, i.e. it does not involve temporal 'succession', but only logical 'depth'. The least sympathetic of my readers will, I hope, recognize how essential this is to my whole thesis. Failure to make this distinction is the source of the too common identification of timelessness with eternity, and also of the failure to understand how time emanates from eternity, and my main object in this essay is to give an *adequate definition of eternity*, and to prove its adequacy by *the deduction of time*.

eternal and infinite essence of God. For it is at once infinite multiplicity or externality (i.e. 'formal' diversity) with its infinite variety of *nisus* to unity, and unity with its infinite variety of *nisus* to infinite multiplicity, externality, or 'formal' diversity. This ultimate essence can only be adequately conceived, and can only really exist, as the immanent cause of all the variety of nature: yielding, primarily, the infinite mode of *motus et quies*, which is the reciprocal *nisus* conceived in abstraction from concrete Extension; and ultimately, the universe itself as the variety of individuals of all grades of completeness which express the infinite types and complications of harmonized mobility.

EXCURSUS V

THE ACTUAL INFINITE

It has often been asserted that real wholeness, and therefore real infinity, implies a limit; and again that an infinite multiplicity cannot be completed, and cannot therefore be actual; so that the conception of an infinite whole, which is both infinitely many and also *unica*, is incoherent. I reply that this is to confuse the infinitely many with the indefinitely plural. Mathematical readers will be familiar with the conception of a determinate infinite multiplicity, as distinct from an indefinitely large multitude numerically greater than any assigned number, from the researches of Dedekind, Cantor, and others, and I may leave them with their acknowledged masters. Philosophical readers, however, will probably recur to the discussion of the conception by Royce in his volumes of Gifford Lectures on *The World and the Individual*, especially in the Supplementary Essay on 'The One, the Many, and the Infinite', at the end of vol. i. As I cannot but regard some central features of that discussion with the greatest suspicion, and its main conclusions as allacious, I am not content to leave my readers to this acknowledged master without some warning. But the merest reference to his long discussion must suffice.

Royce is directly occupied in his Essay with the question of the validity of F. H. Bradley's arguments in *Appearance and Reality*, that we cannot construe to ourselves the way in which the multiplicity of 'appearances' are unified in the Absolute, because every effort after such a unity involves us in an 'infinite process'. This result Bradley held to be logically vicious, in that it implies that there is an *actual infinite multiplicity*, a notion which he believed to be self-contradictory. Royce attempts to meet such objections on Bradley's own ground by showing that thought itself presents a diversity in unity which, though infinite, is 'self-evident', i.e. one in which the infinite multiplicity issues from the *proprius motus* of the unity. Here we have an existing determinate infinite, which, if it is admitted by Bradley himself as real (and we must remember that Bradley regards the finite self as 'appearance'), constitutes a refutation of his general argument. In this part of the discussion it seems to me that Royce fails to penetrate the exceptionally fine armour of Bradley, though I think he comes nearer to doing so when he asserts that 'the "endless fission" of Mr. Bradley's analysis expresses not mere Appearance but Being';¹ it is the evidence of the actuality of the infinite which constitutes the Real. That Thought is an actual infinite

¹ *The World and the Individual*, i, p. 554.

is a doctrine that I myself advance and defend, but not from the premisses used by Royce. His argument that "Thought does develop its own varieties of internal meaning"¹ seems to me either radically unsound, or, on the best interpretation, incapable of showing how the concrete details of finite thought could be provided even in formal outline from within thought itself. As Bradley says, the intellect fails because it 'cannot do without differences, but on the other hand it cannot make them'.² Royce replies that thought makes its own multiplicity by 'Reflection':³ the application of any operation of thought to any special matter may itself become the matter to which a further operation of thought is applied, and so on to infinity (e.g. I may know A; know that I know A; know that I know that I know A; and so on). Thus, he argues, since self-consciousness is itself actual, and involves the 'infinite process', it is an *actual infinite*. For my part I am confident that no such 'infinite process' belongs to self-consciousness, for we do not immediately know our own conscious states by contemplation at all: we consciously enjoy them, for we are they. This, as I have said elsewhere, is what Spinoza means when he says that the *idea* and the *idea ideae* are one and the same thing in one and the same Attribute. Doubtless, a *subsequent* idea, by contemplating the 'same' object, may reproduce the former idea with increased detail and extent due to memory and comparison; and this is perhaps Royce's meaning. But if so, the 'Reflection' belongs, not to the original content, but at each stage to the existing content with its filling from memory and comparison. Thus the actual infinity of any intellectual element is not serial, but systematic or implicative. If we began with a truly *simple* element, the multiplicity would be the result of memory and comparison, and would thus not be actual but only accumulative; if we begin (as empirically we must) with a finite intellectual *whole*, then its multiplicity is partly accumulative and partly actual (as in true inference); only with the absolute whole of intellect is the infinity truly actual.

I will venture a comment also upon Royce's attempt to deal with the possibility of an *actual infinite* of a 'realistic' kind, i.e. of being out of relations with a knower. This is singularly unconvincing. Diversity is introduced into such a unity because we must be able to say at least that it has the potency of either being, or not being, in the presence of a knowing mind. Hence issues an 'endless fission'. This is held by Royce to be a sufficient reason for denying that a purely 'realistic' being can exist; the *circulus in probando* is, however, so obvious that I can only suppose that idealistic presuppositions of an important kind concealed it from the acute mind of Royce himself. His belief that there are con-

¹ *The World and the Individual*, i, p. 490.

² *Appearance and Reality*, p. 562.

³ *The World and the Individual*, i, p. 493.

traditions involved in an 'actual *extended* infinite' that do not occur in an 'actual *conscious* infinite' seems explicable only as due to the idea that mind is additional to 'extended being' as a fact of the same order (and Mr. Alexander does something very similar). Mind, so introduced into the extended world, undoubtedly may, if discretion is not exercised, be the cuckoo that pushes out the true brood and occupies the whole nest. Ideas, as Reid assured us, are unfriendly things. But however he arrives at it, Royce's conclusion is that 'any world of self-representative Being must be of such a nature as to partake of the constitution of a Self, either because it is a Self, or because it is dependent for its form upon the Self whose work or image it is'.¹ But he is also clear that the 'corruption and destruction' of 'realistic' fact by 'fission' does not result from 'the mere infinity of the relational process', but from the fact that the *relata* (owing to the absence of knowledge) are wholly disconnected from each other. Thus, 'the real that is in any final sense independent of knowledge can[not] be either One or Many or both One and Many'.² And what 'independent from knowledge' means seems to be indicated in the next sentence, which speaks of a 'real' which is 'linked with' knowledge, and not of a 'knowable real'. If extended being is essentially knowable, as with Spinoza, then surely it may be a 'chain' (*kette*) equally with intellect; it must, indeed, be so if it is true that within knowledge we discover such *ketten*.

With Royce's dual criticism of the idealism of Bradley on the one hand, and of realism on the other, I have, after all, only secondary concern; what is of prime interest is his application to the Real of the conception of a *kette* as it was defined and analysed by Dedekind. By the use of this conception he holds that the *actual infinite* ceases to be self-contradictory in that the multiplicity of members results not from 'wearisome repetition' which can never end (and can thus never be fully actual), but from the nature of the whole or One, which by its single form determines the unlimited series, and thus by its own actuality ensures and determines the actual infinitude of its parts. We may thus ignore the reference to self-consciousness (which is not constitutive but merely exemplificative), but not the conception of the *actual infinite* which I regard as one of the ultimate and inescapable categories of the Real. In a later chapter I shall explain in greater detail how this conception may be applied in the deduction of the infinitely many from the self-creative One. The general character of a real existent must be its individuality, its wholeness, the unity of its manifold. The many must receive the *form* of unity, and the one must receive the *matter* of multiplicity. The real is the individual or *formed matter*—a venerable doctrine in its most general character. Where the individual is finite the form imposes itself

¹ *The World and the Individual*, i, p. 542.

² *Loc cit.*, p. 543.

on a resistant matter which it limits: here there is no *actual infinite*; but where, in the limit, the individual is all-embracing, the multiplicity must be infinite and thus non-resistant. Thus the isolated definition of 'man' does not determine how many men there will be in nature: it cannot even determine a single *individual* embodiment. The isolated concrete universal 'man', on the other hand, will determine *infinite* individual embodiments differing from each other within the range of subordinate variations admitted by the universal. But *within the system of nature* the concrete universal 'man' meets resistant material: man can only appear in nature where the conditions permit. And the matter resists because it is otherwise 'formed' with nature as a whole. It is in this sense that the concrete universal 'has power, in the context of the real world to which we refer it, to dictate the epoch, place and quantity of its individual embodiment'.¹ With the whole, there can be no resistant matter, for all forms within it are, in their way, and in *its* way also, expressions of it; and they are therefore infinite in number.

Thus the essence of the *actual infinite* is the dictation by the actual One of the unlimited character of the many, which thus become actual. A number greater than any assignable number cannot be actual unless its multiplicity is derived from a single formula.

Finally, these principles apply equally to Thought and to Extension. Each is actually both one and infinite. Their multiplicity is not adequately represented as involving their division (hence Royce's assertion that 'Spinoza expressly makes extended substance indivisible, so as to avoid making it a self-representative system'² entirely misses the point) but as involving hierarchical individuation.³ Further, as I shall show,⁴ the *infinita Attributa* are also dictated by *unica Substantia* which thus characteristically expresses its essence in infinite different, but equally adequate, ways, and thus constitutes itself as an *actual infinitude* of Attributes each of which expresses the nature of the whole by a character which in itself focuses the total being of all the rest. Thought as it is for us 'objectifies' Extension; Extension 'embodies' Thought. But Thought, and again Extension, as they are in Substance, focus but do not merely collect the being of all the other Attributes, and Substance is the ineffable unity of them all. In such a real *kette* an infinite multiplicity of *ketten* are timelessly actual, though it may involve subordinate temporal perspectives for the apprehension (or, again, for the extended being) of any of its finite members.

¹ Bosanquet, *Logic*, i, p. 227.

² *The World and the Individual*, i, p. 544, note 1.

³ Cf. *Eth. II, Lem. vii; V, xxxiii, Sch.*

⁴ In Chapter XI.

CHAPTER VII

QUALITY AND SYNTHESIS

I HAVE sought in the character of duration itself for the clue to the concrete nature of eternity. My method has been in that, and no other, sense empirical. We cannot rest content with the world of enduring facts, for it is the very duration of empirical existences which at once constitutes their being, and confirms their ultimate unreality. They are dissipated by time. This, indeed, is the source of that double valuation of duration which has sometimes been deplored as an imperfection in the philosophy of Spinoza, but which no true Spinozist will endeavour to reduce to unity. For the ambiguity arises from the double character of duration itself, as essentially successive, and therefore as the result of the co-operation of the two elements of externality and transformation of quality. Without the latter, duration will not move; it remains a neutral form within which passage must be arbitrarily imputed.

But the double character of duration and succession at once complicates our problem and renders it worthy of solution. The rejection of succession from the Real must now be more discriminating; we must not reject too much, or more than the principles involved may demand. The imperfection of duration may lie either in the element of externality, or in the qualitative element, or again in the way in which these are integrated in succession. I have shown that the element of externality that is involved in duration though in itself no more vicious than that which belongs to Extension (which, rightly ordered and conceived, remains as an Attribute of the Real) is yet only durational at all in virtue of its union with, or derivation from, those transformations and limitations of quality which constitute the second essential element of duration and succession; and that these elements are not, therefore, metaphysically co-ordinate. It follows that while intellectual criticism excludes succession from the Real, it may yet retain, in a more appropriate and satisfactory form, both the element of qualitative transformation and also the element of externality. The qualitative transformation will then appear as

itself quality, and all quality as 'transformation without succession'. The externality, again, will appear as a perspective of concrete eternal Extension as it must express itself, not for a neutral observer, and not for Thought, but for a finite part of Extension, which is no mere section, which is by no means neutral, which is yet not total, but which responds to the whole in its measure, and in its measure constitutes the whole. The integrations of selective qualities and transformations with the ranges of externality appropriate to their fragmentary character, constitute the world of enduring facts. This is a perspective of the whole as it appears for a real part which only in part reproduces the whole, and which, therefore, in part is for itself 'imaginatively' reproduced by the whole. Of necessity it imagines, but is not necessarily deluded.

Some attempt must be made in this chapter to illustrate the general principle thus suggested and which underlies both the Spinozistic conception of eternity, and also the alternate commendatory and depreciatory uses of the term 'duration' in the writings of Spinoza. That he more often uses the term depreciatingly is due to his great concern to distinguish the conceptions of eternity and duration, in view of their general confusion in contemporary philosophy and in popular thought in all ages. But the dual nature of duration corresponds exactly with that of Imagination, which, as I have already noticed, is at once the sole source of error, but is also capable of being true. 'Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity.'¹ 'Error does not lie solely in . . . Imagination, but in the fact that, while we . . . imagine, we do not know . . . the cause of the imagination.'² 'There are no ideas confused or inadequate, except in respect to a particular mind.'³ Not *partialitas*, but unrecognized *partialitas*, or *partialitas* masquerading as *totalitas*, is the source of error. No positive content is excluded from the Real, and whatever is truly positive in the world of empirical existence, must find a place in the eternal Real. 'There is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to be called false.'⁴ Nor is the connexion of duration and Imagination merely analogical, it is essential; for duration is the mode under which we

¹ 'Cognitio primi generis unica est falsitatis causa' (*Eth. II, xli*).

² 'Error in . . . sola imaginatione non consistit, sed in eo, quod dum . . . imaginamur . . . imaginationis causam ignoramus' (*Eth. II, xxxv, Sch.*).

³ 'Nullae [ideae] inadaequatae, nec confusae sunt; nisi quatenus ad singularem alicujus Mentem referuntur' (*Eth. II, xxxvi, Dem.*).

⁴ 'Nihil in ideis positivum est, propter quod falsae dicuntur' (*Eth. II, xxxiii*).

imagine empirical existences; and we imagine because we are only parts of nature in connexion with the whole, which thus, so far, remains opaque to us. We project the picture of ourselves as affected by the whole, and we call the picture 'nature', mistaking appearance for reality. But it is not all illusion, for our capacity so to project is itself founded upon our real nature and the nature of the whole. It is because we are modes of extended and thinking Substance that 'projicience' is possible; it is because we are parts of *Natura* that we have content to project; it is our *nisus* to wholeness that necessitates the supplementing of our finite eternal being by that which *is*, but which we *are not* (but are only, in Augustinian phrase, *towards*), and which could only be known adequately, and as it eternally is in the being of *Natura*, by the infinite whole. For us it is a sempiternally enduring nature, so immense and so awful that the tiny spark of being that belongs to this or that observer seems lost in the vast abyss of being which constitutes or informs Space-Time. Doubtless the awe that we feel as we vainly attempt to plumb the ghastly gulfs of sky, with their hanging monsters, their deep wells of nothingness,¹ is *bene fundatum*, but its true source is not the magnitude and persistence of its object: not that we are small and evanescent, and nature vast and sempiternal, but that we are so poor and empty and passive, and *Natura* so rich and full and active. For there is no time with which we can compare our brief moment, nor any space with which we can compare our handful of dust, that we do not so far, and at least in a passive sense, ourselves possess. What we lack and *Natura* possesses is fullness of active content woven into that fabric of infinite intellectual love which is the stuff of the eternal Real.

That fabric is not hidden from us, it is ours in our measure; and in the measure in which it is beyond us, it is revealed to us *sub specie durationis*; and the sempiternal and infinite universe is a perspective of eternal *Natura naturata*, and hence a *phenomenon bene fundatum*. Our search for the true nature of the Real must

¹ Web Enorme,

Whose furthest hem and selva may extend
To where the roars and plashings of the flames
Of earth-invisible suns swell noisily,
And onwards into ghastly gulfs of sky,
Where hideous presences churn through the dark—
Monsters of magnitude without a shape,
Hanging amid deep wells of nothingness.

(T. Hardy, *The Dynasts*, After Scene.)

therefore begin from these bases, for it must begin from the given, and these alone are given: our own eternal being which is finite, and the sempiternal universe which is infinite. We know ourselves as eternal existences; we know the universe, including ourselves, as a complex of durational existences; and we must proceed from these together. If we permit ourselves to ignore our eternity, and regard ourselves solely as sections of the universe, finite in time and space, then we shall inevitably come to make of duration an absolute existence, when the very nature of duration cries aloud its relativity. And thus duration will become not merely a mode of imagining empirical existences, but time itself, the sole value of which lies in perfecting the illusory features of duration, will be taken as real, and eternity will become a mere dream. On the other hand, if we take our own eternal existence as our sole effective *datum*, then the universe itself, which gives its elements and sections their duration (and presently confounds its gift) becomes a dream, and an inexplicable dream. For it is thus not a dream which really endures, since *ex hypothesi* duration is itself a dream; it is a dream that we have dreamed of dreaming; and that again a dream that we have dreamed that we have dreamed of dreaming; *et sic ad infinitum*. Our ultimate view of the nature of the Real must, therefore, take due account both of our own eternal existence, and of the durational existence of empirical things; but it must proceed, not to interpret the Real in terms of the appearance, but to discover the reality that strives to manifest itself through the appearance. We must seek the total Real which is wholly eternal.

Duration, then, is a mode of imagining the existence of empirical things. It is not wholly illusory; in its positive features it is real, but these alone do not constitute it as duration. Increasingly it involves negation as we attempt to grasp and determine it. When we apply temporal measures to it we pulverize it. Time which is 'an aid to Imagination', in perfecting the 'imaginative' object, reduces it to absurdity. But Imagination stands in need of no such 'aid'; it is already by nature fragmentary and confused: it stands in need rather of the integrating activity of Intellect. By Intellect alone can the Real be known; 'for since there are many things which we can by no means grasp by Imagination, but only by Intellect, such as Substance, eternity, and others, if any one tries to explain such things by notions of this kind [viz.

measure, time, and number] which strictly speaking are aids to Imagination, he does nothing more than take pains to rave with his Imagination.¹ And it is because we assume, partly justifiably and partly not, that a real existence must bear some resemblance to that which we ascribe to the objects of sense-perception, and which we think that we understand until we try to explain it,² that we rebel against the conception of existence that we are asked to ascribe to the objects of Intellect, i.e. to real things. But the notion of existence which *prima facie* we derive from sense-perception, viz. the occupation of spatio-temporal position, is really negative; we learn nothing therefrom but that what is here-now is other than what was there-then. But the very slightest exercise of reasoning or thought leads us from the here-now to the there-then, and their difference is recognized as a difference in unity, and not a mere negation. Nor is their unity a mere association or aggregation or a purely quantitative relation (for Reason all the parts of space-time are alike), it is a unity of principle which with all its differences (and not only those given) constitutes a concrete universal determining events in space-time, but not itself an event of the same order. So, and only so, an enduring world is constituted, and not of event-blocks or located 'nows'. And perception itself, therefore, is only possible so far as its *prima facie* principles have been transcended, and mere exclusion overcome. Further, I must again recall the fact that it is the clear teaching of Spinoza that Imagination itself is not necessarily wholly false; when, and so far as, it is taken for what it really is, it is true; and I must add that without some transcendence of *partialitas* and fragmentariness, some real duration as distinct from the dust of time, there would be no perception, for there would be no content to perceive. No one has ever perceived an 'event', i.e. a point-instant, or even an event-block, or continuum of point-instants. What we perceive is something that endures as well as occupies a complex of point-instants.

This is not the place to attempt a serious analysis of perception,

¹ 'Nam cum multa sint, quae nequaquam imaginatione, sed solo intellectu assequi possumus, qualia sunt Substantia, Aeternitas, et alia; si quis talia ejusmodi Notionibus, quae duntaxat auxilia Imaginationis sunt, explicare conatur, nihilo plus agit, quam si det operam, ut sua imaginatione insaniat.' (*Ep. xii.*)

² 'Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio' (Augustine, *Confessiones*, XI, xiv). Though Augustine here speaks of time, the close relations of time and sense-perception render the reference significant.

but some of the features that are revealed by a casual analysis have an important bearing on my thesis, and may, therefore, be used to accentuate the discussion.

It is important to remember that a particular thing or quality is never perceived in isolation, but always in a concrete situation of which the observer's organism is a central and essential element. Perception is always of a whole situation, though the perceiver's attention may be unequally distributed over the situation. From such simple roots springs that vast jungle of epistemological disputation concerning idealism and realism which appears for many recent writers to constitute the main content of philosophy. I must not here sow seeds for further dispute, but I cannot very well proceed without stating as succinctly as possible the attitude of Spinoza to such questions. For though in the time of Spinoza the realistic and idealistic solutions of the problem of knowledge had not been elaborated *effuse et ad nauseam*, or even attentively and clearly, the problem itself was by no means hidden from him; and it was, perhaps, the simpler for the absence of two or three centuries of disputation, confusion, and sophistication.

Epistemological idealists, rightly impressed by the information derived from the study of physiology and psycho-physics, have asserted that the object as known is in some way affected or even constituted, wholly or in part, by the knower, primarily by his organism, but also and necessarily by his knowing mind, since his organism is itself a perceived object, falling under the same criticism as other bodies, and again, because sense-contents are not things capable of independent existence. Epistemological realists, on the other hand, impressed by the legitimate, nay essential, distinction between knowing a thing and creating it, have asserted that the knower does not, in his capacity as knower, affect the object.

Now Spinoza is able in the main to accept both of these assertions, because he recognizes that knowledge is an activity which is the very essence of the mind, and is not a transient causal relation at all. An idea is the *essentia objectiva* of a thing; there is no other commerce between ideas and things; and the mind is the *essentia objectiva* of the body. Thus ultimately the mind knows only the body, but by reason of the responsive organization of the body, in knowing this, it also knows other things, and in its measure it knows the whole. Knowledge is at once of the body, and also only of the body as affected by things. The transiency thus concerns the

relations of bodies with bodies, and again of ideas with ideas. There is no transiency as between bodies and ideas, or ideas and bodies.

Thus although we must distinguish clearly between *knowing* a thing and *being* that thing, it is as important not to forget that the *mental* being of an individual is its knowledge: for God, knowledge of himself; for finite modes, knowledge of themselves as reproductions of other things, and in their measure of the whole. Here being is knowledge, and knowledge is being. In sense-perception the external object is *known* only in so far as it is 'imaginatively' reproduced by the perceiver; and in adequate thought it is known *truly* only in so far as it is correctly reproduced. But the reproduction is not of qualities or things by minds, or of ideas or minds by things. The body reproduces extended nature in its degree as the pianoforte, *sotto voce*, reproduces the striking of the clock and other sounds to which it is resonant; and the mind reproduces the 'infinite idea of God' as the present work reproduces (in some measure, it is to be hoped) the thought of Spinoza.¹

What we know, therefore, is never an isolated and external thing. That we could never know, both because there are no such things, and also from the very nature of knowledge. We know that to which the body is resonant; and that is always a whole situation or world, owing its integration, in part at least, to the presence and inclusion of the observer's sense-organism. For that sense-organism is part of the total situation or world, and it is not the 'body' as we imagine it in sense-perception. For the 'body' of common knowledge is no more (and no less) the real body, than are external things the real things as they are for perfect knowledge. But though the perception of the body as a 'qualified' thing, possessing limbs and sense-organs and nervous system, is 'imaginative', the real body is, nevertheless, a genuine part of *Natura*, responding to the other parts constituting its environment and,

¹ Of course ultimately the analogy halts, because the body does not merely reproduce the universe, but it is the partial reproduction of *Natura extensa*; similarly the mind is the partial reproduction of *Natura cogitans*, and nothing more. This is, indeed, the ground of the more obvious failing of the analogies, in that though the mind and the body cannot do more than reproduce *Natura*, and in fact fall far short of that, the pianoforte may, by its independent structure, actually provide organization and content for the piecemeal sounds which it echoes; and the thought of an expositor may, and will, synthesize the ideas of the author (and even consciously or unconsciously add to them), for one man is never the mere echo of another.

in its measure, responding to the whole. In its reality it does not *become* the whole which it reproduces; nor does the mind in its reality (which is its partially active or adequate knowledge of the whole) become one with the whole which it knows. It truly or adequately knows the whole in so far as in its own structure and content it reproduces the whole (and, thus far only, as one of its real, though subordinate, elements, constitutes it).

As I have indicated, it is the nature of the infinite whole to reproduce itself in infinite degrees in its infinite parts; to be a real part is to reproduce the whole; to be an organism is to be in some degree resonant to the whole and to the parts of extended nature. There is nothing finite which is not in its degree organic in this sense: a molecule, an atom, an electron, a point of space, nay, even an historical date is, in its minimal measure, an organism. And when we turn to the mind, to knowledge, we find that the same principle must hold, but now amplified by the 'objective' character of ideas. For in knowledge there is a double interest: there is the interest in the constitution of thought itself as in some degree reproducing the *whole*; and there is the cognitive interest in the *reality* which is revealed by thought. And only in perfect thought can these two interests be completely united where there is knowledge of *the whole of reality*.

It is from the complex situation which I have described that there arises the peculiar liability of sense-perception to fall into error. The body is affected by things and it responds to them selectively. We know it, therefore, not completely, or as it is in itself, but only as it is affected by other things; and we know other things only in so far as the body can reproduce them.¹ Thus in sense-perception the object of knowledge is liable to confusion. Not that in perception we invent any positive content which does not belong to reality 'somewhere': it is confused in form, but all its positive elements are real, and truth is achieved by placing the elements in their right order, by removing them from 'the common order of nature', and arranging them in 'the intellectual order';

¹ Nor must it be thought that our knowledge is inadequate because we know things only in their relations with each other: for they only so exist, and to know them in isolation would not be to know them truly. But our perceptual knowledge is unsatisfactory because the relations are overlooked or wrongly interpreted. Rightly interpreted, all things do not merely merge into one without relation; but neither are they indefinitely plural and isolated from each other (and hence, once more, without relation).

nothing positive must be rejected. We perceive a whole of some kind, but we misread it. What belongs to the body in relation to things is taken as belonging to things out of relation to the body; what belongs to things in relation to the body, we take as belonging to the body out of relation to things. 'The untutored regard the green of a leaf as an attribute of the leaf. The physicist, however, knows that colour depends upon the light reflected from the leaf and calls the reflected light green. The physiologist knows that the leaf, which appears green when looked at directly may appear yellow or grey when its image falls upon the peripheral part of the retina. He is therefore inclined to regard the colour as an attribute of the eye itself. Finally, to the psychologist the green is neither an attribute of the leaf, nor of the light, nor of the eye, but a psychical phenomenon, a definite qualitative entity in consciousness. Colours therefore are visual qualities, and we are only justified in speaking of red or green objects, red or green rays and so on, in the broad sense that the objects or rays appear red or green respectively under the ordinary conditions of vision.'¹ The moral is clear: what the mind knows in sense-perception is always its body in effective relation with an environment to which it is resonant. The mere act of knowing does not affect the whole situation which is the real object of knowledge, but in sense-perception the body is an essential factor in that whole situation, and indeed very largely constitutes it by integrating its elements physiologically and neurologically. In Imagination we interpret our apprehension of the whole situation as if we knew an object distinct from the body and independent of it. We forget the 'mechanism' of perception. Epistemological idealism reminds us that there is a 'mechanism', but it does so misleadingly as if the mechanism were *mental* instead of *neuro-physical*. It is truer to say, as Spinoza does at the outset, that we know only the body, for we can know nothing that the fully organized body is not capable of integrating, *and thereby constituting*. But that which it integrates is itself the result of integration. The body which is the sole object of our knowledge is not the body as it appears for Imagination: it is a real part of the whole, responding in its degree to the whole. And its response is at once its reality, and also the ground of our knowledge of the Real.

¹ J. H. Parsons, *An Introduction to the Study of Colour Vision*, p. 22.

It remains to consider shortly some of the modes of integration exercised by the body in sense-perception. Normally and primarily we become aware in sense-perception of 'qualified' things; our perception of qualities is reflective and secondary. And perception is always of individual things; even our acquired perception of qualities is of individual qualities, and not of universals *per se*. We attend abstractingly to the quality and overlook the individualizing infinitude of circumstances. I have asserted that the main feature of perception is always, from the phenomenological point of view, integration of a differentiated whole: in the perception of 'qualified' things, it is the integration of qualities and relations within spatio-temporal contours; in the perception of qualities, it is integration in a sense yet to be determined.

The Integration of 'Qualified' Things

I have spoken of our perception of 'qualified' things as original and primary, as opposed to that of individual qualities which is secondary and acquired. This reverses the order in which Thomas Reid set forth the distinction between original and acquired perceptions.¹ 'When I perceive that this is the taste of cyder, that of brandy; that this is the smell of an apple, that of an orange; that this is the noise of thunder, that the ringing of bells; this the sound of a coach passing, that the voice of such a friend: these perceptions, and others of the same kind, are not original—they are acquired. But the perception which I have, by touch, of the hardness and softness of bodies, of their extension, figure, and motion, is not acquired—it is original.'² I need not stay to determine, or even to discuss, the suitability of these diverse statements; I shall even agree that Reid's expression is suitable in its place, and with appropriate qualification, for in any case the distinction remains. Reid admits that we immediately perceive the integrated thing; we do not on each occasion of an acquired perception begin with the particular qualities, and then actively and consciously integrate them; what is given in perception, whether original or acquired, is the integral thing, and reflection reveals the constituents. Further I shall agree that Reid is right in his assumption that in some sense the constituents are prior to their integration;

¹ These questions are again discussed, slightly but freshly, in Mr. Whitehead's little book on *Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect*, i.

² T. Reid, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind*, VI, xx.

we do not invent them. We directly perceive the apple, but we also perceive its roundness, hardness, greenness, smoothness, &c. This, indeed, becomes clearer in such examples as Reid himself cites: 'The shepherd knows every sheep of his flock, as we do our acquaintance, and can pick them out of another flock one by one. The butcher knows by sight the weight and quality of his beeves and sheep before they are killed. The farmer perceives by his eye, very nearly, the quantity of hay in a rick, or of corn in a heap. The sailor sees the burthen, the build, and the distance of a ship at sea, while she is a great way off. Every man accustomed to writing, distinguishes his acquaintance by their handwriting, as he does by their faces. And the painter distinguishes, in the works of his art, the style of all the great masters.'¹ In such instances the resultant perception is undoubtedly acquired in the course of experience, through custom, reflection, and sometimes by overt inference. But though the same may be true of all our perceptions of 'qualified' objects, except that we cannot recall the process, or the period, of acquiring them, yet it must also be recalled that experience itself can only give rise to such perceptions in so far as its objects are already in themselves integrated. I need not now speak of the more reflective of these 'acquired' perceptions, which are really the result of incipient mental construction or integration; attention must be concentrated upon the simple perception of 'qualified' things where, I shall contend, the integration is by no means reflective, but is itself, in some sense, given. The question, therefore, is, assuming that it is understood how the constituents are given, how is their integration also given? Further, is the given integration intrinsic to them, or is it superimposed upon them by some other thing?

In reply to the former of these questions, I shall assert that the integration of qualities and relations in the 'qualified' object of perception is an extension of, and is thus one with, the integration of the sense-organism of the perceiver. It is because all his sense-organs belong to a single body, that the percipient can perceive the apple as a single thing which is round, hard, smooth, green, sour, &c. I do not for the present assert that the body integrates these elements, but only that because the body is one, these elements can be perceived as belonging to one thing. This is very clearly the case with the visual object, which is normally single in spite of

¹ T. Reid, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind*, VI, xx.

the use of two eyes. But it is true more generally, since even a single sense-organ, such as the eye or ear, is plural in structure, is in fact a complex of minimal sense-organs. Each rod or cone of the retina (it may legitimately be supposed) does its own work in vision, and might be conceived as operating in the absence of all the others, if, that is, their absence made no lesion in its complete structure and connexions.

The further question as to the validity of the integration thus established does not arise because, as I have said, the integration of the perceived thing is an extension of that of the body. That is the significance of Spinoza's assertion that the mind knows only the body, or rather that it knows only the modifications of the body as they are produced by things acting upon it.¹ For the world of nature as we perceive it, or, let me say, the worlds of nature that we perceive from time to time (for they change from moment to moment, and differ from observer to observer), these are selections from the Real, and as selections, constructs. Because, and in so far as, we are real parts of the whole, reproducing it in our measure, our selective constructs are not mere illusions, but are, in their degree, *bene fundata*. But their wholeness is but an extension of our wholeness, and in so far as our wholeness is adequate, their integration is not imposed upon them but belongs to their reality. The nature that we know fails to be real, where it fails, because, and in so far as, we fail to reproduce the Real by reason of our *partialitas* and fragmentariness.²

The Integration of Qualities

For the purpose of the present discussion I shall overlook what has already been emphasized, viz. the concrete setting of the qualities we perceive, and shall concentrate my attention on the specific content of the quality. It is noteworthy that the main arguments

¹ 'Objectum ideae, humanam Mentem constituentis, est Corpus, sive certus Extensionis modus actu existens, et nihil aliud.' (*Eth. II, xiii.*) 'Mens humana ipsum humanum Corpus non cognoscit, nec ipsum existere scit, nisi per ideas affectionum, quibus Corpus afficitur.' (*Eth. II, xix.*)

² Any attempt to retain all the worlds of nature by describing them as *perspectives* of the whole from different point-instants is defeated by the complete unreality of each of the infinitely numerous momentary worlds. *An instantaneous world is unreal through the absence of duration.* The solution of this *impasse* by the use of the conception of the continuity of duration is rendered nugatory by the collapse of duration under intellectual criticism. *An enduring world is unreal through the presence of duration.*

used by Spinoza against the validity of our sense-experience are aimed, not at the secondary qualities, which through the influence of Descartes and English Empiricism we have come to regard as specially open to cavil, but at the primary qualities, implying as they do the division of the indivisible, the numerability of the non-numerable, the wholeness of the mere section. This may be due to his desire to go right to the root of the matter; and it may be that he failed to realize the suggestions and implications of his own theory of the affects, *acquiescentia*, and blessedness. But however that may be, this is precisely one of the points at which speculative amplification of the theory of Spinoza is specially apposite. I have taken the view that the general formula for quality, and therefore for Reality, is 'transformation without succession', non-transient activity, integration without loss of asymmetry. If that formula is in essence satisfactory it must be exemplified in the sense-qualities of things.¹

¹ I may anticipate the further discussion so far as to explain very shortly that the main problem which metaphysicians must meet is the dilemma that in the whole there can be no unrealized possibility, whereas unrealized possibilities are among the most obvious features of our immediate experience. In instantaneous extension, and even in space-time (unless time be taken as total, i. e. as non-temporal), not all things are compossible; thus it is that Imagination demands infinitely extended time in which impossible content may, without obstruction, distribute itself by means of dated succession. But as I have shown, Intellect will not rest content with time. As Reason it overrides duration, confining itself to *propria communia* and their relations, i. e. to existences perceived *sub quadam specie aeternitatis*. But *scientia intuitiva* which has for its object the eternal whole in its infinite singularity cannot thus avoid the difficulty. And it must meet it not as Imagination does, by dating and succession, but by transformation or creative synthesis. This method is exemplified by Spinoza, as also I have indicated, in the theory of the affects and of *acquiescentia* and blessedness or intellectual love. Thus, just as Imagination makes room for the impossible by transformation *in* succession (and thus generates durations appropriate to the various ranges of finite individuality together with their qualities which at each stage are known by 'intuition'), so, ultimately, *scientia intuitiva* must have its ideal expression in an infinite 'transformation' or creative synthesis *without* either relative or absolute succession. Each quality, in so far as it is the synthesis of finite elements within the Real, itself endures and provides content for further synthesis and a new quality. And so to infinity. Thus there are infinite grades of being each as the synthesis and consummation of a lower, and each being consummated and synthesized in a higher. The Real is the consummation of them all in an infinite 'transformation without succession'. In so saying I am viewing things from the finite end; to speak with metaphysical propriety I must say, not that the finite is transformed, transmuted, expanded, in the Real, but that the Real is deformed, degraded, and contracted in the finite. There is nothing positive in the finite that has not its place in the Real. Many have found difficulty in imagining how our triumph over limitation, our

It has commonly been supposed (and the theory is much older than Locke) that it is possible to believe that there is at one and the same time a sense-quality (e.g. red) in the mind, or in the head, or in the sense-organ (or somewhere other than in the 'red thing'), and also, in the external thing, certain minute movements, or primary qualities of its minute parts, corresponding to the colour. Thus the real quality of the thing is supposed to be compresent with the secondary quality which is caused by it, or symbolizes it, or represents it. No such idea can be sustained. While the observer is perceiving the colour he can only be thinking or imagining the 'real' quality of the thing; contrariwise, if he could perceive the latter he would at most be able to imagine or think of the colour. It is impossible to perceive both the red colour and also the movements of the minute parts of the thing at one and the same time, with one and the same organ. Nor is this merely a case of being unable to see the wood for the trees, or the trees for the wood (the trees and the wood being identical): the colour and the movements cannot be coherently conceived as compresent or conjunctive existences. Their relation both for perception and for science must be disjunctive and not conjunctive: *either green or vibrations of frequency 19×10^{-16}* ; never both at once for an observer unambiguously single. If we make the impossible supposition of a microscope with lenses of a 'celestial' crystal, ultimately non-granular or of much finer texture than ordinary glass, and eyes sensitive to a light that never was on sea or land (for none less occult would render the experiment coherently imaginable), we may suppose that by such means it might be possible to examine satisfaction in reunion or discovery, the thrill of sacrifice, the relief after the terror of imagined evil (and these and similar experiences seem for us too insistent wholly to lack reality or significance), can find a place in an unlimited, undivided, single, all-comprehending, Real. In the same way it might be supposed that a philosophical submicroscopical animalcule would wonder how the two-way motion of the vibrations of heat or of light could be conserved in the universe as a whole. We know they are conserved by consummation as quality (heat or light): so disunion and reunion, loss and gain, gift and theft, horror and relief, are real but subordinate *momenta* in the eternal all-transforming, all-conserving, Real. Of such, indeed, is the Real constituted, but not as their sum or difference; they are synthesized as ever-higher quality; they are transformed without loss, because without succession, and eternally. My contention is that an analogous function is at the foundation of all reality whether this appears *sub specie durationis* or is more adequately known as eternal. Our very sense-organism is mainly engaged in such synthesizing functions, and it is in virtue of this fact that the term 'intuition', which is applied by Spinoza to the highest kind of knowledge, is defensibly applied also to the processes of sense-perception.

a luminous or coloured object, and actually to observe the movements of its minute parts, setting up or ordering vibrations in the ether. But the object as thus seen would no longer appear to emit ordinary light or possess ordinary colour. It would be invisible to ordinary eyes (hence the supposition of a further 'celestial' light by which to see in our microscope). An hypothetical eye that could see electrons, atoms, and molecules oscillating in their orbits, could not see also the light and colour which is the result of the integration of these movements. On the other hand, no coloured thing is seen as possessing 'infinitesimal' motions; the brightest colour in spite of its origin is a steady content. But when I say that the relation of colour and motion is disjunctive for perception and for science, I must not be taken to assert that they are disjoined in existence. For it is because they are existentially (but hierarchically) conjoined, and are, indeed, one and the same contour of content variously integrated, that they must be disjoined for perception and for science.¹ If they were two separate things, a single observer might perceive them as compresent. Their real conjunction or 'identity' is the ground of their perceptive and scientific disjunction.²

The colour and the motions, then, if motions they are, are not two compresent entities, but one, now perceived by sense, and again imagined or scientifically thought. Science differentiates the sense-quality into motions. Sense integrates motions into qualities. I have supposed an impossible observation in the case of colour and light, but an admittedly inconclusive experiment, in some degree analogous, is not impossible with sound. The lower threshold of hearing varies from person to person, and certainly from species to species of animal, but for any one individual there is a region near the threshold within which it is difficult to determine the precise manner in which he becomes aware of recurrent aerial

¹ Thus, if the reader looks for an analogy, they are not identical in the sense that gold is the same as its small change, i.e. equal in value but different in material; or in the sense that the wood is the same as the trees, i.e. the same in value and in material; but perhaps as the syllogism with its unsyllogized 'premisses', i.e. identical neither in value nor in material, but solely in the fact that the one is the synthesis, integration, consummation (as distinct from the mere summation) of the other.

² In the same way we cannot be aware of the vibrations of the string and also the sound with the same sense organ (or part thereof). We may *see* the vibrations and *hear* the sound, and thus think of both as belonging at once and in the same sense to the string. But we can do so only because we are capable of two modes of perception of different sensitivity at the same time: the eye is more minutely sensitive than the ear.

vibrations: whether by affection of the body in general (as the pedal notes of an organ may shake the whole resonant building together with the listener's body), or by the sense of hearing operating through the specialized auditory 'mechanism'. If the frequency is gradually raised from below the threshold of hearing to a point a little above it, there is a gradual transformation of a tremor of kinaesthetic throbs into a continuous note which is auditory. It is almost as if at a selected intermediate point a deep note is heard, not with the ear in particular, but with the whole body in general, and that above that point, only the ear is sufficiently sensitive or sufficiently organized, to integrate the throbs into notes.¹ It is important perhaps to notice that what is integrated is not the aerial undulations but the kinaesthetic throbs, but just as those throbs are our perception of the motions of our sense-organism at large set up by the undulating medium, so our sense of sound is the *essentia objectiva* of a real integration of motions within the situation which is the total object of perception.²

The enduring world of perceptual nature or sensible fact, unmodified by science or reflection, constituted as it is of things possessing primary and secondary qualities, is thus itself made possible by synthesis or integration, by a movement from mere exclusion and otherness (which alone can constitute nothing, since the exclusion of nonentities is not exclusion at all) towards inclusion and identity. I have spoken of the integrations which constitute the being of secondary qualities, and again of the integrations which constitute the 'qualified' things of sense; integration, further, so clearly lies at the root of the primary qualities of perceived things

¹ My use of the term 'throb' may suggest that it is the 'beats' of discordant sounds that are felt, and that the real explanation is that with very low notes the threshold of audibility may occasionally happen to synchronize with the resolution of discords. I do not deny the possibility of this, but the phenomena to which I refer are different. I have, however, admitted, that they provide no more than a doubtful analogy or illustration, and thus I base nothing of importance upon either them or my interpretation of them.

² One of the most important functions of our sense-organs is often not merely to summate, but also to constellate selected happenings in the extra-organic world. This is, perhaps, the truth at the back of the subjectivistic contention that sense-qualities are *in the mind*: they are the result of constellation performed by the vigilant sense-organs, and they belong, therefore, not merely to the extra-organic thing, but to that in its relations with the sense-organ with which a relative whole is constituted. Here again, therefore, as Spinoza says, we perceive only our own body as acted upon by external things.

(in so far as they are concerned with their extension, number, and duration) that it has been possible to avoid an extended examination of its modes. Nor can we, in this connexion, differentiate between the primary and secondary qualities in respect of ultimate truth: those who would depreciate the secondary qualities and retain the primary must be reminded that the primary qualities as they appear merely for sense-perception are mainly unreal, since they imply that Extension is plural, finite, and divided; contrariwise, those who would on this basis depreciate the primary qualities and allow a large measure of truth to the secondary (and my own argument might well produce a bias in that direction) must be reminded that secondary qualities alone cannot constitute an empirical existence, and cannot therefore enjoy any advantages resulting from a prejudice in favour of 'facts'. Neither primary nor secondary qualities, nor the 'qualified' things of sense-perception, are, in the form in which they appear in mere experience, ultimately real; but neither are they in themselves ultimately and wholly unreal, for they endure. It is pure time and not duration that is wholly unreal; for time divides duration and does not itself endure. And it is not the positive content of the primary qualities which is false: that content does not divide, but expresses, the Real. What is false is the negation that is assumed in uncriticized perception. Every movement of thought must negate that negation. The geometer does not reject the finite determinations of space: in a very important sense these are his immediate subject-matter; but he puts them in their context as modes of space. For him the triangle is not simply three lines connecting three points, or even a finite space enclosed by such lines: the simplest theorem demands that the lines and their enclosed space shall be regarded as belonging to infinite space, or to space without limit. That is the plain and admitted significance of 'construction' which is always in some form essential to geometrical proof. The triangle must be regarded not as a *section* of space, but as an *expression* of space. The same is true of a line and of a point. The whole of space is in travail to bring forth a point, and therefore space is not composed of infinite points but is prior to them. All finite determinations of space, from the simplest to the most complex (and who shall say what is simple and what complex?) are the offspring of space, and issue eternally from her 'o'erteemed loins'.

The same principles must govern our estimate of the reality of

the secondary qualities: not what they posit but their rejections and exclusions are unreal. It is not the simple fact that we often wrongly arrange the colours and sounds and tastes of things, that the distant copse looks blue but is really green, that the fruit tastes sour but is really sweet, that the water feels cold but is really warm: we are familiar with such errors. Nor need I at this point discuss with any care the exact meaning of phrases such as 'the real colour of X', 'the real taste of Y', and so forth. For these qualities do not belong to X and Y *simpliciter*, but to these in appropriate relations with their media and an integrating and partly integral sense-organism. The precise ownership of the quality is not now in question, but its reality, and I must hold that the positive content of the quality, constituted as it is by integration of the partly integrated features of a contour of space-time,¹ is real in so far and only in so far, as it is whole. The degree in which it is whole has already been estimated: it belongs not to an external and independent thing, not to something wholly divorced from a sense-organism, but to a situation in which such an organism is an essential and active part. It is a monster begotten of partition, but still in its degree an expression of the unity of the eternal whole. Further, its monstrosity concerns not so much its content as its sectionalized distribution (and its content only as so modified). In a sense in which the real part is other than a mere section, it is real as an element in the whole; but its reality is not divided, though neither is it self-sufficing, it is a 'middle term' or a 'species intermediate between the One and the Infinite',² which Spinoza being perhaps, as I have already admitted, like the sophists of Plato's time, somewhat too quick in passing to unity or infinity, was thus prone to forget. But the same metaphysical principles that establish the reality of the whole and of the eternal part of man, unlike the epistemological principles which support the latter,³ must convince us of the reality of all positive content in the Real.

¹ Metaphysically, of course, it is constituted by the dispersion of eternal Extension for its real but finite eternal parts which thus operate as 'screens'. The dispersion is due to the *partialitas* of the part, and the duration of the constituted thing issues from the same source.

² *Philebus*, 16 E. (See above, pp. 45-6.)

³ The reality of the knower must be epistemologically prior to the reality of the known, and therefore the part which knows must be real with the whole which is known by the part. *Cogito ergo sum*.

Nor, as I have contended, does Spinoza wholly overlook these intermediaries: his doctrine of the *affectus* provides us with analogical ground for our further speculative account of the sense-qualities of empirical things, and indeed of all intermediate modes of unity. Without doubt there is in this region a serious and unexplained hiatus in the theory of Spinoza; for it is a genuine hiatus, and even in the *Appendix to Part I* of the *Ethics* and in the *Principia Cartesii*,¹ there is no more than the vaguest suggestion of a sceptical or Empiricist treatment of the secondary qualities. Just as with the primary qualities the argument concerns their limitations and divisions and not their positive character, so here again the argument concerns the distribution of the secondary qualities rather than their positive content.

The way is thus left open for us; and when the intellectual criticism of the world of perception carries us to a world which we essentially perceive *sub quadam specie aeternitatis*, we are only moving farther along the road that led to perception from impercipient. We may freely resign ourselves to an intellectual criticism which is not only accepted in our corrections of the details of perception (with which we are never wholly satisfied), but is also already at work in the constitution of perceptual things. Nor must the criticism be limited; if it applies to the details of perception it must apply also to its main principles and products: things are as they are correctly, coherently thought. And the existence enjoyed by the Real is to be interpreted not by the exclusion and otherness that more obviously characterize existence in the world of perception (but could never constitute even that), but by the inclusion and identity discovered by Intellect, and already enjoyed in their degree by the partial objects of perception, and the more fully enjoyed as inclusion and identity become more complete and intimate in the infinite existence which is eternity.

¹ Perhaps more strangely in view of Descartes's own discussions, which, as Reid pointed out, lie at the root of the sceptical tendencies of English Empiricism.

EXCURSUS VI
THE PLACE OF SENSE-QUALITIES AND
PERSPECTIVES

It may, perhaps, help to illuminate the argument of the last chapter, as well as some parts of Chapter V, if I insert a short discussion of the difficulties connected with the location of sense-qualities and perspectives. I shall at the same time be considering some of the main sources of crude popular subjectivism, and perhaps even of phenomenalism in its more responsible forms. Let me say at once that the questions: 'Where is the ellipticity of the inclined hoop?' 'Where is the colour of the rose?' are not fairly met by the reply: 'in the *mind*'; for unless to be 'in the mind' is not to exist at all, the question would still remain: 'where among all the other extended existents in the mind are the colour and the ellipticity?'

Take for example the red colour of the rose; where is it? It seems natural to suppose that the colour of the rose belongs to the rose itself, and I think that no answer would really satisfy us that did not in effect mean this. We call the red 'the colour of the rose' because we suppose that the rose has the colour. It seems to be *on* the rose; it is of exactly the same shape and size as the rose itself; there are no misfits in the luminous garb of nature. If we confine ourselves to visual perception, we cannot even conceive what a misfit would look like, for we only perceive the shapes of things by the contours of their colours. If we bring in the sense of touch we can certainly imagine a seeming misfit in which we *feel* the surface of a thing with a finger which we *see* as at a distance from the visual surface. In such a case we should not naturally imagine that the colour did not fit the thing, but that the thing was cased in glass, or that we were suffering from some defect of sight, or touch, or judgement. The colour fits the rose so snugly that we feel that it must belong to it. We cannot separate them; there are no roses without colour, and no colours without roses (or their substitutes). Still we must remember that a rose is not self-luminous: it does not glow in the dark; its colour disappears when all light is excluded from it. The colour disappears, but does it cease to exist? I speak, of course, of the colour itself; Thomas Reid distinguished between the *colour* as it is in the rose, and the *appearance* of colour as we see it. For him real colour is not coloured: it is only a certain superficial texture in the rose-petals. That distinction seems to me verbally unsuitable; and by 'colour' I understand what Reid called the 'appearance of colour', viz. the actual sense-content.

In this sense of the term it is evident that the rose is not independently red; it reflects red light, but it does not produce it. Thus in a dark room the rose has no colour, unless we say that it is black and thus indistinguishable among all the other black objects in the vicinity. If we so argue, we must equally assert that when we expose the flower to a blue or a green light, its new colour, the purple or the grey, is also in the rose. It fits it as snugly as the red with which it glowed in the garden, and there appears to be no argument for assigning the colour to the rose in the one case that is not equally valid for the other.

Now when we begin to inquire into the conditions of these changes in the colour of the rose, we are immediately led to the belief that there is some interaction between the colour as it is in the rose *simpliciter* (or *ceteris paribus*) and the illumination under which it becomes visible to us. We are apt to say that the *real* colour of the rose is red, even when its apparent colour is black or grey or purple. We say that the light which passes from the petals to our eyes is modified by the conditions present in the medium through which it passes (and, since the rose is not self-luminous, we must add, by the nature of the source of light, and the conditions present in the medium through which it passed in illuminating the rose). In fact that the colour we see, and call the *apparent* colour of the rose (as distinct from its *real* colour), belongs not so much to the rose, as to the light that is reflected from the petals under the special conditions of the particular act of perception. The flower is really red, but it appears to be purple or grey or black because the light reflected from its petals has been modified by its source, or by its medium, or by both.

The compromise is attractive but delusive, for the so-called 'real' colour of the rose also has its conditions: it belongs to the rose, not *simpliciter* but only *ceteris paribus*. It too is conditioned by its source of illumination and by its medium; without white light and transparency of medium, the rose would not appear to be red. But we normally regard these conditions as normal, and normally neglect them. In no case, therefore, does the colour belong to the rose considered as an independent thing, but only in a certain set of conditions; indeed, if we are to make any distinction at all, it belongs to the conditions, or some of them, rather than to the rose. We perceive the flower as red because, and only in so far as, the light reflected from its petals is red; and it is the light that is red rather than the rose. The most that we seem to be able to say of the rose as the owner of the colour, is that its petals possess a certain superficial structure through which they absorb all kinds of light-rays except those which are red, leaving these alone to be reflected. So that it is the light *rejected* by the rose which is said to be that which it *possesses*; that which it absorbs, and thus most truly possesses, remains occult. The real colour of the rose (if we may call

it 'colour' when it remains occult) is green, and of the grass, red; in the same way soot is white, and virgin snow is black. But the red-hot poker is 'really' red.

The colour that we call 'the colour of the rose' belongs, therefore, not to the rose, but to the light reflected from it. But what can we mean when we say that the colour belongs to the light? Where is the light? It is in the space outside of the rose; it travels through that space in all directions towards and away from the rose which reflects it. But *is* the colour in the space round the rose (as it must be if it is in the light)? It is not there in the way in which we thought of it as in the rose; for the red of the rose filled its contours, whereas the space round the rose is not a rose-red space, unless it is rendered partly opaque by vapour or dust (but even so it is not the space or the light in it that is red, but the particles of dust or vapour which become coloured things like the rose itself). Light is thus not coloured in the same sense as the rose appears to be coloured; light-rays are not visible in elevation, but at most in cross-section. It is, of course, open to any one to believe that every ray of light possesses colour at each of its infinite cross-sections, but there are some facts that make it more natural to suppose that the presence of an active retina with its appropriate 'mechanisms' and systems of nerves, at any given cross-section of a light-ray, is also an essential condition for the presence of colour. The fact that only cross-sections of light-rays seem to be coloured, is in itself a ground for suspicion; and the further fact that when a ray of light is deflected from the central regions of the retina to the periphery, its colour changes to grey or yellow, gives us reason to ask with some sceptical intent what may be its colour when the retina is altogether removed. Our scepticism becomes unmitigated when we recall that colour is not apparent only when light-rays impinge upon the retina, for other stimuli, both intra-organic and extra-organic may produce it when they are brought into effective relation with the retina or optic nerve. Chemical agents in the blood, a congestion in the capillary vessels of the optic nerve, a blow on the eyeball, a wound in the retina, these all may produce the appearance of colour, and therefore either produce the colour, or reveal its presence.

Thus it seems that the colour of the rose is not in the light reflected from its petals, but that this light is of such a nature (like certain other agents) as to produce colour, either where it impinges upon the retina, or at some other point in the optic nerve or its connexions. The colour of the rose is somewhere in the optical system of the percipient.

But in what way, in what sense, is it there? It is not there in the way in which we thought of it as in the rose. True, there may correspond to the physical rose, a small area on the retina which is red in the same manner as the rose. It may be seen there by the oculist peering in

through the pupil of the eye. But the perceiver himself does not see by peering in through his own pupils. He does not look *at* his retina at all; nor does he look *through* it and see the play of images thereon as a photographer looks through the ground glass at the back of his camera. He looks not at it, nor through it, but *from* it; and he sees, not the rosy spot on the retina, but the red rose (or thinks he sees it). For the rose itself is not a part of the retina, but is an object compresent with it; and the colour of the rose, if it is truly an attribute of the retina, as the argument seems to indicate, is only seen as in the rose by some sort of projection. The rose is *out there*; the colour is *in here*.

The retina is thus in no more favoured position, as the possible seat of the colour of the rose, than any other less exposed part of the visual organism. The argument has led us to the extraordinary theory that while the rose is outside of the head of its perceiver, the so-called 'colour of the rose' is inside of his head; and in perception, it would seem to follow, the mind, or some part of the nervous system, either performs the curious feat of transferring or projecting something from the inside of the skull to the distant rose, presumably through the eyes; or else it tints the figure of the rose as coloured spectacles tint the objects seen through them. Of the two alternatives the former is optically preferable since coloured spectacles only tint a world already otherwise illuminated: the tinting being not an addition of coloured light but rather a subtraction of certain constituents from the existing light. If something in the head supplies the colours of the world, that same something illuminates the world. We have been accustomed to regard with admiration, not unmixed with envy, the ability of the cat and other nocturnal animals to see in the dark; upon the present hypothesis no one has ever seen in anything else. Descartes suggested¹ that the eyes of the cat exercise some kind of 'action' through which objects become visible to them in the dark, whereas our eyes, not possessing this valuable property in the same degree, can only see through the operation of an 'action' proceeding from the object to them; the present hypothesis suggests that from the heretofore supposed darkness of the interior of the skull there issues all the light and colour of the universe. Common-sense will agree with all science and sound knowledge in refusing to believe that it so issues in the ordinary sense of the verb 'to issue', and hence we must disbelieve the suggestion that the colour of the rose is really in the head of the perceiver. Wherever else it may be, the colour is not in the head in the sense that it is the attribute of any existing thing within the skull. The inside of the cranium is wholly dark.

Must we then allow ourselves to believe that the colour which is neither in the rose, nor in the light-rays, nor on the retinal surface, nor in the skull, is nowhere at all? Or that it is 'in the mind' in the dis-

¹ Cf. *La Dioptrique, Discours I.*

paraging sense according to which real things such as rose, light, retina, and skull, are not in the mind? Is colour a delusive dream, and therefore precisely nowhere? If so, we must be prepared to lose all the sense-qualities of all things, as well as their precise apparent shapes and sizes and movements so far at the least as these differ from their real shapes and sizes and motions. Thus the main content of the world of perception will become a mere dream. For my own part I am unwilling to accept such a conclusion; I believe that colour has some reality: that it is not wholly and in every sense illusory. When I perceive the red rose, something has the colour red; I do not invent or create it in the act of perception. I cannot change the colour at will and without physical means. Blindness is not a defect of the faculty of imagination, but of the sense-organs. I conclude, therefore, that there has been some error in the inferences which have led us to our present *impasse*, and that it behoves us to review the argument in order to discover its latent flaw.

I argued that the colour is not in the rose, because the colour changes without any relevant change in the rose (e.g. with illumination): hence it must be in the light reflected from the rose. But I did not explore the alternative explanation that the colour is in *the rose as illuminated*, though neither in the rose *simpliciter*, nor in the light *simpliciter*. The same or an analogous omission characterized the argument at each stage of its disastrous career. The colour is not in the light, because it changes without any relevant change in the light (e.g. when it falls on a different region of the retina). But I did not explore the alternative explanation that the colour is in *the light as brought into effective relation with the retina*, and neither in the light *simpliciter*, nor in the retina *simpliciter*. Again, the colour was not in the retina, because colours are visible when the retina is not affected as it is in normal vision (e.g. when the optic nerve is intra-organically affected). But I did not explore the alternative possibility that it is in *the retina as appropriately connected with the optic nerve and its central ramifications*. And although, even if I had carefully examined all these further possibilities, they would undoubtedly have proved unsatisfactory taken distributively, may it not be the case that taken collectively, or rather systematically, they do give a satisfactory answer to the question: Where is the colour of the rose? Is it not the case that though the colour is not in the rose *simpliciter*, nor in the light *simpliciter*, nor in the rose as illuminated *simpliciter*, nor in the retina *simpliciter*, nor in the retina as affected by the light *simpliciter*, nor in the head *simpliciter*, and so on; that although it is in none of these simple or conditioned situations, yet it *is* in the total situation with all its conditions: that is, it is in the rose as illuminated and reflecting rays of light upon a retina which is in effective union with an optic nerve and central nervous system?

But it may be objected that such a statement by no means gives a *precise* answer to the original question, or if it does so in any degree it is only because of its accidental grammatical form, beginning with 'the rose' and then adding the conditions. But why should we not begin with 'the light', or 'the retina', and make the rose one of the conditions? *Where*, indeed, within the complex system is the colour; for colour seems to demand a definite place for its definite shape and magnitude. We cannot say that it is in all the elements of our complex system, that it fills the volume determined by the contours of rose, ether, retina, head, &c. Nor, as has been shown, can we say that it is in any one of them alone, or even in any one of them under the stated conditions. This last alternative is perhaps worth a further examination. I said at the outset that no answer which did not mean that the colour of the rose belongs to the rose itself would really satisfy us; supposing we say therefore that the colour belongs to the rose under the conditions stated. In spite of the sceptical treatment of this simple hypothesis it may be possible to discover in it a truth that will survive all our reasoning. After all, I said, the colour does fit the rose itself in a way in which it fits no other thing in the world. But in what way does it fit the rose? The flower itself is a solid thing possessing three spatial dimensions, and even its surface to which the colour seems to cling, though it may have no thickness (or so we may suppose) can only be defined in terms of three dimensions. But the colour itself certainly has only two dimensions as we perceive it; or, if it is held that we are capable of actually *seeing* depth or distance (as I myself believe), we can at least say that the contours of the colour that is visible from a given point are not identical with the real contours of the rose itself as a physical thing. We do not, for example, see the colour on the far side of the rose.

The fact is, of course, that the colour only fits the rose *in projection*; and that is so in spite of the fact that for each of its infinitely many projections there is a precisely fitting patch or mask of colour. The colour of the rose, therefore, fits not the total rose but one perspective of the flower at a time for each perceiver (i.e. from each *standpoint*, for 'perception' does not make or supply the colour). It does not seem possible to say that the colour of the rose is *all* the colour that fits *all* the perspectives, for that is an infinite multiplicity of shades and patches of colour of different sizes and shapes, neither overlapping each other, nor conterminous with each another, nor unambiguously excluding each other.

I shall say, therefore, that the colour of the rose belongs to the *perspective* of the rose from any one of infinite points of view, and not to the rose as a three-dimensional physical thing. It is the perspectives of the rose that the colour fits so snugly. We need not, indeed we must not, take the perspectives as independent existences occupying positions

in or around the rose; nor may we say that the colour is in this or that perspective *simpliciter*. There *are* no isolated perspectives. The colour of the rose is in the perspective of the rose on the occasion of the illumination of the rose by light which is reflected towards a functioning visual sense-organ situated at the place from which the perspective is determined. And the colour fills and qualifies, not this or that element of this system, nor the system as a whole, but that perspective of the rose.

Shall I ask, where are the perspectives of the rose? It is much easier to say where they are *from*, and what they are *of*, than *where* they are. Where is the ellipticity of the inclined circular hoop? Where is the apparent flatness of the sun's disk, the minuteness of the distant star? To say that they are 'in the mind' will serve us no better than with the colour of the rose. For they are not purely imaginary. There is a certain fitness in such appearances, and hence a certain reality which we must not deny. The circular hoop ought to appear elliptical when viewed from a position outside of its axis or plane; and it does. An immense star viewed from a very great distance ought to appear minute; and it does. The receding parallel lines ought to appear to converge; and they do. These are not, therefore, mere appearances as when a mouse looks like a bird, or a philosopher like a fool.

Thomas Reid who, realist as he counted himself, was ready, as I am not, to concede that the 'appearances of colour' are mental in character, explicitly denied that this is true also of their apparent figures and magnitudes. These, according to him, are real even though they do not reproduce the figure and magnitude of the physical things of which they are the appearances. But he makes no attempt, so far as I know, to state where these real apparent figures and magnitudes reside. And perhaps he was wise. They are two-dimensional projections of three-dimensional shapes, which they represent. The visible figure of a body is the position of its several parts with regard to the eye.¹ He declines even to tell us to what category these real existences belong; they are not mere ideas, nor even impressions of sense; nor presumably are they physical things on their own account. And though it is by means of them that we come to know the real shapes and magnitudes of physical things, yet we need not, and normally we do not, first examine them, and then infer the realities which they represent. In sense-perception we can *see* the inclined circular hoop as a circular object in spite of the ellipticity of its shape in projection, and in spite of the fact that nothing is *given* us in vision but the elliptical patch of colour (with, as I should say, the ambiguity due to binocular vision). We *can* do so, and normally we *do* so; we elide the process. From Reid, therefore, I derive some authority, but no direct help.

¹ *An Inquiry into the Human Mind, VI, viii.*

In recent philosophy these perspectives with their filling of quality have come to be called 'sense-objects', or more simply '*sensa*'. 'Whenever', says Professor Broad, 'I judge that something *appears* to me to have the quality *q* there must be an object with which I am acquainted which *really does have* the quality *q*. This object is the *sensum*.'¹ Effort has been expended in the attempt to determine the precise situation of our *sensa* in the real world. Mr. B. Russell once advanced the view that each *sensum* is a substance having a small duration, and that a physical object is composed of such atomic substances, being the class or sum-total of all the *sensa* that anybody could perceive (from any position and with any sort of organic body) as occupying a given contour. If that is so, then the colour of the rose is not merely in the perspectives of the flower, but is where these are, viz. in the rose itself. For Mr. Alexander, too, the perspective is a part of the physical thing; all perspectives are, he says, selected portions of the thing presented to sight. The real thing 'is the totality of its perspectives, which are contained in it. It is not,' he proceeds, '“the class of its perspectives” in the language of Mr. Russell, but it is that from which its perspectives are selected by the finite observer according to his position.'² Thus for Mr. Alexander, too, the colour of the rose is in the rose.

It is to Mr. Whitehead, however, that we must look for the most resolute attempt to resolve the difficulties connected with perspectives. His main point with regard to the situation of sense-qualities in general is that normally the question is not rightly put. To ask where is the colour of the rose, is to assume that colour must be the Aristotelian adjective of some subject; that if it is not this, it is nothing real. But, he says, the category of substance and accident, or subject and adjective, is not the only category under which real existence may fall, and sense-qualities are not related to their situations as physical objects are related to theirs: they do not unambiguously *occupy* them. The relation of an object to its so-called 'situation' depends on the nature of the object, and, as Mr. Whitehead expresses it, upon its mode of 'ingression' into nature. When we say that the rose is red, that the red is situated in the rose, we must not mean that the red *occupies* the rose as the rose occupies its situation; what we mean is that there is a relation between the rose, the red, the perceiver's situation, and the situations of various other things such as lights, mirrors, spectacles, &c. The relation of the red to the rose is not dyadic, but polyadic. Normally we think of it as dyadic because the other factors are relatively constant; it is the abnormal case that brings home to us the real complexity of the situation (e.g. the presence of a mirror, or of a magnifying or distorting glass).

¹ 'The External World', *Mind*, N.S. XXX, p. 388.

² *Space, Time, and Deity*, ii, p. 196.

I do not doubt that Mr. Whitehead here makes substantial progress towards a definition of the difficulty, but it seems to me that much remains to be done satisfactorily to clear up the matter. We must not, for example, speak as if the problem were peculiar to the perspectives, and might be explained by reference to indubitable separate things such as the physical rose, light, spectacles, mirrors, &c.; for the same problem recurs in connexion with every element in the natures of these things. Where, after all, and what, is the rose itself? Its position and nature is as ambiguous as that of the colour and the perspectives. We do not determine the position of the colour by saying that it is 'in the rose', unless we also determine the position and connexions and extent of the rose itself. That point was discussed in the course of Chapter V, where I indicated that the limits of any corporeal thing are relative to the special interest of the definition. Every body in some sense occupies all space, and draws upon all corporeal essence for its reality. And, in that sense, all things are perspectives of the whole, and are so without losing their individual reality. The rose is thus an extension of the perceiver's body, and that body is part of the realizing environment of the rose: it perfects it, integrates it, completes it. It does so without superseding it or absorbing it. The rose has no colour when its elements are unintegrated, nor is it a rose; and if its integration can result only from the compresence of a sense-organism (an assumption that it would be unwise to make), then, without an organism of this kind, it has no colour at all, but only the disintegrated elements of colour (vibrations, or whatever they may be). The rose is realized by integration, and only thus exists in the eternal Real. And the integration there must transcend colour, and rose, and the beauty in which we bathe. But in time it wavers in and out of being as the accidental conditions of temporal existence may determine; and the doctrine of perspectives only in a new manner implies the essential simultaneous unity and infinite multiplicity of all corporeal nature. There are not things *and* perspectives; but *Res extensa* with its infinite real parts, represented 'imaginatively' as sections of the whole, yet each co-extensive with the whole, and thus including the perspectives of all the others imagined as sections. And the qualities of these 'imaginative' sections are the integrations of more elementary 'imaginative' sections, down to the *corpora simplicissima*. But they are not mental or psychical, though they are 'subjective', or microcosmic, in the corporeal sense: that is, they arise from the corporeal *partialitas* of the perceiver, and would be there even if, *per impossibile*, the perceiver became unconscious while his sense-organism continued to function effectively as in normal perception.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MODES OF UNITY

IT is a commonplace of Spinoza-study that in the period between the composition of the *Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-being* (if indeed that work was directly composed by Spinoza himself) or of the *Cogitata Metaphysica*, and that of the *Ethics*, Spinoza's views about the relations of man and God developed and became increasingly coherent and concrete. In the *Short Treatise* an attempt is made to establish human immortality (*onsterfelykheid*) as possible through the union of the soul with God, whereby the decease of the body becomes a mere incident in the soul's unending life. 'The soul can become united either with the body of which it is the idea, or with God without whom it can neither be nor be conceived.' 'If once we get to know God, at least with a knowledge as clear as that with which we also know our body, then we must become united with him even more closely than we are with our body.' 'From this, then, it can easily be seen: (1) that if the soul is united with the body alone, and that body happens to perish, then it must perish also; for when it is deprived of the body, which is the foundation of its love, it must perish with it. But (2), if it becomes united with some other thing which is and remains unchangeable then, on the contrary, it also must remain unchangeable. For through what agency could it possibly perish?'¹ Here there

¹ 'De Ziele kan vereenigt worden, of met het lighaam van het welke zy de Idea is, of met God, zonder de welke zy nog bestaan nog verstaan kan worden' (*cap. xxiii*). 'Indien wy eens God komen te kennen, ten minsten met een zoo klaar een kennisse als daar wy ons lighaam mede kennen, dat wy als dan ook naauwer met hem als met ons lighaam moeten vereenigt worden, en als van het lighaam ontslagen zyn' (*cap. xix*). 'Waar uyt men dan ligtelyk kan zien 1. dat by aldien zy met het lighaam alleen vereenigt word, en dat lighaam komt te vergaan, zy als dan ook moet vergaan want het lighaam, zynde het fondament van haar liefde, ontbeereende, moet zy mede to niet gaan. Maar (ten 2^e) by aldien zy met een andere zaake die onveranderlyk is en blyft, vereenigt word, zoo zal zy in het tegendeel ook onveranderlyk moeten blyven. Want waar door zoude het als dan mogelyk zyn datze zouw konnen te niet gaan' (*cap. xxiii*). (*Korte Verhandeling, II*). Maimonides had spoken of the possession of true knowledge of God as conferring immortality and eternity on the human mind: 'Quarta species, vera Hominis est Perfectio, quando videlicet Homo veras consequitur Virtutes intellectuales, et ex illis veras scientias ac opiniones addiscit in rebus Divinis. Atque hic ultimus est finis Hominis, Hominem perfectione vera perfectum reddens, eique soli propria; per illam Homo dignus fit Aeternitate et Immortalitate; per illam Homo est Homo' (*Doct. Perplex., III, liv*).

appears to be no thought of the eternity of the soul in any sense distinct from its immortality;¹ nor is any such doctrine to be found in the *Cogitata Metaphysica* (1663) which is commonly regarded as only a year or two subsequent to the *Short Treatise*, and that in spite of the fact that the general doctrine of eternity is, as I have said,² fully developed in the earlier chapters. The human mind is still held to be immortal (*Deo volente*) because it is a substance; but it is not said to be eternal, since the eternity of creatures is expressly denied, even when their duration is limitless in both past and future.³ 'When we consider the structure of the human body we can conceive clearly that it is capable of being destroyed; but when we consider its substance we cannot conceive that to be destructible . . . Since it follows clearly, as I have already, if I am not mistaken, proved abundantly, that a substance cannot be destroyed either by itself or by any other created substance, we are compelled to conclude, from the laws of nature, that the mind is immortal.'⁴

¹ 'Immortality' in the literal sense of 'imperishability' belongs to an eternal thing as well as to a being existing through endless time, but my point here is that no distinction is made between these two senses of 'imperishability' with reference to the soul. That was a further step which Spinoza took before he wrote the *Cogitata Metaphysica*. But there, as I have indicated, real eternity is confined to God, and the finite soul is immortal in the lower sense. In the *Ethics* the finite soul also is eternal, at least in part. (Cf. also below, p. 307, note 1).

² The critical question as to how far the statements of the *Cogitata Metaphysica* on the immortality of the soul are to be taken as the genuine opinions of Spinoza, ought perhaps to receive a slight comment, though I am basing nothing of importance on them. The principle on which I have proceeded with respect to the use of this treatise (see Excursus II, pp. 64-71) is that in spite of the statements of the *Preface* to the *Principia Cartesii* of which it is the *Appendix*, it may be taken to amplify and particularize the teaching of the *Ethics*, *Epistolae*, &c., on any topic where formal agreement in the main outline can be independently established. Thus my conclusion with respect to the doctrines of time and of eternity was in the main affirmative; here, on the contrary, the evidence seems to point in the other direction: for though it is true that there is no such radical disharmony between the *Cogitata Metaphysica* and the *Ethics* as to rule out the possibility of a development from the position of the former to that of the latter, still it must be admitted that the relevant doctrine of the *Appendix* is Cartesian, and no positive evidence of such a development is forthcoming from any other source. On this subject it seems to me that the *Short Treatise* is more obviously a stage towards the *Ethics* than are the *Cogitata Metaphysica*. (Cf. also above, p. 143, note 1).

³ 'Hanc infinitam existentiam Aeternitatem voco, quae soli Deo tribuenda, non vero ulli rei creatae; non, inquam, quamvis earum duratio utroque careat finis' (*Cog. Met. II, i*).

⁴ 'Clare enim concipimus, ubi ad corporis humani fabricam attendimus, talem fabricam posse destrui; et non aequè, ubi ad substantiam corpoream attendimus, concipimus ipsam annihilari posse. . . . Cum autem ex [naturae legibus] clare sequatur substantiam, nec per se, nec per aliam substantiam creatam destrui

In *Part V* of the *Ethics*, however, Spinoza has at last reached his characteristic position, and the human mind is shown to be in part eternal as such, and in part an enduring, but perishing, existence. The thought has thus become both mature and coherent. Nor has it done so as the result of any recession from the original interest in the value and destiny of the *individual* mind, for already in the earlier *Parts* of the *Ethics* Spinoza had established the eternity of the immediate and mediate infinite modes which constitute *Natura naturata*. In *Part V* he takes what is clearly intended to be a further step, and asserts the eternity even of the *finite*¹ mode, such as the mind of 'this or that' individual man, as it stands in its appropriate place and order in the Real. I have already dealt with the principles involved in this doctrine so far as it relates to the nature and destiny of the human mind; in the present chapter I shall discuss them in a more generalized manner as applied to the nature of the eternal and infinite whole, constituted and expressed in its infinite parts; for, as I have argued (and it is, of course, no novelty), a whole which is not a whole of parts, a one which is not a one of many, is empty, and must therefore be unreal.

Every real existence, and I may add every empirical existence in so far as it is independent (and therefore real), must be a many-in-one. But unified plurality takes many forms: that of a mere collection, that of simple parts in a mechanism, of mechanisms in a machine or engine, of factors in a living cell, of cells in an organ, of cells and organs in a multicellular organism, of organisms in a contour of animate nature, of persons in a society, &c.; and to each belongs a special type of unity. My object here is to indicate in outline and speculatively the generalized relations of such diverse modes of wholeness, and the characters of their reciprocal parts; and to show how they may themselves be unified as essential characters of a single reality. Only thus can we decide which existences are eternal, and in what sense, and which are not. In carrying out this part of the inquiry I shall follow my selected method, and permit the argument not only to be urged forward in

posse, ut jam antehac, ni fallor, abunde demonstravimus, mentem esse immortalem statuere cogimur ex legibus naturae.' (*Cog. Met. II, xii.*) The Cartesian form of the argument is connected with the general purpose of the book.

¹ 'Finite', in a most obvious and important sense; yet, as I have indicated, also in a sense less obvious but not less important, an infinite and eternal mode. (See Excursus III, pp. 99-104.)

accordance with the main clues provided by Spinoza, but also by the logical and speculative demands of the developing subject-matter.

COLLECTIVE UNITY

The mode of unity which is most readily accepted (I do not say understood) by an uncritical intelligence is that which is exemplified by any simple collection of things: a bag of miscellaneous coins, a batch of pictures put up for sale, the membership of a philosophical congress. With this type of unity I need not for long detain the reader: the cashier who counts the money, the connoisseur who decorates his rooms with the pictures, and the speakers at the congress, soon become conscious of the imperfect character of the wholes constituted by this mode of unity. It is true that there have been philosophers who have attempted to construe the universe in such terms, but even these, when they have been thorough, because they have not been content with the miscellaneous character of their collective whole, have demanded in place of the well-knit unity of a complete system a unity running through the infinite plurality of existents. But they could find nothing but the empty unity of likeness in the ultimate parts: the infinite many, the ultimate granules of existence, are one because each is nothing in particular.¹ Many scientists have shown a disposition to move in the same direction. The search for an underlying reality or ultimate form of matter by a process of division and sub-division into particles, molecules, atoms, electrons, &c., and the consequent progressive elimination of quality at each stage, in the vain hope that in the end the world of nature might be resolved into grains which are alike in possessing no quality at all, or that minimum of quality which is quantity—this must result not in the explanation but in the dissipation of the Real. The principle *divide et impera* is of limited validity: men may be ruled by dividing them into factions, but if you divide them into limbs and organs there will be no men to rule. If the tyrant's wish that all his subjects had but one neck between them had been realized he might better have understood that even a tyrant has a certain dependence on his subjects or slaves. The pathway to the Real must lie in the direction of further integration and not further dissipation.

¹ For size and shape can hardly belong to the *ultimate* granules.

MECHANICAL UNITY

Among empirical existences we are familiar with collections of parts which co-operate to produce a single result or set of results. The cylinder, piston, connecting-rod, crank, and flywheel of an engine co-operate to produce the practically uniform rotation of the shaft. Evidently in such a whole of parts a higher type of unity is exemplified than in any mere collection: the attention of the designer and of the craftsman is concentrated on giving all the parts the exact size, conformation, and arrangement that are demanded if the required result is to be achieved. Nominally such a unity may be distinguished from the collective unity already touched upon by calling it a 'mechanical' unity; the real distinction lies in the nature of its members, their relations to one another, and to the mechanical whole. For here the differences in the elements are essential, and therefore cannot, as with a collective unity, be ignored;¹ each part is so designed as to take a special place in the assemblage of parts that constitutes the whole. These relations may, provisionally, be summed up in the formula: the parts are designed for the whole, and are thus in some measure intrinsically determined by the whole; and each part reciprocates directly or indirectly, and in some measure, with all the other parts, and is in that degree extrinsically determined by them.

Upon closer examination, however, such a description is seen to be more readily applicable to the *complex machines* or *engines* which come most readily to mind when the term 'mechanism' is used. But it must be remembered that every such complex arrangement is ultimately divisible into a narrow variety of *simple mechanisms* (e.g. the lever, the inclined plane or screw, cylinder and piston, &c.), and to these the description is less obviously suitable: for they are wholes the parts of which are not, as such, 'mechanisms' at all, but specially conformed masses of material. There is a simpler and more intimate degree of unity between the sections of a simple mechanism than among the parts of a complex machine.

Nevertheless it is universally recognized that the unity is emptier

¹ The statement is convenient, but not precisely accurate: in a collective whole, abstract characteristics are the basis of the collection, and the remainder, however important to the parts themselves, are ignored. In a mechanical whole the characters in the parts which reciprocate with the design of the whole are more concrete, and what can be ignored is relatively less important even to the parts themselves.

and poorer, so that those who regard the whole universe as 'simply a machine', are least willing to assert that it is 'a simple machine'. Mechanistic philosophers always place great emphasis upon the *complexity* of the system of nature, and under cover of this extraordinary, nay indefinite, complication, some difficult problems are allowed to remain concealed.

I turn, then, from the patently inadequate notion of the Real as a simple mechanism, to the common attempt to read it as a complex mechanism. Those who are familiar with such situations will, of course, recognize this transition from the simple towards mere complication as a sufficient indication that the notion of a mechanical unity must ultimately prove inadequate as applied to the total Real. For thus we enter upon the road towards the indefinite, which signifies the necessity to proceed to a new conception of unity, capable of including all the indefinite complexity thus adumbrated, but of doing so genuinely, i.e. indivisibly. Thus we proceed, not to the indefinite, but to the infinite, that is to the complete.

In order to explain and illustrate the immediate application of these familiar general principles, it will be well to examine with some care the special defects of mechanical unity, both simple and complex. I shall thus not only demonstrate the ultimate inadequacy of the conception, but also in some degree indicate its place and value *within* the Real.

The characteristic imperfections of all forms of mechanical unity are that they are not *self-contained* or *complete*, and that they are not *self-maintaining*: they are incapable of growth, self-repair, and reproduction.

Empirical mechanisms are not self-contained

Machines in general require guidance, adjustment, and repair by a mechanic who is not a machine: they do not manage themselves, or repair themselves, or they do so only incompletely. Where they are supplied with self-governing, self-repairing, and self-feeding mechanisms, these supplementary parts themselves stand in need of similar attention. This involves an infinite process which cannot be completed on the level of mere mechanism.

Further, every machine depends upon its environment for the supply of energy, which it can only store, transmit, or transform in various ways. It cannot create energy. In this defect it does not,

as I shall show, stand alone among empirical unities; but with this is associated a more proper defect which may be considered under the second heading.

Empirical mechanisms are not self-maintaining

Not only can a machine or engine not create energy, it cannot but dissipate it (though, of course, no energy is destroyed). In all mechanical transferences of energy there is always loss to the system by friction in one form or another. It might, perhaps, be supposed that, as this is merely a loss to the system and not ultimate destruction of energy, it is a defect peculiar to finite mechanisms, and that just as such mechanisms may be rendered more and more complete, automatic, self-repairing, self-feeding, and self-governing, so a complete machine, including in its own pattern all the elements and conditions which commonly operate from the outside, would dissipate no energy, but would retrieve the frictional loss in this or that part, putting the heat, &c., thus produced to essential work within the whole. A machine such as the solar system might be taken as a partial analogy: here, owing to its relative isolation, the loss by friction is proportionately less than with terrestrial machines, but it is not absent; it is an essential element in the operation of the mechanism.

But the defect of mechanism is not merely the loss of energy to the environment; it runs deeper. Even if it were possible by the completion of a process *in infinitum* to have a complete mechanism in which there is no actual loss of energy, there would still be what is an even more serious defect, viz. the loss of the *organization* of the energy so conserved (and it is, of course, through the organization alone that the energy is available for the production of mechanical effects). Thus, if the solar system is a pure mechanical whole, it must be running down, not merely in the sense that its motion is being retarded, but also in the sense that the heat-energy of the sun is being dissipated in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics. This is a law which is treated with very great respect by those who have been most prone to a belief in a purely mechanical universe,¹ as a law which no mechanical system can avoid. '*Mechanicalism*' can therefore be judged out of its own mouth. No mechanical system can be ultimately self-maintaining:

¹ See Excursus VII (pp. 216-18).

it must sooner or later run down unless it is a part or perspective of some wider system from which it derives energy in a suitable form. And so to infinity. Thus even if the available energy from every source within the system is included in the reckoning, the solar system in isolation is no more than a storehouse of energy which is in process of being transformed into an unavailable form; it is a mechanism that is slowly running down; it cannot maintain itself indefinitely. Its original energy, therefore, must have been derived from some other system associated with it, or some wider system of which it is a subordinate part. If the other or wider systems are always machines, then we must proceed to infinity before a satisfactory explanation of any single mechanical fact is forthcoming. If by 'infinity' is meant 'indefiniteness', all hope both of explanation and also of finding a self-maintaining mechanism must be resigned. If by 'infinity' is meant 'completeness' then there must be a complete system capable not only of storing, transmitting, and transforming energy, but also of creating it, or at least restoring it to organization and availability. Such a system can be no mere mechanical unity in the ordinary, unambiguous sense of the term; and, while admitting the validity of the conception of mechanical order as a subordinate principle *under* the Real, we must continue our pursuit after a more adequate conception of the unity which is directly characteristic of the Real.

ORGANIC UNITY

In searching for such a type of wholeness it is natural to look first of all to those empirical unities within our experience which are strikingly contrasted with artificial machines in their power of self-maintenance and relative completeness, viz. living *organisms*. Unfortunately the notion of organic unity has so often been used vaguely and rhetorically, or to conceal loose thinking, that the conception stands in real need of clarification and definition. Most things have at one time or another been described as 'organic', from the atom or electron up to society and the universe; and the term is now used by Mr. Whitehead in what seems to be a perfectly general sense covering many forms of unity which are not *prima facie* organic at all.¹ I shall use the term in a sense as close as

¹ 'The doctrine which I am maintaining is that the whole concept of materialism only applies to very abstract entities, the products of logical discernment. The concrete enduring entities are organisms, so that the plan of the *whole*

possible to its natural and primary significance as applied to empirical living beings.

Organic unities are characterized by self-maintenance in spite of changes of material and transformations of energy, by development or growth through gradual internal changes, and normally by the power to reproduce or give rise to new individuals of the same species. These characters are evidently dependent upon the existence of a certain relation of the parts in the organic being through which the whole is maintained, developed, and reproduced. The precise nature of these relations need not, at the moment, be determined, nor is it possible to do so until I have more carefully distinguished different forms of living and organic being. In particular I must distinguish between the processes of life, and organic form; and also between simple and complex organisms. It will be simpler to deal with the second of these distinctions first.

(a) A living being is either a single cell or it is a 'collection' of cells derived from a single cell by division without immediate separation. In the latter case there is a tendency towards a specialization of form and function among the constituent cells or groups of such cells, resulting, finally, with very complex organisms, in a distinction not only of cells but also of 'organs' within the organism. These organs become relatively independent, both physiologically and anatomically, though they remain generally subordinate to the requirements of the whole organism. This relative independence does not begin where anatomically separate organs are developed, but each constituent cell of every complex or multicellular organism has its degree of independence.

The *rationale* of this tendency to complex development is only

influences the very characters of the various subordinate organisms which enter into it. In the case of an animal, the mental states enter into the plan of the total organism and thus modify the plans of the successive subordinate organisms until the ultimate smallest organisms, such as electrons, are reached. Thus an electron within a living body is different from an electron outside it, by reason of the plan of the body' (pp. 115-16). 'Science . . . is becoming the study of organisms. Biology is the study of the larger organisms; whereas physics is the study of the smaller organisms. . . . The organisms of biology include as ingredients the smaller organisms of physics; but there is at present no evidence that the smaller of the physical organisms can be analysed into component organisms. It may be so. . . . It seems very unlikely that there should be any infinite regress in nature' (pp. 150-1). (A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*.)

revealed by an examination of the other distinction which I suggested, viz. that between living processes and organic forms.

(b) This is a distinction in a different sense from that between simple and complex organic form; for living processes are never actually discovered except as taking place in organic forms, simple or multiple. Living matter is always organic or cellular. But a distinction must be drawn between the metabolic processes which constitute life, i.e. the reciprocal streams of anabolic and katabolic processes which, by their immediate balance, give rise to irritability or capacity for response, and which, by the adjustment and organization of their differences give rise to growth, reproduction, or decay; between these on the one hand, and the special contours within which such processes operate, on the other. For this may be done without overlooking the fact that response, growth, reproduction, decay, are all functions of the form, rather than functions of the processes, though form and process cannot be separated.

This principle of the inseparability of the form and the process is of great importance, for it points immediately to the impossibility of assigning life to the universe at large except on the assumption of a suitable organic structure in the Real. For there is clearly some peculiar advantage connected with the cellular structure of the organism; it is no accident that vital processes always take place within the cell or cellular whole. There is nothing in the mere concurrence of reciprocal processes to give rise to any special conformation of the elements involved. Heating and cooling, for example, may concur in masses of water widely varying in contour and size without a tendency to special division or texture. The boiling of water in the kettle, and again in the locomotive, is equally in each case the result of the dual process of heating by fire and cooling at a slower speed by conduction, radiation, and convection. But metabolism is a self-maintaining set of processes only within a contour, viz. the cell: thus it adapts itself to the general conditions of physical existence; and this, indeed, is the earliest and most elementary form of the adaptation to environment which is the characteristic of all living matter, and which results in all the vast variety of living forms which constitute the world of animate nature. Proceeding from this primitive and general basis, there is a progressive adaptation of organic form to ever more and more particular features of physical nature, followed, far behind, by an adaptation of these to the requirements of the organic forms.

Now we know from observation that cellular adaptation is not merely general, the cell is not a mere bag of perfectly homogeneous living matter; but it has a definite structure, and it can, within limits, adapt itself to some of the less general features of physical existence. Protozoa, for example, can become differentiated in function, and even in external shape and activity (forming organs of movement, absorption, and excretion) to a relatively high degree while remaining unicellular; but, in general, the higher and more complex forms of adaptation demand a multiplicity of cells, and a high degree of specialization in the adapted organs. Speaking very generally it may be said that the highest organisms are the most complex, since thus only can the obvious defects of the simple organism be successfully remedied on the level of organic unity. Thus the multicellular human body is by no means a mere collection of cells resulting from an even process of fission, and all performing the same functions; on the contrary, there is the very greatest variety of cellular form and function, certain cells becoming so highly specialized as to be totally given up to particular activities, losing in many cases the capacity to produce cells of a less specialized kind, losing often all capacity for growth or renewal. But the functions for which they are adapted are now carried out with relatively great detail and precision.

Thus by an argument comparable with that employed in the valuation of mechanical unity I must contend that the development of organism towards complexity and special adaptation, that is towards efficiency in the struggle for existence, is an index to the insufficiency of organic unity as an ultimate character of the Real; the organism is essentially finite. The single cell, which cannot but be a better representative of organic unity than the complex organism or the species, is capable of growth and differentiation up to a limit; further progress demands division and multiplicity, qualified, it is true, by specialization among the resulting plurality, but the development is towards the indefinite and the partial, rather than towards unity, wholeness, infinity, completeness. Only so can the organism magnify its status in the Real; but not thus can it constitute a world *and also remain an organism*. A principle is evidently at work here which is analogous to that of the second law of thermo-dynamics in the sphere of mechanism: every organism is urged by its own inherent nature towards growth and adaptation to a range of environment; but that growth necessarily

implies division and multiplicity. But thus the parts of the complex organism assume a relative importance which is not possessed by the parts of the single cell; they achieve an increasing independence, so that the original balance is jeopardized, and the unity of the whole is weakened.¹ Thus the single cell presents a closer type of unity than the multicellular organism, and much closer than the species; and yet it cannot but lead on to these looser unities by the simple process of living its own life efficiently. There is thus a constant increase of disorganization (or 'organic entropy') due to the natural development of organic life, and it is thus that organicism, like mechanicalism, reveals its ultimate inadequacy as an account of the Real; it shows itself both in the relative poverty of the highly unified single cell, and the relative multiplicity of the highly varied and adapted multicellular organism.

SELF-REFLECTING UNITY

Nevertheless the search for a satisfactory type of unity from which to begin a metaphysical deduction has not been in vain. The organism is infinitely nearer to such a unity than is the mechanism, though still infinitely remote from it; for the organism is an *infinite* or *complete mechanism*, and ordinary mechanisms are but perspectives, 'filaments', or cross-sections of organism. In the same way I must assert that organisms are perspectives of a higher unity or infinite organism: not an indefinitely multiplex and specialized animal, but an *infinite*, i.e. *complete organism*. Now the special defect of the multicellular organism is its lack of wholeness. Not that this is totally lacking, for, as I have already said, the parts (i.e. single cells and organs) are specialized, i.e. they perform special functions for the benefit of the whole. But in so doing they are themselves curtailed and maimed.² Further, because the whole

¹ But not destroyed, since there is special adaptation in the parts for functions essential or beneficial to the whole.

² Compare the unsatisfactory and partial character of the craftsmen and soldiers in the Platonic republic: the perfection of the whole state demanding the imperfection of the majority of the citizens, not as citizens but as men. Thus the state, like the organism, is an imperfect unity, containing a large element of mere makeshift. It would be a profitable (even if inconclusive) inquiry from time to time to discover how much social and political friction is due to the incurable nature of the social organism as a finite, abstract expression of ultimate wholeness and unity; and how much to curable defects. For though there may be a best possible social order for any given set of conditions, there is no such thing as a perfect State; that is a contradiction in terms, as Solon is reported to have suggested.

is essentially finite, lives in a wider world, and has an environment, its parts, in becoming specialized, also become relatively isolated from the whole. For the elements of the environment with which they reciprocate are not capable of precise totality. The whole is divided, and the parts are thus but fragments; and these fragments are the respective stimuli of the specialized parts of the multicellular organism, which thus shares the fragmentary and divided character of its environment. Thus the part becomes at once both weak and isolated;¹ and the whole is, in the same measure, disintegrated.

Now a complete or infinite organism would not suffer from *these* special defects. For, as complete, it would have no external environment: it would be its own environment, if I may so speak. Thus each of its parts, responding to it, would remain in appropriate harmony with it as its partial reflection. But in responding to the whole, each part would be responding to all the other parts which, with it, constitute the whole, and thus each part would feel itself responsive to an external nature, and would thus image itself as an organism. As a mere part it would *be* an organism; but as a real part, reflecting the whole, it would be more.

A complete organism, therefore, is a unity of a new and higher type, in that, having no external environment, yet being infinite in content or essence, without limitation or negation, each part of it in its measure reflects the whole, so that the whole is reflected in infinite ways and degrees, and is, in some sense,² constituted by these infinite reflections of itself. This is the conception of a *self-reflecting unity*. The descent from it to organic unity is from infinity, as the descent from organic unity to mechanical unity is from infinity. In a self-reflecting unity the parts are not mere sections, for each is a reflection of the whole. In the multicellular organism, on the contrary, there is partial division, mitigated by that specialization of function which is the 'ghost' of wholeness. In the simple organism again, there are no separate sections, but each part permeates the whole: a fact which is illustrated even when the unity is breaking down into duality, for in fission each

¹ This combination of weakness and isolation, as it develops in social life, is the basis of our feeling of relative *independence*. In relation to society it is plausibly so described (since society is a dissipated unity), but in relation to *Natura*, weakness and isolation are not independence, but dependence of the most slavish kind.

² I have yet to indicate in *what* sense.

part takes its share of all the factors.¹ Analogous principles apply with respect to complex and simple mechanisms.

Again, just as the organism in every cross-section and 'filament' is a precise mechanism, so the self-reflecting unity is organic and purposive in every perspective, and in every subordinate part (though not in its sections or fragments). Purpose and duration are thus twin products of abstraction from the concrete unity and eternity of *Natura naturata* as a self-reflecting unity.

The whole cannot be a mechanism because it is self-maintaining and self-dependent; it cannot be an organism because it is self-complete and wholly active: it has no external environment by the demands of which it is limited, and to which it must adapt itself (thus introducing unharmonized multiplicity within its unity). But neither can it be a simple unity; that would be to fall back through organic unity, and mechanical unity, and the unity of the simple aggregation of atomic parts, to mere simplicity, that is to non-being. It must be a unity of parts, but one in which the parts, not merely in a formal sense but concretely and really, reflect the unity of the whole. The unity, therefore, must be a unity that reflects itself in the parts, and is in turn constituted by those parts taken as a whole.² This, indeed, follows from the absolute completeness of the whole; for the infinite parts of the infinite whole, *Natura naturata*, are the reflection of the whole in every possible degree. I must not say of each part that it is in every respect equal to the whole; for so the infinite parts would, in every respect, be indistinguishable, and the whole would be void of content, and hence nothing. The ultimate parts of the whole must reflect the independent unity of the whole in every possible degree. It is not that these ultimate parts must include unities of every grade: organisms, mechanisms, collections, &c., for some of these subordinate unities can only belong *eminenter* to the ultimate parts of *Natura*. *Formaliter*, the ultimate parts must all in their infinite degrees, 'from the highest down to the lowest',³ be individuals affected by co-ordinate individuals, determining other individuals

¹ i.e. of the cytoplasm, and of the various constituents of the nucleus: sap, linin, and chromatin.

² I need not again emphasize the crucial distinction between the 'part' and the 'section'. Only the instantaneous undivided whole can have no parts. An enduring whole may have temporal and enduring parts; and an eternal whole has parts which are at once eternal (as relative wholes) and (as parts) enduring.

³ *Eth. I, Appendix.*

of subordinate rank, and wholly dependent on their creator, *Natura naturans*.

CREATIVE UNITY

Such a conception of the constitution of *Natura* as a whole of individual parts, reflecting itself in infinite degrees, obviously raises some difficulties. In particular it raises the difficulty as to how a being so constituted can remain a genuine and intimate unity. That it must do so, has already been shown, for if *Natura* itself is dissected, so also *ex hypothesi* must all its real parts be dissected, and thus all unity would be lost, and we should be left with a mere dust of point-instants. Again and contrariwise, if all the parts equally and perfectly reflected the whole there would be but one part, and that the whole, and hence no part at all, nor any whole. *Natura* would be neither one nor many, but simply nothing.

This particular problem affords a convenient opportunity of turning from the abstract consideration of the various modes of unity to the precise application which they receive, or may be conceived as receiving, in the metaphysical system of Spinoza. The special problem of the unity of *Natura* as a whole is met by Spinoza by use of the distinction between *Natura naturata* and *Natura naturans*. The exact significance of his application of this classical distinction has not always been understood because it has been supposed that at some period after writing the *Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-being* and the *Cogitata Metaphysica*, and before preparing the final draft of the *Ethics*, he definitely put aside the notion of creation which had figured largely in those earlier works. As opposed to this view, I shall assert, however, that this distinction between the two aspects of *Natura*, the active and the passive, is his final solution of the problem of creation. It is also his solution of the problem as to how *Natura* can be a single whole composed of individuals which are at once real and finite. This is so because the distinction of *Natura naturans* and *Natura naturata* is not a mere distinction of reason, but a real distinction implying an eternal act. Substance as *Natura naturans*, in expressing itself in the complete modal system, or *Natura naturata*, in the same eternal act recreates itself with infinite degrees of perfection, and thereby creates the nature which it expresses, and which expresses it. *Natura naturans* and *Natura naturata* cannot be separated: it is not the teaching of Spinoza, as so many superficial students of his

philosophy have supposed, that Substance is real and the modes of Substance illusory. There is a real modal world standing in eternal relation with the genetic unity of Substance by which it is created and from which, therefore, it cannot be separated, and which constitutes the Real on its derivative side. It is amazing that these principles should have been so generally overlooked. Spinoza signifies his meaning clearly and vigorously in the closing paragraph of the *Appendix* to *Part I* of the *Ethics*: 'To those who ask why God did not so create all men that they should be governed only by Reason' (i.e. why each is not a perfect reproduction of God), 'I give no answer but this: because matter was not lacking to him for the *creation* of every degree of perfection from highest to lowest; or, more strictly, because the laws of his nature are so vast as to suffice for the production of everything conceivable by infinite Intellect'¹ (i.e. for the reproduction of himself).

The ultimately Real is thus an eternal *creative* or *self-producing* unity, and this explains how infinite *Natura naturata* can be an eternal self-reflecting unity of real but finite parts, and of parts, therefore, which in their degree share the freedom of the whole. For each finite part issues eternally from the undivided creative nature of Substance, and is thereby united to it by love.² Thus the infinite love which eternally unites *Natura naturata* with *Natura naturans* at once constitutes and expresses the infinite perfection of God. It is in this and in no trifling sense (*pace* Martineau and all who echo his gibe) that God is *causa sui*,³ for activity is the very essence of Reality (a doctrine which, in spite of commentators and popularizers, is absolutely essential to Spinozism, and was no invention of Leibniz in modern philosophy). And activity, further, is one with real existence as it follows from the essence of the

¹ 'Iis autem, qui quaerunt, cur Deus omnes homines non ita creavit, ut solo rationis ductu gubernarentur? nihil aliud respondeo, quam quia ei non deficit materia ad omnia, ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis gradum, creanda; vel magis proprie loquendo, quia ipsius naturae leges adeo amplae fuerunt, ut sufficerent ad omnia, quae ab aliquo infinito intellectu concipi possunt, producenda.'

² This relation is, indeed, foreshadowed, but not exemplified, even in the complex or multicellular organism in which all the cells are the result of the division of a single original. That is the source of the 'ghost' of wholeness that unites the parts and organs of such a being. But production by fission is not creation!

³ It is not for nothing that a new definition of a phrase, the vulgar interpretation of which had been derided by Spinoza in the *Short Treatise* and in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* (as Martineau himself points out), stands at the head of the earliest *Definitions* in the *Ethics*. Clearly, Spinoza's view was that the phrase as he defines it is by no means trifling or absurd.

existing thing; so that, as Spinoza says, 'essence in God is not different from existence, indeed the one cannot be conceived without the other'.¹ Creation, as the ultimate unity of creating and created, is thus the very essence of the Real, and is, therefore, one with eternity which is 'the very essence of God'.² Again it is one with 'the infinite love wherewith God loves himself', and hence with freedom and true blessedness. In all these, therefore, the finite parts of the infinite whole necessarily and in their degree participate: "The intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself;"³ 'the love of God towards men and the intellectual love of the mind towards God are one and the same'.⁴ Again, 'our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom consists . . . in the constant and eternal love towards God or in God's love towards men'.⁵

The general lines of exposition which I have traced are corroborated by the account which Spinoza gives of the creation of *Natura naturata*. He explains that it is mediated by the creation of the immediate infinite and eternal modes: *motus et quies* in the Attribute of Extension, and *intellectus absolute infinitus* in the Attribute of Thought. And, perhaps under Christian influences (though this is uncertain), these are described in the *Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-being* as 'Sons of God' 'created [immediately] by him from all eternity and remaining immutable to all eternity',⁶ expressions which are in effect pointedly, but

¹ 'Ad primam [questionem: an essentia distinguatur ab existentia] respondemus, quod essentia in Deo non distinguatur ab existentia; quandoquidem sine hac illa non potest concipi' (*Cog. Met. I, ii*).

² 'Aeternitas est ipsa Dei essentia, quatenus haec necessariam involvit existentiam' (*Eth. V, xxx, Dem.*).

³ 'Mentis erga Deum Amor intellectualis pars est infiniti amoris, quo Deus se ipsum amat' (*Eth. V, xxxvi*).

⁴ 'Amor Dei erga homines, et Mentis erga Deum Amor intellectualis unum, et idem' (*Eth. V, xxxvi, Cor.*).

⁵ 'Nostra salus, seu beatitudo, seu Libertas, consistit . . . in constanti, et aeterno erga Deum Amore, sive in Amore Dei erga homines' (*Eth. V, xxxvi, Sch.*).

⁶ 'Van alle eeuwigheid van hem geschapen, en in alle eeuwigheid blyvende onveranderlyk' (*Korte Verhand., I, ix*). It has been said that 'the expression "created from all eternity" amounts to a denial of "creation" in its usual sense' (Wolf, *Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-being*, p. 201). Undoubtedly it does so; but the correction which Spinoza makes (*Cog. Met. II, x*) applies not to the term 'creation' but to the phrase 'ab aeterno'. There is no contradiction in the phrase 'eternal creation' if the term 'eternal' is rightly interpreted. On the contrary, the phrase is pleonastic, for *eternity and creation are one and the same*.

curiously, corrected in the *Cogitata Metaphysica*: 'When we say that the Father had begotten the Son from eternity we only mean that the Father has *always* shared his eternity with the Son.'¹ The 'creation' which is accepted by Spinoza is thus not an action or set of actions initiated in time through which what was previously non-existent came into being. God is not the *causa transiens* of the world but its *causa immanens*, and creation is the infinite self-manifestation of a being whose essence it is to express himself. Creation is eternal. And the distinction in the Real between that which is created and that which is increate is the same as that within an 'expression' between the expression of the expressed, and the expressed expression. But though in general an 'expression' may be considered without reference to its being actually expressed, an eternal 'expression' cannot be conceived except as really existing, i.e. as 'expression' in both senses, so that the dilemma resolves itself as system. 'That thing is created whose essence is clearly conceived without any existence, and yet is conceived *per se*';² finite, enduring, created things can be thought of in abstraction from their existence, as mere essences, but the infinite and eternal creative unity cannot be so conceived: 'By that which is *causa sui* I mean that of which . . . the nature is only conceivable as existent.'³

Symbolic Deduction

Such being the relations existing within the creative unity of *Deus sive Natura*, let me next attempt to indicate symbolically the place and significance of the lower types of unity among the subordinate parts of *Natura*, and their relation to the eternal whole.

I begin from the constitution of *Natura naturata*. This must be represented as an infinite whole composed of infinitely many parts ranging from highest to lowest, each in its special degree reflecting the whole.

Let these parts be $P^1, P^2, P^3, \dots P^n, \dots P^\infty$.

¹ 'Cum itaque dicimus patrem filium ab aeterno genuisse, nihil aliud volumus, quam patrem suam aeternitatem filio semper communicasse' (*Cog. Met. II, x*). Cf. Augustine, *Confessiones*, XI, xiii: 'Hodiernus [dies] tuus aeternitas: ideo coaeternum genuisti, cui dixisti: ego hodie genui te. Omnia tempora tu fecisti et ante omnia tempora tu es, nec aliquo tempore non erat tempus.'

² 'Respondemus, id omne creatum esse, cujus essentia clare concipitur sine ulla existentia, et tamen per se concipitur.' (*Cog. Met. II, x*).

³ 'Per causam sui intelligo id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cujus natura non potest concipi, nisi existens.' (*Eth. I, Def. i*). This, of course, is the essence of the Ontological Proof as it is accepted by Spinoza.

No one of these will completely reflect¹ *Natura naturata*, but each will do so in some degree. They will vary, therefore, in activity from a maximum to a minimum, and hence in passivity from a minimum to a maximum. In other words, there will be not only reflection of the whole by each, but also that failure to reflect the whole which implies interaction or transiency as between the parts. The most perfect of these immediate parts of *Natura naturata* will suffer least from transiency; the least perfect will suffer it most. Thus each part will be constituted on a general plan which may thus be symbolized:

(1) P^n includes $P^n p^1, P^n p^2, P^n p^3, \dots P^n p^n, \dots P^n p^\infty$, where $P^n p^2$ is that part of P^n which is due to the immanency of P^2 in P^n .

This series represents the activity of P^n , or its adequate reflection of the whole.

But the passivity corresponding to the interaction of all the other parts of *Natura naturata* may also be symbolized; for these other parts are inadequately reflected in the imperfect nature of P^n . It is important to remember that the imperfection of any part is its *partialitas*, and is therefore essential to it, and mediately essential to the whole.

Thus: (2) P^n includes $P^n b^1, P^n b^2, P^n b^3, \dots P^n b^n, \dots P^n b^\infty$, where $P^n b^2$ is that part of P^n which is due to the transiency of P^2 on P^n .

This series represents the passivity of P^n , or its inadequate reflection of the whole.

Combining the two sets of parts we have:

$$P^n \equiv P^n(p^1, b^1), P^n(p^2, b^2), P^n(p^3, b^3), \dots P^n(p^n, b^n), \dots P^n(p^\infty, b^\infty).$$

Similar expressions may be used to symbolize the constitution of all the infinite immediate parts of *Natura naturata*.

I may notice here that if it were assumed that all the immediate parts of *Natura naturata* exactly reflected the whole, the single general expression for such parts would be:

$$P^n \equiv P^n P^1, P^n P^2, P^n P^3, \dots P^n P^n, \dots P^n P^\infty,$$

¹ The term 'reflect' is now used in preference to 'reproduce' (which has elsewhere been employed, and is in many ways a more suitable term, especially where transiency is involved), in order to avoid confusion between real production (i.e. expression or creation), and its mere reflection in finite existence.

which is the arrangement supposed by McTaggart under a system of 'determining correspondence'.¹ The objection to such a system is its tacit assumption that all the parts can equally reproduce or reflect the whole, and yet maintain their *partialitas*. Now Spinoza saw quite clearly that such an arrangement is impossible. If the whole is to have parts, those parts must be distinguishable. Their distinctness and their *partialitas* are one and the same. Further, the whole must have parts if it is to possess content, and thus be a whole.² His conclusion therefore is, as I have indicated, that there are infinite parts of all degrees of perfection 'from highest to lowest', each in its degree reflecting the whole, and each in proportion to its *partialitas* being subject to the transiency of all the other parts. From this arises, as I have contended, the distinction and confusion of eternity and duration.

According to the analysis set forth, each immediate part of *Natura naturata* is partly an adequate reflection of the whole through the immanency of the whole in the part, and partly an inadequate reflection of it. That inadequacy is the obverse of the transiency of the other parts in so far as they are not fully reflected, for the spirit of the whole urges to that full and infinite expression of which it must distributively deprive itself in order to maintain its fullness of content. Failing to achieve full expression in the part while maintaining its perfection in the whole, there is of necessity that pressing-in upon the part by all the other parts in so far as they have failed to find adequate expression in it. Thus the eternal *κένωσις* gives birth to time, and imperfection to transiency; and thus also for each part the whole is partly transparent and partly opaque; it is partly understood and partly imagined; it is partly eternal and partly durational, i.e. sempiternal. So the stability of the eternal whole is maintained, and its unity is expressed in, and constituted by, its infinite multiplicity.

I have argued that *Deus sive Natura* is an eternal creative unity; that *Natura naturata* conceived *per se* is a unity which, since each part in its measure reflects the whole but cannot wholly reproduce it, may be called, in that restricted sense, a self-reflecting unity.³

¹ Cf. McTaggart, *The Nature of Existence*, IV, xxiv.

² Nor is the necessity merely verbal, but real and constitutive.

³ The phrase is McTaggart's, and although he uses the conception too loosely, he explicitly recognizes the possibility of the restriction I have introduced (*Loc. cit.*, IV, xxxi, § 284).

In the primary parts of *Natura naturata* there is found an example of a lower type of unity which to some extent corresponds with that of a specially complete multiple organism. For here there is not self-production, and not self-reflection, but only the partial reflection in the single part of *Natura* of all its other parts; thus it possesses, as I have shown, something of the unity of mere aggregation.

The parts of P^n are the reflections within P^n of all the other immediate parts of *Natura naturata*. Here there is multiple reference beyond the part itself demanding an internal structure responsive to an environment. But even here the part is not solely constituted by what is other than itself; it is not a mere whole of partial reflections. For as the symbolic formulae indicate, one part at least of every such immediate part corresponds not with some other part but with itself. One part of P^1 is $P^1(p^1, b^1)$; one part of P^2 is $P^2(p^2, b^2)$; and so on. Within each mediate part of *Natura naturata* there is a reflection of the whole in its single integrity, though not in its absolute completeness. The characteristic of an organic whole, it would seem therefore, must be a set of parts, one at least of which reflects the whole, while the others reflect external things partly adequately and partly inadequately. The adequate reflection of external things will be their *propria communia*, and all else but imaginative or confused reflection.

The same principles apply in the analysis at each succeeding stage, with an increasing range of inadequate imaginative reflection and a decreasing (but never absent) range of adequate understanding. For though no part of *Natura* fully and clearly understands or reproduces the whole, yet each part that is genuine possesses a part which survives integration or intellectual criticism, as a real part of the whole.

In our typical analysis of an immediate part of *Natura naturata* into its parts (i.e. into the mediate parts of *Natura naturata*):

$$P^n \equiv P^n(p^1, b^1), P^n(p^2, b^2), P^n(p^3, b^3), \\ \dots P^n(p^n, b^n), \dots P^n(p^\infty, b^\infty),$$

the mediate part $P^n(p^n, b^n)$ reflects P^n as it is in the integrity of *Natura naturata*. It reflects it but does not wholly reproduce it. And each of its parts again contains one part that reflects it but does not wholly reproduce it, while all its other parts reflect the remaining parts that constitute it as a mediate whole.

Thus the parts of the part $P^n(p^n, b^n)$ will be:

$$[P^n(p^n, b^n)] [p^n(p^1, b^1), b^n(p^1, b^1)], \\ [P^n(p^n, b^n)] [p^n(p^2, b^2), b^n(p^2, b^2)], \dots \\ [P^n(p^n, b^n)] [p^n(p^n, b^n), b^n(p^n, b^n)], \\ \dots [P^n(p^n, b^n)] [p^n(p^\infty, b^\infty), b^n(p^\infty, b^\infty)],$$

of which the part $[P^n(p^n, b^n)] [p^n(p^n, b^n), b^n(p^n, b^n)]$ is the reflection in itself of $P^n(p^n, b^n)$. It is a stage further removed from concreteness, but it is not confused by transiency. It is not complete but it is real in its place in *Natura naturata*. *Formaliter* it survives integration; *objectivè* it survives intellectual criticism.

It follows from this analysis that all the immediate parts of *Natura naturata* are 'organic' wholes *eminenter*, for they reflect, not merely themselves (and thus also the whole *per speculum in aenigmate*), but further, they reflect the other parts of the whole through transiency, i.e. confusedly. It does not follow, however, that all empirical, imperfect, formal organisms are immediate parts of the whole, though it is not impossible that certain of them are parts, either immediate or mediate. For all the parts of the immediate parts of the whole are wholes containing parts which reflect themselves and all the other parts within their series. And they do so even where they themselves are parts which as such find no place in the ultimate whole (though all their determinants find a place therein).¹ It will be thus that enduring existences follow from the necessity of the divine nature and yet are 'ortal' and mortal. They follow by necessity as mediate parts of *Natura*; as such they have duration: but in so far as they are parts which, in reflecting themselves, reflect no immediate part of the whole, they are not eternal but merely endure.² Though such mediate parts are within *Natura* they are not parts of *Natura* as a whole; they are parts of parts which are but sections of the whole, and which in the whole are resolved into their determinants. Those ultimate determinants are necessarily parts of *Natura* and are eternal, but they contain their infinite determinates not as sections but as reciprocating

¹ Clearly this applies to parts such as $P^n(p^m, b^m)$, and all the parts of P^n other than $P^n(p^n, b^n)$; to $[P^n(p^n, b^n)] [p^n(p^m, b^m), b^n(p^m, b^m)]$; and to all their subordinate parts, *ad infinitum*.

² Nor, however long their duration may be, are they sempiternal. For sempiternity belongs to *Natura* as the whole to which all parts, both mediate and immediate, belong, and to homologous wholes. To their parts these cannot but appear as sempiternal. In and for itself *Natura* is eternal; its sempiternity is a *phenomenon bene fundatum*.

parts: that is, they contain them each and all not *formaliter* but *eminenter*. Each mediate determinate or part of a part reiterates the rhythm of the whole *sub specie durationis*, which thus becomes 'a moving picture of eternity'. Doomed to duration, suspended between time and eternity, between non-being and being, it is as 'an instrument in the hand of the workman, which serves unwittingly, and by serving is consumed'.¹

The symbolic deduction need be carried no further; its utility depends solely upon its simplicity and clearness (as well as its special appeal to a certain type of mind); in itself it is not specially effective as a method of discovery, and in the steps so far taken it has perhaps more than served its purpose. To carry it further would thus be no more than an exhibition of agility in the use of complex symbolic expression. Mechanical unity, it may be supposed, would belong to various subordinate sections or complications of sections of the mediate parts of *Natura*, and their unity would be not intrinsic (and certainly not complete) but derived immediately from finite determinants,² and only mediately or remotely from the spirit of the whole.

The limit towards which the general analysis must asymptotically approximate is an infinite assemblage of point-instants wholly without quality (or even continuity) and therefore wholly without being. Such an assemblage can constitute nothing: it cannot even constitute Space-Time which has sometimes been made the starting-point of phenomenological development. That which *ex hypothesi* is without essence can have no existence and can be nothing. But all real stages of the analysis are 'qualified' (i.e. are integrated), and therefore in their own way they exist, though their existence may be, only or largely, duration. And it is their quality or unified diversity that exists, and not some primeval stuff, or formally unified multiplicity, to which the quality is superadded. Their ultimate stuff is the whole as creative eternity, and the quality of a finite thing indicates its *partialitas* within the whole. Quality does not 'emerge', it is reality; but the qualities of finite things are always a 'falling from' reality, a 'vanishing'. 'From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinitude of things in infinite ways, that is, everything which can fall within the sphere of infinite

¹ 'Non sunt nisi instrumentum in manu Artificis, quod inscium servit, et serviendo consumitur.' (*Ep. xix.*)

² Though not necessarily from *human* determination.

Intellect,'¹ for as I have shown the determinants of all things lie within the divine nature, though of their determinates some also lie within that nature as immediate parts of *Natura naturata*, while some are precipitated only by the dissolution that belongs to *partialitas*, and are therefore resolved by integration in the whole. And thus what for us are lurking flaws or 'warpings past the aim', for the whole are elements in that eternal 'strain o' the stuff' which is real activity, which is eternity, which is creation, which is love.

¹ 'Ex necessitate divinae naturae, infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent.' (*Eth. I, xvi.*)

EXCURSUS VII
THE SUPREMACY OF THE SECOND LAW OF
THERMO-DYNAMICS

'THE law that entropy always increases . . . holds, I think, the supreme position among the laws of Nature. If someone points out to you that your pet theory of the universe is in disagreement with Maxwell's equations—then so much the worse for Maxwell's equations. If it is found to be contradicted by observation—well, these experimentalists do bungle things sometimes. But if your theory is found to be against the second law of thermo-dynamics I can give you no hope; there is nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation.'¹ But there are theories of the universe which, though they do not *contradict* the law of the increase of entropy, are yet unable to accept the supremacy which is claimed for it in this passage. Mr. Eddington does not describe the appropriate attitude for a thinker whose less 'provincial' theory of the universe demands that applications of, and inferences from, this law shall be confined to its proper sphere, viz. the transactions of purely mechanical systems or series; or, more widely and more precisely, of all systems *qua* mechanical. Mr. Eddington might, perhaps, take refuge behind the title of his book, where he would often be safer; and doubtless scientists generally are excusably amused when an unwary philosopher suggests the possibility of suspending the operation of the second law of thermo-dynamics; and yet, though I hope I am not unwary, I venture to ask, what is it that the living bodies of the scientist and the philosopher, together with all other organic bodies down to the most primitive protozoa, are doing throughout the whole course of their lives, if it is not partly suspending that law by organizing energy within their contours (and even in their immediate environment)? Indeed, the same is true even of machines whether produced by living beings or not, where the disorganization of energy is never complete. The rate of increase of entropy, whether in a machine or in a living body is, after all, finite. Thus if we define entropy as the *disorganization* of energy, or 'the practical measure' of its disorganization,² life is, if not its organization *de novo*, at least its *re-organization*, or the *neutralization* of the tendency towards disorganization. In other words, if the law of the increase of entropy says nothing of its *rate*, it is, like other laws, only a law of *tendency*, and therefore it can be suspended or counteracted if the source of the tendency can be excluded, neutralized, or reduced.

¹ A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 74.

² *Loc. cit.*

Now if an organic body could be regarded as complete in itself, we should then have within its contours the suspension, i.e. the neutralization of the second law of thermo-dynamics; the condition is, of course, as I have asserted in the text, *essentially* impossible, so that the scientist may safely continue to smile, though perhaps more reflectively; for he will do well now to consider whether, when we take nature as a whole (if we do not prejudge the issue by regarding it as an exclusively serial mechanistic order), it does, after all, remain impossible to believe that the law of the increase of entropy may be suspended, i.e. whether it is applicable to *tota Natura*. The inescapability of the second law of thermo-dynamics is, I venture to suggest, only an alternative expression of the inadequacy of merely mechanistic concepts in the theory of the ultimate nature of the Real. For though we cannot by any organization of the parts of external nature make the whole universe live, or even, so far, make any of its subordinate parts live (except by the ordinary processes of organic generation), it does not follow that nature is a lifeless mechanism or mechanistic series; on the contrary, there is reason to believe that *Natura* alone is completely alive, and that its parts have their quasi-life only as partial reproductions of the living whole. In our operations on external nature, e.g. in an engine (and the conditions would not, in this connexion, be essentially different if we succeeded in making a living cell), we can at best 'throw two half-shuffled packs [of cards] into a hat and draw out one pack in its original order and one pack fully shuffled'.¹ The analogy, however, must be pursued a step further if it is to serve the present purpose: for we do not, even in the laboratory, make an engine which will do no more than shuffle half of our cards and leave the others precisely as they were. We get the second pack out of the hat *equally* shuffled, perhaps, but shuffled *differently*; we put in petrol (say) and get out rotation. Even with the lever, the inclined plane, the spring, we get a change of place, direction, time, respectively. So again, in the intra-organic operations of the living body, though we do not, even locally, *reverse* the law of increasing entropy, we do locally *neutralize* it in so far as our processes are efficient; and if we only neutralize, and do not completely suspend, the law, it is because we are finite, and thus entropy is increased in the course of our struggle against the forces of external nature. Thus we must not suppose that the universe as a whole either shuffles or unshuffles its cards: here the analogy breaks down, for *the order of nature is the order of the cards*. In other words the whole of nature is no mere organism maintaining itself against a partly obstructive environment. Organic unity, I have argued in the text, is but a perspective, only less inadequate than the mechanistic order, of the eternal unity of *Natura extensa*, which in-

¹ A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 71.

cludes, but transcends, these abstract, finite, imperfect modes of being. Our life indeed, our power of retarding the increase of entropy within our own contours, and even in our context, is an imperfect reproduction, within corporeal nature, of the eternal self-creation of the whole. It involves the irruption of no psychical or quasi-psychical entity within extended reality. When we regard *tota Natura extensa* abstractly, as a vast mechanical unity or series, we confine our attention to its mechanical attributes, and thus imagine it to be in process of running down, either continuously, or with incidental halts, but no re-windings. True, its supposed infinity of extent and power restrains our certainty; but it is only when its infinity is rightly interpreted as its concrete wholeness that we are able to understand that while there is increase of entropy in all colligations within the whole, yet wholeness (whether in *tota Natura* or in the *res singulares*) involves not summation but self-maintenance, which, in the limited form proper to us as organisms trading with time, having commerce with circumstance, and sharing in our own evolution,¹ is life, but which must take ever more and more potent form in the ascending hierarchy of the worlds, and in the Real is eternal creation.

¹ J. A. Thomson, *System of Animate Nature*, p. 456.

PART III

PHENOMENOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS



PREFACE

PHENOMENOLOGY

THE fundamental ambiguity of the term 'phenomenology' in recent times, as well as the important variations in its meaning in earlier philosophy, impel me to offer a brief explanation and comment to guide the reader towards a correct understanding of the use which I have made of it in the following chapters and throughout the book.

I need hardly say that in employing it I have had no thought of the 'Pure Phenomenology' which, in Germany at least, is associated with the name of Dr. Edmund Husserl. In this country, so far as I know, the older sense or senses of the term have not yet become obsolete or even antiquated, though the researches of Dr. Husserl and his school have been by no means uninfluential. The phenomenology of which I speak in this essay is thus not the fundamental critical science of 'pure consciousness' or 'essences', which for Dr. Husserl takes precedence even of metaphysics, the science of real being, but, on the contrary, my persistent, and, indeed, obvious, intention throughout is to show that all phenomenology is subject to more ultimate metaphysical criticism. In my use of the term, 'phenomenology' is the study or theory of 'phenomena'; not phenomena 'reduced' to essences, but as finite, temporal appearances or expressions of the eternal, undivided Real. The distinction thus emphasized is, I think, not remote from that drawn by the Greeks between τὸ φαινόμενον and τὰ ὄντα, especially if that distinction is rightly interpreted as a distinction *within* the Real, so that the phenomena do not constitute an order of existences radically different and separate from real things. Such a division and isolation of *noûmena* or things-in-themselves from phenomena was emphasized in modern times by Kant, and is generally recognized as one of the weak points of his Critical Philosophy. There is not the slightest trace of this in the writings of Spinoza; indeed, it is expressly excluded by the doctrine of *Eth. II, xxxiii*: 'Nihil in ideis positivum est, propter quod falsae dicuntur'; and certainly I should be the last to impute such a distinction to him. My view of the Spinozistic theory in this connexion must by this time be sufficiently clear: it implies that temporal

phenomena are the appropriate appearances of the eternal Real for finite individual parts of that Real. They are real appearances or expressions of the whole under the conditions of finite existence and experience; and, as so understood, they are not illusory or false, but are real perspectives of a whole which is no mere indefinite aggregate of such views, but their transcendent perfection.

Thus, in my view, phenomena are genuine, objective existences; but they are none the less not the ultimate Real which transcends, includes, and integrates them, but its appearances or finite expressions; or rather, phenomena are differentiations within the Real. Thus though I have used the term 'subjective'¹ in a sense which allows me to say that phenomena are 'subjective', yet if that term is to be understood (as it normally is) to mean that 'physical' phenomena are really mental 'projects', I should most strenuously deny the assertion. Corporeal phenomena are 'subjective' only as conditioned by, and conditioning, the *body* of the knower; mental phenomena are 'subjective' only as conditioned by, and conditioning, his *mind*; but this does not mean, in either case, that the phenomena are illusory, for the human body and mind are certainly real in some form or sense. The knower cannot doubt his own mental existence, nor, therefore, the existence of his 'body' or *ideatum*. Thus the source of phenomena is *partialitas*; and this again, as I have shown, has a place in the Real, flowing from its very nature as an actual infinite.

It follows that for the finite knower there will be knowledge of the phenomena of the Real, as well as knowledge of the Real which, in the measure of their perfection, appears in phenomena. Hence the distinction which I draw between phenomenology and metaphysics. This distinction is fundamental, in that metaphysics is the science of the eternal Real as it is in and to itself; while phenomenology is the science of the appearances of the Real in and to its own parts. If it is asked, how can the eternal Real as it is in and to itself also be known to its parts? I have answered, firstly, that such knowledge in complete fullness is not possible; secondly, that because the genuine part is also a partial whole, and thus eternal, it can possess *adequate* knowledge of the eternal being of the Whole: for thus the Whole is, so far adequately, expressed in the part. It follows also from the premisses that I have thus sketched, that both phenomenology and metaphysics are possible and valid

¹ Cf. p. 18, note 1.

sciences in their place. Nothing that I have said in this book implies that phenomenology is necessarily fallacious, or even unimportant. It is the form of philosophy which is natural to the special scientist, and so far as it is coherent, it forms an approximation to ultimate truth. Thus if mechanistic philosophy were put forward for what it is, viz. a phenomenology using the categories of mechanism, it would not be fallacious, for the Real is in some minor and abstract sense a mechanism. A 'conscious' mechanism if such were possible would 'know' the Real as a mechanical 'whole'. Even in living organisms mechanistic categories are not so much rejected as transcended and infinitely included. So, again, the biological interpretation of the world is not untrue if it is recognized as a phenomenology, for the world is, in a rather less abstract and minor sense, an organic 'whole'; and a conscious living organism as such would 'know' the Real as an organic 'whole'. The real objection to such philosophies arises only when they misapply their categories by attempting to explain the mechanism, or again the life, in the universe as if the universe were confined to these, when in fact they cry aloud their ultimate inadequacy. Such thin, abstract phenomenologies can give no complete account of the Real, as it is in and to itself, for they do not satisfy even the eternal intellect of man. If they are put forward as complete accounts, they will be found to explain the higher and more complete types of unity in terms of the lower and less complete, or they will ignore them altogether. What I condemn, therefore, is always phenomenology masquerading as metaphysics, and not phenomenology in itself.

Further, it is the contention of this essay that the ultimate quintessence of phenomenology is found in the attempt to read the universe as a process in time. As enduring beings we 'know' the Real as an enduring 'whole'. Thus when mechanism, 'chemism', vitalism, 'psychologism', have all been put aside, there remains as the ultimate refuge of unrecognized finitude the belief in the temporal character of the Real. This, as I say, is the very quintessence of phenomenality, for time is the efflux of eternal *κένωσις* or *partialitas* in the eternal Whole. Thus I have in general spoken of phenomenology as essentially distinguished from metaphysics by its insistence on the ultimate irreducibility of time: here again it is not that a theory of the Real as temporal is essentially false. For the partial and temporal percipient the Real

is in time. But what I have objected to is the assumption that such a theory is ultimately valid, and gives a clear view of the nature of the Real as it is in and to itself, i.e. as it is for adequate knowledge. For a real or complete 'knower' is essentially eternal, and ultimate problems are only resolved (so far as we *can* resolve them) when we take the point of view of the eternal, that is to say when we carry our intellectual criticism to its final issue in a metaphysical account of Being-as-such-and-for-itself. Metaphysics, as James said, means only an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly.

This account does not at all imply that metaphysics has for its object mere Being, or *ens absolute indeterminatum* in the sense in which that is one with non-being. Such a misunderstanding could result only from failure to realize the priority of Perfect Being and the derived character of temporal phenomena. The Real is without limitation only because it possesses all perfections: none of them are cut off. This is true both for each Attribute, and for the infinite whole of Attributes, which is Substance. Each Attribute is eternal, and hence its nature is perfect in its kind; and Substance includes all kinds. To be without limitation is not, therefore, to be indefinite: the actual infinite, as I have said, is unlimited without being indefinite. It is thus that Spinoza meets the difficulty of those who have been driven to defend a 'negative theology'. God has an actual infinitude of Attributes, each of which is an actual infinitude of modes. That is to say, all *perfections* belong to him, but no *limitations* of perfection (which is the root of the Ontological Proof). Finite perfections belong to him only in his subordinate constellations; infinite perfections in *Natura naturata* as it eternally flows from the creative urgency of *Natura naturans*. 'Negative theology' results from a failure to grasp the character of the actual infinite;¹ this again results in a failure to make the fundamental distinction between perfections and limitations of being. For perfection demands no limitation in itself, though finite perfections belong to limited beings in the hierarchy of the Real. But even a finite perfection is in relation to itself unlimited. Perfection in the whole thus limits its subordinate constellations, but the limitation of these does not necessarily result in perfection—a point which has been overlooked by those who have argued against Spinoza (as they thought) that '*negatio est determinatio*'. Perfection in the whole demands no limitation

¹ See Excursus V (pp. 160-3).

in the whole; and it is prior to limitation in the part. Hence, the absolutely perfect must be without limitation.

Thus it is not the case that *Natura* has an indefinite number of Attributes each of which is composed of an indefinite number of modes; nor has it a finite number of Attributes each composed of a finite number of modes. For *Natura* as a whole has none of the limitations of the modes, and none of the abstractness of the isolated Attributes. It possesses these in its ranges and in its grades which are infinite in number because they are completely derived from the One. Thus *Natura* is *ens perfectissimum et realissimum*, not *ens inanissimum et deficientissimum* (*sive non-ens*).

The term 'ens absolute indeterminatum', as is well known, does not appear in the formal definition of *Part I* of the *Ethics*, which uses 'ens absolute infinitum',¹ and the *Explanation* which follows emphasizes the all-inclusive perfection of Infinite Substance: 'Dico absolute infinitum, non autem in suo genere; quicquid enim in suo genere tantum infinitum est, infinita de eo attributa negare possumus; quod autem absolute infinitum est, ad ejus essentiam pertinet, quicquid essentiam exprimit, et negationem nullam involvit'. The phrase which has so often given offence is actually found in one of the letters to John Hudde, but in such a context as to leave no room for misunderstanding. It is always conjoined with the assertion of perfection in such a way as to point unmistakably to the sense in which 'indeterminatum' is to be construed: 'Dico ergo, quantum ad sextam attinet, si ponamus aliquid, quod in suo genere solummodo indeterminatum, et perfectum est, sua sufficientia existere, quod etiam existentia entis absolute indeterminati, *ac perfecti* concedenda erit; quod Ens ego Deum nuncupabo. Si ex. gr. statuere volumus, extensionem, aut cogitationem (quae quaelibet in suo genere, hoc est, in certo genere entis, perfectae esse queunt) sua sufficientia existere; etiam existentia Dei, *qui absolute perfectus est*, hoc est, entis absolute indeterminati erit concedenda. . . . Et quandoquidem Dei natura in certo entis genere non consistit; sed in Ente, quod absolute indeterminatum est, ejus etiam natura exigit id omne, quod *τὸ esse* perfecte exprimit; eo quod ejus natura alias determinata, et deficiens esset.'²

I may add that the often quoted assertion of *Ep. I*, that 'deter-

¹ *Eth. I, Def. vi.*

² *Ep. xxxvi.* (The italics are mine. On this whole question cf. L. Robinson *Kommentar zu Spinozas Ethik, Exkurs II*, pp. 239-48.)

minatio negatio est' refers directly and clearly to the limitation which characterizes a finite thing viewed as a subordinate 'individual' within some whole, and might have been so understood by numberless critics (who have indicated the Hegelian source of their 'knowledge' of Spinoza by the unanimity of their too emphatic misquotation of the dictum) if they had gone to its author direct. *Ep. xxxvi* is perfectly clear, and the formal *Definition* in the *Ethics* places the final seal on the positive and concrete significance of the real infinite in the theory of Spinoza.

All phenomenologies, then, are approximations to the ultimate truth; but only approximations. In themselves they are useful, or at worst innocuous, but they have a way of claiming to be ultimate. Their universal scope emphasizes this danger if we forget their thin and abstract character. Hence arises that 'spectacle des philosophies, "dont aucune n'apporte de certitude" et qui ne font que s'écrouler les unes sur les autres en clamant vers le ciel leurs absolus contradictoires'.¹ M. Benda has brought into prominence the 'treason' of the teachers of the modern world who fail to lay due emphasis upon the eternal, the 'transcendental', the ideal, a failure so abject that they even emphasize the claims of the temporal, the national, the 'real', in accordance with the passions of the masses and their worldly and national leaders. I have elsewhere in this book argued that M. Benda has placed an unbalanced emphasis upon the separation of the eternal values from temporal interests ('Mais si je crois mauvais que la religion du clerc possédât le monde laïque, je crois autrement redoutable qu'elle ne lui soit plus prêchée . . .'),² but if I might adapt his rhetorical phrase, I should say that it is the acceptance of phenomenology as the sufficient end of our intellectual nature that is 'la grande trahison'; and this is undoubtedly a leading characteristic of recent philosophical developments. Individual philosophers of great influence may have been guilty of 'la petite trahison' of elaborating a metaphysics which finds no genuine reality in phenomena, which thus stand side by side with the Real as an ultimate inexplicability. Bradley, with his incapacity to explain the appearance of 'finite centres' in the Absolute, and M. Benda with his emphasis on the need for preaching the eternal values and his simultaneous disbelief in their practicability—each in his way is an example of this more

¹ J. Benda, *La Trahison des Clercs*, p. 217.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 234.

pardonable fault. Much worse, indeed, is the philosopher or 'clerc' who looks for ultimate metaphysical satisfaction, and thinks that he has found it, in some phenomenological construction; for thus to substitute for the 'queen of the sciences' what can be no more than a subject science, to make the temporal efflux of *partialitas* the character of the eternal whole, is veritable 'haute trahison'.

CHAPTER IX

PHENOMENOLOGY AND TIME

TIME is the phenomenon of eternity; eternity the infinite existence that determines and comprehends all existence in time, and partly expresses itself in the duration of things. Eternity at once transcends and pervades its finite temporal expressions. All philosophers are, of course, agreed that it is necessary, in Mr. Alexander's often quoted phrase, to 'take Time seriously'; and this is a cardinal feature of the theory and method that I have defended in the preceding chapters. For, as I said at the outset, to take time seriously is not the same thing as uncritically to accept it as metaphysically ultimate: that is rather to trifle with it, or at least it can only be called serious in a derogatory sense. The only way genuinely to take time seriously is to be prepared if necessary to deal with it faithfully, accepting both its relative value and its absolute limitations as essential clues to the nature of the Real.

Substantial philosophical advance can undoubtedly be made without coming to grips with the problem of time, as several recent philosophers have proved, but it is a speculative adventure which presents some danger where the necessary limitations of the results are not clearly recognized. Philosophers who have been ready to detect the limitations of a scientific account of reality have not always recognized the operation of the same set of principles within the realm of philosophy itself. The shortcomings of scientific explanation arise from the initial assumptions of the sciences, and their necessary acceptance of principles and categories as ultimate uncriticized *data*, together with those *data* of experience which are to be subjected to criticism and construction. But philosophy itself in several of its branches is subject to similar limitation: in ethics, aesthetics, politics, &c., and most notably for our present purpose in general phenomenology, where a study is made, not of infinitely perfect being without limitation, but of being in passage and of the process of things. Here speculation is subject to limitation arising from an uncriticized *datum*, viz. time or duration, and the resulting conclusions are in that degree rendered opaque to thought, and hence fall short of metaphysical

adequacy. But this defect is often unrecognized precisely because the study of enduring things seems to approach more closely to the Real than any study of perfect being as such, and hence phenomenology, assumed to be the science of *real* being, is made to do duty for metaphysics, thought of as the study of *mere* being or *ens absolute indeterminatum*. This, however, is the very error which it is the concern of my whole discussion to expose: the existence of the eternal Real is real existence, more real than that which belongs to enduring things. Perfect being is not devoid of reality or genuine content because none of the limitations which the impotence of its finite parts involves belong to it; it is not a realm of pure essences conceived as a ghostly apparatus of thought-objects devoid of the solidity and reality of enduring being. It is this fatal misunderstanding that is the source of the fundamental defect of those contemporary phenomenologies that masquerade as 'empirical metaphysics'. This is indeed a 'prejudice in favour of facts'.

Thus when recent philosophers have permitted themselves to accept time at its face value, as a mere empirical fact, ultimate and inescapable, they have thereby (consciously or not) doomed their theories to metaphysical inadequacy. As phenomenology, in many cases, these philosophies may be excellent, but they are incapable of sustaining a claim to the title of metaphysics.¹

It was thus no accident or arbitrary emphasis that led Kant to concentrate his attention upon the temporal aspect of phenomena when dealing with the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding. Arbitrary it may have been from the standpoint of the Kantian theory itself with space and time as co-ordinate forms of sensuous intuition, but from the broader standpoint of philosophical construction it was in accordance with genuine insight, and it is noteworthy that, as his thought developed, Kant laid increasing emphasis upon the central importance of time in the critical account of phenomena.² Phenomena are essentially temporal; as

¹ The situation is not essentially changed by Mr. Whitehead's substitution of 'passage' or 'process' for time. Though 'passage' is prior to time it is still conceived as a 'moving on' or succession; and if the unwary are apt to read this as temporal (or spatio-temporal) it is because no alternative significance (e.g. eternal creativity) is provided by the author (for the term 'creative passage' does no more than emphasize the reality of the passing). Passage is, therefore, a mere *datum* the opacity of which to critical thought darkens the whole issue.

² Cf. Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, p. 242.

Professor Kemp Smith expresses it: 'Consciousness of time is the *factual* experience, as conditions of whose possibility the *a priori* factors are transcendently proved. In so far as they can be shown to be its indispensable conditions, its mere existence proves their reality. And such in effect is the ultimate character of Kant's proof of the objective validity of the categories.'¹ Kant himself, indeed, seems to have been ready to go even further and to assert that phenomena are formally, i.e. essentially, *constituted* by time; that at least seems to be the obscure significance of his very remarkable statement that 'as time is only the form of intuition, consequently of objects as phenomena, that which in objects corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects as things-in-themselves'.² Certainly for Kant the phenomenal world is (if not a world of time) essentially a temporal world the parts of which are ordered in accordance with the *schemata* or categories; and it is significant that when he comes to discuss the metaphysical presuppositions of morality, and in particular the senses in which man as a moral agent must be both autonomous and also subject to the heteronomy of nature, he finds that freedom belongs only to beings who are not mere parts of nature (and hence subject to the transient causality of the other parts, and thus to determination by impulse and inclination), but are also members of the noumenal kingdom of ends. He thus rightly emphasizes the double nature of the moral agent as a partial whole, i.e. as at once phenomenal and noumenal, so that the 'must' of nature and the 'would' of reason become the 'ought' of morality; but he fails to see what was, I think, clear to Spinoza, that these principles imply that the distinction of phenomena and noumena applies only to the parts and not to the whole, so that though there may be wholes of phenomena, there can be no phenomenon of the Whole; and that therefore every phenomenology must necessarily be inadequate when it is made to do duty for ultimate metaphysics. For the perfect whole, as such, must be free; it cannot be *subject* to the categories, which govern only the relations between its parts. The parts of nature endure and suffer violence; the whole is eternal and

¹ Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*, pp. 241-2.

² 'Da die Zeit nur die Form der Anschauung mithin der Gegenstände als Erscheinungen ist, so ist das, was an diesen der Empfindung entspricht, die transcendente Materie aller Gegenstände als Dinge an sich (die Sachheit, Realität)' (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Werke, Berlin, 1903, IV, p. 102).

free; and the parts themselves only endure in spite of the violence that they suffer because they are also partial wholes capable of limited self-maintenance. Thus for Kant metaphysics is much narrower in scope and importance than it is for Spinoza, and phenomenology the more central and all-embracing; and that metaphysics retained even the place that it did in the thought of Kant is a tribute rather to his faith and feeling for morality than to his speculative insight. Further, the scope of metaphysics is the wider for Spinoza because he finds that space or Extension is not a mere form of sensuous intuition but, *qua* eternal and hence infinitely creative, is a fundamental character of the Real. For the essential difficulty about the Kantian things-in-themselves, as has so often been said, is that we both know too much and also too little about them. We ought to know nothing at all of their content, but our ignorance is qualified by the revelations of our moral and aesthetic, not to say sensitive, experience. It is true that we assume all too naturally that though things-in-themselves are unextended they are characterized by some sort of thought (for moral beings are at once noûmena, members of the kingdom of ends, and rational beings), yet even this attribute ought, on the theory advanced, to be unknown. The suggestion of the passage already quoted, that the matter of things-in-themselves is 'sensation', or what corresponds to sensation in phenomenal objects, could fare no better. Thus the members of the intelligible world are the most unintelligible of all things, and the world of understanding the least understood. Nor is this merely *ignotus nobis*, it is *ignotus natura*, and no possible extension of our knowledge could be conceived as providing a genuine *éclaircissement*; for by no means can we even explain how reason is practical in human conduct; all that can be done is to show that it *is* practical, or rather that it is *not impossible* for it to be practical, that it *must* be, and hence that it *is*. But *how* reason is practical cannot be explained, primarily because noûmenal reason is different in nature both from phenomenal understanding, and from that unconscious sense of values that actuates phenomenal beings in appetite and desire; it therefore acts within the time-series inexplicably, and not, as with Spinoza, because it reveals the very essence of all genuine activity in whatever grade of existence it may be discovered, and of the reality that is enjoyed both by finite and by infinite things. For although Kant tells us, with the emphasis of italics, that 'the world of under-

standing contains the foundation of the world of sense, and consequently of its laws also',¹ the real emphasis remains on the other side, since though the *whole* temporal series of phenomena (whatever that may mean!) may be so determined, there seems to be no method whereby any *part* of the phenomenal world may freely determine itself in accordance with values or self-imposed laws. Thus the freedom of the human moral agent becomes a miracle because his phenomenal nature is alien to his noumenal nature, and can be governed by it neither by *force majeure* nor by invasion, but only by an impossible 'transcreation'. Further, 'the world of understanding' as the foundation of *phenomenal existences* is not identical with the 'kingdom of ends' or world of reason which is concerned with *noumenal values*, and hence there is required even for the determination of the whole world of nature a similar transcreation (though not now impossible in the same sense). This bifurcation of reality, therefore, destroys all possibility of making it through and through intelligible; and the source of the whole trouble is clearly a phenomenology incapable of resolution by further metaphysical analysis. For we are not presented with two reducible interpretations of a single reality, but two realities: one of temporal facts and the other of eternal values; and not only so, but also the necessity of relating them in such a way as to explain the nature of the moral person who mysteriously (and necessarily) belongs to both realms, and without radical bifurcation.

The solution is impossible so long as a divorce of fact and value is maintained. As Spinoza saw, and as Plato also had seen, to exist in any degree is in that degree to have value, for reality and perfection are one and the same. Thus not only is noumenal reason concerned with values, but so also is the phenomenal understanding as it constitutes the world of nature, and, as I have already suggested, even the inclination of the natural man as it is expressed in his appetites and desires already involves an unconscious 'judgement' of value. A thing is real, is free, embodies values, in proportion to its wholeness; and though only the absolute whole is wholly real and free and perfect, yet every real part of the infinite whole is itself a partial whole, and is to that degree real and free and

¹ 'Die Verstandeswelt den Grund der Sinnenwelt, mithin auch der Gesetze derselben enthalt' (*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, Werke, Berlin, 1903, IV, p. 453).

valuable. Hence there is no need for transcreation when a finite being acts in accordance with values; only so can it act. Every genuine action is an expression of real power, and therefore of a relative perfection, as passion or the failure to act is the expression of impotence and therefore of imperfection and relative unreality.

In man, therefore, there is truly a double nature, but not a bifurcated nature: this or that man is both a relative part of nature and also a relative whole within nature, and hence the moral struggle between the determination to be free, and the subjection to the power of external things. So also he endures as a part of nature and is eternal as a reflection of *Natura*. For phenomenology he is merely a being that endures and is subject to the determination of external causes, but for metaphysics he is also an eternal part of the eternal whole, and free in proportion to his wholeness.

The unfriendly and even parricidal character of phenomena is notorious: it arises, as I have indicated, from the uncritical acceptance of the ultimacy of time, and nothing is more common in recent philosophy than phenomenology thus masquerading as metaphysics, precisely because it is the character of our era, not perhaps to be too much impressed by the reality of time, but to be too little affected by its insufficiency. It has already been remarked how M. Bergson, after boldly advancing in the direction of a more adequate view, having put aside the spatialized version of time which is only appropriate to the metric sciences, and substituted a qualitative duration more suited to the biological and psychological sciences, failed to complete the work so happily begun, and which he was so well qualified to carry through, because apparently he feared that all reality might be lost if duration itself under intellectual criticism should collapse either in the direction of multiplicity or that of unity. Never was philosopher more entirely entangled in the web of time: creation itself was conceivable only as a creation in time, and therefore as a miracle. It would, of course, have been surprising if M. Bergson had not here and there approached to a more adequate view than that to which he ultimately settled down. The distinction which he draws, for example, between a conceptual eternity and an intuitive eternity, an eternity of death and an eternity of life,¹ only fails to release him, because

¹ 'Introduction à la Métaphysique' (*Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1903, pp. 23-5).

he thinks of duration as the norm and eternity as a mere ideal limit either on the side of the abstract unmoving unity in duration, or on that of the ideal concentration of all durations. Neither alternative alone can satisfy the moving spirit of the philosopher; for we are told that it is between the two limits of homogeneity, repetition and materiality on the one hand, and pure living eternity on the other, that 'intuition moves, and [that] this movement is the very essence of metaphysics'.¹ But why, I ask, should metaphysics be represented merely as the monkey running up and down the ladder between being and non-being, unless 'the living eternity' is still regarded as lacking content which must be collected from partly dispersed durations? It is phenomenology which is thus described, and the metaphysician finds, and must find, all that he requires, and in the form in which he requires it, in the intuitive eternity which, rightly understood, comprehends and supersedes all durations, and therefore does not itself endure. M. Bergson regards such an eternity as a mere ideal limit simply because he fails to recognize what is, I think, implicit, though unacknowledged, in his own theory, viz. that all finite durations are still successive in nature as well as 'intensive', and are only thus rightly called 'durations'; but the existence of a perfect and all-inclusive being is purely 'intensive' in the sense that it is without succession. Nor does it thus become empty or neutral: in its eternal being successive transformations have given place to 'transformation without succession', i.e. to quality in its absolute form, viz. eternity. To use analogies which are to be found here and there in M. Bergson's own discussions: just as light includes its vibrations, the quality being in fact their synthesis or integration; just as the song

¹ 'L'intuition de notre durée . . . nous met en contact avec toute une continuité de durées que nous devons essayer de suivre soit vers le bas, soit vers le haut: . . . dans les deux cas nous nous transcendons nous-mêmes. Dans le premier, nous marchons à une durée de plus en plus éparpillée, dont les palpitations plus rapides que les nôtres, divisant notre sensation simple, en diluent la qualité en quantité: à la limite serait le pur homogène, la pure *répétition* par laquelle nous définirons la matérialité. En marchant dans l'autre sens, nous allons à une durée qui se tend, se resserre, s'intensifie de plus en plus: à la limite serait l'éternité. Non plus l'éternité conceptuelle, qui est une éternité de mort, mais une éternité de vie. Éternité vivante et par conséquent mouvante encore, où notre durée à nous se retrouverait comme les vibrations dans la lumière, et qui serait la concrétion de toute durée comme la matérialité en est l'éparpillement. Entre ces deux limites extrêmes l'intuition se meut, et ce mouvement est la métaphysique même.' ('Introduction à la Métaphysique', *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1903, p. 25.)

includes its separate notes, and is indeed their melody; and as the duration of the light, or of the melody, is more self-permeating and 'intensive', and less successive and 'extensive', than that of the separate vibrations and notes respectively, so eternity is existence so 'intensively', so genuinely, synthesized as to eliminate all succession. Such an eternity is no mere ideal limit of self-inclusive duration: it comprehends all durations, and in so doing, duly subordinates them, as the musical phrase comprehends and organizes and duly subordinates its several parts, and thus crowns them with a supervenient value:

each survives for the melodist,
When eternity affirms the conception of an hour.

It is a truism that M. Bergson's whole philosophy is directed against the ultimacy of an intellectual conception of the Real, and thus labours under the peculiar disadvantage of being an intellectual presentation founded upon the denial of the validity of any intellectual account. It shares this defect with all other anti-intellectualistic theories. Wholly to escape self-contradiction such philosophers should remain dumb; but this is not so easy as it seems, nor do I deny that there is something to be said for their attempt to use the intellectual tools which, valid or invalid in an ultimate sense, are useful common property, if only as a *pis aller*. Science, M. Bergson tells us, 'cannot do otherwise'.¹ It then becomes possible, when the intellect has done its work as well as it can, to appeal directly from its results to the faculty of intuition. Thus the intellect will 'build the house', and intuition will 'put on the architecture'! In some such way the anti-intellectualistic philosopher is able to make the best of both worlds; he can begin by speaking of duration as a synthesis of successive elements, and then add the correction that there are really no successive elements, and hence no synthesis. Thus he may avoid both complete dumbness (or a trifling mysticism), and also the disadvantages of a devitalized conceptual atomism. But it seems to me that the acceptance of such a *pis aller* is really an implied acknowledgement that the true 'intellectual order' is not the atomism that is imagined by the anti-intellectualist. I need not revert more explicitly to

¹ 'La science moderne, comme la science antique, procède selon la méthode cinématographique. Elle ne peut faire autrement; toute science est assujettie à cette loi' (*L'Évolution Créatrice*, p. 356).

a subject already sufficiently discussed, but I will pass to the further and connected reflection that M. Bergson also, by an unbalanced emphasis on what is admittedly a genuine feature of duration, in effect misinterprets its total character. For it cannot seriously be doubted, as I shall shortly show, that the empirical durations of finite things not merely precede, accompany, succeed and overlap each other, but further that they are in themselves essentially successive as well as self-permeating. The empirical nature of an enduring thing is determined by such relations of succession and self-permeation. Thus though succession is not the whole story, it is an essential part of it that must not be overlooked or explained away; and it is only in so far as a duration is falsely imagined as either all-inclusive or else 'unique', that successiveness can be supposed to be eliminated from it without loss of positive reality. So far as the former alternative is concerned, I have shown that there can be no complete or all-inclusive duration (nor is such posited by M. Bergson); but the successiveness of duration cannot otherwise be denied without either implying that the durations of finite things are illusory, and duration itself 'unique' and successionless (I must not say 'one' or 'single' because it is non-numerable), or else by asserting that the distinct successionless durations of finite things are ultimately isolated from each other, so that the Real is atomistically and indefinitely multiple (if even that category is applicable). But neither hypothesis will either cohere with our experience, or explain the origin of its non-cohering elements, or of the intellectualistic 'fallacy' itself. All such attempts to resolve the riddles of finite duration without laying bare its source in the very nature of the eternal Real are but new instances of the sophist's fallacy of advancing too quickly from the Many to the One; thus the eternal whole is read as if it were an enduring part, and the enduring part as if it were the successionless whole.

Now M. Bergson was undoubtedly right in emphasizing the 'intensive', self-permeating, homogeneous character of the finite individual's real duration which is not fully determined as a mere section of an indefinitely extended, uniform time, characterized solely by succession and irreversibility. Such a time is necessarily the object of Imagination and not of Intuition: it is the inadequate image of the successionless eternity of the whole from the point of view of its parts. The 'duration' of the whole is

certainly not spatialized and successive, but self-permeating and 'intensive', for it is eternity. But it does not follow that for the finite individual also real duration is unambiguously successionless. In point of fact it is neither successionless, nor is it constituted by succession; it is an 'intermediate species'. And it is the ambiguity in the nature of the finite individual as a partial whole that is the real source of the ambiguity of his duration with its conjoined self-permeation and successiveness, its 'intensiveness' and 'extensiveness'. But to deny the self-permeation is to read the part as a mere section; and to deny the successiveness is to read the part as if it were the whole.

Thus, though it is true that we experience our duration as within the duration of nature, and as succeeding, accompanying, preceding, or overlapping the durations of other things and individuals; and these again as similarly related, on the one hand to us, and on the other hand to the durations of their qualities and elements; yet it is equally important to remember that, *taken concretely*, these durations are not homogeneous sections of a single, uniform, successive, irreversible duration, but are essentially heterogeneous, so that each individual thing lives and develops at its own rate; *it takes its own time*. The individual is not merely 'in' an extraneous time, but the two are somehow united. This has been emphasized, and rightly emphasized, by M. Bergson; but it does not, as he supposes, exclude the truth of the other aspect, and it only appears to do so because the real source of duration has not been laid bare. Time has been taken as a mere *datum*, and not subjected to criticism up to the ultimate point of being deduced from the nature and existence of the eternal Real. When this is done, it becomes clear that it is possible, indeed necessary, both to distinguish between the two aspects of the duration of finite things, and also to do justice to both.

At any level of observation the extended duration within which an individual occurs may be distinguished from the manner in which this duration is 'occupied' (or to speak more precisely, 'generated') by the individual. The former is condemned by M. Bergson as spatialized time which according to him is an illegitimate intellectualized derivative of the latter, which is real duration, reciprocating with the essence of the individual. Thus we can say, on the one hand, that the various grades of individual are phenomenologically constituted by time, since all quality may

be represented as the integration (as distinct from the summation) of elements which ultimately resolve themselves, under differentiation (as distinct from division), into pure time or non-being; and on the other hand, that metaphysically, the actual essence of the finite individual of any grade must be represented as appearing in the form of an enduring *conatus*, which thus constitutes the *real duration* of the individual (being his partial eternity as it is imagined *sub specie durationis* as a result of his uninterrupted awareness of *partialitas*). We can thus reconcile the homogeneity of durations with their heterogeneity as being the result of a double point of view, which is an essential feature of the Real, but which is concealed so long as duration is taken as a mere *datum*, and its origin and nature not elucidated. Viewed in itself as a genuine part of *Natura* each thing is a real *conatus* or active essence, which is not, as such, a *stretch* of time, though under analysis it breaks up into subordinate elements occupying such a stretch; and though also when it is regarded as a part of some more integrated whole, it is necessarily itself the occupant of a stretch of time within the imagined wider stretch of its enclosing whole.

Thus the durations of finite individual things are homogeneous considered as parts of the single imagined duration of an enveloping whole, but are heterogeneous when considered as wholes within which further subordinate parts appear at once to succeed and permeate each other. The truth is neither simply that the whole is in a stretch of successive, irreversible time, of which the parts occupy sections; nor simply that the part is a non-successive purely intensive existence. The former view misinterprets wholeness; the latter misinterprets *partialitas*, and raises the difficulties already indicated about the relations of the durations of finite things, and thus also about the concrete 'duration' of the whole.

The special difficulties, therefore, which have proved to be common stumbling-blocks in the philosophy of M. Bergson, are shown to be due to his failure to pass beyond a phenomenological account of the Real, and to achieve a metaphysical deduction of time. And the peculiar defect of M. Bergson's phenomenology is that he has introduced into it factors which ought to have been reached only in a more ultimate analysis. The assertion of the successionlessness and self-permeation of real duration is in essence an unconscious passage beyond duration to eternity; and the result can thus only be that what might have remained a perfectly harm-

less skeleton in the cupboard for a phenomenology recognized as subject, becomes for the treasonous usurper the spectre at the feast.

The principles which I am emphasizing are exemplified also, though differently, in the theory of Mr. Whitehead, as might, indeed, have been anticipated from his virtual, though not verbal, agreement with the Bergsonian conception of real time.¹ As I have already suggested,² Mr. Whitehead substitutes for this the conception of 'creative passage', which he finds to be the primitive character not only of nature, but also of sense-awareness and thought. This 'passage' is not a measurable quantity 'except as it occurs in nature in connexion with extension'.³ Further, the original passage of nature is exhibited not only in temporal but also in spatial transitions. Nature is primarily a congeries or system of distinguishable, overlapping, and more or less concrete happenings or events; and from this point of view it is characterized by pure change, or rather, since events never change,⁴ the event 'nature' and its constituent events simply 'pass'.

But diversification into events of varying concreteness and extension is only one mode in which nature may be rendered; it may also be regarded as a congeries or system of sense-contents. In themselves these neither change nor 'pass'; 'A colour is eternal. It haunts time like a spirit. It comes and it goes. But where it comes, it is the same colour. It neither survives nor does it live. It appears when it is wanted'.⁵ It is only in their appearances that they both 'pass' and also endure, and the vision of nature as the drama of such appearances is alternative to that of pure 'passage'. Many other diversifications are possible within the same nature: that of more or less permanent perceptual objects; that of scientific objects (electrons, &c.); and so forth. There is, in fact, an indefinite number of such renderings, disclosing an indefinite number of types of entity. So, analogously, it may perhaps be

¹ 'I believe that in this doctrine I am in full accord with Bergson, though he uses "time" for the fundamental fact which I call the "passage of nature"' (*The Concept of Nature*, p. 54).

² Above, p. 229, note 1.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 55.

⁴ 'Events never change . . . events pass but do not change. The passage of an event is its passing into some other event which is not it' (*An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 62).

⁵ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 126.

supposed, a pastel drawing might be considered alternatively as a surface of paper or canvas having a certain texture; or as a number of spots of chalk adhering to the prominences of that surface; or again as a distribution of a number of different coloured pigments; as a representation of such and such objects; as the expression of an emotion or sentiment; and so on. And each of these characterizations will be important for appropriate circumstances and conditions: for preparing a block or a colour-reproduction, for the scientist, or antiquarian, or connoisseur. But the painting itself is not the *sum* of these diverse renderings: the mere series of alternative readings is only a step, or series of steps, in the work of description or explanation; and so also with the diverse renderings of nature. No one has protested more vigorously than Mr. Whitehead against the bifurcation of nature into two systems of reality: the electrons, &c., of speculative physics over against the sense-perceptions of psychologistic philosophy; 'thus', he says, 'there would be two natures, one is the conjecture and the other is the dream.'¹ Yet though only a serious misunderstanding of Mr. Whitehead's theory could lead us to assert that this very bifurcation of nature, purged of its subjectivistic error, is only carried to its ideal limit in the distinctions which he draws between the various renderings of nature, e.g. between the world of pure 'passage' and that of sense-perception, yet the suggestion is not wholly devoid of foundation. Indeed, but for the attempt which is undoubtedly made to relate these diverse diversifications² of nature in the theory of the 'ingression' of objects into events, we might have to complain not of a bifurcation of nature but of its 'multifurcation'. For the variety of diversifications is indefinitely great. But it must be admitted that in the main Mr. Whitehead makes it clear that the alternative renderings are not meant to result in separate realities, but are ways of reading the same reality. Yet this principle is by no means seriously pursued to its metaphysical conclusions; for although it is obvious that sense-contents are not in themselves sufficient to constitute concrete nature, since *per se* they are 'eternal objects' which are merely and indefinitely 'available' for the filling of events, and only endure in so far as they are related to the

¹ *The Concept of Nature*, p. 30.

² Mr. Whitehead hesitates between the two senses of 'diversification': (a) that produced by the many renderings (*Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 60, ll. 1-2); and (b) the multiplicity laid bare by each analysis (*Loc. cit.*, p. 59).

system of events; and again, that mere passage is insufficient without content; and although Mr. Whitehead's own theory assumes these insufficiencies, yet we are told that all such renderings of nature are equally adequate or inadequate. Not that they are all true of nature *conjunctively*, but, shall I say? nature is these *disjunctively*: it is *either* a complex of events, *or* a congeries of sense-contents, *or* a collection of physical things, and so on. But, I ask, which of these is the one real nature? When that question is considered it immediately becomes obvious that the disjunction I have suggested is *not* after all Mr. Whitehead's real meaning: though 'one mode of diversification is not necessarily more abstract than another' yet, he adds in the next sentence, 'objects can be looked on as qualities of events, and events as relations between objects, or—more usefully—we can drop the metaphysical and difficult notion of inherent qualities and consider the elements of different types as bearing to each other relations'.¹ Thus the diversifications are *within* nature, or *of* nature, and nature includes them all; they are related to one another within nature, and nature is the appropriate synthesis of its infinite diversifications. That is a possible view; but Mr. Whitehead neither holds to it firmly, nor accepts its implications. He tells us e.g. that there is in nature nothing else but events;² he adds that 'a reference to objects is only a way of specifying the character of an event', thus indicating that an event is not a *mere* happening, but that it is *something* happening.³ It must be capable of being discriminated, and the passage of nature is, therefore, not continuous (though abstract space and time, and of course 'pure passage', are continuous). But what is the 'something' which passes, and is capable of being discriminated as 'passing'? It must be objects as qualifying events, or, as Mr. Whitehead prefers it, as related to events. 'There is no apprehension of external events apart from recognitions of sense-objects as related to them, and there is no recognition of sense-objects except as in relation to external events.'⁴ And apart from this relation these objects are the 'eternal objects' (which might better have been called timeless logical essences). Thus are perceptual

¹ *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 60.

² 'The conditions which determine the nature of events can only be furnished by other events, for there is nothing else in nature' (*Loc. cit.*, p. 73).

³ The ambiguous character of an event, as both abstract and concrete, both empty and qualified, is a real difficulty in the philosophy of Mr. Whitehead.

⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 83. Mr. Whitehead is, I believe, an epistemological realist.

and scientific objects constituted; and hence the natural tendency to read the theory as implying that nature is created by the distribution of the 'eternal objects' within a space-time framework: 'there is a structure of events and this structure provides the framework of the externality of nature within which objects are located.'¹ But how distributed, and on what principles? Putting aside the phenomenological construction of perceptual and scientific objects, on what principles are 'eternal objects' distributed in the event-continuum?²

Mr. Whitehead discusses this question in the metaphysical part of his book on *Science and the Modern World*: it is not my intention to expound his views in detail, but I must examine their main trend. He distinguishes between the realm of possibility (i.e. of 'eternal objects') and that of actuality (i.e. of events and spatio-temporal objects). The two realms together constitute, or are 'intrinsically inherent in the total metaphysical situation'.³ The relation between these two realms immediately becomes a vital question. Among possible relations four of importance may be named:

(1) The two may be wholly unconnected, so that there is an ultimate bifurcation in the Real. This may be put aside since according to Mr. Whitehead there is admittedly 'ingression' of the 'eternal objects' into nature. They are among its ingredients.

(2) Both may be abstractions from the Real which is the synthesis of the 'eternal objects' and the web of 'passage'. This is excluded by statements to the effect that 'actual occasions are selections from the realm of possibilities'.⁴

(3) This suggests the alternative that the possible may contain the actual *eminenter*, and that the actual is thus a passage of perspectives within the possible. This, however, would imply the introduction within the realm of 'eternal objects' of the foreign element of 'passage' and event, which is commonly supposed to render the actual more real than the merely possible. If this last supposal were true then we should have:

(4) The possible contained *eminenter* (in whole or in part) within the actual. If only in part, then the problem recurs with respect to that part of the possible which is not actualized. Now Mr. White-

¹ *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, p. 80.

² It is not unimportant to remember that for Mr. Whitehead 'objects' are not 'emergent' from events (cf. *Science and the Modern World*, p. 151).

³ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 228.

⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 235.

head definitely excludes this fourth suggestion: 'It is the foundation of the metaphysical position which I am maintaining that the understanding of actuality requires a reference to ideality.'¹ 'Every actual occasion is set within a realm of alternative interconnected entities. This realm is disclosed by all the untrue propositions which can be predicated significantly of that occasion.'¹

I am thus driven to the view that Mr. Whitehead holds that the possible includes the actual *eminenter*; for their identity seems to be excluded by his insistence on the positive character of 'passage'. But if 'passage' is thus a positive character, how can the actual (which possesses it) be contained in the possible, which is 'eternal', and in which, therefore, nothing can happen or 'pass'? Mr. Whitehead must thus either interpret 'passage' in such a way as to make it subordinate to and coherent with the 'eternity' of the realm of possibility, or else he must make the actual in some sense external to the possible.

Between these two views he seems finally to hesitate: in any case the possible is vastly richer in content than the actual; but the actual is either, on the one hand, a real passage to which nothing corresponds in the possible, and which constitutes the very *differentia* of actuality: in which case 'eternal objects' have no direct ontological significance, but are mere 'subsisting' *entia rationis*, and *the Real is identical with the actual*. Or, on the other hand, passage already belongs, in some form, to the possible, a suggestion which is by no means absent from Mr. Whitehead's exposition: 'the spatio-temporal relationship, in terms of which the actual course of events is to be expressed, is nothing else than a selective limitation within the general systematic relationships among eternal objects.'² In that case the passing existence of nature is a diminution of the eternal existence of possibility, *the Real and the eternal possible are identical*, and the passing actual world but a moving, changing selection within the possible.

In either case the urgent problem would then concern the empirical passage of the actual, and its metaphysical ultimacy; and if it could be shown that real existence contains passing existence *eminenter*, *sub specie aeternitatis*, then a real explanatory (and not a merely descriptive) metaphysics would be in sight.

Mr. Whitehead's attempts to explain the precise relations between events and the various sorts of intermediate objects are

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 228.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 232.

acute and most instructive, and had the same method been carried through to the metaphysical issue the difficulties which I have raised might have been met, though the system would then, I think, have been somewhat modified. For my requirement is not that a philosopher shall explain the nature of being and why it is precisely what it is, but rather that he shall exhibit the relations existing between the various elements into which he has analysed the Real.

Now, as I have said, Mr. Whitehead distinguishes, in the Real, between the actual and the possible, the actual being the result of the 'ingression' of the possible into actual occasions or events; thus there are two main questions demanding clarification: (i) granted that the distinction of the possible and the actual is in itself valid in general, to what extent is it possible for them to be separated from each other in the Real and its various diversifications? (ii) what are the relations of the objects of various kinds to the actual occasions or events in which they are 'situated'?

The two questions are, of course, fundamentally related to each other, though the first is metaphysical and the second phenomenological. I deal with the phenomenological question first.

A great part of Mr. Whitehead's philosophy is occupied with the question of the relations of objects and events. With the very precise details I have no immediate concern,¹ but in the general principles I am vitally interested. For Mr. Whitehead, an object is not a complex of events or a complex event *simpliciter*: it is situated in and pertains to its actual complex event. Thus events, for example, are divisible, while objects are essentially organic and thus cannot be divided: not spatially, for they function as unities; not temporally, for they require their 'whole period in which to manifest [themselves]'.² The object is thus not a mere conventional fiction which, for some extrinsic purpose, we substitute for the events on which it is patterned. Rather, as it seems to me, if we can distinguish them from the objects, it is the events that are the fiction; for the picture of nature as an event-framework, even when it is elevated above mere non-being by a formal decking of sense-contents, is less adequate than that of a world of objects characterized by unity and permanence rather than

¹ Not that they are unimportant. Intricate and difficult as they are, I believe them to hold the solutions of some long-standing problems in phenomenology.

² *Science and the Modern World*, p. 54.

by diversity and passage, and therefore not in themselves events, but containing spatio-temporal relations, and bearing such relations to each other; and this again is less adequate than that of a world of nature as a total object, not itself in, but containing space-time. For at each stage in the progressive synthesis the diversity gives place to unity; the reputed organic character of events belongs to the objects situated in them, or capable of being so situated, rather than to the pure events. The fact is that the continuum of mere events, or even space-time, is too flimsy to serve the purpose to which phenomenologists are wont to put it.¹ The merest object already distorts it by substituting unity and permanence for multiplicity and 'passage'. Only so are objects constituted: their creation or 'ingression' is founded upon the distortion or even destruction of space-time or passage. At each stage in the 'ingression' of objects, the continuum of passage becomes more distorted and contracted, until in the limit when totality is reached it must disappear. It is, in fact, only the empty form of occurrence without content, and therefore nothing real; it is a mere fictitious lower limit of abstraction. Actual space-time is essentially occupied, and thus more concretely called 'enduring thing'; while real space-time, carrying this correction to an ideal limit, is the eternal Extension of Spinoza in which passage is wholly transformed into quality.

Thus in order to understand the relations of objects and events it is necessary not only to watch the 'ingression' of objects into a ready-made event-framework, but also to notice how the framework fares as a result of its occupation. What, for example, becomes of 'passage' when it falls within the permanent object? It is no answer to say that while the object as a whole is permanent its ultimate parts suffer 'passage', for as an object it is not divisible into parts; nor can the object and its parts be separated as co-ordinate entities (for thus there would be reduplication without limit). Still less reasonable would it be to regard the object and the events as separate existences.

The relation of the objects to the events which they are said to occupy is, therefore, from the side of the events an 'ingression', but it is also a 'condensation' of the event-framework. The

¹ And, recurring to the ambiguity in the notion of an event, if we once begin to make the events (or space-time, either) qualified or concrete, we shall have to proceed further than any mere phenomenology is willing to go.

pure transiency of 'passage' gives place to the duration of a relatively permanent object. But the 'ingression' and the 'condensation' are not real processes but only the mythical *momenta* of phenomenological genetics. As the actuality of a pure event is its 'passage', and its possibility is its indefinite 'patience', so the actuality of a finite thing is its *conatus* or 'real duration', and its possibility the 'patience' of a concrete world for its 'ingression', or in the reversed form in which it is natural for Mr. Whitehead to prefer to express the same relation: 'the meaning of the term "possibility" as applied to A is simply that there stands in the essence of A a patience for relationships to actual occasions.'¹

But if possibility means the mutual patience of an 'eternal object' and actual situations or occasions, no meaning can be attached to a realm of possibility transcending the limits of the total actual. That brings me to the former of my two questions. What could be meant by the possibility of an 'eternal object' for which no actual occasion is or could be 'patient', which can never be situated in an event, or be an 'ingredient' in nature? Surely this is precisely what is meant by an absolute *impossibility*!

Thus it is in the abstract event-framework that actuality is minimal and possibility a maximum. It is pure $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ without form. Among the partial phenomenal objects which endure and 'pass', actuality is *conatus* or 'real duration', and possibility is the mutual 'patience' of the parts within an appropriate whole. But with the absolute totality of nature actuality must be, not minimal, and not duration (which is never complete, and in principle never can be complete), but eternity as infinite existence, and possibility is the 'patience' of the Real for itself, which is complete and is hence identical with actuality.

That Mr. Whitehead draws no such conclusions is the result of his failure thoroughly to clear up the questions relating to the relative status of objects and events. They are never unambiguously either separate realities, or identical, nor do they possess differing degrees of reality or ultimacy. The double account of the nature of events tells the same story: they are at once pure 'passage' and also 'organic'. But they cannot be both;² and, as I have suggested, the imputed 'organic' character of events is but

¹ *Science and the Modern World*, p. 230.

² Events which essentially 'extend' and are capable of overlapping are clearly not characterized solely by 'passage'.

the reflection in the events of their possible filling by organized objects. Doubtless without such reflected content the event-framework becomes a mere transparency devoid of ontological status; and in that case the question of the relation of objects and events is reduced (or rather elevated) to that of objects and their actual spatio-temporal context, and ultimately to that of the character of the eternal Real.

Hence what is really needed is a metaphysics which is the criticism and completion of all the possible phenomenological accounts of nature and not a superadded description of a new type of reality. The different grades of objects distinguished by Mr. Whitehead would then be regarded as the elements of successive and increasingly satisfactory phenomenologies, in which mere 'passage', multiplicity and repetition progressively give place to duration, unity and change. And the critical examination of this series and of the relative values of its members, as these bear upon the estimation of the ultimate character of the Real, would render metaphysics only the final step of an assured logical process, but a step which would transform the whole field of inquiry.¹

¹ The term 'phenomenology' cannot be applied to the theory of pure events; for, as I have said, a pure event is not, strictly speaking, an event at all: where nothing happens there is no happening. Not that this part of Mr. Whitehead's theory is valueless; on the contrary it is of great interest as an abstract analysis of the forms of unity within the Real. This part of doctrine might be styled *Analytic*; it tells its own story of the interplay of 'passage' and 'extension'. *Phenomenology* begins when we pass from the mere form of events to occurrences having quality or content, and hence duration. And the whole structure should be crowned by a *Metaphysics* which, taking the cue from the hierarchy of phenomena, shall determine the nature of being-as-such without abstraction, or partition, or limitation: the nature, as Spinoza would say, of *ens realissimum sive perfectissimum*, i.e. the Real.

The reader will, perhaps, permit me to add that the discussion in this chapter of Mr. Whitehead's doctrine was written before his latest work, *Process and Reality*, was accessible to the general public. Rumours were, indeed, abroad indicating that some of the points which I have raised had been illuminated or reconsidered in the Gifford lectures to which a favoured few in Edinburgh had listened during the previous session, but the new light reached remoter regions of the republic of letters only in jack-o'-lantern flashes; and having no mind to 'follow wandering fires, lost in the quagmire' I confined my attention to the works then available. By the time that *Process and Reality* was published my book was already in the hands of the printers, and it is, of course, impossible to deal, even inadequately, with Mr. Whitehead's impressive cosmology in a stop-press addendum to a footnote. Nor do I think that my discussion of the earlier doctrine is thus rendered nugatory: in relation to my own argument its value remains unchanged; and in relation to Mr. Whitehead's teaching its value may even be enhanced, both as a criticism of the old, and as an introduction to the new.

CHAPTER X

SPACE-TIME AND EMERGENCE

THE assimilation of the problems of space and time that distinguishes Mr. Whitehead's general attitude from that of M. Bergson is characteristic also of the philosophical system of Mr. Alexander. This connexion of space and time is, of course, ultimately derived from speculative physics, which in this respect at least is an uncritical development of common-sense assumptions; and though in these systems the union becomes more profound and intimate (especially in the theory of Mr. Alexander, as I shall indicate immediately), in so far as it remains as an unresolved assumption, it has its baneful effect in both. Whether the representation of space and time as a single four-dimensional continuum is satisfactory as a *schema* within, and for all the purposes of mathematical physics, and if so how far, I need not discuss.¹ Presumably, the main interest of physics being in measurement, it follows that space and time can, for that science, only be extant in so far as they can be represented, adequately or not, as measurable quantities. Hence time must be conceived extensively as clock-time; and as we, in common with all conscious finite beings, are well accustomed to this conception, which has, as I have said, a certain phenomenological validity, we come to accept it as satisfactory in the further sense of being ultimately and metaphysically adequate.² But in so far as such measurements of time themselves involve movements (and thus also reference to space-measurements) it is not surprising that the association of space and time (so determined) should also appear quite natural, demanding no

¹ Though even for this science the time-dimension and the three dimensions of space appear not to be universally interchangeable.

² Artificial clocks are not the only sort to which we are accustomed. Anything which moves is capable of functioning as a clock, and especially those things which move in cycles which by reference to those of human activity (themselves also clocks) appear to be regularly recurrent. Thus not only the motions of the sun and moon, the variations of the seasons, the habits of animals, and the growth of plants, but also our internal functions, the pulsations of the heart, the movements of breathing, the recurrence of hunger and sleepiness, are all natural clocks which provide us with the sense of extensive passage in time. The question as to what would happen to time if all clocks were removed affords an interesting subject for dialectical debate.

special critique. But philosophy must probe beneath this set of symbols in its attempt to lay bare the veritable nature of space and time, or space-time.

Mr. Alexander is under no misapprehension about the *metaphysical* inadequacy of the representation of Space-Time as a four-dimensional continuum. For him there is no space which is not essentially temporal: even a one-dimensional space demands as a minimum the temporal character of successiveness if it is to be spatial. For without the distinction of parts which is the result of temporal succession among the points of space, the single dimension would remain an undifferentiated, and therefore non-spatial unity. Similarly a two-dimensional space is strictly inconceivable except as characterized also by the additional temporal attribute of irreversibility, whereby the second dimension is, as it were, spread out and maintained. In addition to the temporal characters of successiveness and irreversibility, a three-dimensional space must receive the further quality of uniformity of temporal direction (or 'betweenness'), and without these appropriate temporal characters our space would be, not merely incomplete, but incapable of being fully spatial. It would collapse or evaporate, and either analogy will serve indiscriminately. Thus, 'Time does with its one-dimensional order cover and embrace the three dimensions of Space, and is not additional to them. . . . Metaphysically, (though perhaps mathematically) [*sic*], it is not therefore a fourth dimension in the universe, but repeats the other three.'¹

Mr. Alexander is thus led (as is very well known) to one of his most characteristic speculative transitions, according to which time is not so much a homogeneous addition to space as it is a heterogeneous constituent: 'Time is the mind of Space'.² Equally characteristically this *aperçu* is not thrown out as a rhetorical substitute for critical exposition: it is explained, limited, defended, and finally elaborated, with some care. It is not for me to attempt to expound in any detail either the explanation or the defence, but I must, for my purpose, note the limitations introduced, and (what is the same thing viewed from the opposite side) the elaboration of this relation of space and time as an ontological category. For Mr. Alexander following Spinoza will not make the human constitution the standard and exemplar of things; it is truer to say not that 'Time is the mind of Space', but that 'we are examples of a

¹ *Space, Time, and Deity*, i, p. 59.

² *Loc. cit.*, ii, p. 38.

pattern which is universal and is followed not only by things but by Space-Time itself'.¹ 'Rather than hold that Time is a form of mind we must say that mind is a form of Time. This second proposition is strictly true.'² The relation of mind and body (i.e. brain or neural process) in man is much more complex than that of time and space in Space-Time, and hence it is simpler to understand the latter than the former. But the general pattern is the same throughout. In the human body, as I shall point out shortly, the simple relation is complicated by the fact that the neural processes are part of a general body which 'exists as it were of its own right', i.e. we have here another example of the same pattern in which for 'mind' must be substituted 'life'. From this complication arises the distinction between 'enjoyment' and 'contemplation' in mental life, since the living bodily organism is, as a whole, external to mind (as also are the other parts of the external world). Thus we 'contemplate' ourselves and other things as non-mental entities, and 'enjoy' ourselves as conscious bodies, thus we enjoy our consciousness, that is, our contemplating minds. But this complication cannot arise in the relations of space to time in Space-Time: for there is in space nothing existing of its own right, and external to time, in relation to which time could be something additional. For space without time is nothing. Thus qualities only 'emerge' at levels above that of Space-Time, where there is the additional complication arising from, or concomitant with partition; for in Space-Time, 'the matrix of all empirical existence', partition may give rise to parturition.

This is a point of determining importance. Time is not a quality of space, but an essential element in its constitution. Spaceless time and timeless space are alike non-existent and inconceivable. The only quality possessed immediately by Space-Time is motion, and this *is* it. Here quality and stuff are identical. With mind the case is different; for mind is distinguishable (and, in a sense, separable) from body: there are bodies without minds, though not perhaps minds without bodies; and thus the quality of mentality is distinct³ from the body, brain, or neural process which is so qualified. And Mr. Alexander, taking his cue from these⁴ empirical

¹ *Space, Time, and Deity*, ii, p. 39.

² *Loc. cit.*, ii, p. 44.

³ But not epiphenomenal (cf. *loc. cit.*, ii, p. 8).

⁴ 'The case which we are using as a clue is the emergence of the quality of consciousness from a lower level of complexity which is vital.' (*Loc. cit.*, ii, p. 45.)

limits, puts forward his theory of the temporally hierarchical or evolutionary constitution of the Real. The ultimacy of Space-Time as the matrix of empirical things implies the temporal character of the hierarchy: 'New orders of finites come into existence in Time; the world actually or historically develops from its first or elementary condition of Space-Time. . . . As in the course of Time new complexity of motions comes into existence, a new quality emerges.'¹ The speculation is familiar, and need not for my present purpose be elaborated. Some years ago Mr. Alexander surprised and delighted students of Spinoza by publishing what he described as 'a gloss upon Spinoza's teaching',² in which he set forth the relations of his own philosophy to that of Spinoza, and indicated some of the important changes which the latter would suffer if certain positions, fundamental to his own theory were incorporated into it. What would be of interest at this point of our discussion, if I had the ability or the vanity to attempt it, would be just such a gloss upon the philosophy of Mr. Alexander as Spinoza might have offered if he had enjoyed, among the other advantages of an English writer of the twentieth century, familiarity with the theory which, perhaps, among recent philosophies makes the nearest approach to his own. To attempt to supply even a rough estimate of a part of such a gloss would be an undertaking beyond my competence, and the most that I can offer, therefore, is a few suggestions as to the directions in which difficulties are to be found in Mr. Alexander's general theory, and the lines along which a Spinozist might look for their solutions.

One of the main suggestions of Mr. Alexander in his 'little piece' was that time should take the place of Thought as an Attribute of the Real which would thus become Space-Time instead of Extension *and* Thought, &c. Thus, as I have explained, time would diversify space and make it concrete, i.e. make it genuinely spatial; and space would unify time, make it continuous, i.e. make it genuinely temporal. Real Time is Space-Time, which again is real Space. Mere space and mere time in isolation are mere unity and mere diversity, i.e. non-being.

With this general argument, so far as it goes, no Spinozist need find fault. The Extension of Spinoza is not, as Mr. Alexander very naturally tends to suppose (since most of the commentators give

¹ *Space, Time, and Deity*, ii, p. 45.

² *Spinoza and Time*, p. 36.

that impression, or at least do not refute it), the empty conception of extension, or even an instantaneous, recurrent, or representative extension. It is an eternal Attribute expressing the concrete nature of Substance in its fullness. Thus the difficulty is not so much what Mr. Alexander affirms with respect to Space-Time as what he refrains from affirming: for on the one hand, though time diversifies space it only does so in a piecemeal fashion, little by little, and not completely and eternally; and on the other hand, space only renders time continuous, i.e. makes it duration, but does not, or rather is not by Mr. Alexander allowed to unify it in any ultimately satisfactory sense. The result is that the ultimate Space-Time is essentially incomplete, not merely at any epoch, but at 'all' epochs; 'for the very nature of duration is such that it is always possible to conceive a duration greater or less than any given duration'.¹ My criticism of the conception of Space-Time so far as it includes duration will by this time be familiar: at any given point of time there is always more to come in a continuous duration, and though it is true that Space-Time itself does not stand at any one such point, but comprehends them all, it is precisely because it claims to include all periods while itself never resting, because it thus claims to be all-inclusive while ever demanding more, that Space-Time does not satisfy. Professor Taylor has reminded us that "passage" does not "pass",² just as others have assured us that duration does not endure. And since time *per se* is not *in* time, it may verbally be agreed that 'all' Space-Time must be spatio-temporally self-contained. But the term 'all Space-Time' begs the question, for a genuine duration cannot be complete, but must always be passing. 'Its soul's wings are never furled'.³ Thus Space-Time is not merely *now* unfinished, it is *essentially incapable of being finished*, it belongs to the indefinite rather than to the infinite and complete. Nor can the unsatisfactoriness be confined to the time-element in Space-Time, for, according to Mr. Alexander (and I have not disputed his contention), time reciprocates with every dimension of space, and is thus not a distinguishable dimension. Space which in itself, rightly conceived, is innocent, by its inadequate temporal diversification becomes full of vice. The partners in this marriage are thus un-

¹ 'Talis enim est natura durationis, ut semper major, et minor data possit concipi.' (Cog. Met. II, x.)

² *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, p. 691.

³ *Spinoza and Time*, p. 42.

equally yoked together, and though they can never be simply divorced, neither can they settle down in harmony and fruitfulness, and their reputed offspring can be none of theirs, but only, for them, abiogenetic monsters accepted with 'natural piety'.

Thus Space-Time must be spatio-temporally self-contained without being spatio-temporally complete; from which premisses the plain conclusion surely must be that Space-Time is not the ultimate reality. For though, *ex hypothesi*, it contains everything, it yet remains essentially incomplete. But what then *is* completeness? Further, there is a fundamental self-contradiction in the conception of an ultimate reality which cannot in any given respect be completed. For the ground of the incompleteness must lie either within the nature of the Real, or in something else partly or wholly unreal. If the latter, then what is not fully real is more powerful than the Real and limits its existence. If the former, then the Real deprives itself of existence which it might, without equivalent loss, possess. But this is absurd.¹

I have said that the vice is introduced into Space-Time through the agency of time; also that it is time that realizes space. Thus the dilemma cannot be avoided by a retreat into a timeless space *simpliciter*. That was in essence the Cartesian solution which was bluntly rejected by Spinoza,² and, indeed, was only rendered possible for Imagination by the introduction of the will of God as operative within extension.³ The only way of escape must be through a more complete diversification of space, resulting in an ultimate Real not open to the objections I have urged. For space, as Mr. Alexander has said, is primarily a principle of unity, and when its enduring character is ignored (as for example with instantaneous or recurrent extension) its unity is patent. The mere principle of the relativity of position and motion in space guarantees its formal unity;⁴ but the attempt to rest in the abstract conception of a space diversified only by time cannot be successful: time,

¹ Cf. *Eth. I, vii et xi*.

² Cf. *Epp. lxxxi et lxxxiii*.

³ And if Spinoza would accept no filling for extension by miraculous agency, neither could he look to thought for it. It must stand or fall by its own power and nature.

⁴ Mere space is, as Mr. Alexander says, not spatial. But it is a unity, and therefore real space, which is qualified or occupied, is necessarily a unifying principle in the diversity of its contents; and in the end it becomes an infinite whole of content: *Extensio aeterna*. I must here once again emphasize the distinction which Spinoza draws (*Ep. lxxxiii*) between the 'conception' of ex-

which is rightly introduced to 'inflate' mere space, must in the end, if it is not controlled by some superior principle of wholeness, burst it and scatter it to dust. Thus both the theory of Space-Time and the stuff itself may be exploded.

How, then, is Space-Time to be amended? I reply, by the continuation and completion of the dialectic so promisingly begun by Mr. Alexander himself. Mere space is, so far as *content* is concerned, nothing; it is real merely as formal unity. Mere time is, so far as *form* is concerned, nothing; it is merely diversity of content. From these incomplete elements there is forged the minimally concrete reality: Space-Time. *Being* (i.e. space = formal being; time = being as content) and *Non-being* (i.e. time = formal non-being; space = non-being in content) are synthesized as *Becoming* (i.e. Space-Time = Motion or formal becoming); but this is only the beginning of the dialectic; real being must lie at the end of a long series of constellations, in the procession through which duration becomes more and more complete, i.e. concrete and definite (as opposed to the indefiniteness of the *mere* duration which belongs to space-time). This is a point of great importance which in essence has been elaborated already, and I need do no more than emphasize the main assertion, viz. that every individual part of, or under, *Natura naturata* has its own *conatus*, 'real duration' or quality; it does not *merely* occupy a section of a longer or indefinite duration, though as a part of a wider constellation it certainly occupies a part of the duration of that higher individual as it appears, or is imagined, from the standpoint of the part. *Natura naturata* does not for itself endure, but is eternal; but from the standpoint of any of its parts it appears as sempiternal, and thus as enduring indefinitely longer than the single part. Thus the duration of the part *as such* (and it is truly such) is a part of the sempiternity of nature; but *as an individual* it has its own duration: it endures at its own rate, and if not, among the higher orders of individuals, 'unhasting, unresting', at least hastening and resting under the necessity of its own content. Thus the duration of each

tension and the Attribute 'which expresses infinite and eternal essence'; from the latter alone is the variety of the universe deducible. The abstract conception of space is not real space with its content omitted (which would be nothing at all), but real space with its content ignored. Mr. Alexander's pure Space-Time, as 'the matrix of all empirical things', is again different: it is space provided, not with real, but with formal content, up to its minimal demand for formal diversification. Evolved Space-Time moves further towards the concrete.

is one with its own constellation, individual quality, or *conatus*. If it were complete, duration would, for it, be consummated into eternity, or rather, since Imagination would not arise, its absolute essence would not endure, but would be identical with the infinite existence which is eternity. As it is not complete it imagines, and its partial eternity appears as its real duration or *conatus*, including the durations of its subordinate parts and suburbs, and beginning, included, and cut off, in the imagined indefinite duration of the enveloping whole within which it lies. With lower types of constellation there may be no eternal part, and the whole existence of the 'individual' may be durational. But, even so, if it is in any sense an 'individual', it has a duration, which resists simple solution in an endless general duration of Space-Time.

And this is the plain evidence of our experience, as M. Bergson has so well illustrated. The real duration of a finite individual has its own native speed which cannot be quickened or retarded at will; which cannot be varied without such a change in its conditions as would, in effect, constitute also a change in the 'contour' of the process and its pattern. Thus though it is true that 'Time is an object given to us empirically',¹ yet it is given us in so varied and multiplex a form, that in effect we are given also with it the principles which must in the Real transform it into non-successive quality. Empirical time already exhibits in varying measure such a transformation; Mr. Alexander's Space-Time exhibits it in minimal measure, for there the 'quality' of motion is the formal condensation by means of space of the 'vapour' of instants which is pure time; thus, to change the metaphor, the broken instants are welded into spatio-temporal tracks, currents, or reciprocal strains. It is true that Mr. Alexander will not call motion a quality² supervening on Space-Time since it *is* Space-Time, but he will agree that motion is something new over and above mere space and mere time, for at this level Space-Time alone is real, and therefore new. The same principles must apply at every stage in

¹ 'It was not open to us to say that since the successiveness of Time and its continuity are contradictory Time is therefore not real but only appearance. Time is an object given to us empirically.' (*Space, Time, and Deity*, i, p. 46.) This at least suggests that to be given empirically is also to be inescapable in the metaphysical determination of the ultimate reality, which is a truth only when it is suitably qualified. Taken at its face value the principle implies the impossibility of error. (Cf. *Eth. II*, xxxii-xxxvi.)

² But cf. *Space, Time, and Deity*, ii, p. 45.

creation.¹ A constellation of tracks, currents, or reciprocal strains means further condensation or integration as material things, whereby the successive or repetitive and exclusive temporality of the elements is transformed into the more self-permeating, but still in its measure successive, duration of the whole, with a consequent partial disappearance of the mere diffused diversity which is found at a lower stage of analysis. Materiality is thus not a new 'emergent' quality *superadded* to the constellation, and to be accepted as an inexplicable *datum*: it is the *constellatio* which includes its *constellata*, and by integration transcends and perfects them. So with the secondary qualities: they are not supervenient on the motions which are said to correspond to them; they *are* those motions in their appropriate synthesis and integration, and stand to them, as I have said, as the musical phrase or melody stands to the notes which are its elements or members. And at each stage in the movement upwards through the hierarchy of being, there is a further condensation of the mere repetitive character of time, to give something accumulative and synthetic, and thus nearer to the unity of the Real which is eternal. Thus in the limit the transiency of time must be overcome, and without loss of its positive character as the source, or indeed the content,² of all modal diversification within the Real, and consequently without resolving space into a mere unity. For as the externality of time is progressively overcome in this mythical phenomenological process, there arises the equivalent integration which is quality, and this, in the issue, in its perfect form, becomes the very content of the extended Real, namely eternity under the Attribute of Extension.

My contention is, therefore, that Mr. Alexander's attempt to exalt time to the status of an Attribute of the Real must fail because time cannot sustain the part thus assigned to it. But Mr. Alexander was not content thus to exalt time, he wished also to depose Thought from the dignity of an Attribute, and to make it a mere relation between certain types of modal being, to make it indeed a special

¹ The term is here used neutrally to avoid prejudgement of the nature of the process by which mere being is transformed into the Real, or by which the Real exhausts itself into the dust of mere being (=non-being), for 'the way up and the way down are one and the same'.

² Whence, as I have said, eternity itself is neither *timelessness* nor the mere *sum* of all durations (an impossible conception since durations are not homogeneous, and cannot be completely summed). It is the ultimate *constellation* of all durations: their integration and perfection.

form of the simple general relation of 'compresence' which holds between all spatio-temporal facts. Thought is 'the distinguishing quality of the highest level of empirical things'.¹

It is true that Mr. Alexander also has his own interpretation of the *omnia animata* of Spinoza, but this need not deflect attention from his main denial.² When Spinoza says that all things are animated or conscious he means that to every extended constellation there corresponds a psychical constellation which is the knowledge or contemplation of that extended individual. Many commentators of Spinoza (indeed most of them) have feigned to discover ambiguity in his use of the term 'idea', but, as I shall in due course show, there is no real evidence that the ambiguity exists outside of the minds of those who detect it. The 'idea corporis' is the knowledge or contemplation of the body; the 'idea Petri' is the knowledge or contemplation of Peter. True, Spinoza asserts that what is called Paul's idea of Peter would more correctly be described as an idea of Paul's body as affected by Peter's body, but that is merely the assertion that the idea is false unless it is taken for what it really is.³ It is equally true that the idea of the body is such only under the proviso that it is the idea of the body *as affected by things*, i.e. either as responding more or less adequately to *Natura* as a whole, or as responding inadequately and confusedly to this or that section of nature or external body. It is thus that the mind knows only its own body.

In all these and similar statements, therefore, there is not the least ambiguity about the doctrine that ideas and extended modes belong to precisely correlated (but not concatenated) systems, and that ideas are contemplations or cognitions of things.⁴

¹ *Spinoza and Time*, p. 46.

² 'We arrive also at a conclusion which seems to repeat Spinoza's view that thought is a universal feature of things, only with a difference. All things for him are in a sense animated, they are all in their degree thinking things. For us things which are not minds, which are merely alive or are inanimate, are no longer minds, but they do bear an aspect, or contain in themselves an element, which corresponds to the aspect or element of mind in a thinking thing. That aspect or element is Time.' (*Spinoza and Time*, p. 46.)

³ And I may add that the idea is inadequate even then. On these points the reader should consult in particular *Eth. II, xvi-xvii, Sch.*

⁴ This is important: ideas are not little *pictures* or *images* or reproductions of things in a rarified psychical material, or in the brain. They are *acts* of the mind. 'Veram . . . habere ideam, nihil aliud significat, quam perfecte, sive optime rem cognoscere; nec sane aliquis de hac re dubitare potest, nisi putet, ideam quid mutum instar picturae in tabula, et non modum cogitandi esse, nempe ipsum intelligere.' (*Eth. II, xliii, Sch.*)

Thus each world, the extended and the conscious, is in itself complete without the other: there are extended constellations in infinite detail and integration; correspondingly there are psychical constellations as detailed and as integrated. The human body, for example, in so far as it is a complete individual is complete in itself without reference to the human mind: the mind does not complete the body, it contemplates it. Knowledge as such does nothing within the bodily order; but it is not, therefore, ineffective, for it does everything within the psychical order, because in a sense it *is* everything there.¹ So also the mind is complete in its degree as a mind, it does not need the body to complete it: it needs no physical *basis* from which to 'emerge', or to 'qualify'; it needs the body only in so far as it is the *contemplation* of the body. Spinoza's theory, therefore, is wholly opposed to that of Mr. Alexander in so far as for him thought is a self-dependent system, whereas for Mr. Alexander it is a *quality* of certain complex constellations of living material, and as such is wholly absent from lower constellations (though something remotely analogous is to be found in these also, viz. Time). Spinoza does not admit that psychical being is wholly absent from any region of modal or substantial existence. True, not all individual things have minds in the full sense; only the infinite whole can be said to think perfectly, for perfect thought demands a perfect object.² No finite thing can be perfectly intelligent, and vast ranges of finite being lack even the imperfect mental character enjoyed by human beings.

¹ 'Mens, et Corpus una, eademque res [est] quae jam sub Cogitationis, jam sub Extensionis attributo concipitur. . . . At, quamvis haec ita se habeant, ut nulla dubitandi ratio supersit, vix tamen credo, nisi rem experientia comprobavero, homines induci posse ad haec aequo animo perpendendum, adeo firmiter persuasi sunt, Corpus ex solo Mentis nutu jam moveri, jam quiescere, plurimaeque agere, quae a sola Mentis voluntate, et excogitandi arte pendent. Etenim, quid Corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit, hoc est, neminem hucusque experientia docuit, quid Corpus ex solis legibus naturae, quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, possit agere, et quid non possit, nisi a Mente determinetur.' (*Eth. III, ii, Sch.*)

² 'Et cum per se clarum sit, mentem eo melius se intelligere, quo plura de Natura intelligit, inde constat, hanc Methodi partem eo perfectiorem fore, quo mens plura intelligit, et tum fore perfectissimam, cum mens ad cognitionem Entis perfectissimi attendit sive reflectit.' (*De Intell. Emend.*, Op. Post., p. 368.) Thus, further, it follows that Spinoza is not involved in the curious difficulty experienced by absolute idealists as to how perfect knowledge can be distinguished from its object. It is distinguished by the fact that it is knowledge whereas its object is not. Where this distinction does not hold (e.g. in reflective knowledge or *idea ideae*) perfect knowledge (i.e. the enjoyment of contemplation) is *not* existentially different from its object (i.e. the contemplation itself).

The general distribution of perfection among the modes has already been explained in some detail. The thought of a finite being *qua* finite is selective and in part imaginative or even false. Primary parts of nature do, in part, think adequately, and their primary parts to infinity may do so also; for all these can have knowledge of the Real (*ens perfectissimum*) and their knowledge of this object cannot but be adequate, i.e. perfect so far as it goes. But every finite mode is necessarily involved in abstraction and transiency: to that extent its thought is imperfect; and the more limited such a being is, the more it will be infected by transiency without integration, and the more imperfect will be its thought. The thought of a finite being is only possible at all as the reflection of *Natura cogitans*, arising from, and originating its response to the activity of the whole. That this responsiveness cannot be complete in an incomplete being constitutes the imperfection of its thought. Thus, though in man there is a glimmer of thought at its best, or at least as adequate, in the remoter constellations of the hierarchy of being there are quasi-systems so loose and so fragmentary and so slight as to be incapable of reflecting with clearness and distinctness any ultimate feature of the *ens perfectissimum*. Such broken souls will thus possess thought only in the sense of imaginations which, in that form or constellation, are almost wholly infected with falsity. But no genuine individual existence can be wholly false, for thus, except as a false part of the thought of some other individual, it would not exist.

Thus for Spinoza though thought varies in perfection in the various types of constellation, it is correlated with every extended constellation whatsoever. If an individual extended mode is in any degree a genuine existent, however low may be its degree of integration, there is contemplation or cognition of it as its *essentia objectiva*. It is known. And all psychical existence is of the nature of contemplation or knowledge; it is never the *quality* of its extended correlate; it is its cognition, not in the sense that the extended thing *knows*, but in the sense that it is thus truly *known*.

This is indeed the very crux of the disagreement of Mr. Alexander with this part of the theory of Spinoza: for he regards consciousness definitely as the quality of certain neural processes. These processes thus become not merely material things, not merely living things, but conscious things. Consciousness is 'the enjoyed

innervation of the appropriate neural process'.¹ Consciousness, if it exists,² is related to the constellations which are brain-processes 'just as a certain frequency of sound vibrations is qualified as A, and one of slightly less frequency has a lower pitch'.³

According to Mr. Alexander this part of his theory corresponds to Spinoza's references to the mind as the '*idea corporis*',⁴ the mind is the *enjoyment* of the neural processes; but it is also the *contemplation* of a world of objects, and this, he says, corresponds to Spinoza's use of the phrase '*idea Petri*'.⁵ I have already said enough about this imputed ambiguity in Spinoza's use of the term '*idea*' to indicate my view that Mr. Alexander has been too ready to accept the authority of the special commentators of Spinoza in this matter,⁶ but whatever may be said about such details of inter-

¹ *Space, Time, and Deity*, ii, p. 107.

² 'The real question raised in my mind is whether the physiological process, I mean as described physiologically, is not enough, and whether I have done rightly, *as I still feel I have*, in making consciousness a "quality" of the brain-process. Enjoyment for me was always identical with the brain process and its connections. Now I find it not so easy to recover my mind of seven years ago, and I may have expressed myself and perhaps really thought in a way which led to misapprehension. But all that I mean now by various enjoyments is brain-processes with their quality of consciousness, a quality which they do not have unless the process is of a certain sort, which is therefore intrinsic to them.' (*Loc. cit.* (Second Impression), i, p. xvii.) Cf. also p. xv where Mr. Alexander states one important reason why he does not adopt a behaviouristic metaphysics.

³ *Loc. cit.* (Second Impression), i, p. xviii.

⁴ *Loc. cit.* (Second Impression), i, p. xvi.

⁵ I must take this opportunity of noting a very curious remark of Mr. Alexander in the new preface to *Space, Time, and Deity*: 'Where I still dare to differ from Spinoza is that for him there is an idea of the mind, which is united to it as the mind to the body, and an idea of that idea, and so on. I should say that the mind is an idea, and that an idea of it is merely repetition' (p. xvi). Now it is remarkable that Mr. Alexander has not realized that Spinoza expressly denies that there is a vicious infinite regress: '*Ostendimus Corporis ideam, et Corpus, hoc est Mentem, et Corpus unum, et idem esse Individuum, quod jam sub Cogitationis, jam sub Extensionis attributo concipitur; quare Mentis idea, et ipsa Mens una eademque est res, quae sub uno, eodemque attributo, nempe Cogitationis, concipitur.*' (*Eth. II, xxi, Sch.*) But if they are the same thing in the same Attribute they are identical. And this is what he goes on to emphasize: '*Nam revera idea Mentis, hoc est, idea ideae nihil aliud est, quam forma ideae, quatenus haec, ut modus cogitandi, absque relatione ad objectum consideratur; simulac enim quis aliquid scit, eo ipso scit, se id scire, et simul scit, se scire, quod scit, et sic in infinitum.*' I cannot but suppose that Mr. Alexander put the emphasis in the wrong place and ignored the words I have italicized. The *idea ideae* is thus the idea itself as known in the only way in which an idea can be known, viz. as consciously *enjoyed*. Our contemplations are not lifeless pictures, but *actions* which we cannot have and yet be unaware of them. To know is to be aware of (i.e. to *enjoy*) knowing. It is also to be aware of (i.e. to *contemplate*) an object.

⁶ Cf. *Spinoza and Time*, pp. 19-20.

pretation (I do not mean that they are unimportant) Mr. Alexander is, as I have said, at one with Spinoza in recognizing that human cognition is complicated by the fact that the body is only a part of a larger whole. For Mr. Alexander the neural processes which have the quality of consciousness are only parts of a larger body existing in its own right, which is not conscious, but only living or physical, and this again is related in various ways with a world of external things of various orders of complexity. The result is that we do not merely enjoy ourselves as conscious neural processes, but we also contemplate our bodies and things as non-mental entities.¹

But our total consciousness is not to be imagined as an enjoyment of certain processes *plus* a contemplation of certain objects, for our enjoyment of the processes takes the form of the contemplation of the objects; thus the deliverance of immediate experience is that we enjoy the contemplation of the objects. It is only an outside observer (or the mind itself in thought)² who says that what we enjoy is the neural process. 'In being aware of a certain object the man is in a certain neural condition which enters into his experience as consciousness'³ of that object, or, more completely, as the enjoyed contemplation of the object. The neural condition itself is a response to a stimulus from the object, so that cognition is only a specially complex case of the simple relation of 'compresence': it is the compresence of (i) a neural system possessing the quality of consciousness of an object, with (ii) that object *qua* exciting the neural innervation which is the response of the neural system to the object. 'In and through this practical response the object is revealed to him as being there.'⁴

This theory of the relation of body and mind is, as Mr. Alexander says, 'a species of the identity doctrine',⁵ for the mental process and the neural process are really the same. As mental it is enjoyed by the experient; as neural it is contemplated by an outside observer; the mode of apprehension is different, but the thing apprehended is the same.

¹ What our enjoyment of ourselves would be like in the absence of the outside world which stimulates the neural processes to the innervation which is enjoyed, I need not ask, as the supposition is idle. Idle for Mr. Alexander, because his theory excludes the possibility; idle for Spinoza, because contemplation does not depend upon stimulus and response (though the nature of the object is affected by that). It thus becomes clear how theory of knowledge and metaphysics reciprocate in both of these theories.

² *Space, Time, and Deity*, ii, p. 9. ³ *Loc. cit.* (Second Impression), i, p. xviii.

⁴ *Loc. cit.* (Second Impression), i, p. xvi. ⁵ *Loc. cit.*, ii, p. 9.

It may be well at this stage to state as precisely as possible, in the merest outline and without superfluous refinements, what it is that I understand Mr. Alexander to assert: when two things, A and B, are cognitively compresent, one of them (say A) is of the order of complexity to which the quality of consciousness or mind belongs. A then has (or is) a neural system which is innervated in response to stimulus from B which is mediated by ordinary physical or organic processes. This innervation is enjoyed by A, but not as a neural innervation; it is *enjoyed as the contemplation of B*. Thus A contemplates B, and enjoys the contemplation. The totality of such enjoyments is the mind of A. The neural innervation is also capable of being contemplated by another being (or by A himself in thought), but as contemplated it is not a contemplation (i.e. a *contemplating*) but an object *contemplated*.

Let me first of all ask what is the precise meaning of the statement that 'A enjoys the neural innervation *as* the contemplation of B'? Consider the immediate experience of A: he directly enjoys the action of contemplating B. In thought, it may now be supposed, he also contemplates the innervation of his neural process, and recognizes that his consciousness is the quality of *that*, which therefore he must also, in that sense, be enjoying; how is he to rationalize the situation? How can he simply identify the neural enjoyment and the cognitive enjoyment? For he enjoys both, yet has not two enjoyments: a physical one and a mental one; for enjoyment is essentially mental. He enjoys the contemplating because it is the very nature of consciousness to contemplate: he enjoys the neural process because the consciousness which he enjoys is the quality of that process; he enjoys the process *in* enjoying its quality. He also 'lives through' the process as a vital process, and so on. We may call this 'living through' the process 'enjoying it organically' if we like, but it is not *conscious* enjoyment, which is, I suggest, the only proper meaning of the term.

Evidently the whole difficulty arises from Mr. Alexander's determination to call the enjoyed consciousness the *quality* of the neural process; and yet we must admit that it does *prima facie* seem to belong to it in some such manner!

Now it might be thought that an analogy could be taken from the next lower quality, viz. life, which is at once, as I have said, something that the living being 'lives through' (unconsciously but vitally 'enjoys'), and is also a complex constellation of metabolic

processes. What is the precise relation between the life 'enjoyed' by the unconscious plant,¹ and that which the external observer cognizes in scientific terms (i.e. contemplates)?

It can, perhaps, be said that the plant 'enjoys' its metabolic processes not as such but as a more or less complete responsive adaptation to its environment; and it is possible to understand how the two things, the contemplation and the enjoyment, belong to and reciprocate with one another, and are even, in a sense, the same. The one emphasizes the inner details of the process, the other the outward-tending summary of them, and the whole story demands both. But when we try to fit the analogy to the case of consciousness, we come upon some curious difficulties which cannot be traced to the fact that consciousness is a *higher*² quality, but only to the fact that it is not a quality at all but a *correlate*. There are the vigilant neural processes analogous to the metabolic processes in the case of life; but as the analogy to the vital responsive adaptation there is the conscious contemplation of objects. But what ought to be taken is the partial responsiveness to external objects of the neural processes, with their consequent more or less inadequate neural reflection (not contemplation) of these objects. That is to say we have just what Spinoza emphasizes: the human body receiving 'images' which represent partly the nature of the external thing, and partly the nature of the human body itself.³ And what is pointedly suggested by these facts is that the 'conscious'

¹ I say 'plant' in order to avoid the confusion of the issue which arises when we think of life in ourselves, which is not only 'lived through', and also contemplated as a system of metabolic processes, but further, is contemplated through organic and kinaesthetic sensations. (Cf. *Space, Time, and Deity*, ii, p. 174 *et seqq.*)

² Mr. Alexander is, perhaps, too ready to believe that the special difficulties of the case of consciousness are due to our place in the evolutionary hierarchy.

³ 'Objectum ideae, humanam Mentem constituentis, est Corpus, sive certus Extensionis modus actu existens, *et nihil aliud*. . . . Ex his non tantum intelligimus, Mentem humanam unitam esse Corpori, sed etiam, quid per Mentis, et Corporis unionem intelligendum sit. Verum ipsam adaequate, sive distincte intelligere nemo poterit, *nisi prius nostri Corporis naturam adaequate cognoscat*.' (*Eth. II, xiii, et Sch.*) 'Idea cujuscunque modi, quo Corpus humanum a corporibus externis afficitur, involvere debet naturam Corporis humani, et simul naturam corporis externi. . . . Hinc sequitur primo Mentem humanam plurimorum corporum naturam una cum sui corporis natura percipere. Sequitur secundo, quod ideae, quas corporum externorum habemus, magis nostri corporis constitutionem, quam corporum externorum naturam indicant.' (*Eth. II, xvi, et Corr.*) 'Mens humana ipsum humanum Corpus non cognoscit, nec ipsum existere scit, nisi per ideas affectionum, quibus Corpus afficitur.' (*Eth. II, xix.*)

body is only a peculiarly vigilant specimen of the *living* organism, so that the *organism* is not conscious but only vigilant. I have already said that Mr. Alexander himself toys with this notion;¹ and I must also remind the reader that it is in agreement with my own analysis of the modes of unity, since the highest type of unity indicated among the *parts* of *Natura naturata* was the organic unity, *Natura naturata* itself only surpassing this by its perfection as the infinite whole in which organic unity gives place to self-reflecting unity.

What I suggest, therefore, is that Mr. Alexander has erred in naming *enjoyed* consciousness as a *quality* of certain finite spatio-temporal complexes, and that he must not introduce this error into his reformed Spinozism. The highest of such qualities must be life itself,² though varying in completeness from the plant up through the animal to man and possibly even higher beings. Enjoyed consciousness cannot be conceived as a quality at all: when we think of such consciousness it is of an activity through which, not this or that thing is qualified, but on the contrary all things are *contemplated*. It is not a quality of the body, it is a contemplation of a world which is the body as affected by *Natura extensa*. True, the body has its quality of vigilant responsiveness, which some might be prepared (though I am not) to call 'unconscious consciousness', but the 'living through' (or unconscious 'enjoyment' of) this cannot be the same thing as the experience of knowing it (and certainly not of knowing anything else). Thus Mr. Alexander's use of the term 'enjoyment', as standing not only for the 'living through' of the neural process but also for the psychological enjoyment of the action of contemplating an object, is homonymous. We *enjoy* or *experience* or *psychically are* mental activities; we *live through* or *vitality are* living activities; we *physically are* material things. Hence the hypothetical angel's contemplation of our conscious enjoyment as an object, to which Mr. Alexander's speculative flight directs him, must be interpreted as a contemplation of the extended correlate of our consciousness, however that is best described. Now this is precisely what we already *do* contemplate, and the angel's view could only be a more concentrated or unified

¹ *Space, Time, and Deity* (Second Impression), i, p. xvii.

² In which case it may be expected that Mr. Alexander's doctrine of 'deity', which has appeared one of the least satisfactory (and least attractive) parts of his theory, will collapse.

transcript of such an experience. But as so transformed and integrated and glorified it might well be that our neural innervation with all its universal ramifications through *Natura naturata* would be contemplated as possessing a quality far transcending anything in our experience, and thus would be the correlate of the angel's enjoyed contemplation. *Yet it would not be enjoyed consciousness*, but the object of angelic contemplation. And the angel would enjoy the contemplation; he would not contemplate the enjoyment.

I have distinguished between the vigilance of the fully functioning human organism and the consciousness of the human mind; the former is a quality of the body, the latter a quality of the mind: and I may perhaps, as I have already suggested in passing, identify the former with the much discussed 'unconscious mind' affected by recent psychology. It must, of course, be recognized that this hypothesis was mainly framed to meet another set of difficulties; whether it meets them I will not discuss, but that it is not wholly without significance is both obvious and certain.¹ It is well known that Spinoza himself emphasized the wonderful powers of the organic body in operating without even the seeming agency of mind. 'No one has hitherto determined what the body can do, that is, no one has yet learned by experience what the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far as it is regarded as a body. No one has hitherto gained such an accurate knowledge of the bodily structure, that he can explain all its functions; nor need I call attention to the fact that many actions are observed in the lower animals, which far transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists do many things in their sleep which they would not venture to do when awake: these instances are enough to show that the body can by the laws of its nature alone do many things which the mind wonders at. . . . I would further call attention to the structure of the human body, which far surpasses in artifice all that has been put together by human ingenuity, not to repeat what I have already shown, namely, that from *Natura*, under whatever Attribute it may be considered, infinite things follow.'² Consciousness, therefore, though it does

¹ No one has denied all the 'facts': many have questioned the interpretation. But to advance a rival interpretation is to admit the facts.

² 'Quid Corpus possit, nemo hucusque determinavit, hoc est, neminem hucusque experientia docuit, quid Corpus ex solis legibus naturae, quatenus corporea tantum consideratur, possit agere, et quid non possit, nisi a Mente determinetur. Nam nemo hucusque Corporis fabricam tam accurata novit, ut

nothing in the world of Extension, does everything in the world of Thought; and bodily vigilance which does nothing in the world of Thought, does everything in the world of Extension.

So far I have thought mainly of the human individuality as the natural example of the relations of mind and body; but if consciousness as enjoyed is distinct from the vigilance of the higher centres, there is no reason for making it solely their correlate. We are free, in the first place, to extend *our* consciousness to wider ranges in accordance with the requirements of that consciousness itself. For our consciousness includes the consciousness of other individuals: not of those which lie outside of our own nature, but of the subordinate parts and mixed suburbs of our nature, including our relations with external things and their parts. We know that we contemplate not only our own body as a whole; in some form or another we contemplate every part of our body as vigilant in its degree. Secondly, we contemplate also the external world and its parts as they stand related to our bodies, but we do so confusedly: we *imagine* them. Empirically, therefore, consciousness is extant in correlation with things other than the neural processes of the individual human thinker. We are conscious not merely in our preciser thought or intuition of the world as a whole as it is reflected in the body in its highest processes of synthesis, in the higher nerve centres; we are conscious also in Imagination of a world of sense-perception as it is reflected in the relatively lower processes of synthesis associated with the special sense-organs and their integrating centres. And here too we have genuine knowledge, but of lower orders of synthesis in things. For consciousness does not *make* the sense-qualities of things (whether special, as mediating the materiality of things; or organic and kinaesthetic, as mediating their vitality); it contemplates them *as* the syntheses of elements either within the human body or in the system composed of

omnes ejus functiones potuerit explicare, ut jam taceam, quod in Brutis plura observentur, quae humanam sagacitatem longe superant, et quod somnambuli in somnis plurima agant, quae vigilando non auderent; quod satis ostendit, ipsum Corpus ex solis suae naturae legibus multa posse, quae ipsius Mens admiratur. . . . Addo hic ipsam Corporis humani fabricam, quae artificio longissime superat omnes, quae humana arte fabricatae sunt, ut jam taceam, quod supra ostenderim, ex natura, sub quovis attributo considerata, infinita sequi.' (*Eth. III, ii, Sch.*) If, then, the theory of Spinoza is correct, the wonder is not that the body can act of itself, but that consciousness should seem to be non-existent in these special cases, while all the extended factors are present in the bodily correlate. Some form of dissociation appears to be suggested.

external things in suitably effective compresence with the human body.

Our mind or consciousness, then, is 'of' our body both appositionally and in reference: we know only our own bodies and their parts, but these relate us to outside things in such a way that subordinate individuation implies no division of the unity of *Natura naturata*. The division is *in* or *under*, but not *of* *Natura*. It follows therefore that though we cannot enter into and possess the complete consciousness of any external individual of any grade, but only at best our own, we can and do discover something of their conscious nature in our own experience, because we are constituted by, and contemplate the same objects, though not in the same degrees of integration. What for us is confused and partial Imagination may, for them, be consciousness more distinct and clear. We perceive them in their relation to us as perceptual things, i.e. as loosely integrated ranges of qualities of various degrees. So they also may perceive us. But they perceive themselves in their relation to us, and we perceive ourselves in our relation to them, as more highly integrated ranges of quality.¹ And when I speak of perceiving ourselves, I do mean perceiving *our* bodies, for we never perceive (i.e. contemplate) anything else, though we perceive them *as affected* by things. When a man perceives his body, it is not necessarily the 'two-legged animal without feathers' which is the body for sense-perception; he may perceive it as it is for *Intellectus*: a partial and inadequate reflection of *Natura naturata extensa*. In this sense a man's body is what he reproduces of *Natura naturata extensa*, it is what he (and only he) mistakes for nature. For the world which we perceive by sense is not *Natura naturata extensa* as it is in itself, but only a partly confused perspective of it, largely composed of 'imaginings' which, though essential to the man in question, and genuinely a section of his nature, find no place, in that form, in *Natura* itself. A man's body, therefore, as I said in an earlier chapter, is of varying contour: for some purposes it is the nervous system; for some the organism as a whole; again for some it is *Natura* itself as it is imagined by the man himself: he paints nature with the affections which things

¹ Through these relations we may, perhaps, be said to have a 'direct' knowledge of other minds. This alone, in essence, can be what is meant by the saying that we know other minds directly as the concomitant of 'sociality'. Sociality must here be a function of consciousness, and not mere physical or organic reciprocity or adaptation. (Cf. *Space, Time, and Deity*, ii, pp. 31-7.)

outside of him produce in him (i.e. in relation and integration with him). Well, indeed, then, did Spinoza emphasize the difficulty of understanding what the body is, as well as the necessity of doing so if his theory were to be understood.¹ For here the commentators almost uniformly have misunderstood the theory, finding, as I have said, an ambiguity in the use of the term 'idea'. In the term 'idea corporis', says Mr. Alexander, following the lead of Sir Frederick Pollock and others, the genitive is used in the sense of apposition or enjoyment; but in the term 'idea Petri' it is used in the sense of reference or contemplation. Now I assert on the contrary that in *each* case the genitive is *both* of apposition *and* of reference: it is the genitive of apposition or enjoyment because the idea is the correlate of the body or of Peter, and is also enjoyed; it is the genitive of contemplation and reference because it is a cognition or mental action. The 'idea corporis' is at once both the contemplation of the body, and also the correlate of the body; for the body as it is for man's completest thought is not a section of *Natura extensa*, but a real part of it, running through it as a selection of all things in varying degrees of integration and adequacy. Thus we get our nearest approach to a complete view of the human body as a part of *Natura extensa*; and in knowing our own bodies we also know all things in the degree in which it is possible for such finite parts as we are to know them. And though the human body that we perceive in *mera experientia* is broken and sectional, it is not wholly unreal, and it has its range of consciousness as a relatively integrated system of 'imaginings'. It is thus capable of a certain duration and self-maintenance within the world of such things.

Similarly with the 'idea Petri' which forms a section of Paul's mind: it is at once the contemplation of Peter's body, and also the psychical correlate of that body. That it is also a section of the correlate of Paul's body is no difficulty, for Peter and Paul are parts of *Natura*, and therefore not wholly isolated from each other. They are both in some degree and fashion real parts of *Natura*, but Peter's idea of himself is more complete and more highly integrated than is Paul's idea of Peter (which is only a relatively disintegrated and 'imaginational' selection from the outlying suburbs of the being of Peter).

Once more, I cannot but regard it as amazing that writers who

¹ *Eth. II, xiii, Sch.*

have otherwise shown themselves to be sympathetic towards the doctrine of Spinoza can so uniformly have failed to discover the real significance of this part of his theory. It is due, undoubtedly, to their failure to understand how *Natura* can have parts without being divided. But this, as I have insisted, is possible because *Natura* is a constellation of constellations to infinity, and not a one-dimensional system of *corpora simplicia* and *ideae simplices* (which cry aloud their incoherence). It is genuinely, and not merely temporally, hierarchical in form, and it is so because the eternity of *Natura naturata* is, in its parts, and parts of parts to infinity, progressively dissipated into duration, and vanishes in the limit (i.e. in the instantaneous and isolated *puncta*, and their 'ideas') as pure time, which is non-being.

There is therefore a harmonized complexity in the body corresponding to consciousness with the mind; and as the one is the spatial character of the individual so constituted, so the other is his mental character. Consciousness is thus not the same thing as physical vigilance or responsiveness; it is not a quality of certain spatio-temporal systems; it implies a new rendering of the Real; it is ideal vigilance as distinct from corporeal or spatial vigilance.¹ And wherever there is the one there is also in like measure the other. *Omnia animata*; but thought and precise knowledge by any individual mean a high degree of responsiveness or reflection in the order of ideas, correspondent with a high degree of responsiveness or reproduction in the order of things. 'The human mind is adapted to the perception of many things, and its aptitude increases in proportion to the number of ways in which its body can be disposed.'² 'That which so disposes the body that it can be affected in many ways, or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in many ways, is profitable to man'³ as an ex-

¹ It is this vigilance that constitutes our bodily individuality, as it is our consciousness that makes us psychical individuals. Again it is not mere compresence, but conscious and vigilant compresence that is important for knowledge and physical community respectively. Where the vigilance and the consciousness are intimate and highly varied, there we have an individual of a high degree of reality, and knowledge which is true and adequate; where they are vague and general and superficial, a mere thing, and perceptual imaginative knowledge.

² 'Mens humana apta est ad plurima percipiendum, et eo aptior, quo ejus Corpus pluribus modis disponi potest.' (*Eth. II, xiv.*)

³ 'Id, quod Corpus humanum ita disponit, ut pluribus modis possit affici, vel quod idem aptum reddit ad Corpora externa pluribus modis afficiendum, homini est utile.' (*Eth. IV, xxxviii.*)

tended being; and the same is true in the world of consciousness since 'we do not certainly know that anything is good . . . excepting that which actually conduces to understanding.'¹ 'He who possesses a body fit for many things possesses a mind of which the greatest part is eternal.'²

My view then is that Mr. Alexander has himself been guilty of a subtle confusion in making consciousness a special quality of a class of spatio-temporal constellations; that he has thus illegitimately passed from the contemplated external world of Space-Time and its qualities and relations, to an enjoyed conscious world which in its own way (viz. *objective*) corresponds with Space-Time through and through. Thus time is not rightly called the *mind* of space, though it might, perhaps, be called the responsiveness of the parts of space to each other, if this is conceived as at once the source both of their distinctions and of their relations.³ Time constitutes space, as it constitutes all individuals in space, and as eternity constitutes the individual which is real Space, viz. the eternal Real under the Attribute of Extension. But no less does time constitute consciousness, and eternity the Real under the Attribute of Thought; for, to use one of Kant's most famous sayings, 'Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without perceptions blind';⁴ that principle applies universally: not only to thoughts and perceptions, but also to intuitions or 'sense-data' in so far as these involve distinctly apprehended content.⁵

We are thus committed to what appears *prima facie* as a dualism, and has seemed to many to become, in the hands of Spinoza, an infinite reduplication of being; for the attribution of these forms of being to the one Substance has too often appeared as a mere assertion, without rationalization. 'The otherness of God's Attributes and their identity are postulated. God is a Substance "consisting of" an infinite diversity of Attributes. God is the union of contrasts; i.e. the receptacle in which they are statically combined,

¹ 'Nihil certo scimus bonum . . . nisi id, quod ad intelligendum revera conducit.' (*Eth. IV, xxvii.*)

² 'Qui Corpus ad plurima aptum habet, is Mentem habet, cujus maxima pars est aeterna.' (*Eth. V, xxxix.*)

³ But this responsiveness seems even more suitably identified, not with Time, but with the mobility of Space-Time (=Motion), wherein it achieves its first primitive reality.

⁴ 'Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.' (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Werke, Berlin, 1903, IV, p. 48.)

⁵ A point which seems to have eluded Kant.

not the life which fulfils itself in the making and overcoming of oppositions.¹ And although Mr. Alexander has himself put forward an explanation (not a defence) of Spinoza's meaning, he regards his own theory of Space-Time as an improvement upon Spinoza, by reason (among other things) of its completeness: time and space reciprocating with and mutually realizing each other. Of course in a similar way, if Spinoza had inclined towards idealism (which he did not), Thought and Extension in his system might have reciprocated in an indivisible unity: Thought being essentially *of* Extension, and Extension being solely the object of Thought. The possibility has not passed unnoticed, either by Spinoza's commentators, or even by more independent philosophers. Happily, for Spinoza that door still remained closed. The necessary duality of the empirical Attributes of existence as necessarily pointed the way to the affirmation of infinite Attributes in Infinite Substance.

I conclude that however attractive may be the hypothesis suggested by Mr. Alexander, Spinoza would not, for the reasons I have stated, have been able to accept it; his own theory in the end, as I shall indicate in the next chapter, presents a far more lofty flight of rational speculation, and one that does not suffer from the metaphysical otiosity, or even contradictoriness, which have usually been ascribed to it.

I must now bring the criticism of Mr. Alexander's speculation to an end. His philosophy has, as the reader will perceive, much in it that commends it to the Spinozist: I may mention in particular his insistence upon the ultimate character of real Space or Extension, as against the common condemnation by the idealists of both space and time. The opposition between Mr. Alexander and the idealists, however, on this special point is not so extreme as it might appear, for in the main, what the idealists deny is what I take it Mr. Alexander has no desire to affirm, viz. that space and time can be without content or relation. Bradley held, for example, that 'empty space—space without some quality (visual or muscular) which in itself is more than spatial—is an unreal abstraction. It cannot be said to exist, for the reason that it cannot by itself have any meaning'.² The principle is perhaps correct, but the limitation of quality to 'visual or muscular' is indefensible. Why should the content of Extension be sense-content universally? Mere

¹ Joachim, *The Nature of Truth*, p. 174.

² *Appearance and Reality*, p. 38.

empty space is, of course, inconceivable; but it is equally true (and is admitted) that mere unextended quality is inconceivable. Nor, as I have said, is it sufficient, *qua* extended, to constitute a world in which there are distinct individuals of various orders from *corpora simplicissima* up to *corpora humana*. Further, the existence of responsive parts within the Real is most readily grasped in the first instance when this is conceived as extended, and it is not impossible that the difficulties relating to the status of finite individuals within the Absolute arise mainly, if not entirely, as the result of epistemological idealistic presuppositions which have no genuine foundation.¹

In the belief in a real space or Extension existing in addition to Thought, Spinoza and Mr. Alexander would be very largely at one; but the precise way in which this principle is worked out and used by the latter would, as I have contended, certainly have seemed unsatisfactory to Spinoza. For in the theory of Mr. Alexander space is only in a formal sense realized by time: its unity is thus formally diversified without being destroyed. But only formally: you cannot begin with Space-Time and deduce the variety of the universe therefrom; that is, perhaps, the point of Mr. Alexander's assertions about the empirical character of philosophy.² Space-Time is the simplest thing in the universe, but for us (and in itself too) it is filled with complexity in the form of emergent qualities, from mobility up to deity.³ This complex content is

¹ Though, of course, a *complete* conception of conscious existence would correspond with the conception of extended existence. There is, however, the fatal tendency to attempt to *contemplate* thought as an abstraction, instead of intuiting it on the analogy of our own *enjoyed* concrete individuality. This ineffective contemplation of thought results only in a thin, desubstantialized, image of extended existence as it is the object of this or that mind. Thought thus comes to be taken as desubstantialized logical content, which soon becomes a single one-dimensional unity which contains all thought, or even disappears into the Real when it is fully perfected and unified. How it can disappear into the Real when, *ex hypothesi*, it *is* the Real, is a mystery which has been dealt with by idealists in various ways. But all thought is, in its measure, concrete and individual; and its individuality is measured by its truth and adequacy. Thus the whole truth is the perfect being or individual as enjoying the knowledge and love of itself. There is, however, no such thing as truth or an idea which is not active enjoyed knowing. And the very nature of thought, therefore, itself implies the hierarchy of individuals. It remains true, nevertheless, that this is most readily brought home to the unreflective mind in the world of Extension: most readily, but not necessarily more clearly and truly.

² *Space, Time, and Deity*, i, p. 4.

³ *Loc. cit.*, i, p. 1.

given to us, and we have to make what we can of it. If, then, we begin with Space-Time as a formal reality, all its qualitative content has to be accepted piecemeal as additional with 'natural piety'. But just as spiritual piety is not attested by a belief in miracles, so 'natural piety' should not be associated with a belief in 'natural miracles'. For the presence of quality in nature is only a miracle to be hailed 'with glad surprise',¹ because it has been left out of account at the beginning, and has been powerful enough to re-assert itself: for it will not be ignored or denied. If Space-Time had been allowed to take its proper place in the inquiry as a result of the analysis of the world as given (i.e. as not only formally extensive and temporal but also as concretely 'qualified'), and not as the formal starting-point of phenomenological development, it would then have been found that it is *essentially* 'qualified', and the problem would have been to discover some principle whereby the relations of qualities and spatio-temporal contours and transitions might have been explained. It would thus have been possible to go back to the beginning with a Space-Time that would not merely receive qualities with open-mouthed astonishment, but would be able to incorporate and assimilate them, and so construct a phenomenal nature for itself, culminating in *Extensio aeterna* as a metaphysical goal. In philosophy we must begin by taking reality as we find it; if we are to swim we must take the plunge into the water: as we have so often been told, he who learns on a stool is likely to find the water a little distressing. Are not the qualities a little distressing to those who so anxiously accept them 'with natural piety'?

It is well, then, from the point of view of right order and thoroughness to begin with the simplest of all things (Space-Time) and thence proceed to more complex matters; but only if the clue to the mode of complication has been discovered by an independent investigation. Without that clue the complexities must be simply superadded, with the result that not even an effective phenomenology will be possible, and certainly no genuine metaphysics. In the philosophy of Mr. Alexander the case is, of course, by no means so desperate as that; for his theory that the qualities emerge² in constellations of Space-Time affords a certain phenomenological

¹ Lloyd Morgan, 'The Case for Emergent Evolution' (*Journal of Philosophical Studies*, IV, p. 37).

² Especially when his peculiar use of the term 'emerge' is fully understood.

propriety to the speculation. But the further development towards metaphysics cannot but halt in the absence of a more complete *éclaircissement* of the relations of constellation and quality. For Mr. Alexander the qualities emerge, not as mere mental additions to be ignored in the philosophy of nature, but as real qualities which nevertheless have no intelligible relation with their matrix. Quality and constellation are associated *de facto*, and that must suffice for the naturally pious. But piety must not be looked for in metaphysicians; they will not long remain incurious about such *de facto* associations: they will inquire, as I have done, whether these qualities are in fact *additional* to their constellations, or whether they are not rather *alternative* to them. There is sensation of sound *or* of cochlear vibration, not both with the same organ or element; hearing of sound *and* sight of vibrating string, perhaps, for the two senses reciprocate with different ranges of quality; or again, *thought* of spatio-temporal constellation *and also* of quality, because thought penetrates to many ranges of quality, but it does not follow that the Real is the *sum* of all ranges. The Real is the appropriate synthesis and subordination of all ranges. It is always, as I have said, a question of the vigilant responsiveness of the sense-organ or neural system to its environment: one organ integrates only the vibrations, another their constellation; yet another the constellation of constellations. And the vibrations themselves are already a constellation of more primitive constellations. Thus Mr. Alexander may well be right when he speaks of Space-Time as the *matrix* of all things, and even as the *stuff* of all empirical existence; but his argument should have carried him even further; for if it is their stuff it must be cut to their measure and fashioned to their form. As so fashioned to its qualitative content, it becomes, further, in the end, in the finished form of eternal Extension, their very *Substance*.

That Mr. Alexander is unable to reach this conclusion is the result of two serious limitations in his theory: (1) He is content to accept part only of the empirical characters of time, overlooking its integration as the result of constellation, whereby its 'extensive', repetitive character progressively gives place to an 'intensive', self-permeating character, which is quality. (2) He fails, further, to find a place in the concrete nature of Space-Time for that qualitative element of the Real which, at the same time, he is unwilling to put aside as mere appearance or illusion.

These two are only diverse appearances of the one fundamental limitation: failure to recognize the fact that qualities do not merely 'emerge' without the modification of their spatio-temporal site: they do not merely *occupy* it, they *integrate* it. Thus the smooth continuity of Space-Time becomes knotted and warped; for its concrete filling must always be its subordinate enduring constellations or qualities;¹ and the constellation which is the whole *Natura naturata* is no longer temporal but eternal. For Space-Time cannot wait to the end of time for its complete filling; without its filling it is nothing but the empty form of existence. In so far as it is real it is the *constellatio constellationum*, in which all durations find their appropriate subordinate place: as such it is not Space-Time but *Extensio aeterna*, or, if you will, *aeternitas extensa*. For eternity is the content of the Real, whether it appears under the Attribute of Extension, or that of Thought, or any other of the infinite Attributes of the Real.

It might be conceived as possible that though no explanation is forthcoming in the earlier part of Mr. Alexander's theory as to how empirical emergent qualities are related to the constellations of Space-Time, yet some suggestion might become available as the result of the speculative effort which aims at passing from mind (the highest of the qualities actually enjoyed by us) upwards towards the next quality, viz. deity. The universe actually possesses materiality, life, and mind, and 'compels us to forecast the next empirical quality or deity'.² But unfortunately the very method of the inquiry necessarily precludes Mr. Alexander from putting forward a theory of God, from which he might retrace his steps, lighting up the way by means of ideas derived from that more daring (and less empirical) venture. For clearly we can only apply the principles derived from the analysis of our actual data to the merely possible further case; for God 'as actually possessing deity does not exist',³ though we have a clue to the validity of the further speculation in that 'God as the whole universe tending towards deity does exist'.⁴ Thus we explain the nature of God from what we know of matter, of life, of mind, and of the general plan of human and sub-human existence. Deity is, of course, more complex⁵

¹ Distinguishing, but not separating *constellatio* and *constellata*.

² *Space, Time, and Deity*, ii, p. 353.

³ *Loc. cit.* (Second Impression), i, p. xxiii.

⁴ *Loc. cit.*

⁵ *Space, Time, and Deity*, i, p. 1. The whole speculation is, of course, for me

than these, but it is superadded, or emergent, on the same principles. We cannot hope, therefore, to have much light thrown on the subordinate ranges of being from the speculations about deity: in this matter, at all events, for Mr. Alexander's theory there is no help in God.

This is one of the points upon which Mr. Lloyd Morgan has not (to use his own words) 'played jackal to Mr. Alexander's lion';¹ and the divergence is, for my argument and in itself, noteworthy, because it formally reconciles Mr. Lloyd Morgan with some of the main contentions of the present chapter. For it is important to remember that he has never put forward the theory of 'emergent evolution' as an ultimate metaphysics,² but always as a 'philosophy of science', i.e. as a phenomenology. As such, in its main lines, it is from my point of view not merely unobjectionable, but generally acceptable. Mr. Lloyd Morgan has more than once emphasized this limitation: Emergent evolution is 'a generalization *founded on observation and experiment*'.³ 'Given your emergent evolution, how do you propose to explain it? In my capacity as a man of science it is no part of my business to explain it . . . You are content, then, . . . to leave it wholly unexsomewhat crippled by my denial that consciousness or mind is a quality of spatio-temporal contours.

¹ *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, IV, p. 26. The statement is far too modest if it is applied to the philosophies of these two writers, considered as wholes. It is only in the merest skeleton (and only part of that) that Mr. Lloyd Morgan's speculation agrees with that of Mr. Alexander. In the details, and in the directions in which the details are sought, there is the widest possible divergence. The same is true of their epistemological positions: for here Mr. Lloyd Morgan, by a *tour de force*, by moving away from Spinoza (and Mr. Alexander) towards an idealistic theory, or at any rate towards idealistic premisses, succeeds thereby in more nearly approaching Spinoza, than does Mr. Alexander, in his view of the relations of mind and body. The whole of this part of Mr. Lloyd Morgan's theory is exceedingly interesting and instructive. It constitutes, indeed, an inquiry into the phenomenological implications of the doctrine of Attributes, and limitations of space alone prevent me from considering the theory at length, and its relations (recognized by Mr. Lloyd Morgan) with that of Spinoza.

² 'Metaphysically my modest scheme will not bear comparison with that elaborated with admirable skill by Mr. Alexander, but it is all I have to offer' (*Emergent Evolution*, p. 24). I agree that Mr. Alexander shows a greater sense of philosophical system, that he is right in making metaphysics the ultimate discipline, but nevertheless Mr. Lloyd Morgan is too modest in overlooking the metaphysical importance of his refusal to believe in mere Space-Time, and in the satisfactoriness of the concept of the fluency of time (cf. *Emergent Evolution*, pp. 23-4). His growing sense, too, of the metaphysical need for an ultimate principle in terms of which emergent evolution may itself be explained, is of great importance.

³ *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, IV, p. 37.

plained. I confess that I have not been content to do so.¹ But Mr. Lloyd Morgan's explanation is coloured by his assumption that in emergent evolution we have an ultimate generalization with respect to the nature of empirical reality; hence for him the further question is not so much the metaphysical one of the nature of the Real Being so manifested, but 'What gives to events their initial go?' or 'What gives to them this or that determinate plan of the manner of their going at this or that stage of their evolutionary advance?' or 'What gives the comprehensive plan of emergent evolution?'² These are the *data*, who is the Giver? Is there a Giver? But these are ways of putting the question which may lead, and often have led, the unphilosophical mind to give answers which belong to mythology or theology rather than to metaphysics; for the question is not so much as to whether the *data* are 'given' in any special sense of the term, and if so by whom; but what is their status in the Real? Are they self-sufficient as they stand in this ultimate scientific generalization (which Mr. Lloyd Morgan denies), or have they some further or more ultimate ground in relation to which they are contingent? What is their relation to such a ground? If their being flows contingently from some source which lies outside of them, then the question will recur with respect to the *totum* which includes the *data* and their source; if not, i.e. if their source is their immanent ground, then its nature must come into question, and the answer will be not theological or mythological, but metaphysical. And in no case is it a reply to such questions to speak of things as the outcome of Divine Purpose, with no adequate explanation of the meaning and place of purpose in the universe, for thus the will of God becomes once more, in Spinozistic phrase, 'the asylum of ignorance'. In any case, therefore, we are driven on to problems which are metaphysical.

These facts are recognized, of course, by Mr. Lloyd Morgan, and he expressly asserts that his theory includes no supernatural in the bad sense of an interfering supernatural; 'from the strictly emergent point of view any notion of a so-called "alien influx into nature" is barred. And if we acknowledge Divine Activity . . . it is to be conceived as *omnipresent*'.³ 'There is for me . . . only one realm of reality that is *both natural and spiritual*, in ultimate unity of substance, but is *not both natural and supernatural* if this

¹ *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, IV, p. 38.

² *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, p. 280.

³ *Emergent Evolution*, p. 13.

imply ultimate diversity of orders of being.¹ Again 'the rational order in nature, including human nature, is not other than Divine Purpose'.² But I ask, how are the two one? 'What in naturalistic regard is "epigenetic" emergence is from first to last the temporal unfolding of Divine Purpose in which there is no first nor last since it Is.'³ But the ultimate reality cannot be a plan or purpose in isolation from its actual filling or detail, and I have, therefore, to ask how the timeless plan of things contains its timeful details: i.e. not primarily how the spiritual apprehension is related to the rational or reflective, but how the objects which are for ordinary consciousness in time, find their place in the timeless Real of spiritual apprehension. This is a metaphysical problem which must be met if we are to avoid a nerveless mysticism, but it is not a point to which Mr. Lloyd Morgan has yet turned his attention, certainly not in the comprehensive and acute way to which he has accustomed us in other inquiries. The magnitude and importance of his achievements in these would render it ungracious to complain that he has not faced a question so difficult and so remote from the interests of science, even of psychological science. But it has been necessary to judge of the ultimate satisfactoriness of his theory, i.e. not of its phenomenological adequacy, but of its metaphysical ultimacy and validity.

The incompleteness I have detected is most probably due to the fact that the problem which Mr. Lloyd Morgan has mainly in view is nearer to the commonplace conflict between Religion and Science, than to the special difficulties of the pure philosopher. But we do not clear up the question of the relations of temporal unfolding and timeless purpose by asserting that the spiritual attitude of mind is emergent upon the reflective attitude, and that what is for the latter a rational natural order, is for the former and higher attitude the expression of Divine Purpose; and Mr. Lloyd Morgan's 'constructive' philosophy is a generalization from empirical data in terms of the single principle of emergent evolution, followed by an effort of faith in the direction of an 'acknowledged' Deity, rather than a genuine attempt to substitute knowledge for faith by the persistent application of appropriate rational categories throughout the empirical data. Here we have only *data metaphysica*, or at most the *apparatus metaphysicus*, but no genuine *cogitata metaphysica*.

¹ *Life, Mind, and Spirit*, p. 302.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 303.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 308.

PART IV
TRANSCENDENCE

CHAPTER XI

THE INFINITE ATTRIBUTES OF THE REAL

THE ascription by Spinoza of infinite Attributes to Substance, which is thus made to transcend human nature and experience not merely by its infinitude within the Attributes of Extension and Thought, but further by its absolute infinitude beyond these empirical limits, has often been regarded as a mere husk of superfluous metaphysics, intrinsically incoherent, and resulting from a combination of scholastic 'principle-riding' and an extreme anti-anthropomorphism; in a word, as an instance of pre-critical dogmatism. That the theory is the result of reasoning rightly described as metaphysical, and not of a direct appeal to experience, is sufficiently obvious, since it is an essential part of Spinoza's doctrine that man is a mode of Extension and Thought exclusively, and is thus unable, directly and positively, to know the natures of the other Attributes.

The actual reasoning is undoubtedly based upon Spinoza's perception that an absolute being must wholly transcend the category of number: for to have a determinate finite number implies the operation of an external cause. 'No definition implies or expresses a certain number of individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing beyond the nature of the thing defined. . . . For example, if twenty men exist in the universe . . . and we want to account for their existence, it will not be enough to show the cause of human existence in general . . . a cause must be assigned for the existence of each individual. Now this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man, for the true definition of man does not involve any consideration of the number twenty. Consequently the cause . . . must necessarily be sought outside of the individuals. Hence we may lay down the absolute rule, that everything the nature of which permits of several individual instances, must necessarily have an external cause to bring about their existence.'¹

¹ 'Sequitur . . . nullam definitionem certum aliquem numerum individuorum involvere, neque exprimere quandoquidem nihil aliud exprimit, quam naturam rei definitae . . . Si ex. gr. in rerum natura 20 homines existant . . . non satis erit (ut scilicet rationem reddamus, cur 20 homines existant) causam naturae humanae in genere ostendere; . . . quandoquidem uniuscujusque debet necessario dari causa, cur existat. At haec causa non potest in ipsa natura humana

The same principle operates, not merely with reference to the uniqueness (as distinct from the unity) of Substance as such, but also with reference to the infinitude (as distinct from 'indefinitude') of the Attributes themselves which are the expressions of Substance. In the former case the principle operates in the direction of unity: if Substance exists and is not definitely plural (since no external cause is available) then neither can it be indefinitely plural, it must be, not *una inter multas*, but *unica*. With the Attributes which constitute Substance the case is more complex, since, as Spinoza held, and as I have argued in discussing the theory of Mr. Alexander, experience actually presents us with modes of two distinct Attributes: Thought and Extension. It follows that their non-numerability cannot be expressed by a retreat upon unity, but only through the conception of infinity: a conception which, as I shall argue, is admissible through the peculiar relation found to subsist between Thought and Extension, which do not simply stand side by side as two, but which involve each other in an intimate and unique manner without loss of distinctness as existences.¹

This was the root of the theory put forward by Spinoza to the effect that 'an absolutely infinite being must necessarily be defined as consisting in infinite Attributes each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence'.² And the conception thus defined certainly did not appear to him, to judge from his expressions,³ to involve special difficulty, though the fact remains that it has occupied the ingenuity of generations of Spinoza-students,⁴ and remains, according to Mr. Alexander, 'the standing unresolved puzzle of interpretation of Spinoza'.⁵ Even by Professor Joachim,

contineri, quandoquidem vera hominis definitio numerum vicenarium non involvit; adeoque causa . . . debet necessario extra unumquemque dari, et propterea absolute concludendum, omne id, cujus naturae plura individua existere possunt, debere necessario, ut existant, causam externam habere.' (*Eth. I, viii, Sch. ii.*)

¹ Thought being the *essentia objectiva* of Extension; Extension the *objectum* or *ideatum* of Thought.

² 'Nihil etiam clarius, quam quod ens absolute infinitum necessario sit definiendum ens, quod constat infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam, et infinitam certam essentiam exprimit.' (*Eth. I, x, Sch.*)

³ Cf. *Ep. lxvi*: 'Ad haec' (i.e. *Eth. II, vii, Sch.*; *I, x*) 'si aliquantulum attendas, nihil difficultatis superesse videbis.'

⁴ A fairly exhaustive account of the results of these speculative inquiries is available in the article by Egon von Petersdorff on 'Spinoza's Unendliche Attribute Gottes' (*Chronicon Spinozanum, II*, pp. 67-91).

⁵ *Spinoza and Time*, p. 50.

who is otherwise, in the main, a sympathetic (though perhaps a sophisticated) interpreter of Spinoza, the theory is, as I have noted, thought to be 'fatally defective'. 'The substantial identity of Thought and the other Attributes is stated dogmatically, but not in any sense made intelligible. . . . The one Substance does not fulfil its being through a self-diremption and a return upon self-identity by the negation of this negative. . . . God is the union of contrasts; i.e. the receptacle in which they are statically combined, not the life which fulfils itself in the making and overcoming of oppositions.'¹ The idealistic interpretation of Spinoza and the Space-Time conception of Mr. Alexander are alternative ways of meeting Professor Joachim's requirements, or at least of going out to meet them. But neither way was possible for Spinoza himself.

I shall not attempt to set forth the various interpretations which, from time to time, have been suggested, or which have been foisted upon Spinoza. They are sufficiently explained and discussed in the article by von Petersdorff, to which I have already referred; it provides a truly instructive account of human ingenuity. Since the date of that article, however, Mr. Alexander, with the ample generosity of an appreciative critic, and with equally striking ingenuity, has made a new attempt to elucidate this obscure region of the philosophy of Spinoza, while at the same time holding that his own gloss on the Spinozistic theory renders 'the whole

¹ *The Nature of Truth*, p. 173. Similarly Mr. Macran in the *Introduction* to his recent translation of *Hegel's Logic of World and Idea* expresses the view that just as Anselm's ontological argument 'is not really an argument at all, but only the reiteration of the position that truth and fact, thought and being, must and can be brought into unity[; the] infinite that serves as the middle term is merely the *allegation* of this unity, and the unity is not effected'; so also it is 'precisely the same fallacy as this that vitiates a cardinal feature in the doctrine of Spinoza. To the question of the relationship between extension and thinking, Spinoza replies that they are at the same time separate and identical, as mutually exclusive attributes or expressions of the one reality, God. . . . Extension and thinking, then, are one by reason of God. But in Spinoza's system, God is no deduction of one attribute from the other, no reasoned reconciliation of their difference, but merely the *allegation* that they are one. So that his whole reasoning comes to this, that thinking and extension are one because they are one' (p. 15). Mr. Macran's book is not devoted to the study of Spinoza, and it must be admitted that the comment is more intelligible, nearer the point, and even truer, than is usual in such incidental references to Spinoza's opinions; but the failure to refer to the doctrine of the infinity of the Attributes, together with that of the very precise relationship of Thought and Extension, vitiates the comment as an adequate indication of Spinoza's own position.

edifice of infinite other attributes . . . otiose and unverifiable'.¹ In spite of Mr. Alexander's disinterested goodwill and sympathy, the conditions were not favourable to successful exposition, and the attempted elucidation fails because it does not attend *with sufficient persistency* to the fundamental tenet of Spinozism that the order and connexion of modes is the same in every Attribute. 'Whether we conceive nature under the Attribute of Extension, or under the Attribute of Thought, or under any other Attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same connexion of causes—that is, the same things following in either case'.² The essence of Mr. Alexander's suggestion is that the constellations correlated with Thought in a third Attribute X may not coincide with those correlated with Thought in Extension,³ hence the ideas which are of extended things will not correspond with those which are of X-ian things. There would thus be infinite sets of ideas within the infinite Intellect of God, and whether we think of these as merely side by side, or (as we surely must), as mutually involved and integrated in the absolute being, there would equally be a breach of the common order of connexion within the Attributes,⁴ Thought being more concrete than either Extension or X or,

¹ *Spinoza and Time*, p. 56.

² 'Sive naturam sub attributo Extensionis, sive sub attributo Cogitationis, sive sub alio quocunque concipiamus, unum, eundemque ordinem, sive unam, eandemque causarum connexionem, hoc est, easdem res invicem sequi reperimus' (*Eth. II, vii, Sch.*).

³ 'We cannot . . . be sure that the X-correspondent of my idea of the table gives me the perception of the X-table. It might, for instance, be possible that in order to have perception of the X-table there was needed another body composed say of . . . my body and a stone. The X-correspondent of my body in perceiving the table may be only a part of the X-mode which is necessary for the perception of the X-table, which perception consequently would belong to a quite different mind from mine.' (*Spinoza and Time*, p. 54.)

⁴ Unless we suppose what Mr. Alexander does not clearly advance, viz. that the diversity is made up in Extension (e.g.) by extensive constellations corresponding to varieties of complication within the other Attributes; and so on. But in that case there must be a mind corresponding with 'my-body-and-the-stone', and this will be 'unconscious mind' in reference to Extension, but conscious mind in reference to X; just as the human mind is conscious with reference to Extension, but unconscious with reference to X. But this is a form of the doctrine of 'unconscious mind' of the very worst possible description: a sophisticated, self-contradictory, primitive animism.

Mr. Alexander's theory thus seems to be, not that Thought infinitely replicates the order and connexion of each other Attribute, but that the order and connexion under each Attribute other than Thought is only *selectively* correlated with Thought, but that these selections together sum up (or integrate)


perhaps more accurately, these being less concrete than Thought. Now Spinoza would not have raised any special objection to the complication thus supposed within the infinite Intellect of God,¹ but only to the notion of the several systems of ideas being founded upon diversity of constellation within the various other Attributes. For every possible constellation of modes is adequately expressed in each of the infinite Attributes.

In order to show that this notion is really involved in Mr. Alexander's attempted elucidation, let me examine the situation, as he represents it, more closely. The suggestion evidently is that among the infinite constellations within *Natura naturata* the human body is capable of responding to selected types only, even within extended nature; hence since the human mind knows only the things to which the body responds (that is only the body as it is affected by these things²), its knowledge cannot cover the whole nature of reality. Other parts of *Natura naturata* will have other

to the Thought total. Thus the order and connexion is *not* the same in all the Attributes.

I may, perhaps, illustrate the situation in an elementary way thus:

Let *a, b, c, d, e, f* be *modi simplicissimi*. Then Thought as it relates to Extension corresponds to integrations of *a, c*, and *e*, but not of *b, d*, and *f*. But as it relates to *X*, it corresponds to *b, d*, and *f*, and not to *a, c*, and *e*.



¹ His own statement in *Ep. lxvi* implies something of the sort, but without the mistaken complication involved in Mr. Alexander's theory (if that is the true explanation of the interpretation) of a differentiation of constellations within the infinite Attributes.

² It is, perhaps, Mr. Alexander's failure to recognize unflaggingly that this is a strict alternative expression that conceals from him the impossibility of his exposition of Spinoza's doctrine.

constellations which respond to them, and hence other minds which know them (i. e. know their own constellations as affected by them). The only question is whether Mr. Alexander holds that these other parts of *Natura naturata* are only known under Attributes other than Extension, or whether they can (indeed, are) known under Extension, though by minds other than human. Let me attempt to clear this point up: under the Attribute of Extension the human mind knows only its own body as it is affected by certain classes of extended things. But with the X-ian Attribute, according to Mr. Alexander, the case *may* be different: it may be that though the extended table acts upon the extended body of a man, the X-ian table does not act upon the X-ian mode corresponding to the human body, or not in such a way as to be correlated with Thought: 'Interaction between a thing like the table and my body is intelligible only within the infinite mode of motion and rest; but we cannot speak of X-modes in such terms',¹ nor apparently in analogous terms, the implication being that though table and body interact to give an image in the brain representing the combined or confused natures of the two things, and though the idea of the body and of the table are analogously connected or confused (as intellectual systems and not as systems of motion-and-rest), yet the X-ian table and body are not, or need not be, analogously related. In other words, as I formerly asserted, the theory implies that the constellations differ from Attribute to Attribute, and, if I may so speak for the moment without offence, the unit of thought, the unit of body, and the X-ian unit do not correspond.²

Thus it is not so much that human knowledge is limited by the imperfect responsiveness of the body to extended *Natura naturata*,

¹ *Spinoza and Time*, p. 54.

² I need not deny that there is a tendency for human Imagination to impute a difference between the Attributes in respect of their outstanding or prevalent constellations. The so-called *ideae simplices* and the supposed *corpora simplicia* of Imagination do not correspond with each other, for the object of the former (e.g. a colour, extension, unity, or infinity), and the idea of the latter (e.g. an electron or proton) are both really complex, and of different complexity and status in the Real. The same principle may be extended to the other Attributes. But it does not follow that the 'order and connexion' differs, but only that the 'imaginative' importance of the constellations differs, from Attribute to Attribute; or perhaps that we tend to read one Attribute analytically and another synthetically by turns; for all real existences are both one and many, and all constellations are present in every Attribute.

but that even if its knowledge of this were as complete as the nature of the Thought of Extension will permit, it might still be incapacitated for knowing the X-ian world, since this is constructed on a different plan. Now such a conception, if it had ever entered the mind of Spinoza, would promptly have been rejected, and Mr. Alexander's suggestion is, it seems to me, really connected with the fashion of his own philosophy, which, as I have indicated, proceeds from a formal framework of spatio-temporal elements towards increasingly complex constellations with emergent qualities: thus he tends to think of Spinoza's theory also as involving the progressive synthesis of the units in different ways under the different Attributes. But Spinoza works, as it were, from the other end, so that he thinks rather of the constellations as identical under all the Attributes. About the fact, at all events, that this is his clear teaching there can be no doubt.

I admit, of course, that Spinoza regarded the *human* conception of *Natura* as selective (and therefore limited); and in a double sense: it is limited with respect to Thought and Extension themselves, since its responsiveness to *Natura cogitans* is essentially incomplete; but further, it is limited in that our thought is the *essentia objectiva* of the extended body exclusively, and not of the modes which must be supposed to correspond with it under any other Attribute (except, of course, if it is an exception, Thought itself). And it was for this reason (for the two limitations are ultimately one), that he regarded the infinite Intellect of God as being more than a vast human mind.¹ Thus though he would not object to the complication under the Attribute of Thought suggested by one interpretation of Mr. Alexander's elucidation, he would certainly object very vigorously to any notion which implies that the various systems of ideas in the divine Intellect together constitute a single idea of *Natura naturata* because each is selective, taking certain elements from extended *Natura naturata*, others from the X-ian *Natura naturata*, and so on to infinity. Every possible constellation of modes is adequately expressed under *each* of the infinite Attributes, and God's Intellect, therefore, corre-

¹ Cf. *Ep. lxvi*: 'Dico, quod quamvis unaquaeque res infinitis modis expressa sit in infinito Dei intellectu, illae tamen infinitae ideae, quibus exprimitur, unam eandemque rei singularis Mentem constituere nequeunt; sed infinitas: quandoquidem unaquaeque harum infinitarum idearum nullam connexionem cum invicem habent' (i.e. no proximate *causal* connexion, the immediate reference being to *Eth. II, vii, Sch.*, as the next sentence states).

sponds with every expression of *Natura naturata* under every Attribute. Thus, to use Mr. Alexander's example, though it may be that the mode composed of a human body *plus* a stone is responsive to modes other than those to which the human body alone responds, and though the human mind may therefore be deflected from the knowledge of certain types of existent which are known to the mind of the hypothetical body-stone system, that in itself does not imply that the X-ian table cannot be known by the human mind,¹ and that the mind of the body-stone system must be ignorant of the extended table. For what is unknown by the human mind is not the X-ian table *simpliciter*, but the X-ian body-stone system as affected by the X-ian table; and similarly, what the mind of the body-stone system must be ignorant of is not the extended table *simpliciter*, but the extended body as it is affected by the extended table. And in this there is nothing wonderful, since it is true of every mind whatsoever that it knows only the affections of its own 'body', i.e. of its own *ideatum* or correlate, under whichever Attribute may be in question. The limitation of knowledge is thus primarily and essentially the result of a different standpoint, with consequent differences in perspective; and the further question as to whether the difference in Attribute also implies a limitation is left wholly undetermined by the argument. By Spinoza it is determined by some such considerations as the following: each constellation with all its affections is extant under each Attribute, and each has its own appropriate mind or, rather, series of minds, for there is a different mind for each constellation as it appears in each Attribute (other than Thought, where the *idea ideae* is one with the enjoyed *idea*). This follows from the definition of an *idea* as the *essentia objectiva* of an *ideatum*. Ideas such as ours cannot at once be the *essentia objectiva* of a mode under two different Attributes, not even of the *same* mode of Substance. There will thus be infinitely many minds corresponding with the expressions of any one constellation under the infinitely many Attributes; that certainly will be true of *finite* constellations, however it may be with the all-embracing constellation which is *Natura naturata*. The extended body-stone system (if it is such) is affected by the extended table,

¹ The argument is, of course, purely hypothetical, working within suppositions which I do not accept. Thus I must not be taken to suggest that the X-ian table is known by the human mind. The human mind is the *essentia objectiva* of the extended human body, and of nothing outside of Extension.

and the resulting affection will have a thought-equivalent, though it may not form even a part of the human mind; but the X-ian 'body' is affected by the X-ian table, and *its* thought-equivalent ought *on one supposition* to form part of the human mind; the supposition is that what is true of the infinite Intellect of God is true also of finite minds, viz. that the minds correlated with the infinite expressions of the same constellation within the infinite Attributes must form a single mind, which is thus either infinitely reduplicated within itself, or at worst is a mere sum of the *essentiae objectivae* of the diverse expressions of the same constellation. I shall have occasion presently to consider this supposition more carefully, and to question whether it follows from the precise correspondence of all the infinite Attributes of Substance that any particular finite mind must be *aware of* all the infinite modes with which it *corresponds*.

I conclude, therefore, that Mr. Alexander is in error in so far as his explanation implies that Spinoza means that our ignorance of modes which do not fall under Thought or Extension is due to, or associated with, the selective responsiveness of the human body; though it is this which limits our knowledge within the Attributes of Thought and Extension (indeed, the same principle applies *within* every Attribute). Different constellations respond to different selections under whichever Attribute we conceive them to fall, or they are conceived as falling; but knowledge arises where a mode of Thought is the *essentia objectiva* of a mode in some other (or indeed any) Attribute, and no human mode of Thought can be the *essentia objectiva* of an extended mode and also of an X-ian mode. Nor, according to Spinoza, can the ideas of one and the same finite mode of Substance, as it is expressed in infinitely many Attributes, be included in a single finite ideal constellation or mind. Hence if there are ideas of X-ian tables as well as of extended ones (and Spinoza plainly asserts that 'each thing is expressed in infinite ways *in the infinite Intellect of God*'¹) they must belong to different finite minds of our grade. The human mind is the *essentia objectiva* of the human body: the mind which is the *essentia objectiva* of the X-ian mode corresponding to the human body (and human mind) is, therefore, a different mind. But, as I have more than once suggested, it will be found that these

¹ *Ep. lxvi*: 'Unaquaeque res infinitis modis expressa [est] in infinito Dei intellectu'.

principles apply only to finite modes, and that the situation is fundamentally different with the infinite Attributes of Substance.

Thus even Mr. Alexander's attempted defence of Spinoza must be taken as a part of his general gloss upon the theory; it only appears to him as an explanation because he has been unable to place himself precisely at the point of view of Spinoza. He is still thinking of mind as 'an empirical character of certain complexes of . . . motion',¹ rather than as the *essentia objectiva* of some existing thing (extended or otherwise). And the extraordinary thing is that, as Mr. Roth has said, 'Spinoza evidently thought that he had meant, and had said, something very simple—unfortunately, nobody since has been able to show exactly what it is'.² Many of the explanations advanced have been simple only in the derogatory sense, and most have been largely or wholly alien to the general tenor of Spinoza's thought. One might well imagine the astonishment with which Spinoza would have read the section in Mr. Alexander's little book from which I have been quoting, not because his theory is misunderstood, but because, after having begun by suggesting the correct solution, the argument is allowed to drift off into the complicated error upon which I have commented. 'The attribute of Thought is much wider than the other Attributes—is in fact coextensive with them all. . . . [This gives] Spinoza's doctrine a kink in the direction of idealism. Yet exactly the same kind of reflection might with proper changes be applied to Extension, which would then be wider than all the other attributes, and Spinoza might thus receive a kink in the direction of materialism.'³ Precisely; but what would give the 'kinks' would not be the theory that Thought, or again Extension, is an *attributum latissimum*, or is co-extensive with all the infinite Attributes, but that in so being super-eminent it includes all the others as they are in themselves, and thus usurps the place of Substance itself. But short of this act of suicidal insubordination, whereby Substance would be infinitely impoverished, desubstantialized, and rendered incapable of explaining even the weak and abstract nature of man (which is completely expressed under two Attributes only), no fundamental objection could be raised to the conclusions implied; for since each Attribute is the essence of undivided Substance, it is co-extensive with all the Attributes, since all are

¹ *Spinoza and Time*, p. 56.

² L. Roth, *Spinoza*, p. 197.

³ *Spinoza and Time*, pp. 51-2.

Attributes of Substance; but co-extensive in a sense which does not mean or imply complete identity with them all. Only Substance itself is completely identical with all the Attributes, for it is they. Substance 'consists of', not 'is qualified by', infinite Attributes.¹

The clue to the co-extensiveness of the Attributes is directly derivable from the relations of Thought and Extension. The co-extensiveness of these is our primary *datum*; and it need not (and for Spinoza cannot) imply their simple identity, and hence neither idealism nor materialism.² If we use the terms 'subject' and 'object' in their modern sense we may say that Thought 'includes' Extension and Extension 'includes' Thought only in the sense that Extension is the ultimate 'object' (= *ideatum*) of all our thought, and Thought the essential 'subject' (= *essentia objectiva*) of Extension; *omnia animata*. But from this it cannot follow that Extension is *existentially* included in Thought, for so Thought would not *know* its object, but would contain it or possess it; not that Thought is *existentially* included in Extension, for so Extension would have no 'subject' or correlative consciousness; and in each case knowledge would be impossible. It is knowledge therefore which at once unites Thought and Extension cognitively, and also separates them existentially. The idealists make knowledge impossible by removing its independent object; the materialists by removing its independent subject. Nor can we satisfy the conditions by exalting knowledge (or 'Experience') as the ultimate reality: it cannot sustain the part, because there can be no knowledge or Experience but only knowledge-*of* or Experience-*of*; they are not self-existent, but other-referent in nature. Thus, as Malebranche saw very clearly, 'intelligible Extension' implies 'real Extension', and in

¹ 'Per substantiam intelligo id, quod in se est, et per se concipitur, hoc est, cujus conceptus non involvit conceptum alterius rei. Idem per attributum intelligo, nisi quod attributum dicatur respectu intellectus, substantiae certam talem naturam tribuentis.' (*Ep. ix.*)

² A suggestion which must certainly be rejected has been made by more than one commentator, viz. that since 'infinite' does not mean an indefinitely large number, but rather 'complete', the two Attributes that we know are, or may be, *all* the Attributes, in that they complete the nature of Substance. How 'two' can be 'infinitely many' passes my comprehension. The suggestion could only seem superficially satisfactory on an idealistic reading of Spinoza, according to which Thought and Extension complete each other as absolute subject and object in the concrete nature of absolute Experience. But that reading cannot be made to cohere with the statements and general attitude of Spinoza; or, I may add, with the facts of finite experience.

general the object which is *included in* knowledge (i.e. the 'objective content' of the idea) cannot be identical with the object (i.e. the thing) which is *known through* knowledge. Further, as Malebranche did not see, real Extension does not, for an acute epistemologist, imply the real or independent *existence* of a second or 'intelligible' Extension, for thought and its object are in direct relation with each other: adequate knowledge is of the Real; inadequate knowledge is of phenomena; error arises from the division and mis-ordering of thought. In no case is there a third real *interpositum* between the thought (=the knowing of the thing) and the thing known through the thought.

Thus the object *contained* by thought is an abstract *ens rationis* (=objective content of thought) and is no real separate existent,¹ being real only in its relation to the equally abstract act of knowing (=subjective content of thought), by which relation concrete thought is constituted; it thus falls on the side of the subject. The object *known* by thought, on the other hand, is a concrete *ens reale*, independent of the act and fact of knowledge.

On these grounds, therefore, it must be recognized that Substance has at least two Attributes, viz. Thought and Extension. Hence, as I have said, the process of counting having begun, it cannot rest; and the complete character of ultimate reality thus demands an infinitude (as opposed both to a finite, and also to an indefinitely large, number) of Attributes, related among themselves and to Substance, as Thought and Extension are related, or in an analogous fashion. For why should any finite number suffice? Or how could an indefinite number be actual? No answer can be forthcoming which does not conflict with the independence of the Attributes, and with the reality and perfection of Substance.²

¹ The distinction itself is rather one of emphasis than a matter of even 'logical' separation.

² Thus the difficulties of Professor Joachim, and those who in this matter agree with him, about Spinoza's not rendering, and being unable to 'render intelligible the being of the Attributes "in" God . . . a plurality "in" an absolute Unity' (*A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, p. 137), may easily be traced to their idealistic presuppositions in the case actually given to us (viz. the relations of Thought and Extension). 'The metaphorical "in" leaves the conception totally unintelligible', says Professor Joachim; on the contrary, I reply, the relation of subject and object in finite experience is totally unintelligible if 'Experience' (whether in an inchoate or developed form) is the ultimate reality and therefore self-dependent. If Experience itself is to be possible we must be able to transcend its duality in the sense that its real object, as distinct from its 'objective content' (which is an *ens rationis*) must have independent existence; and if Experience is

The same result would follow an acute examination of the single Attribute of Thought. Thought is necessarily a duality in unity of 'subject' and 'object', i.e. of 'subjective content' (=act of knowing) and 'objective content' (=intelligible Extension). This 'objective

to be intelligible we must be able to transcend its duality in the sense that real subject and real object must be unified. These principles are confused if the duality is taken as lying *within* Experience (a duality of 'subjective content' and 'objective content', the latter being identified with the real object) for thus the object falls within sentience, and the duality is sufficiently synthesized in Experience (for it never was a real existential duality at all). But to speak with restraint, it is surely less sophisticated to believe that the real object does not necessarily or ultimately fall within sentience. The duality to be made intelligible is of Experience on the one side, and the real object experienced on the other. It is of the essence of Experience to transcend itself, not existentially, but as 'knowing'. The thing known, on the contrary, transcends Experience existentially, but not as 'known'.

In so speaking, I am not unmindful of the very obvious dangers attending the effort to pass beyond human experience at its best in the characterization of the Real; nor indeed that in a restricted sense it is impossible. But man is so placed in the Real as to be capable of reaching truth only by facing great intellectual dangers. To generalize the acrobatic analogy of Robert Browning: *Man's reach must exceed his grasp!* The perception of this is not, of course, foreign to Professor Joachim: Bradley, who in these matters is obviously his 'father Parmenides', again and again emphasized its importance. 'How can truth be true absolutely, if there remains a gulf between itself and reality?' (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 544.) Truth is only completely true when the distinctions of subject and predicate, of subject and object, vanish, i.e. when truth becomes reality. Thus 'even absolute truth in the end seems thus to turn out erroneous' (*Loc. cit.*). The passages have been quoted *ad nauseam*; I quote them again because it is precisely here that the demand for more of Spinoza, and not less, becomes insistent if the Real is to be interpreted adequately as transcending the duality of 'consciousness', and not falling below it to the mere unity of 'sentience' or 'sentient experience'. For I cannot agree that 'dissatisfaction with the form of knowledge' is 'chimerical' (Pringle-Pattison, *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 122), and Bradley was in principle right in attempting to resolve the duality of knowledge and the thing known which, existentially but not as known, transcends knowledge. Why he should so vigorously have felt the necessity is less clear when his impression of the character of knowledge was so slight that his reflection upon it led him to believe that Reality is necessarily 'sentience' or 'sentient experience'; unless, indeed, the reason is to be found in the extreme facility with which, on this theory, the duality may be resolved; for the object of knowledge, being conceived in Berkeleian fashion, is already within the psychical. The genuine consistent idealist has nothing to lose by Bradley's reduction of the duality to unified (but not simplified) sentience.

But for those who take knowledge seriously, and its object as independently real and not necessarily fashioned out of 'experience' as the 'matter' of all reality, the impulse to unity can only be satisfied by transcending Experience, and neither by its reduction nor by its acceptance as 'the absolute relation'. They must proceed to a genuine infinity; and if this cannot be compassed in precise detail (for we are but men seeking, rightly but perhaps heroically, to avoid ultimate anthropomorphisms), at least it may be sketched in broad outline,

content' is no *interpositum* between the act of knowing and the real object known, but an *ens rationis*, having existence only in synthesis with the act of knowing. And the act of knowing, again, is an *ens rationis* existing only in synthesis with the 'objective content'. This duality of Thought implies the existence of *real* Extension as the object known; thus we have two Attributes, and hence, as before, infinitely many Attributes.

That a similar result does not seem to follow from an examination of the Attribute of Extension taken alone is due to the fact that the reasoning in the case of Thought is really an analysis of the implications of knowledge (= Thought), and that Thought is here analysing itself. But such conscious self-analysis is not the nature of Extension. What corresponds to it in Extension is thus not 'criticism'. This connects itself with Spinoza's denial that there are modes belonging to one Attribute only. There are no inanimate bodies, and no disembodied minds; that at least is the way in which the principle is exemplified in our experience. Presumably it might be generalized in the forms that: (1) minds are always the *essentiae objectivae* of bodies or X-ian modes; (2) bodies are always animated or em-X-ed; (3) X's are always embodied, animated, or em-Y-ed. In the case of Thought this is obvious because it is essentially knowledge (and must be of some-formally, and speculatively. To parody a distinction of Francis Bacon (*Advancement of Learning*, II, *Nat. Rel.*, 2): sufficient to convince, but not to inform.

Thus from the simple irrefragable fact that knowledge implies, as I have said, an existentially, but not cognitively, independent object, the argument leads us on to the doctrine of the infinite Attributes of the Real. By the too rapid movement from the many to the One (the characteristic vice of the 'wise') in the case of the Attributes, which is the essence of both epistemological and metaphysical idealism, metaphysics has in the past been stultified as much as it is now disabled by the too slow movement of the epistemological (and metaphysical) realists towards unity. The idealists make knowledge an illusion; the realists make it a brute fact; neither can be said to make it *intelligible*. Nor do they explain why and how far it is unintelligible. Even those idealists who have censured Bradley's resolution of the ultimate duality of experience have looked for a completer view, not beyond the confines of Experience with its inescapable anthropomorphic limitations, but to aspects other than intellectual within Experience. These aspects are undoubtedly important, especially when 'intellectual' is taken in too narrow a sense; but the general restriction of interest which is implied by the attitude I am criticizing means that the main problem is only shirked and obscured, but not rendered the less urgent. Nor does it follow that because the Real is only grasped by us in (or even as) the unity of Experience, that therefore we cannot recognize that in itself it transcends that unity. The philosopher must, in Hegelian phrase, 'bathe in the aether of the One' (*Werke*, Berlin, 1836, XV, p. 376), but he will not, unless the drought is very severe, attempt, as too many have done, to *swallow the bath!*

thing). But solitary Extension too is impossible, and whatever may be the other Attribute to which it is conceived as related, and whatever the relation involved (and in no case can it be causation¹ of the kind which connects finite modes), the ultimate result will be the implication of infinite Attributes. And this must be the case even if it is taken as related to itself as Thought is related to itself in reflection.

The nerve of the argument must be that any limitation of Attributes within Substance would curtail its absolute perfection and dissipate its unity: its perfection would be limited in that it would then no longer include every possible type of being (for a finite number implies an external cause, and hence some being outside of the nature of Substance); its unity would be dissipated, because the expression of the independent reality which each Attribute possesses as expressing, in its own way, the *whole* nature of Substance (which alone is independently real) demands reflection in infinitely many Attributes. For not the whole essence of Extension (e.g.) is expressed in Thought, but only its *essentia objectiva*. But the unity of Substance demands adequate expression, in *each* Attribute, of the nature of *all* Attributes, and complete expression by each, of its nature, in all.

Thus what is true of Thought in its relation to Extension must *mutatis mutandis* be true of Extension in relation to Thought, and of all the Attributes in relation to each other. Indeed, as may be gathered from the doctrine of *idea ideae*, it is true of Thought in relation to itself, and hence will be true, in an appropriate form, of each Attribute in relation to itself. As Thought is also Thought

¹ This point is of the utmost importance. The only relation of the sort known to us is, of course, the unique cognitive relation, which has often been mistaken for a causal one (with the most disastrous epistemological and metaphysical results). The reaction away from this error, however, to the view that there is no relation, but virtual identity, has had equally disastrous results, both metaphysical and epistemological. The relation is for us *unique*, but it *is* a relation. And all the relations between the Attributes must be unique in analogous senses, while the relation of Thought to all the other Attributes will be always, in some sense (though always, we must suppose, with a difference), cognitive. For these among other reasons I must strenuously and abruptly deny that the Attributes are *systematically* or *organically* connected in Substance, as has sometimes been asserted (cf. A. Wolf, *The Correspondence of Spinoza*, pp. 392, 460). The mode of connexion is *sui generis*. Even the single example of which we have empirical acquaintance (i.e. knowledge) is a source of endless perplexity to the acutest intellects (in proportion to their acuity and superficiality). It is at once too simple and too profound for us.

about (i.e. enjoyment of) Thought, that is, in addition to being Thought about (i.e. contemplation of) Extension, and infinite other Attributes, so Extension extends over (i.e. 'lives through' the being of) Extension in the hierarchy of worlds.¹

Further, Thought is the *essentia objectiva* not only of Extension but of every other Attribute of the eternal Real; not in the sense that it is infinitely and extensively reduplicated, but, since Extension includes Thought (in the sense I have indicated), and hence also in analogous manners every other Attribute, Thought in so including Extension does also, in like manner, include all the others. And it is surely in this sense, and in this sense alone, that each Attribute is the adequate expression of Substance, viz. because it includes (in the sense defined) every other Attribute, and, indeed, in the same sense, includes itself. But this is true only of the infinite and eternal Attributes of Substance, and not of this or that finite mode *as it is known to us*. Each mode *in itself* is expressed in all the Attributes; but the expression of any mode in the Attribute of Thought will again be infinitely reduplicated as a mode of Thought about itself, about a mode of Extension, about a mode of X, and so on to infinity. Now man is not all of these infinite expressions: he is a mode of Thought (about itself and about a mode of Extension) and that mode of Extension itself. But he is not a mode of X, nor of thought about X; for these are not implied by his nature as a finite, animated body. True, Thought implies Extension and all the other Attributes; Extension implies Thought and all the other Attributes; but a *mode* of Thought, or of Extension, does not imply a *mode* of any other Attribute: *it implies nothing beyond*

¹ Some such meaning may underlie the suggestion of Camerer and Professor Joachim already mentioned (p. 53, note 5), that Spinoza's doctrine of *idea ideae* was perhaps put forward to provide a basis for the restoration of 'that unity and continuity in all our thinking, which his conception of the mind as a complex of 'ideae' seems to have destroyed' (*A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, p. 140). Professor Joachim, of course, admits that the attempt, if made, was doomed to failure. But surely it was never made, and did not need to be made; for, as I have sufficiently emphasized, Spinoza's 'ideae' are not conceived by him as Humian, and they therefore do not need to be extraneously conjoined. They are essentially constellated in *scientia intuitiva*, and even in Reason; they are fragmentary only in Imagination (and then only in a limited degree). But the doctrine of the self-reflection of the Attributes certainly emphasizes the systematic character of *Natura naturata* as a self-reflecting unity, and its subordinate constellations, organic, chemical, physical, atomic, &c., which, as we know, are not its sections, but run through it with varying proportions of self-maintenance and dependence (or, under Thought, of *intellectus* and Imagination).

its own Attribute (nor that, indeed, *completely*). Ideas give rise to ideas, movements to movements; but ideas do not cause movements, nor movements ideas; nor do ideas and movements cause X-ian modes. Hence for us, two only of the Attributes are known. 'Although each thing is expressed in an infinity of ways in the infinite Intellect of God, yet those infinite ideas whereby it is expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular thing, but infinite minds; seeing that each of these infinite ideas has no connexion with the rest.'¹ But though infinite *minds* are thus required, it does not follow that infinite *Thought-Attributes* are required; the argument implies the contrary, and it is thus that our minds and the Thought of God differ from one another: there is 'about as much correspondence between the two as there is between the Dog Star and the animal that barks'.² For Thought implies every other Attribute, and is thus a draught of the ineffable essence of *Natura* as creative eternity; but our thought is creative only within its own circuit, and even there only with patience and derivatively: it waits for the *data* upon which it works. And the mind receives no *data* with respect to modes other than the extended body, nor could it; for it receives no *data* at all from things external to itself (not even from the body); its *data* are its own, and can, therefore, refer only to the body of which it is the *essentia objectiva*. Thus we are doubly finite: both as parts of psycho-physical nature, and also as lacking the infinite diversity of expressiveness and expression that belongs to infinite *Natura*.

Let me now very rapidly marshal the main heads of my argument in formal order: my general view of *Natura naturata* is of an infinite whole of infinitely many parts each of which in its measure reflects the whole. Their measures are infinite, not merely because there is an infinite series in which neither repetition nor *lacuna* occurs, but also because each part and each part of each part *ad infinitum* is a whole of subordinate parts.³ Thus in the diversification

¹ *Ep. lxvi*. Cf. p. 287, note 1.

² 'Si ad aeternam Dei essentiam, intellectus scilicet, et voluntas pertinent, aliud sane per utrumque hoc attributum intelligendum est, quam quod vulgo solent homines. Nam intellectus, et voluntas, qui Dei essentiam constituerunt, a nostro intellectu, et voluntate, toto coelo differre deberent, nec in ulla re, praeterquam in nomine, convenire possent; non aliter scilicet, quam inter se conveniunt canis, signum coeleste, et canis, animal latrans.' (*Eth. I, xvii, Sch.*)

³ And also in the further sense that the parts of various grades constitute relative wholes through which the main diversification receives infinitely varied cross-connexion.

of *Natura naturata*¹ there arises the necessary distinction between eternity and duration: for each finite thing in part reflects the whole adequately, and in part inadequately; adequately in so far as it is self-contained and active; inadequately in so far as it is acted upon by the infinitely many other parts, and is thus passive.² As active individuals, finite things are eternal; as passive things they are temporal, and endure only so long as it is possible for them to do so under the being of *Natura naturata*. Using the terms 'whole' and 'part' very strictly, it may be said that every whole is for itself and in itself eternal; every whole is for its parts sempiternal; every part is for other parts external to it an enduring existence. Thus pure time which characterizes the dust of non-being becomes real time by the 'densification' or integration which belongs to the union of events within increasingly concrete individualities. Timelessness is thus, as Bosanquet says in the passage already quoted, an essential constituent of time.

I need not repeat the argument by which I was led to the further movement of thought from *Natura naturata* to *Natura naturans*, not as a separate existence, but as the same thing viewed first as created nature, and again as creative essence. The eternity which is enjoyed by *Natura naturata* is enjoyed necessarily as flowing from *Natura naturans*, and is thus the creative eternity of *Natura*.

I have thus re-emphasized the main steps in my argument in preparation for a further flight of rational speculation for which the reader must now gird himself, and towards which we are urged by the conclusions reached in the course of this chapter. It is impossible to rest in the nominal creative unity so far explained, because, empirically, *Natura naturata* is already twofold in expression, as both extended and thinking. Creation must explain not merely the emergence of finite extended and conscious modes from the unity of the Attributes of Extension and Thought, but also the unity of these and all other Attributes in *unica Substantia*. That ultimate unity must, so far as possible, cease to be ineffable. Creation, in other words, is only a legitimate principle of explana-

¹ In the constitution of *Natura naturata*, I must remind the reader, we have transcended mere 'organic' unity, which has too often been regarded as the high-water mark of intimate system, and thus has been applied indiscriminately wherever a unity which is more than mere simplicity, aggregation, or mechanical system, has been imputed. Organic beings are finite things bearing a certain relation to an environment; hence infinite nature cannot be an organism.

² 'Nos eatenus patimur, quatenus Naturae sumus pars, quae per se absque aliis non potest concipi' (*Eth. IV, ii*).

tion, if it really explains: not when it is a mere term to cover some final inexplicability by thrusting it into an 'asylum of ignorance'. The ineffability of the unity of Substance, so far as it remains at the end of our analysis, must be due not to intellectual impotence as such, but only to that intellectual impotence which arises solely from an existential limitation in the thinker. Thus only may the divine unity be accepted as ineffable with philosophical propriety. So far as it relates to the Attributes of Thought and Extension the human mind has grounds for adequate knowledge of the divine unity; for in our finite way we are at least familiar with it, since it is the unity of knowledge.

I need not repeat the arguments in favour of an infinitude of Attributes, but I must consider the state of human knowledge with respect to these, and their relations to Thought and Extension, to one another, and of all to Substance. In the nature of things, these can be dealt with only in the most formal manner; in the absence of actual experience of their natures we are precluded from understanding them and their relations to each other as they are understood in the infinite Intellect of God.

We know, then, that the unity of Substantial Thought, i.e. of Thought of Extension together with Thought of Thought, Thought of X, Thought of Y, &c., is the same as the unity of the Attributes themselves of Extension, Thought, X, Y, &c.; i.e. it is the Thought-transcript of the creative unity of Substance; i.e. Thought as creative eternity. Similarly the unity of Substantial Extension is the extensive transcript of the creative unity of Substance; i.e. Extension as creative eternity. And so on. Further, the unity of Substantial Thought, Substantial Extension, Substantial X, Substantial Y, &c., is the unity of the infinite transcripts of Substance. Hence once more the necessary postulation of infinite Attributes: for it is only because there are infinite transcripts of Substance that Substance can adequately be regarded as the unity of its transcripts *without remainder*. It is pure expressiveness with infinite expression. There is no part or element in Substance which is opaque either to Thought, or to Extension, or to any other type of expression; *it utters all itself*.

But to us, by reason of our relative inexpressiveness and unresponsiveness it remains ineffable; and this inexpressiveness infects even our legitimate expressiveness, since for us knowledge is a miracle even when, as knowledge, it is effective, and its object thus transparent to thought. The object of knowledge may be clearly

and distinctly apprehended, but nevertheless knowledge itself remains opaque, and this opaqueness of the cognitive relation is but the reverse of the reality of the infinitude of Attributes which we do not know. Our ignorance of them is reflected in the *givenness* of the fact of knowledge. But, it may be said: on the contrary, the cognitive relation is transparently clear; we have only to accept it as a unique relation! True, I reply, but that is not to understand it, not to explain how it is essential in the Real.¹ Nor is the explanation for us. All we can know is that in the infinite Intellect of God Thought and its object are not exclusive as they are for us even when our knowledge is adequate; for there Thought reciprocates with every range of expressiveness (including its own), and its object, therefore, retains no ground of otherness. So long as the types of expressiveness remain finite, infinite Substance possesses some core of unexpressed essence, so that Thought remains other and less than its object. Make them infinite and Thought melts into its other in the eternal unity of the Real. *The argument, however, has no idealistic implications*; for precisely the same thing is true *mutatis mutandis* of Extension, and of every Attribute of the Real. There is no pre-eminence.

Natura, therefore, is doubly ineffable to us; it is ineffable with respect to the Attributes which we know, because to us they fail to present a unified appearance; it is ineffable, further, because infinitely many Attributes are hidden from us; and the two sources of mystery are ultimately one. The eternal 'uniquity' of infinite Substance is for itself not ineffable, for it is its nature to utter itself completely, not merely by way of Thought, but by every possible way of expression. Such is eternity as it constitutes the essence of the Real in its ultimate uniqueness as creative expressiveness at one with its infinitely diverse created expressions. It is thus that from the infinite essence of God there flow 'infinite things in infinite ways'.

¹ It will be profitable abruptly to re-emphasize these principles: I recognize the difficulty experienced by idealists in accepting the 'projicience' involved in knowledge (through which they tend to incorporate the object into the 'experience', and thus, in effect, to deny 'projicience', and therefore to deny the ostensible meaning of 'knowledge' also). I recognize equally the necessity urged by realists for accepting the fact of knowledge as a unique relation involving 'projicience', or its equivalent. I conclude that since both are unanswerable, the 'miracle' of knowledge is part of an infinitely wider set of relations which alone can make knowledge itself intelligible. Where the idealists refuse to face the facts, and the realists are content merely to take them as 'brute' facts, my choice is of a way at once more rational, more difficult and, perhaps, more modest.

EXCURSUS VIII

MORAL PROGRESS AND THE CHANGELESS REAL

THOUGH the scope of my present inquiry does not include the metaphysics of ethics, it will be well for me to indicate shortly what I take to be the attitude of Spinozism to the question of the coherent relation of the moral progress of finite individuals with the changeless perfection of the Real, on the one hand; and with the ultimate reality of the finite individuals themselves, on the other. I am the more ready to do so because this difficulty has commonly been regarded as the ground of a fundamental objection to the philosophy of Spinoza.

It is, of course, perfectly obvious that if ultimately the Real is changelessly perfect, then moral progress in its parts can be no more than an appearance or perspective within it or under it. But once admitted as such it seems to demand an infinite scope: only continuous moral progress in an immortal existence could be a genuine, well-founded, appearance of the infinite perfection of the Real. Thus the finite individual progressing in time must either be illusory, or immortal and infinitely perfectible. But, if the latter, then in the end each finite individual would cease to be finite and become identical with the whole. Such a view only illustrates the truth of my contention that an immortal existence is not proper to the finite individual: the actual enjoyment of complete immortality and the loss of finitude are but the reverse and obverse of the same quality of individuality. Such a 'kingdom of ends' as that thus adumbrated is conceivable only in so far as it ceases to be the end of a process and is lifted altogether out of time. But even so (my argument runs) the conception is invalid because it implies a plurality of indistinguishable, because equally perfect, individuals. We can choose, therefore, which we will regard as illusory: either the moral progress of the finite individual; or the changeless perfection of the Real; or the ultimate reality of the finite individual: we cannot have all three at once. Moral progress of an unreal individual may cohere with the changeless perfection of the whole; the changeless perfection of the whole may cohere with the ultimate reality of unchanging finite parts; the ultimate reality of the finite parts may cohere with their progress within a changing Real; but how can moral progress in ultimately real finite individuals cohere with a changeless perfect whole? Any two, but not all three.

The problem is resolved by the application of the principles already expounded: ethical judgements have reference to our existence as *enduring* individuals, and they are valid as applied to the ineluctable

imaginative representations of our finite individuality. This is a point upon which there has been among philosophers in general (and even among experts) very persistent misunderstanding of Spinoza's philosophical position. In Chapters V and VI, where I have indicated the relations and distinctions of the eternal and the enduring existences of the finite individual, and the roots and implications of his finitude and of his individuality, I have already laid down the principles which must govern the interpretation of this part of Spinoza's theory. It is of the essence of the duration of the finite individual that it cannot comprehend his being as a whole (i.e. as eternal): he is wholly present at no instant or epoch, however extended, of his temporal life; for he is eternal. In *time* he runs through the perspectives of his eternal nature under the partial heteronomy of his context and complement. *Eternally* he occupies his concrete but finite individuality, as a real part of the eternal whole. Now as both finite and individual he is both temporal and eternal; or rather, he is essentially eternal yet dissipated by time and transiency. Thus if we consider the abstract individual as he exists at this or that moment or epoch of his duration, we find him not merely incomplete and partial (for as I have shown in the text, he is partial *eternally*), but in time he is even *incompletely himself*. Hence arises the sense of imperfection or of sin: not that we fall short of *absolute* perfection, for it is proper that we should do so; but that we fall short of our own eternal stature. And that we do so, and are aware that we do so, is the deliverance of our eternity; for the eternal being of the finite individual lies *perdu* in his duration, revealing itself more especially in movements towards higher values and deeper insight, but constituting all that is positive in its temporal perspectives.

Thus Spinoza's assertions to the effect that each thing is as perfect as it is its nature to be, since it is what it is, and lacks nothing that it ought to have,¹ and that it only appears imperfect when compared with something other than itself (and, in general, with the highest perfection possible to its *genus*) in no way conflict with the ethical parts of his philosophy, or the ethical atmosphere of the whole. For though we may not compare this or that man with outstanding historical examples of human perfection, or expect him to achieve the ideal goodness of an imagined perfect man; yet he may, and must, be judged *by his own eternal standard*, the criterion which he eternally is for himself, and to which in time (i.e. as temporal) he never attains. This judgement of the temporal man by his eternal self is the very root of ethics in the philosophy of Spinoza; and it is thus that insight is freedom and salvation. For from every point of time there is a way out into the eternal: with mind it is the way of knowledge, which is the way of blessedness. Morality,

¹ Cf. *Epp.* xix et xxiii.

therefore, issues from the relations of eternity and duration, and moral improvement means increasing individuality in the sense of an increasing approximation of the temporal actuality of the finite individual to his eternal reality. Not that this reality is ever submerged by time: it is the root of all that is real or positive in the waste of our years; *this is it*, falsely seen as transient and piecemeal; but moral strength means its synthesis and completion, the substitution of 'the order of the Intellect' for 'the common order of nature'. So long as the finite individual rests in 'the order of nature' his eternity is *for his knowledge* (i.e. for Imagination) dissipated; but it is not destroyed. The disorder of the premisses darkens the conclusion. But 'the common order of nature' itself is not wholly unmeaning, or even unreal: it is a temporal perspective which in part fails to indicate the proper degree of perfection which characterizes the finite individual as an eternal reality.

The same essential relations become clear also when we think of individuality as determined primarily by responsiveness to the Individual Real, and only remotely (and as an imaginative result) by division or section of the seamless whole. In time we discover ourselves as responding to this or that abstracted external situation rather than to the whole in our measure; and moral progress is achieved by a progressive correction of this failing. As we respond more and more fully to a wider context we gain power and freedom in the moral life, and more nearly approximate our temporal individuality to the eternal that we are.

At this point I may add that the reader can conveniently test his grasp of the main principles of this essay by his ability to resist the objection that my analysis necessarily leads in practice to pococuranteism, in that it saves morality from illusoriness only to render it wholly fatuous, since we *already* (note the term!) eternally *are* all, and more than all, we can ever *become* as the result of moral endeavour.

Thus as against those who regard the reality of moral development in time as conflicting with the unchanging character of the eternal Real, I shall assert that it is because even the finite individual suffers, *sub specie aeternitatis*, no temporal transition, but sums up as quality all real (i.e. logical) transition, that the same, viewed imaginatively (and so far as he is finite, not falsely) *sub specie durationis*, can be aware of imperfection (or a falling below *himself*) and of the imperative to live in accordance with the eternal constitutive principles of his own nature. The temporal progress is real, and involves real achievement, only in so far as it is the imaginative transcript of eternal immanent causation.

Further, as against those who would make use of the interpretation of moral progress as towards more and more complete community of purpose within social wholes, to imply that finite individuals have no ultimate reality within or under the Absolute, I contend that in moral

progress there is not less but more, not merely of individuality defined as responsiveness to a world, but even of individuality indicated imaginatively by distinction, exclusion, and division. For each subordinate individual is ultimately finite, and his moral progress is towards his own proper fullness of being, and not towards the goal of infinite perfection; though the road to the one is the same as the road to the other, viz. organization and wholeness (in mind, insight or adequate ideas).

Finally, as against those who would interpret the ultimate reality of the finite individual as implying an immortal progress towards an infinite perfection, I must hold that such a destiny can belong, even *sub specie durationis* or imaginatively (for intellectually it is incoherent), to no individual but the Absolute Whole, which is eternally perfect, and thus possesses all achievings and achievements, not as involving temporal transition, but as quality or integrated 'transformation without succession'. Thus though the finite individual is unlimited in moral scope (for time and eternity are incommensurable, so that his eternal reality can never reach complete or adequate expression in time, not though he should endure indefinitely), he is none the less limited by his eternal place in the Real as a subordinate part: in time he cannot surpass the bounds of his eternal finite nature; nor, however his life might be prolonged, could he reach them:

All I could never be,
All, men ignored in me,
This, I was worth to God . . .

CHAPTER XII

THE TRANSCENDENT REAL

IF I have reasoned correctly from the *data* of experience to the ultimate character of the Real, it should now be possible to judge of the value and ultimate satisfactoriness not only of the extreme theories of deistic transcendence and identity or equivalence which have been held with respect to the relations of the temporal and the eternal, but also of the *via media* which has sometimes been supposed to resolve their opposition: the doctrine of immanence.

On the one hand, extreme transcendentalists, exclusively impressed by the opposition of the actual and the ideal, of facts and values, have held that the relation of these two worlds is wholly asymmetrical, not only from the standpoint of both production and interaction, but also from that of human knowledge: for all action, they say, is from the noumenal to the phenomenal, and the latter should, or rather must,¹ remain passive clay in the hands of the potter. Thus though the actual world may be led or inspired by ideals, these ideals themselves cannot be determined by reference to their remote effects in the world of actual facts, nor can they develop from the facts; the eternal world of values may, indeed, by a miraculous condescension, or creative parturition, even be the source of the factual world, and therefore also of the values embodied in it, but no return is possible from the side of phenomena, not even in the epistemological form of a satisfactory reconstruction of the divine nature by reference to the ordered hierarchy of temporal existences. It would be far easier to suppose that a man could 'enter the second time into his mother's womb, and be born'; for it is to suppose that the child could conceive its own mother, and the creature recreate its creator.

On the other hand, extreme opponents of transcendence have held that it is to the temporal that we must look for genuine reality, and therefore for the true significance of the eternal; that the Real

¹ The distinction here between 'should' and 'must' indicates the weakness of the theory. If all realized ideals are placed on the side of phenomena (as they must be if these are to have content at all) then 'must' is the word. If they are retained on the side of noumena, then 'cannot' would appear to be analytically necessary (for phenomena would be either non-existent, or wholly alien to values). As they are left indeterminate, 'should' becomes convenient.

is essentially of a developing, progressive nature, and is thus the source of ever new values; reality is constituted by time. This tendency of thought is, perhaps, distinctively modern in its unqualified form, though it is descended from a respectable ancestry; in our own time it is immediately traceable to developments of the speculations of M. Bergson. Thus when we are told that '*l'éternité même est dans le temporel*', the meaning is not that which we have found in the writings of Bosanquet, viz. that 'timelessness is an essential constituent of time',¹ still less that eternity, so far as real existence is concerned, is pure negation, belonging only to logical essences for which time is neutral; but rather that though we may intellectualize reality as a passage of temporal things and events, reality itself which *is* time is not in the same sense 'temporal'.² Time is not *in* time, and it is therefore eternal; and it is thus, presumably, that '*l'éternel s'amorce sur le temporel*'.³ Eternity, then, is not outside of time, nor are values: they are its very offspring, and thus only are they real.

At the present moment extreme deistic transcendentalism is being preached in France, by way of reaction from the Bergsonian doctrine of identity or equivalence; but historically the latter was elaborated in opposition to the abstract and empty conception of eternity that had for long occupied the field. That older tradition might easily be traced back to the famous dictum of Plato in the *Timaeus*, which certainly governed much mediaeval and early modern speculation about the nature of eternity. Its influence on Augustine is clear enough, and it has been seen at work in the doctrine of Boethius which I discussed in an earlier chapter. Plato's statement is to the effect that 'when the father who begat it perceived the created image of the incorruptible gods moving and living, he rejoiced, and in his joy determined to *make the copy still more like the pattern*'; and as this is a living being incorruptibly existent

¹ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 339. Cf. p. 59, note 1, for the context which is important.

² So also, as I have already noticed, Professor Taylor reminds us that 'passage', which Mr. Whitehead finds to be the fundamental character of Nature, does not itself 'pass'. (*A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, p. 691.)

³ For a criticism of this type of thought, though mainly in its ethical, social, and political aspects and implications, see M. Julien Benda's volume, *La Fin de l'Éternel* (the continuation of his well-known *La Trahison des Clercs* which has been translated into English under the title, *The Great Betrayal*). The vivid dictum to which this note is attached is taken from Sertillanges, and is quoted from *La Fin de l'Éternel*, p. 184.

he sought to make the sum of things also such, as far as might be. Now the nature of that living archetype was eternal, and to bestow this attribute in its fullness upon the creature was impossible. Therefore he resolved to make *a moving image of eternity*; so while he was marshalling the heavens he made of the eternity that abides in unity an eternal image that passes in accordance with number, even that which we call time'.¹ The account of time by contrast and relation with eternity very naturally becomes for us an account of eternity in contrast and relation with time, eternity being *notius natura*, but time (or so it is supposed) *notius nobis*. But from whichever end we view the relation it is clear that Plato means that time (*χρόνος*) and eternity (*αἰών*) are at once to be assimilated to, and distinguished from, each other. The immediate problem is to discover *how*. Plato conceives the universe in the first instance as without time, not in the sense that it does not move, that it is not a process: it is 'moving and quick', it is active; but *how* it is active he does not explain. No suitable image or appropriate description of such a condition is possible, because, as Plato clearly means, the condition itself is impossible, because incomplete. What is lacking to it is determinate form, either in the sense of self-sufficiency and wholeness, or in the sense of measure, transforming mere vital urgency and disturbance into ordered succession without limits. Now the former attributes belong only to 'the everlasting gods', or whatever is rightly styled the archetype of the universe (a point which is not altogether clear); for these there is no process or becoming, for they are eternally complete. Thus the universe could only be approximated to its *paradeigma*, and this is accomplished by the introduction of that ordered succession which is the result of the comparison of the inchoate durations of passing but overlapping processes within the total process of nature. This measurement of

¹ Ὡς δὲ κινήθην αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνόησεν τῶν αἰδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα ὃ γεννήσας πατήρ, ἡγάσθη τε καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς ἔτι δὴ μᾶλλον ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα ἐπενόησεν ἀπεργάσασθαι. καθάπερ οὖν αὐτὸ τυγχάνει ζῶν αἰδίων ὄν, καὶ τότε τὸ πᾶν οὕτως εἰς δύναμιν ἐπεχείρησε τοιοῦτον ἀποτελεῖν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζώου φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὔσα αἰώνιος, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῷ γεννητῷ παντελῶς προσάπτειν οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν· εἰκὼ δ' ἐπενόει κινήτῳ τινα αἰῶνος ποιῆσαι, καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, τοῦτον δὲ δὴ χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν (*Timaeus* 37 C, D.) Though the point has not, I think, been noticed by scholars, Plato here appears to assume a distinction between an eternal (*αἰώνιος*) and an everlasting (*αἰδίων*) existence. 'Everlasting', however, in addition to its *prima facie* suggestion of 'sempiternal duration' may also mean simply 'incorruptible'. It is in this sense that the eternal 'gods' are also everlasting.

process is time, and it is by its agency that mere process (thought of as indefinite, unmeasured extent of duration, or, perhaps conceivably, as indeterminate Bergsonian *durée*) comes to be ordered and determinate as an enduring process of successive elements, having neither beginning nor end. By this means the processes of the universe are made 'still more like' their archetype in that they are now conceived as 'everlasting' (*αἰδώς*), at least in the extensive sense which alone is possible with a created thing (full of beginnings and endings, yet having neither beginning nor end). The 'everlasting gods', on the other hand, are truly everlasting or eternal (*αἰώνιος*), since they are without process or becoming: they are incorruptible because they are uncreated. Time, therefore, the source of the ordered successiveness of the universe, is at best an approximation to eternity; for eternity 'that abides in unity' is the *paradeigma* of time the everlastingness of unending ordered process 'that passes in accordance with number'.¹ Endlessly long succession without a beginning, when it is thought of (or 'imagined', as Spinoza would say) as a whole, is a nearer approach to eternity than the formless duration of a restless seething mass of timeless events: for time introduces form and law and measure, and therefore with the inchoate completeness of unlimited extent.

Thus the problem was set: nature, containing in itself all duration, all temporal process, is conceived as a whole which, as such, does not endure; for it contains all time within itself. Thus the whole of duration does not endure, though every part of it does endure. In the eternal, on the contrary, no process and no duration is even contained. What is the precise relation of the eternal and the temporal?

I have already examined the answer put forward by Boethius, which attempted to read the eternal as a kind of infinite specious present devoid of reference to the moving 'tempunctum' of a finite existence: as being all duration viewed in a single intuition; 'interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio'. But this account, which with Augustinianism² underlies the doctrine of Aquinas and

¹ *Timaeus* 37 D.

² The doctrine of Augustine about eternity is, in the main, identical with that of Boethius, though his amazing discussions of the problems of time are much more detailed and psychologically acute than the rapid review of Boethius, and certainly than anything that had so far been attempted. On the doctrine of eternity cf. *Confessiones*, XI: 'Anni tui omnes simul stant, quoniam stant, nec euntes a venientibus excluduntur, quia non transeunt . . . Hodiernus [dies] tuus

of the Middle Ages generally, is clearly not the view which Plato himself entertained, but only the appearance which the duration of the universe would present if viewed, *impossibly*,¹ by the universe itself conceived as a total single self-conscious individual including all durations but not itself as a whole enduring. To the finite conscious parts of *Natura* the sempiternity of the whole seems piecemeal, a perpetual coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be; to the supposed universe it would appear as an 'eternal now' including all passage, but not as a whole passing. This is the nearest approach which a creature can make to eternity, but eternity itself must, on Plato's view, transcend even this 'intuitive sempiternity'. It must do so, of course, because the conception of the possession 'all at once' of what is 'unending' involves a patent contradiction.

Thus human acuity was forced on to the view of eternity as excluding all temporal extension, and defined solely as 'tota simul et perfecta possessio': it becomes a timeless moment which, passing the contradiction, is precisely nothing. In some such way, it may be supposed, there arose the empty conception of a logical eternity, against which the Bergsonians have waged unequal warfare. To engender this monster it was only necessary to let loose the one 'eternity' (=successionless whole or *timeless moment*) upon the other (=a whole of interminable succession or *timeful moment*): for if eternity is really without transiency, or again, can be complete

aeternitas' (xiii); 'Praesens autem si semper esset praesens nec in praeteritum transiret, non jam esset tempus, sed aeternitas' (xiv); 'Certe si est tam grandi scientia et praescientia pollens animus, cui cuncta praeterita et futura ita nota sint, sicut mihi unum canticum notissimum, nimium mirabilis est animus iste atque ad horrorem stupendus, quippe quem ita non lateat quidquid peractum et quidquid relicum saeculorum est, quemadmodum me non latet cantantem illud canticum. . . . Sed absit, ut tu, conditor universitatis, conditor animarum et corporum, absit, ut ita noveris omnia futura et praeterita. Longe tu, longe mirabilius longeque secretius.' (xxxi.)

¹ 'Impossibly' because a *total* individual cannot endure. An individual to which all time is 'present', which 'interminabilis vitae plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit, ac possidet; cui neque futuri quicquam absit, nec praeteriti fluxerit' (*De Consol. Phil. V, Pr. vi*) could not regard itself as *enduring* from eternity to eternity. Its mode of existence would be non-temporal, because, as Boethius emphasizes, *tota simul*. Thus past and future would not merely be 'present', they would cease to be past and future. These distinctions only remain in the finite specious present because it *is* finite, and as a whole passing. Thus such a complete individual would be essentially eternal in form. Our own eternity is imaged by us as duration because we are finite beings, and hence only *partly* eternal. Thus our eternal essence, as actual, i.e. as *we* have it (and not as it is constellated in *Natura*) is imagined as a *conatus* which claims indefinite duration, but which cannot make good the claim within the sempiternity of nature.

while succession is incomplete, then succession and transiency do nothing, and must be taken as neutral or null. Time may then be regarded as an infinite congeries of timeless moments among which succession is wholly inoperative. Thus, as I have said, time becomes a neutral order of externality; no longer even an 'unpassing passage', but a mere dimension added to those of space. And eternity, craving the content denied to it as a timeless moment, becomes identical with this neutral time, supersedes it, so that time becomes its measured ordinates.

Against some such 'spatialized' conception of time and eternity, as is well known, M. Bergson put forward his theory of real time or *durée*, which is not neutral but operative, and is, in fact, the very stuff of reality. In so doing he took a step towards a more adequate conception both of time and of eternity. For if time is the mere empty form of the succession of timeless instants with an extraneous content, it matters little whether we regard eternity as a single moment in which all time-contents are confusedly contained, or as the total of all moments without their successiveness, and thus with their contents lacking even the order and connexion which in time they appear to have; for in either case the content of the eternal being must be less coherent than that of time itself. Now such a result can only be avoided by showing that the content of time is not extraneous to it but is essentially temporal, and is, indeed, the very source of extended successive time; for thus the continuity of extended duration becomes real, or at least *bene fundatum*, and eternity, as the form of the existence of the whole, will be neither a single confused moment of all contents, nor these spread out without genuine connexion, but the ultimate source of all contents, and of their temporal forms and successions. Its nature will become clear to us as the ultimate integration of all existence. M. Bergson did not, as is well known, carry the argument to the point I have thus indicated, but his doctrine of *durée* as the reality which is wrongly grasped under the form of spatialized time was in essence the sound beginning of my thesis. What remained to be done was to indicate the proper place in the whole of both the real *durée* of things, and also of their apparent successiveness in spatialized time, for both have an essential meaning in our experience.

The principles underlying the integration of all existence in eternity, which also explain the *durée* of the individual finite being,

and his successiveness within *Natura*, have been expounded in the foregoing chapters. It is not for me to attempt to determine whether beneath the doctrine of Plato that time is 'a moving image of eternity' there is to be read a more profound significance. The fact that both nature and its *paradeigma* are said to be 'everlasting' must not impress us too much: for the incorruptibility of the creature, which is derived from its total possession of time, is only an approximation to that of the 'everlasting gods', which is derived from their uncreated perfection; nor can we suppose that Plato was not alive to the impossibility of regarding mere length of life as universally commensurate with perfection of being: such a view may be possible with the universe as a whole, but never with the finite individuals within the universe. Thus the good man may die young while the wicked enjoy a green old age; and even if we question the validity, or the ultimacy, of human judgements of worth, it is clear that some of the most highly organized of living beings are comparatively ephemeral, while a lowly organism may be wellnigh immortal.

It is thus necessary to distinguish between the reality which a thing possesses in virtue of its own completeness and perfection, and the extent of duration which it actually enjoys under a given set of circumstances; or, to speak in terms of time, between the duration after which a thing *endeavours* and the duration which it actually *enjoys* in the sempiternity of nature. This distinction arises only with the finite parts of nature, for these alone act in opposition to the obstruction of external causes; and hence the indefinite duration which would be enjoyed by even the finite mode if it met no opposition¹ (i.e. if it were not finite) is curtailed in accordance with what for it must appear as chanceful, contingent, accidental.

It is essential to the theory which I have advanced that these facts arise from the ambiguous status of the finite individual within the system of *Natura*: he is but a *part* of *Natura*, and, in his own way, recognizes his *partialitas*. Because all the things that act upon him belong to *Natura*, the existence of the universe as a whole comes to be imagined as everlasting; while his own existence begins and ends within the sempiternity of the whole. His finite duration is thus a 'chunk' of the duration of the universe. But he

¹ 'Nulla res, nisi a causa externa, potest destrui.' (*Eth. III, iv.*) 'Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nullum tempus finitum, sed indefinitum involvit.' (*Eth. III, viii.*)

knows that 'in short measures life may perfect be', and dimly feels that he is something more than a mere section of the universe; that though he is finite, he is yet an *individual* with a nature and value of his own—a value and individuality which are not adequately accounted for, nor adequately respected, by external natural causes. Small wonder then that in his ignorance he falsely imagines himself to be immortal. The value or perfection which belongs to his individuality is, of course, its very content and nature, and it is in virtue of this that he actively operates within *Natura*, and is no mere 'particle' driven about by external forces. This is his *conatus*¹ through which for a few short years he marshals the aid of *Natura* and repels its destructive forces. But for the ultimately insuperable power of the universe² he might, so far as his own nature and *conatus* is concerned, be imperishable.³ But though he thus dimly feels his value and his claim to reality he does not always recognize that this is not rightly conceived *sub specie temporis*, and that he is here in the very act (if he rightly understood it) of 'feeling' that he is eternal. For the immortality or indefinitely extended duration which he claims in *Natura*, and which *Natura* must refuse him (because he is but a part),⁴ is really the image of the eternity which he enjoys as an individual within the eternal Real. He images it as duration, because *Natura* as a whole is imaged as enduring, or, rather, the two facts reciprocate with each other; but in the Real both *Natura* and man are eternal, and man is a part of *Natura*.⁵

Thus man's extended duration, unlike that which he attributes to *Natura*, is not commensurate with his value, for this belongs to his eternity. That eternity appears in time under the form of *conatus*, which may be called his *real* duration, his *durée*; but his *actual* duration, which is the extended or 'spatialized' image of his *conatus* cut short and maimed, *that* corresponds rather to the

¹ 'Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam.' (*Eth. III, vii.*)

² 'Vis, qua homo in existendo perseverat, limitata est, et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur.' (*Eth. IV, iii.*)

³ Though if we were thus alone we should not image our existence as an extended duration at all.

⁴ 'Fieri non potest, ut homo non sit Naturae pars, et ut nullas possit pati mutationes, nisi, quae per solam suam naturam possint intelligi, quarumque adaequata sit causa.' (*Eth. IV, iv.*)

⁵ Thus we 'feel' our eternity as *conatus*; we 'prove' it in our intellectual life. (Cf. *Eth. V, xxiii*, Sch.)

mutilation suffered by a part of *Natura* cut adrift from the whole in which alone it is real.

It is, therefore, not the extent of man's occupation of the imagined sempiternity of *Natura* that determines his value and reality, but the quality of his *conatus*. From a more purely 'extensive' view of existence as spread out in time, the mind is thus led to an 'intensive' one in terms of individuality. Hence arises the distinction between the limited duration of a man and that effort after more content which is the representation *sub specie temporis* of his real duration, which is 'intensive' rather than 'extensive', which is quality rather than quantity, and which, viewed *sub specie aeternitatis* in its ultimate integration in the Real, is his eternity.

In this way I have attempted to explain how it is that the fundamental structure of the Real not only makes the quantitative or durational view of existence legitimate, but renders both this and the 'intensive' or qualitative view essential for its full comprehension; so that the two are, therefore, essentially connected. Further, not only does their proper connexion lead to the solution of the problems which I have just been considering, but, as I shall indicate, it offers also a way of escape from some unwelcome conclusions towards which certain monistic theories of immanence seem to be impelled.

The general theory of the nature of the Real which has been outlined in the course of this study, and especially in its later stages as culminating in the last chapter, provides a platform from which to judge the validity of the opposing views of extreme deistic transcendentalists, who in their eagerness for the unity of the whole have omitted to consider its content; and of their direct opponents who, paying exclusive attention to the temporal content of the whole, have omitted to consider its ultimate form. The theory of the former, in so far as it implies that universals are real without individual expression, and that values can have meaning out of all relation to actual existences,¹ must certainly be rejected. For the Spinozistic theory which I have followed and emphasized, the only existing universals are universal singulars or 'concrete universals', while abstract universals are mere *entia Imaginationis*. All values too are embodied in the eternal Real, which expresses itself,

¹ 'Truth, beauty, love—all the great values—what meaning have they apart from their conscious realization in a living individual, finite or infinite?' (A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *Life and Finite Individuality*, p. 108.) I should omit, but not exclude, the term 'conscious'.

and them, in infinite things, in infinite ways, in unending times. For as Plato saw (and, indeed, it is of the very essence of the Platonic philosophy) reality and value are one and the same.

But the opposing theory of equivalence or identity, in so far as it involves the restriction of the Real to what has already been won and assimilated, or is being fought out in the 'military' present,¹ must also be rejected. For values actualize *themselves* though they may be hidden from us, or seen only *per speculum in aenigmate*, and they are thus in some sense real independently of their appearance in the time-series; they are real *celsitudine semper praesentis aeternitatis*: how else could a purpose determine our action or an acorn become an oak-tree? As in sense-perception the finite individual reveals at once his relative integrity as well as his fragmentariness (in that he perceives enduring things, which survive in time but do not achieve eternity), so in purposive action the finite individual exhibits both his relative wholeness and his *partialitas*; for as he is a part, his ends follow upon their means in time, but as he is a whole his ends inform and guide the means towards themselves. And the 'miracle' thus becomes actual because real duration is an efflux of eternity. In eternity the purposive process is realized as quality, and our love for an ideal which we pursue is itself an abstraction of the eternal love which underlies all temporal process, and all that is positive in our achieving and our achievement. Thus as sense-perception means integration and the weaving of duration from time, so purposive action means the expression of eternal essence, not as time, but as that triumph over time that we call duration.² And for a sympathetic reader, it is

¹ 'Le temporel est essentiellement militaire' (Péguy, quoted by M. Julien Benda, *La Fin de l'Éternel*, p. 141).

² As will be seen immediately, I do not confine my dissent to the contemporary doctrine of equivalence (which is only an extreme form of immanentism), for in a very real sense all anthropomorphistic theories belong to the same general category, even when the values that are expressed in human nature at its best are taken as part of that nature. For so they belong to it underderivatively. And however sophisticated the anthropomorphism may be, and whether it traces its descent from the heights of Hegelian idealism, or *per contra* subsists by preying upon Absolutism, it is at bottom the Protagorean doctrine that 'Man is the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not'. It needs no refutation: birth and life and death cry aloud that it is man himself that is measured; nay more, he is spun, and at last cut off, by *Natura*:

None shall triumph a whole life through,
For death is one, and the fates are three.

And man's finitude remains even when he is conceived *sub specie aeternitatis*.

surely in this sense that Spinoza asserts that 'final causes are human figments':¹ they spread out in time what in duration becomes a realized miracle,² and in eternity the qualitative Real.

On the other hand, the insistence of the transcendents upon the inadequacy of any mere doctrine of immanence or equivalence is undoubtedly valid, not merely for the reason already stated, viz., that the real existence of the eternal values must transcend the actualities of any world still developing in time, but for the further reason that the Real includes elements which transcend the eternal world of Thought-Extension (whence this also transcends our knowledge, both in content and in relational form). The Real, as I have indicated, essentially transcends not merely its finite but also its infinite expressions taken singly or in any finite number; and thus, both in range of expression and in its degree of expressiveness, creative eternity transcends all finite limits.³

Lastly, the opponents of deistic transcendence must surely be right in their belief that even under the categories of finite existence there is something which belongs to the Real; for not only does duration yield us the clue to the eternal fulfilment of the Real, but there is no enduring existence which does not, in itself or in its immediate or remote determinants, find a place within the Real.

It may, perhaps, be thought that the view which I have put forward (neglecting the reference to the transcendence of the unknown Attributes—a doctrine which may be condemned as necessarily either empty or self-contradictory) is essentially a doctrine of immanence, i.e. of equivalence purified from the implications of a mistaken view of the ultimacy of time; and the critic, using a trite figure, may say that while the Bergsonians, in

¹ 'Ut jam autem ostendam, naturam finem nullum sibi prae fixum habere, et omnes causas finales nihil, nisi humana esse figmenta, non opus est multis'. (*Eth. I, Appendix.*)

² From this point of view it becomes a matter for astonishment that in spite of the inexplicable character of consciously purposive action (on the supposition of the reality of time), it has been thought worth while to invent an 'unconscious mind' to rationalize unconsciously purposive action.

³ In this connexion it is clear what must be the solution of the problem to which 'negative theology' was put forward as the answer: we must distinguish among 'attributes' those which *limit a perfection* (and hence cannot be affirmed of the Real), and those which *perfect a limitation* (and hence must not be denied of it). Cf. also above, Preface to Part III, especially p. 224.

searching for the eternal values in the actual, are milking the he-goat; and the deistic transcendentalists, in placing the values beyond the range of the actual, are running their milk into a sieve; the solution which I have offered only milks the he-goat into the sieve; for it finds the eternal values, first detected in their operation among finite individuals in time, really existent only in the Absolute which expresses itself in these 'finite centres'; and thus the many are merged in the one, and their individual content is lost in its identity. By such a critic my theory would thus mistakenly be identified with the *via media* of immanence which falls between the extremes of equivalence and separatist transcendentalism.

It is of some importance that such a misunderstanding should be corrected, and especially in view of the too facile common description of Spinoza as a 'pantheist'. This can, perhaps, most effectively be accomplished by showing how the principles I have laid down constitute a way of escape from a recognized difficulty which has shadowed monistic idealism in the recent past with reference to the ultimate status of the finite individual. This was the subject of an instructive *Symposium* written in 1918 and published with other matter in that year for the Aristotelian Society under the general title: *Life and Finite Individuality*. The discussion arose as the result of some statements by Bosanquet¹ which had just been vigorously combated by Professor Pringle-Pattison² and these writers were the chief symposiasts. I need not follow their arguments in detail, but only notice the main point of the dispute which is so clearly expressed in their papers, and show the effect of the Spinozistic principles which I have emphasized in resolving the opposition. The main point at issue was the suggested possibility of the blending or coalescence of finite selves in the Absolute. According to Bosanquet, what separates any two selves is nothing of the essential nature of mind, but some more or less accidental limitation or hindrance or quality arising, e.g. from the possession of different bodies (body thus being, in this connexion, conceived as but an outlying suburb of mind). On the other hand, selves are assimilated to each other in the social, theoretical, and aesthetic interests of various kinds which constitute the real metropolis of human individuality; so that in the

¹ In his Gifford Lectures on *The Principle of Individuality and Value* and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*.

² In his Gifford Lectures on *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*.

end, i.e. in the eternal Absolute, such finite individuals may be supposed to be merged in the single existence of the Real. The separate individual is finite, impotent, and precarious; the confluent social individual is wider, stronger, and more solid; the Absolute individual is infinitely inclusive, powerful, and self-sufficient.

As against this tendency to read the finite individual as 'adjectival' to the Real, Professor Pringle-Pattison emphasized the ultimate character of each individual as a 'focalization' of the universe, which is nowhere exactly repeated.¹ In a word, the opposition was between the theory which regards differences of individuals as purely a matter of *content*, and that which regards them as primarily a matter of *form*. 'Form is not like an empty case into which a certain content may be put: it is the structure and organization of the content itself.'²

Now, in spite of the fact that Professor Pringle-Pattison speaks of the theory of Bosanquet as reflecting 'precisely the confusion which leads Spinoza to resolve all things and persons into modes of the attributes of God',³ it is, on the contrary, his own theory, in my opinion, which more truly reflects the sense of Spinoza. That follows, as I have indicated, from the *Lemmata* of *Part II* of the *Ethics*, together with the doctrine of *Part V* that 'haec et illa' human mind is, in part, eternal; and, I may add, the important suggestions in *Ep. lxxxiii* about Extension; the whole being read in the light of the system as a whole, not forgetting that the *Ethics* itself in the main necessarily falls under Reason and not *scientia intuitiva*. Certainly the contention of Professor Pringle-Pattison in the *Symposium* is nearer to the theory I have advanced in the name of Spinoza than is that of Bosanquet. For to Spinoza a human mind is precisely not 'simply a complex of ideas, as it were an objective ideal content, continuous with the rest of the system of ideas which together constitute the infinite intellect of God'.⁴ He does not say, nor, I think, does he imply that 'persons are merged in the ideal continuum of the infinite intellect'.⁵ That has doubtless been the common view of Spinoza's theory since James Martineau published his masterly misunderstanding of that philosophy in 1882, but a careful and acute scrutiny of the pertinent sections of Spinoza's own writings, with an open and prepared

¹ *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*, p. 267.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ *Life and Finite Individuality*, p. 105.

⁴ *Loc. cit.*

⁵ *Loc. cit.*

mind (for an unprepared mind cannot be 'open' in any but an ironic sense), will be sufficient to show its falsity. For the human mind in adequate thought is no mere 'complex of ideas', it has 'form', i.e. structure and organization, and if there is in some degree complexity without system in the ideas of Imagination, that is due to its partial inadequacy and confusedness, i.e. its impotence. On the side of Extension the teaching is equally unmistakable. Nothing, indeed, could have led serious readers to miss his point but failure to understand the meaning and place of *Natura naturata*, both *extensa* and *cogitans*, in the Real, and a tendency to ignore or discount Spinoza's idea of creation.

Although, however, there is general agreement between the doctrine of individuation which I have put forward in the name of Spinoza, and that which is defended by Professor Pringle-Pattison, there is a good deal in the seemingly opposed teaching of Bosanquet that is worthy of remark. There is a real and important meaning to be attached to the description of finite individuals as 'adjectival' to the constellations within which they fall, though the actual term is naturally more suitable at some stages of individuation than at others. The problem is not merely that of relating finite individuals to the Absolute, but of relating any constellation to that within which it falls; and the same problem recurs at every stage in the hierarchy of individuals. When colours, sounds, tastes, &c., are integrated into a perceptual thing, they become, at any rate from our point of view, its 'adjectives'. But the integrated adjectives *are* the substantive. So below this level, when vibrations are integrated into a colour or a sound, the vibrations, call them 'adjectival' or not as you will, bear an analogous relation to the quality, though now, as a result of our preoccupation with 'things', we are more inclined to speak of the constellation as the adjective of the contour of its elements. An analogous relation is discovered at every stage in the increasingly concrete individual, right up to *Natura naturata*. There is no loss of individuality among the elements integrated as the result of the integration, for such loss would render the integration void. It is because the vibrations remain (in their appropriate perspective) that the colour remains (in *its* perspective). But the perspectives are different, and hence normally it is one *or* other, and not both that we apprehend in any given single act of perception; though the apprehension is increasingly adequate as the perspective involves increasing integration. In

Natura naturata we have adequate modal integration at last, but no less of subordinate individuation right down to the dust of non-being.

Thus at each stage, *viewed in relation to that stage*, the subordinate individuals appear as 'adjectival' in the sense that their diverse content yields its essence to the higher individual while losing what, from the point of view of integration, is its unresolved and untransmuted incoherence. Thus the vibratory motion to and fro gives place to the steady content of colour; it is transmuted into quality. The many notes are phrased into the melody. The fleeting sense-qualities give place to the relatively permanent perceptual object. The ever-changing parts give place to the identical organism. And so on. In *Natura naturata* what remains of the subordinate individuals is their quintessence, so to say, with all their incoherence and opposition, not lost, but resolved and *transmuted into quality*. It is not lost, but transformed from 'extensity' to 'intensity', or, in accordance with my formula, it is real as 'transformation without succession'.

Although, therefore, the use of the term 'adjectival' is hardly to be advocated, there is undoubtedly a sense in which its emphasis is just. The higher constellation is more real than the lower, because it at once possesses more reality, and also possesses the reality of the lower in a more integral form. It does not absorb or negate it. And our feeling of the impossibility of calling ourselves 'adjectives' of the Real may in part be due to our failure to think of the Real as our constellation, or constellation of constellations. We think of it as that which somehow includes us without 'qualitative' transcendence. Doubtless it is difficult to do otherwise and still retain distinct ideas; but should we not, I ask, be ready always to remind ourselves that it is no degradation to be an 'adjective' of *Natura*, as it certainly would be to be an adjective of even a perfect human being?

There can, however, be little doubt that Professor Pringle-Pattison is right in his judgement that it is because Bosanquet allowed himself to slip away from his better mind, and to think of ideas as 'objective ideal contents' and not as activities of mind (and hence in their due order eternal) that he accepts the image of the Absolute as the single continuum which is composed of the contents which are finite individuals purged of their incoherences and imperfections. But such a view was as impossible for Spinoza as for

Professor Pringle-Pattison: for Spinoza each idea is an active essence flowing from adequate grounds and giving rise to its proper consequents.¹ It is already a *conatus* with its appropriate expression, framed remotely on the analogy of *cogitatio naturans* expressed in the infinite idea of God. 'The human mind is part² of the infinite Intellect of God; thus when we say that the human mind perceives this or that we make the assertion that God has this or that idea, *not in so far as he is infinite*, but in so far as he is expressed through the nature of the human mind.'³ The situation could hardly have been expressed more accurately and succinctly. It is difficult to understand what other significance could be read into a statement which is otherwise only a gross circumlocution. In so far as God is infinite the true ideas which pass in this or that human mind yield their non-successive quintessence for his eternal intuition. They are not lost but 'phrased' and made whole. As such they are the ideas of God, but they do not thereby cease to be the ideas of this or that man. He finds his place in the eternal Thought as a 'filament' of creation, but he remains for himself the finite individual in which that 'filament'⁴ is eternally expressed. From that point of view memory and Imagination as such are gone (though their positive content remains in its proper order in the Real), and the soul becomes for itself what it essentially is for God—a finite eternal integral part of the Real.

It is thus that the eternal Real genuinely transcends *because* it includes the finite individuals in which it expresses itself: what for them is change, loss, contradiction, achievement, is also the very content and expression of the Real which integrates them. Nor need we wonder how in the Absolute our experiences of expectation and disappointment, of hope deferred and the sickness of the heart, of joy or misery founded upon illusion, are integrated. It is sufficient for us that they can be integrated without cancella-

¹ An idea is not 'mutum instar picturae in tabula' but '[modus] cogitandi . . . nempe ipsum intelligere'. (*Eth. II, xliii, Sch.*)

² Not a *section*, for the infinite Intellect is indivisible.

³ 'Sequitur Mentem humanam partem esse infiniti intellectus Dei; ac proinde cum dicimus, Mentem humanam hoc, vel illud percipere, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod Deus, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per naturam humanae Mentis explicatur'. (*Eth. II, xi, Cor.*) They are a little unjust to Spinoza who both deny that he finds room for the finite individual and also sneer at the often-repeated *quatenus*. But the association of ideas is not altogether inexplicable.

⁴ I need hardly add that the 'filament' is an *ens rationis*.

tion. 'So may a glory from defect arise.' Even the endless doing and undoing of ether-vibrations are transformed (and conserved because transformed) in the colour which is their 'phrasing', and the qualitative content of our time is the image of the eternity of subordinate constellations. To suppose that in the Absolute our blunders and our recoveries, our love and its rejection, our fear and its dispelling, our problems and their resolving, do not yield their concrete quintessence (and not their arithmetical sum or difference) is really to suppose, as Bosanquet says, that 'a Dante or a Shakespeare [is] far better off than the Absolute'.¹ If the Intellect of God were but the one-dimensional system of all 'ideal contents', then these concrete experiences could not be conserved; for opposites would cancel or neutralize each other, and the whole would be distorted and impoverished.

Thus, as I contended in the course of the general discussion, the attempt to exclude its real parts cannot but result in the denial of all content to the Absolute. And the same principle demands that these real parts shall be real in the sense of being relative wholes of wholes to infinity. It is thus that they constitute the Absolute; because each in his measure is constituted by the Absolute. But there is no part which in the whole is not transcended and fulfilled. Nor need we wait for the fulfilment of the Absolute whole; here and now we can and do perform the miracle; for we too are partial wholes, and it is thus that we are able to detect 'touches of bliss in anguish that superhumanize bliss, touches of mystery in simplicity, of the eternal in the variable'.²

¹ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 389.

² George Meredith, *Beauchamp's Career*, xxxiv.

CONCLUSION

MY *inquisitio veri* is at an end. I have sought to enforce conviction by a serious endeavour to avoid the extremes by which philosophical investigations are always endangered, and have often been devitalized and perverted: that, on the one hand, of endeavouring to entice assent by consecrating the actual—either making it the ultimate arbiter of truth (and thereby excluding the eternal values), or *per contra* justifying its deficiencies by ‘drawing up a memorandum in favour of the Almighty’ in his supposed special dealings with men (a rock on which many a philosophy has been split); and on the other hand, that of becoming involved in a whirlpool of mere illusions and of idle values, bearing no essential relation to the empirical data of experience:

Vainest of all, the student’s theme
Ends in some metaphysic dream.

But all speculation worthy of the significant name, though it must rise above the actual (viewing it *tamquam ex aliqua specula*) does so only that a clearer and more extensive view may be taken. It does not feed itself upon dreams and illusions; it is the sole road by which we can hope to escape the illusions which arise from a too entire immersion in the unfinished actual.

In that spirit I have looked to the world of duration for guidance in the search for the nature of eternity; and, following the clue thus obtained, have found that the real source of the progressive embodiment of values which is the enduring actual must be the eternal values themselves, wholly realized and hypostasized as the creative unity of *Natura*. Thus the main result of the inquiry has been to reject all current conceptions of eternity which make it either a direct or (if the term may be permitted) an inverse function of time; and to identify it with the ultimate stuff of reality. In this I have but followed the lead of Spinoza himself, for whom eternity is the very essence of God, which reveals itself in each and all of the infinite Attributes and *affectiones* of Substance: ‘as if eternity could be understood apart from the contemplation of the divine nature, or as if it were anything other than that nature’.¹

¹ ‘Quasi aeternitas absque essentiae divinae contemplatione intelligi posset, vel quid esset praeter divinam essentiam.’ (*Cog. Met. II, i.*)

I am willing to admit, nay rather I assert, that Spinoza passed too rapidly from the clue to the completion, and thereby short-circuited the current of intellectual criticism, and thus concealed an important part of the infinite content of eternity which falls within the experience and nature of finite individuals, yet in the main principle he is both clear and resolute: duration is the limited conception, eternity the infinite; 'an infinite existence belongs to God . . . which I call eternity'.¹ It follows, as I have shown, from the clue provided by perceptual experience, that the existence which is eternity is not an empty form of being but concrete reality. For it is duration that constitutes the content of perceived existences, and it is eternity itself that exists in the eternal. For M. Bergson duration itself is the ultimate reality: for Spinoza eternity is the reality of duration, and is therefore the very stuff of the Real.²

Further, I have shown how the eternity of the whole implies and includes that of every part which in its measure reproduces the whole. To deny the reality and eternity of such parts³ is to evacuate the whole. Our eternity is thus one with our relative wholeness as real parts of the infinite whole. It does not lie in the past or in the present or in the future, but our past, present, and future lie within it, transformed and 'livelier than life'; integrated, expounded, redeemed, stabbed broad awake. Thus though from the point of view of time the past is *given* and cannot be cancelled, 'the Moving Finger writes', yet the full significance of the writing does not at once appear, may never appear *sub specie temporis* (for reflection and evolution do not always, with eternity, affirm the conception of an hour). In the haze of time large things are obscured, and small things loom over-large. The past as past lies already in the maw of 'cormorant devouring Time'; the future as future remains in 'the wide womb of uncreated Night'; and the content and significance of the past as little as that of the future can be read in the present. We must mount, therefore, into the watch-tower of eternity. Where evolutionists have looked to the

¹ 'Deo infinita actu existentia competit . . . atque hanc infinitam existentiam Aeternitatem voco.' (*Cog. Met. II, i.*)

² In this sense it is that I assert that eternity is not the *sum* of all durations, nor their *identity*, but their *constellation*.

³ The argument depends entirely upon the nature assigned to these parts which (since the whole is indivisible) are sections or 'chunks' of reality only for Imagination.

first syllable of time, and eschatologists to the last, it is for the metaphysician to weigh the discourse as a whole, not cursorily as he that running reads, but wholly, profoundly, quintessentially.

Nor must we think of the discourse as already pronounced and laid up in heaven; to think of the work as already done, or as still to be done, is equally to place the eternal in time. Still less can we say that the work is now being done, as if the garments of God were covered with the dust of time. It has been said that 'what is negated in "timelessness" is not the reality of the present, but the unreality of the past and future';¹ on the contrary, the present is no more and no less real than the past and the future. We must not thus confuse real being with temporal doing. Temporal being is undoubtedly, as such, one with temporal doing, for time itself is the urgency of the part to manifest the whole. But eternity is the creative urgency of the whole to manifest itself in infinite parts, and thus to constitute itself; nor can it fail, save in so far as failure in the part is a means of completeness in the whole. Here failure is itself success.

Further, the eternity which constitutes the essence of the Real must not be conceived as the summed contents of all durations, either with or without their successiveness; for taken as successive they can never be whole, and taken together they cannot but merge, either confusedly as mere feeling, or transparently into non-being. But not such is the never wearied love that wields the world. Duration can have no place *in* eternity, though it has a place *under* eternity, for the finite being cannot but perceive his environment *sub specie durationis*. 'Our weakness shapes the shadow, Time'; for duration arises from the finitude of the part recognizing its *partialitas* and imaging its complement under the categories of its impotence. And thus what is opaque to thought falsely becomes the very type of the Real, and what is real in the part only the symbol of illusion. Nevertheless it is thence that the eternal values filter through in our moral, intellectual, and aesthetic experience; we show the cinders of our spirits through the ashes of our chance; we discover the impress of the signet of eternity on many a passing moment. But God, as we say, *sees into the hearts of men*; and their very outsides, truly seen, are, for him, the hearts of subordinate beings. From the point of vantage which he occupies, from the *specula* of eternity, all things are eternal—not merged in a general

¹ W. R. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, p. 275.

totum without distinction; not as a congeries of separate units; but as *Natura naturata*, a constellation of constellations to infinity, flowing undividedly from the pure creative urgency which is *Natura naturans*. Thus from the very focus and centre of all being *Natura* dominates the infinite worlds with the utter simplicity of creative, and therefore commensurate, love.